Australian Army Discussions and Updates

[cdxbow]

Latest from ASPI:

Tanks for nothing? Ensuring the Australian Army is ready for Indo-Pacific conflict | The Strategist

Journalist Greg Sheridan is no stranger to controversy in his writing for The Australian on foreign affairs and defence policy, but even he struck a particular chord of controversy recently when he zeroed in on ...

www.aspistrategist.org.au

Most interesting part of this discussion for me was the emphasis on Long Range Fires.

I believe this is an increasingly important force multiplier, and as a smaller army, Army should be looking to acquire HIMARS at army group strength (as opposed to the regimental strength as currently appears likely to be the case).

Thoughts?

Massive

Certainly many feel LAND 8113 is transformative for the Army. Albert Palazzo talks about it in this article Deterrence and Firepower: Land 8113 and the Australian Army’s Future (Part 1, Strategic Effect) | Australian Army Research Centre (AARC)The articles are more about the strategic, cultural, organisational and transformative aspects rather than the particular technology used. Giving sufficient mass to the force was identified as important:

"Still, it needs to be remembered that Army cannot create a true deterrence capability with a boutique missile force. The coming long-range missile capability must be larger and more robust, if the Australian Defence Force is to dissuade a potential adversary from military adventurism. My sense is that Army must field at least three regiments of long range missile artillery if regional powers are to take the capability seriously. A dedicated brigade of long range fires, in other words. To provide less is a case where one might as well have none, since a too small missile force is not a credible deterrent."

 

[Volkodav]

Critical mass is something we have always struggled with. In the 80s the army was very much an army of one's, 1 armoured regiment, 1 cavalry regiment, 1 APC regiment with one sabre sqn, 1 mech btn, and 1 para btn and 1 high readiness brigade with 2 btns but only one ready. Can't recall exactly what the two btns in Brisbane were doing but know they had a lot or reserves doing full time service to make up numbers.

Many capabilities were more a token demonstrator or training effort than actual capability.

Things are very different and much better now. I still feel we are too light in in armour and aviation but things are getting better. Given the choice I say drop a company from each infantry battalion if need be but get that critical mass of heavy armour ( including engineers), cav, aviation, and long range fires.

I'll have to dig it out but I read a comparison between a US and a Russian heavy brigade a while back. The US org was very tank and direct fire heavy, still with a fair amount of infantry, while the Russian had fewer tanks, more rec and surveillance and lots of indirect fires. The US strategy was to find, engage, destroy with direct fire, air support being assumed. The Russian strategy was find, fix and Destry with indirect fire, with or without air support. As I see it, currently Australia isn't equipped to achieve either.

 

[ADMk2]

Critical mass is something we have always struggled with. In the 80s the army was very much an army of one's, 1 armoured regiment, 1 cavalry regiment, 1 APC regiment with one sabre sqn, 1 mech btn, and 1 para btn and 1 high readiness brigade with 2 btns but only one ready. Can't recall exactly what the two btns in Brisbane were doing but know they had a lot or reserves doing full time service to make up numbers.

Many capabilities were more a token demonstrator or training effort than actual capability.

Things are very different and much better now. I still feel we are too light in in armour and aviation but things are getting better. Given the choice I say drop a company from each infantry battalion if need be but get that critical mass of heavy armour ( including engineers), cav, aviation, and long range fires.

I'll have to dig it out but I read a comparison between a US and a Russian heavy brigade a while back. The US org was very tank and direct fire heavy, still with a fair amount of infantry, while the Russian had fewer tanks, more rec and surveillance and lots of indirect fires. The US strategy was to find, engage, destroy with direct fire, air support being assumed. The Russian strategy was find, fix and Destry with indirect fire, with or without air support. As I see it, currently Australia isn't equipped to achieve either.

Critical mass is the main reason why these (early in my opinion) calls for the Beersheba brigade model to be abandoned concern me so much. We’ve literally just got them up and running and can finally provide something like a Brigade sized formation for operations… I agree they are deficient in heavy armour, artillery, air defence and very probably infantry as well, but they are at least closer than we have been and units are actually gaining experience in operating with capabilities such as their own tanks, IFV’s and soon SP guns that they simply have never had in their past.

