To throw my thoughts in, I believe moving away from Beersheba is/was a poor decision but I understand it giving some of the limitations as it was implemented and the need to prioritise resources and capabilities.
Most conflicts of the 20th and 21st Century the ADF has been involved in started out being anticipated as short, sharp affairs. WW1 was “Home by Christmas”, WW2 was Blitzkrieg, Korea was a UN policing action, Vietnam a counter-insurgency, Afghanistan a special forces-only/Northern Alliance show, Iraq was “Mission Accomplished” within a month. All ended up as drawn-out attractional conflicts. Even East Timor required a decade of attention including a mechanized battalion equivalent in 2006 which many forget about. That force in Land 400 terms was heavier than our Middle East deployments.
To take a wider view, I would argue the Army as a combined arms force peaked in 1918. WW2 was a lot of mistakes and relearning old lessons, the post-WW2 RAR-based structure simply solidified a single arm approach to combat that had been obsolete since we moved from red coats and horses. Every conflict since has reinforced that the combined arms force is the superior force.
I am all for combined arms battalions even if sacred cows needed to be slain (RAR & Cav Regts). I would arrange three combat brigades (3, 7 & 9) with two mechanized battalions and a motorized battalion (both already exist but now non-Corp specific). Leave 1 Bde in Darwin as a smaller rapid-reaction force (as planned). The motorized battalion can be the rapid-reaction force of each brigade. The support units may not be as efficient but would be more capable, "train hard, fight easy" also applies to non-combat units. The current plan risks returning to an army of one's and two's as per the 80s & 90s.
Artillery should be concentrated in an artillery brigade and operated like the aviation brigade. ie generate task-specific groups depending on the operation.
The biggest problem is the lack of amphibious logistics lift. Naval logistics still isn’t given the priority it needs considering just about every conflict we’ve been involved in required some sort of naval lift. Just look at the range of options in the RAAF compared to the RAN. The Naval Shipbuilding Plan was severely lacking in this area.
Most conflicts of the 20th and 21st Century the ADF has been involved in started out being anticipated as short, sharp affairs. WW1 was “Home by Christmas”, WW2 was Blitzkrieg, Korea was a UN policing action, Vietnam a counter-insurgency, Afghanistan a special forces-only/Northern Alliance show, Iraq was “Mission Accomplished” within a month. All ended up as drawn-out attractional conflicts. Even East Timor required a decade of attention including a mechanized battalion equivalent in 2006 which many forget about. That force in Land 400 terms was heavier than our Middle East deployments.
To take a wider view, I would argue the Army as a combined arms force peaked in 1918. WW2 was a lot of mistakes and relearning old lessons, the post-WW2 RAR-based structure simply solidified a single arm approach to combat that had been obsolete since we moved from red coats and horses. Every conflict since has reinforced that the combined arms force is the superior force.
I am all for combined arms battalions even if sacred cows needed to be slain (RAR & Cav Regts). I would arrange three combat brigades (3, 7 & 9) with two mechanized battalions and a motorized battalion (both already exist but now non-Corp specific). Leave 1 Bde in Darwin as a smaller rapid-reaction force (as planned). The motorized battalion can be the rapid-reaction force of each brigade. The support units may not be as efficient but would be more capable, "train hard, fight easy" also applies to non-combat units. The current plan risks returning to an army of one's and two's as per the 80s & 90s.
Artillery should be concentrated in an artillery brigade and operated like the aviation brigade. ie generate task-specific groups depending on the operation.
The biggest problem is the lack of amphibious logistics lift. Naval logistics still isn’t given the priority it needs considering just about every conflict we’ve been involved in required some sort of naval lift. Just look at the range of options in the RAAF compared to the RAN. The Naval Shipbuilding Plan was severely lacking in this area.
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