Well, if I may, as someone who has advocated support for the apparent decision of the Army to abandon that model, and also questioned some other intentions, I would first refer to two paragraphs from that ASPI article shared by Massive:
Of course, that’s the purpose of this site, sensible defence discussion. I’m all for it. I’m not so sure however Army has abandoned the Beersheba model. 3 like brigades was the intent, but no-one ever said it would stop there. I’m sure Army would have 4, or 8 such Brigades if they were authorised, funded and the manpower found for them.
The one power-point presentation on this topic, which suggested a change in tack was a hypothetical force structure document IIRC, was not in anyway binding on Army and it gave our few details beyond a desire to expand the capability and presence of the 9th brigade in Adelaide as well as creating some additional land force capability in the West. If anything, it seemed to me in reality the foundation or very early steps, of pushing towards a primary land force with a 4 brigade structure, plus supporting elements.
The Beersheba brigade, as it is structured, is not conducive to many possible contingencies in our region. It's too heavy, not only for the likely operating environment - in terms of terrain, infrastructure, opposing forces, mission - but also for our logistical capabilities. A credible combined arms force - to borrow the writer's words - of brigade size would be of much greater utility in conflicts we've seen, and exited, in recent decades, being, basically, in the Middle East. In our region, lighter forces - in totality - are much more likely to be desired for the majority of possible contingencies.
The so-called heaviness of these brigades, ignoring that half the brigade is of course a light motorised force, is a good reason to disband them because they strain our logistics? Or a good reason to improve our logistics so that our long held strategic goal of being capable of deploying brigade sized combat formations can actually be realised?
Our forces are too heavy apparently to operate within our region as the argument from that writer goes, so how does this idea gel with the actuality that most SEA nations have much heavier forces than we do and will, with most of the bigger nations, be operating far more heavy armour in this region than we ever will?
Quick head count -
TNI-AD - more upgraded Leopard 2 tanks than we will have Abrams. More tracked IFV’s than we are buying, more wheeled armoured vehicles than our Cav units are equipped with. More heavy SP guns than we are buying under phase 1 and 2 combined of Mobile protected fires. More heavy armoured forces than we are planning.
Singapore - roughly 2.5x as many heavy Leo 2’s as we are buying. Roughly 2x as many heavy Bionix IFV’s as us. Roughly the same number of 155mm SP guns based on M109 variant as us. More heavy armoured forces than we are planning.
Vietnam - About the same heavy tank (T-90) as us, hundreds more other heavy tanks. Thousands of tracked IFV’s. Roughly similar numbers of ‘heavy’ SP guns as we will. More heavy armoured forces than we are planning.
Malaysia - About 3/4 our intended heavy tank force, about 3/4 of our heavy IFV force. Nil SP guns. Fewer heavy armoured forces than we are planning due to budgetary restrictions. Heavy armour remains present in numbers.
New Zealand - virtually no heavy armour due to budgetary restrictions based on political ideology and intended role of armed forces under this ideology.
Phillipines - about 2x planned number of 45t ASCOD 2 “light tanks” as we will have Abrams, a range of heavy wheeled 8x8 armoured vehicles, a range of heavy combat engineer and some heavy wheeled. SP guns. Fewer heavy armoured forces than we are planning due to budgetary restrictions. Heavy armour remains present in numbers.
Japan / China / Taiwan - so much more heavy armour it’s pointless listing it all.
Not very thorough, but to the point. Within our entire region there are only 3 major nations that have or plan to have less heavy armour than us and that is due primarily to budget restrictions. Apart from NZ they all aspire to have it and use it in warfighting scenarios within the region. Which makes me wonder why so many of these analysts seem to posit that it’s only our armour and not theirs, that is apparently so unsuitable? Sure, we have to get it there, but if we have to fight somewhere within our region then as the above clearly shows, in all likelihood we’ll have to fight heavy armoured forces…
None of this is to say we should throw the baby out with the bath water. The plan the Army has apparently now adopted - as shared with us by Raven - will see four combat brigades, rather than three, with 1 Brigade apparently focused on operations in our northern peripheries and 9 Brigade a combined arms force (stronger than now too, with the SP artillery and armoured engineering capabilities). It is reasonable to ask if 3 and 7 brigades should similarly adopt more focused roles. But, and this is important, there is no suggestion of fewer batteries, companies or squadrons.
Four combat brigades, with two "light" and two "medium" or "heavy", makes a good deal of sense given we've moved away from being driven by a need to sustain forces for long deployments in the Middle East, and pivoted back to our own region, while also keeping the option to go elsewhere too. Also, there's no reason why combined arms forces - tanks, IFVs, etc - cannot be deployed as part of a "light" brigade-based taskforce in our region, it's just that they will more than likely be a smaller element within such a force.
For my part, while I fundamentally disagree with Greg Sheridan about the acquisition of new, and a slightly larger number of, tanks, I don't agree that we should - or likely will - have more in service than planned. But at the same time I do wonder if we truly will order - or need - 450 IFVs and three armoured or mechanised infantry battalions.
Were the Beersheba brigades actually ONLY designed for deployment to the Middle East, given we never deployed even half of one of them? Rather we used the taskforce model we normally do… I get the sustainability aspect, but was the Beersheba brigade model specifically designed for those deployments given we weren’t sending heavy armour, artillery, mechanised units and so forth on any of those deployments?
To me the purpose of the Beersheba structure is to give our brigades the combat capability they need for a range of warfighting roles, with the ability to take elements from them as needed AND sustain them, not just for the MEA. If we need to deploy heavy we can from within this structure. If we need medium or lighter forces, we can generate them as well from within this structure. The main point though is any role we may need to undertake may need to be maintained and rather than once again going through a massive re-organisation to achieve this, why not simply keep (and enhance) what we’ve already developed?
As to numbers in armour (and everything else in reality) our forces are incredibly tiny by regional standards with little in the way of ability to absorb combat losses and maintain capability. As Jim Molan correctly points out, governments are in the business of taking risks. Ours have done so since WW2 by maintaining miniscule forces and engaging in military operations of choice. The one time we’ve been “forced” to engage beyond what we desired to, we very nearly failed. Here’s hoping we are never “forced” to again, because both the number of tanks and IFV’s we are planning on operating are going to be grossly inadequate in all likelihood, from a combat loss and normal fleet sustainability viewpoint.
Effectively the numbers of armour we are buying support the training capability now present across Army thanks to the Beersheba re-structure and a niche deployable armoured battlegroup at best, if you wished at all to be able to sustain it or even replace combat losses.
Anyone who thinks this level of capability is an over-investment? Well it sure won’t be, if we never, ever need to use it, is all I will say… It will be shown to be a significant under-investment…