Do we want to change that and go back to only being capable (barely) of battalion group sized formations again? It has taken Army decades to get to the point where it can deploy a Brigade sized formation on medium intensity operations and sustain it virtually indefinitely (if the political will to do so remains…) AND a battalion group deployed to a separate operational tasking in another location and sustain that as well.

So what good reason is there to move away from this when we’ve only just achieved it and what rationale is used to explain how we’d use smaller formations against the future threats we may have to face? If anything I’d suggest we are going to need bigger, harder and far more resilient formations in future, not smaller…

 

[Volkodav]

Critical mass is the main reason why these (early in my opinion) calls for the Beersheba brigade model to be abandoned concern me so much. We’ve literally just got them up and running and can finally provide something like a Brigade sized formation for operations… I agree they are deficient in heavy armour, artillery, air defence and very probably infantry as well, but they are at least closer than we have been and units are actually gaining experience in operating with capabilities such as their own tanks, IFV’s and soon SP guns that they simply have never had in their past.

Do we want to change that and go back to only being capable (barely) of battalion group sized formations again? It has taken Army decades to get to the point where it can deploy a Brigade sized formation on medium intensity operations and sustain it virtually indefinitely (if the political will to do so remains…) AND a battalion group deployed to a separate operational tasking in another location and sustain that as well.

So what good reason is there to move away from this when we’ve only just achieved it and what rationale is used to explain how we’d use smaller formations against the future threats we may have to face? If anything I’d suggest we are going to need bigger, harder and far more resilient formations in future, not smaller…

Exactly.

If there are manning pressures better then to reduce the size of the battalions than the number of them. If anything it would be easier to generate six additional companies than two new battalions, or additional tank or cavalry units.

Keep the structure, the HQs, the supporting elements, fully man and equip the difficult to raise capabilities, armour, aviation, long range fires, while perhaps looking at a ready reserve like element to provide that last 25% of infantry.

 

[John Newman]

https://dtrmagazine.com/issues/june-2021/

Another great issue of DTR Magazine, great article on current procurement programs as well as a round up on Land Forces 2021. One interesting thing they are saying is that the Land 129 phase 3 TUAS has been selected but not announced and it will either be Aerosonde with the V4 or Insitu with the RQ-21. As both systems are also contenders for Sea 129 Phase 5 which is the UAS for the Navy, will be interesting to see if it has any bearing.

Yes read the new DTR this morning.

I don’t know if you noticed, but the feature ‘The Australian Army to 2030’ is downloadable as a separate 16 page PDF:

https://mcusercontent.com/ebe687fe800f7d0f2f28fa168/files/230e2eaa-2239-b107-fcb0-2e543b005e9e/The_Australian_Army_to_2030_DTR_June_2021.pdf

Cheers,

 

[Redlands18]

Yes read the new DTR this morning.

I don’t know if you noticed, but the feature ‘The Australian Army to 2030’ is downloadable as a separate 16 page PDF:

https://mcusercontent.com/ebe687fe800f7d0f2f28fa168/files/230e2eaa-2239-b107-fcb0-2e543b005e9e/The_Australian_Army_to_2030_DTR_June_2021.pdf

Cheers,

Thanks John
I can’t remember ever a time where we had something for pretty much every part of the Army coming over a 10 year period like this and the first thing that strikes you is the number of the programs that have ‘New Capability’ posted with them.

 

[Volkodav]

Read an interesting piece today in the change in attitude of the government in regards to globalism, trade and mutual defence. Basically in the last 18 months of China throwing its weight around the government has realised that the nationalistic concept of going it alone and not giving a stuff about anyone else actually leaves us exposed and vulnerable when our powerful friends and trading partners get annoyed with us for questioning their behaviour.

Increased defence spending and acquiring significant long range fires is only part of the picture. I expect to see defence and trading blocks emerge to counter China's bullying as well.

The thing that comes to mind is the original 2009/10 feelings about China seem to have come true. Rudd called them Rat F'kers and said we needed to develop the capability to rip their arm off if they ever turned on us. That's where the twelve subs with cruise missiles came from, Growler, as well as Beersheba evolving from the original Hardening the Army concepts.

 

[John Newman]

Thanks John
I can’t remember ever a time where we had something for pretty much every part of the Army coming over a 10 year period like this and the first thing that strikes you is the number of the programs that have ‘New Capability’ posted with them.

Good isn’t it?

And so it should be with the level of funding the current Federal Government is providing to the ADF as a whole, RAN, RAAF and Army are all receiving very large buckets of money, and will continue to do so, at least until 2030.

The current Federal Government has also been smart with ensuring local production of a lot of that new equipment too.

It will be a brave, or stupid, future Federal Government that turns away from the path currently set (except if we ever get another Left of the Left Gillard type Government, that thought makes my skin crawl!).

Cheers,

 

[ngatimozart]

Read an interesting piece today in the change in attitude of the government in regards to globalism, trade and mutual defence. Basically in the last 18 months of China throwing its weight around the government has realised that the nationalistic concept of going it alone and not giving a stuff about anyone else actually leaves us exposed and vulnerable when our powerful friends and trading partners get annoyed with us for questioning their behaviour.

Can't understand why meself. What would possibility give them that idea? Shocking that their friends and allies would disagree with such an attitude. Shocking indeed.

Increased defence spending and acquiring significant long range fires is only part of the picture. I expect to see defence and reading blocks emerge to counter China's bullying as well.

The thing that comes to mind is the original 2009/10 feelings about China seem to have come true. Rudd called them Rat F'kers and said we needed to develop the capability to rip their arm off if they ever turned on us. That's where the twelve subs with cruise missiles came from, Growler, as well as Beersheba evolving from the original Hardening the Army concepts.

Well that's one thing Rudd got right. A pity it wasn't followed through earlier.

 

[Anthony_B_78]

Critical mass is the main reason why these (early in my opinion) calls for the Beersheba brigade model to be abandoned concern me so much. (Snipped)

Well, if I may, as someone who has advocated support for the apparent decision of the Army to abandon that model, and also questioned some other intentions, I would first refer to two paragraphs from that ASPI article shared by Massive:

There are many reasons to ensure that the Australian Army has a credible combined arms force to respond to events across the spectrum of conflict, and if the last 20 years of operations has taught us anything, it’s that we should expect the unexpected at the strategic level.

But these positions miss the mark. In the back of our minds should be the fact that in a potential high-end conflict in the Indo-Pacific, a combined arms battle group is not the solution to very many—if any—strategic problems, and its deterrent effect is limited.

The Beersheba brigade, as it is structured, is not conducive to many possible contingencies in our region. It's too heavy, not only for the likely operating environment - in terms of terrain, infrastructure, opposing forces, mission - but also for our logistical capabilities. A credible combined arms force - to borrow the writer's words - of brigade size would be of much greater utility in conflicts we've seen, and exited, in recent decades, being, basically, in the Middle East. In our region, lighter forces - in totality - are much more likely to be desired for the majority of possible contingencies.

None of this is to say we should throw the baby out with the bath water. The plan the Army has apparently now adopted - as shared with us by Raven - will see four combat brigades, rather than three, with 1 Brigade apparently focused on operations in our northern peripheries and 9 Brigade a combined arms force (stronger than now too, with the SP artillery and armoured engineering capabilities). It is reasonable to ask if 3 and 7 brigades should similarly adopt more focused roles. But, and this is important, there is no suggestion of fewer batteries, companies or squadrons.

Four combat brigades, with two "light" and two "medium" or "heavy", makes a good deal of sense given we've moved away from being driven by a need to sustain forces for long deployments in the Middle East, and pivoted back to our own region, while also keeping the option to go elsewhere too. Also, there's no reason why combined arms forces - tanks, IFVs, etc - cannot be deployed as part of a "light" brigade-based taskforce in our region, it's just that they will more than likely be a smaller element within such a force.

For my part, while I fundamentally disagree with Greg Sheridan about the acquisition of new, and a slightly larger number of, tanks, I don't agree that we should - or likely will - have more in service than planned. But at the same time I do wonder if we truly will order - or need - 450 IFVs and three armoured or mechanised infantry battalions.

 

[Volkodav]

Well that's one thing Rudd got right. A pity it wasn't followed through earlier.

A bit hard when you've been knifed by a left wing populist and a gang of ideological sycophants.

Don't get me wrong, Rudd was far from perfect and all the good things he did do, or tried to do, were killed by his own party, even before Abbott got in and introduced his anti manufacturing lunacy.

 

[Volkodav]

Well, if I may, as someone who has advocated support for the apparent decision of the Army to abandon that model, and also questioned some other intentions, I would first refer to two paragraphs from that ASPI article shared by Massive:



The Beersheba brigade, as it is structured, is not conducive to many possible contingencies in our region. It's too heavy, not only for the likely operating environment - in terms of terrain, infrastructure, opposing forces, mission - but also for our logistical capabilities. A credible combined arms force - to borrow the writer's words - of brigade size would be of much greater utility in conflicts we've seen, and exited, in recent decades, being, basically, in the Middle East. In our region, lighter forces - in totality - are much more likely to be desired for the majority of possible contingencies.

None of this is to say we should throw the baby out with the bath water. The plan the Army has apparently now adopted - as shared with us by Raven - will see four combat brigades, rather than three, with 1 Brigade apparently focused on operations in our northern peripheries and 9 Brigade a combined arms force (stronger than now too, with the SP artillery and armoured engineering capabilities). It is reasonable to ask if 3 and 7 brigades should similarly adopt more focused roles. But, and this is important, there is no suggestion of fewer batteries, companies or squadrons.

Four combat brigades, with two "light" and two "medium" or "heavy", makes a good deal of sense given we've moved away from being driven by a need to sustain forces for long deployments in the Middle East, and pivoted back to our own region, while also keeping the option to go elsewhere too. Also, there's no reason why combined arms forces - tanks, IFVs, etc - cannot be deployed as part of a "light" brigade-based taskforce in our region, it's just that they will more than likely be a smaller element within such a force.

For my part, while I fundamentally disagree with Greg Sheridan about the acquisition of new, and a slightly larger number of, tanks, I don't agree that we should - or likely will - have more in service than planned. But at the same time I do wonder if we truly will order - or need - 450 IFVs and three armoured or mechanised infantry battalions.

No no no no no no!

You are completely missing the point, light forces cannot go heavy but heavy forces can go light.

If you don't have, train on and use heavy armour you have no idea how to use it operationally even if it can be magically provided when needed.

If you don't have it when you need it your soldiers die. No ifs, no buts, properly employed heavy armour verses light infantry ends only one way.

The only mitigation is if you have an overwhelming superiority in airpower, missile, rocket and tube artillery, and we don't. We don't have it at home and we definately don't have it to deploy in the south pacific. If armour is too logistically difficult to deploy so is artillery and tactical air power. i.e. no carriers, no F-35B or C.

It makes more sense to increase the capacity of our fatships and ship to shore connectors than it does to divest hard won (and proven by others) heavy armour.

The whole idea behind Beersheba was to move from an army of twos (which was already better than the previous army of one's) to an army of threes. That is three identical, sustainable, hardened, multi purpose brigades, that could generate what ever capability was required and sustain it indefinitely. In this an army of four or five is even better but far more expensive.

Suggesting heavy armour can't be deployed in the South West Pacific is a fiction. Tracked armour, is by its very nature, highly mobile and can get places that other, lighter vehicles can't. Australia proved this in Vietnam. If the issue is getting it there then the answer is fix the logistics and acquire appropriate heavy landing ships, craft etc. Bridges can't handle the load, well that's what bridging vehicles and engineers are for.

Long story short, if you deploy a "light" task force, with minimal armour support it will need the very same connectors to get the minimal armour there as the heavy brigade will need. If you deploy a "light" task force and the opposition deploys armour, your soldiers die, if you deploy a light task force and the enemy deploys a division, your soldiers die. If you commit a Hail Mary and deploy a full Beersheba bridge to a Pacific ally before the enemy gets there, they will likely see the error of their ways and go home.

Light forces are a false economy when real war is a possibility.

 

[Anthony_B_78]

No no no no no no!

I don't think I am missing the point, and I never said heavy armour can't be deployed in the South West Pacific. The question is more about how much of it could be deployed and sustained, and whether that would be the right forces for the operating environment.

Deploying a squadron of tanks and some APCs to support an infantry brigade in a counter-insurgency in Vietnam is very different to deploying a combined arms brigade. There's a big difference between infantry supported by tanks, which is what we saw there, and elsewhere in the Pacific, and the combined arms warfare you'd have seen in Europe if the Cold War had gone hot.

Depending on the AO, and all other factors, a "light" brigade, would likely still have armour deployed. But it may not be all of an armoured cavalry regiment, an armoured infantry battalion, a SP artillery regiment, and so forth, plus all the support. We're talking, what, a couple of hundred armoured vehicles and hundreds more trucks and so forth? You're not going to fit that all in the shipping we have, not going to get it anywhere quickly, not going to be able to support it overly well, and you're hardly going to fight a manoeuvre campaign in much of the terrrain you'll find in our realistic AOs.

Again, too, it comes back to the point that it's about how forces are organised, not about losing anything.

 

[Volkodav]

Quite simply we need a replacement for the retired and transfered LCHs. These ships in turn where ordered instead of the desired LSM Mk II which were designed as a replacement for the LSMs used to support our operations in Vietnam.

We could go something similar in size but for very little extra investment something like the US Army Frank S Besson LSV could be acquired. Actually Japan is looking at just that as a solution to their very similar issue with the same fenemy.

Japan to introduce 3 new transport vessels by 2024 - Naval News

On February 16, 2021, Japan's Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi announced that the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) will establish a unit equipped with three new transport ships by 2024.

www.navalnews.com

Projects Archive - Naval Technology

www.naval-technology.com

.

These ships can each transport a full sqn of MBTs or company of AIFVs then swing to the logistic support role after depositing the heavy forces where required.

Steel is cheap and air is free, these types of ship that can lift 15 MBTs do not cost much more to procure and operate than an LCH that can only lift three MBTs and would definately cost less than the five LCHs or fifteen LCU or LCM required to lift 15 MBTs or AIFVs.

Bonus, they would be great for HADR ops.

Maybe mix it up a bit. The Danish Absalon Class frigate / support ship can lift up to seven MBTs and 200 troops and two large helos. They can do all sorts of other things as well. Maybe a class of modern day APDs (assault transports) that can each lift and support, say an armoured combat team, at short notice anywhere in our region. Followed by a beefed up battle group on an LHD and the rest of the brigade following on LSVs.

Not inconceivable, or unaffordable. RAN gets six support ships that also double as artic patrol ships, big OPVs, MCM command ships etc. and army gets six LSV and LCUs.

 

[ngatimozart]

I don't think I am missing the point, and I never said heavy armour can't be deployed in the South West Pacific. The question is more about how much of it could be deployed and sustained, and whether that would be the right forces for the operating environment.

Deploying a squadron of tanks and some APCs to support an infantry brigade in a counter-insurgency in Vietnam is very different to deploying a combined arms brigade. There's a big difference between infantry supported by tanks, which is what we saw there, and elsewhere in the Pacific, and the combined arms warfare you'd have seen in Europe if the Cold War had gone hot.

Depending on the AO, and all other factors, a "light" brigade, would likely still have armour deployed. But it may not be all of an armoured cavalry regiment, an armoured infantry battalion, a SP artillery regiment, and so forth, plus all the support. We're talking, what, a couple of hundred armoured vehicles and hundreds more trucks and so forth? You're not going to fit that all in the shipping we have, not going to get it anywhere quickly, not going to be able to support it overly well, and you're hardly going to fight a manoeuvre campaign in much of the terrrain you'll find in our realistic AOs.

Again, too, it comes back to the point that it's about how forces are organised, not about losing anything.

You are missing the point entirely. It's not about heavy or light forces. It's getting them to the battlefield and supporting them. If you can't support them you might as well stay at home and play tiddlywinks.

LOGISTICS WIN WARS.

I can't remember who said it, but professionals think logistics; amateurs think tactics.

There is also the rule of threes. That's the long learned rule of thumb that has been around for at least a century or more. One that was learned on the battlefield. It applies to everything in the military except pay and beer:

1. One fully capable of fighting / fully operational / serviceable.
2. One in training / light maintenance etc.
3. One on leave / in hospital / heavy maintenance etc.

That's the rule of threes. It's basic and easy to understand.

@Volkodav is correct in his assessment and it's a subject that he knows something about. In my opinion the Army is short on armour and woefully short on air defence. It requires the Navy to have more amphib sealift capability across a range of classes, including another LHD. There's also a requirement for some logistics support ships that are capable of supporting forces ashore. This frees up the LHDs and fleet for other OPs. These are requirements for operating in the Pacific. Whether or not the government will fund such capabilities is another story.

 

[Anthony_B_78]

You are missing the point entirely. It's not about heavy or light forces. It's getting them to the battlefield and supporting them. If you can't support them you might as well stay at home and play tiddlywinks.

LOGISTICS WIN WARS.

I can't remember who said it, but professionals think logistics; amateurs think tactics.

There is also the rule of threes. That's the long learned rule of thumb that has been around for at least a century or more. One that was learned on the battlefield. It applies to everything in the military except pay and beer:

1. One fully capable of fighting / fully operational / serviceable.
2. One in training / light maintenance etc.
3. One on leave / in hospital / heavy maintenance etc.

That's the rule of threes. It's basic and easy to understand.

@Volkodav is correct in his assessment and it's a subject that he knows something about. In my opinion the Army is short on armour and woefully short on air defence. It requires the Navy to have more amphib sealift capability across a range of classes, including another LHD. There's also a requirement for some logistics support ships that are capable of supporting forces ashore. This frees up the LHDs and fleet for other OPs. These are requirements for operating in the Pacific. Whether or not the government will fund such capabilities is another story.

Excuse me? I was making the argument that logistics is much more difficult with heavier forces. At the very least, where did I say otherwise? That's nothing but a strawman.

Similarly, again, I have said, continually, I got the premise of Beersheba's three like brigades, but it's not me who is planning to take the Army away from that, is it? And all I was saying in that regard is that I agree with the move. We're not sustaining long-term deployments in Afghanistan anymore.

I don't agree the Army will be short on armour when the range of projects are delivered. I think Land 400 Phase 3 might be a tad excessive (as in, maybe we could do with 300 instead of 450, and that this could deliver a saving that could be invested elsewhere. But I don't disagree with any of those projects.

Further, it's only the structure of the brigades that looks to be changing. There's no overall decrease in the units and sub-units. And, again, the only opinion I really offered there is that I could see an argument for two rather than three battalions equipped with the Land 400 Phase 3 winner (consistent with my comment above about a reduced order). I've asked earlier if people here think we will actually see an order for 450, what do you think?

I agree with the need for more air defence. I agree with the Army's watercraft projects. I'm not sure the moderators would want us to discuss the RAN in this thread, but, since you raised it, I would preference other capabilities over a third LHD.

 

[Bob53]

Critical mass is something we have always struggled with. In the 80s the army was very much an army of one's, 1 armoured regiment, 1 cavalry regiment, 1 APC regiment with one sabre sqn, 1 mech btn, and 1 para btn and 1 high readiness brigade with 2 btns but only one ready. Can't recall exactly what the two btns in Brisbane were doing but know they had a lot or reserves doing full time service to make up numbers.

Many capabilities were more a token demonstrator or training effort than actual capability.

Things are very different and much better now. I still feel we are too light in in armour and aviation but things are getting better. Given the choice I say drop a company from each infantry battalion if need be but get that critical mass of heavy armour ( including engineers), cav, aviation, and long range fires.

I'll have to dig it out but I read a comparison between a US and a Russian heavy brigade a while back. The US org was very tank and direct fire heavy, still with a fair amount of infantry, while the Russian had fewer tanks, more rec and surveillance and lots of indirect fires. The US strategy was to find, engage, destroy with direct fire, air support being assumed. The Russian strategy was find, fix and Destry with indirect fire, with or without air support. As I see it, currently Australia isn't equipped to achieve either.

Hi Volk.....What aviation elements do you think are light on? And what additional armour will be required in your view once the current programs are completed!

 

[Volkodav]

Hi Volk.....What aviation elements do you think are light on? And what additional armour will be required in your view once the current programs are completed!

A full regiment of three squadrons of tanks per brigade would be nice, it will bring strength up to the old mech brigade ratio of one regiment for every two infantry battalions, as opposed to the infantry division scale of one regiment for every nine infantry battalions.

I suspect we need more attack helicopters than the 29 planned. The two squadrons of twelve are intended support not just the three brigades but also maintain a regular presence on the LHDs.

On both areas I will defer to our resident experts in Cav and aviation. I've played with both but am well out if date compared to and nowhere near as experienced as Raven and Takao.

 

[Anthony_B_78]

A full regiment of three squadrons of tanks per brigade would be nice, it will bring strength up to the old mech brigade ratio of one regiment for every two infantry battalions, as opposed to the infantry division scale of one regiment for every nine infantry battalions.

I suspect we need more attack helicopters than the 29 planned. The two squadrons of twelve are intended support not just the three brigades but also maintain a regular presence on the LHDs.

On both areas I will defer to our resident experts in Cav and aviation. I've played with both but am well out if date compared to and nowhere near as experienced as Raven and Takao.

With regard to tanks, do you think it's such a priority as to justify the expense in comparison to other capabilities? "Nice" to have, but not necessarily first on the wish-list? I mean, that would be three times the frontline strength planned, so maybe not three times the number of tanks overall, but clearly a lot more.

We might have four combat brigades by the time the Apaches are delivered. Not sure how regular a presence they're intending to have on the LHDs? I don't think they're modifying them for going to sea regularly, are they? (I think the Brits did that?) Is worth noting the Romeos have capability to fire Hellfire and APKWS.

Two squadrons of 12 each, and 5 for training, does make me wonder about what the average aircraft availability would be for each squadron. I would have thought more for deeper maintenance / attrition to maintain the squadron strength of 12?

 

[Volkodav]

With regard to tanks, do you think it's such a priority as to justify the expense in comparison to other capabilities? "Nice" to have, but not necessarily first on the wish-list? I mean, that would be three times the frontline strength planned, so maybe not three times the number of tanks overall, but clearly a lot more.

We might have four combat brigades by the time the Apaches are delivered. Not sure how regular a presence they're intending to have on the LHDs? I don't think they're modifying them for going to sea regularly, are they? (I think the Brits did that?) Is worth noting the Romeos have capability to fire Hellfire and APKWS.

Two squadrons of 12 each, and 5 for training, does make me wonder about what the average aircraft availability would be for each squadron. I would have thought more for deeper maintenance / attrition to maintain the squadron strength of 12?

You really don't get it do you? There are people on here who done this stuff in the real world and even a few, unlike the has-beens like me, who do it all day, everyday, including having deployed to combat zones. People like me, who are out of the loop are more free to talk about it than those in the loop, but there is a lot, the has beens like me are not up to speed on, though we still know more than the average person on the street or the average jouno.

On armour, armour, particularly tanks, save lives, fact. Tank units have much lower personnel requirements than infantry units but are far more survivable and have far greater combat power. The situational awareness of mounted verses dismounted is unbelievable, the networking of armour is fantastic as well. Armoured forces can cover much more ground in less time and are able to be redeployed tactically much faster than light infantry.

It feels like we are going around in circles. You have this idea that light infantry is cheaper has a lower logistic footprint and is perfectly adequate for or region. The thing is it's not survivable, nor is it able to deliver the strategic outcomes required by government policy unless it is beefed up with a lot of Gucci kit specifically developed for light forces. Start adding all this stuff and armoured vehicles don't look so expensive.

As for historically, the only time Australian forces deployed without heavy equipment was in the panicked defence stood up in 1942. Once the fighting left the mountains tanks were deployed when ever available. It's just common sense, how many men do you lose taking out a bunker? The answer when there was a Matilda available with the later 2pdr HE round is usually none.