Australian Army Discussions and Updates

[Anthony_B_78]

Why stop there?

That's a logical fallacy. I'm not suggesting going beyond what I said, and I absolutely agree there are other capabilities that are needed to be strengthened too.

Given all the limitations, as you said, I could see some merit to having 5RAR re-role to amphibious rather than re-raising 4RAR, and potentially doing away with the army of threes in that only two regular battalions need to have IFVs. That would leave you with three light / motorised, two amphibious, and two mechanised battalions. Obviously an eighth battalion would be preferable, but I agree there are budget and personnel constraints.

I think Plan Beersheba was for a different time, and we don't need three like brigades to sustain longer term commitments anymore.

 

[OPSSG]

Wouldn't it be better to have 2RAR and the re-raised 4RAR manned and structured as full battalions? Wouldn't this increase flexibility?

1. I don’t agree with your reasoning to move away from Plan Beersheba, but remain open to listening for your views. The current ADF for structure enables the country to have an unilateral ability to deploy at short notice a brigade+ effort (and scale up from that entry force).

2. I like the current incremental approach taken by Australia and would love to see Singapore develop a 2RAR like capability (and would be willing to be radical and even consider disbanding a division HQ to gain/pay for such changes in the SAF). There is much to learn from Australia, prior to Singapore building our own JMMS (to replace the Endurance class in the 2030s).

3. Having 2RAR is like gaining Recon Marines from a US Marine Division (which are special operations capable) — they are a force of choice in numerous contingencies. In a future Battle of Marawi scenario, a platoon or 2 of troops or staff officers from 2RAR (or 4 RAR) can be a force of choice to train and advice the army of a foreign government — going in-country for 3 to 5 months.

This is where argument on the internet often loses its value, because the answer is always more. Of course two full battalions would be more flexible. But where are the soldiers going to come from? What capabilities are you going to give up to get them? It is easy to say the government should just provide more money, but even then the problem doesn't go way. If the government increased the budget so we could add, say, an extra 10 000 soldiers, we would still have to wring the most capability out of those soldiers as we can. Even the US Army, nearly 500 000 strong, agonise over small force structure changes because they don't have the numbers to do everything.

As it is, if you stress tested the amphibious force, the limiting factor would not be the number of infantry soldiers. So in a zero sum game, why invest in more infantry soldiers rather than the capabilities that are the limiting factor?

4. Thanks for guiding the thread back to earth. Let me share my own throw away comment. This is kind of like the same BS I see in the Singapore defence thread, about proposing NS for women or proposing that Singapore build its own MBT.

(a) Lots of options already on the table for women to volunteer and ST Engineering already has the local capability to build artillery pieces, IFVs and 8x8s — yet, like you, a single idiot wants to DERAIL the Singapore defence thread to keep talking about these 2 topics despite guidance from other Singapore members who know better.​

(b) Most of the time, there is a zero sum logic to proposed changes in any army; and hard trade-offs must be made — including choosing to disband a division HQ (1PDF) and an infantry battalion (4 SIR) as part of force re-alignment to gain 5 rotating companies of ready forces, on tiered alertness for short notice deployments under a single Battalion HQ (reporting to 7SIB/21st Division as higher HQs for overseas contingencies and to 2PDF for local emergencies).​

I think Plan Beersheba was for a different time, and we don't need three like brigades to sustain longer term commitments anymore.

Edit: 5. Please explain your last few t̶h̶r̶o̶w̶ ̶a̶w̶a̶y̶ comments. I don’t understand the points you are trying to make. After all the one proposing change has to provide the logic of change from Plan Beersheba.

Q1: Why would a country the size of Australia decide to give up having 3 brigades?​

That way, at least 1 brigade can be deployed at short notice, even if they are dissimilar in equipping. It’s a very useful minimum capability for a range of contingencies, even in peace time contingencies such as those to support HADR or civil events (and not just for war fighting).

6. You need 3 to 4 brigades to have the minimum to form a single division — making me wonder why the ADF has a division commander. Further under the current plan for 2RAR and 4RAR (to function like Recon Marines to gain an improved ISTAR capability for an army that can deploy from a sea base), you get an increase in capability of any deployed Australian brigade. As an incremental change, it has a huge impact on larger readiness picture.

Q2: Why is there a rush to propose change from having a deployable brigade?​

Especially when the change proposed by you seems to reduce capability to deploy a brigade for the Australian Army.

Edit: Quoted relevant section of post #7417, for ease of reference.

Some key points from the brief:
- 1 Bde is to be split in two to create a fourth combat brigade. The elements currently in Darwin will remain part of 1 Bde, while those in Adelaide will become part of 9 Bde, forming an integrated (ARES/ARA) brigade. 1 Bde will become a light amphibious brigade, with 4 RAR being re-raised as a mirror of 2 RAR. 9 Bde will become a mech heavy brigade with 1 Armd Regt and 7 RAR, as well as 9 Regt equipped with SPGs and 9 Field Squadron equipped with the L8160 combat engineering vehicles.
- 8 Bde is to become the fires brigade based in Adelaide, with 16 Regt (the GBAD unit with NASAMs), the long range fires regiment and a land based anti ship missile unit.
- A new two star aviation command is to be created, which will command 16 Bde and all aviation elements (including 20 STA with the Shadow UAS replacement). The majority of army aviation will be centralised in a centre of excellence in Townsville.
- Darwin is to become the main watercraft precinct with most of the expanded littoral manoeuvre capability.
- A new health brigade is to be raised, taking all the health units off 17 Bde.
- 6 Bde is to become a more specialised brigade with a ridiculous acronym, and include all sorts of ISR, EW, cyber etc capabilities.
- 13 Bde is to grow to have a more significant capability in the west of the country, including a littoral manoeuvre, artillery and cavalry capability.
- The majority of AFVs are to be prepositioned at Cultana and Shoalwater Bay, to save money on moving them for exercises and improve availability.
- What remains of 2 Div will focus on domestic contingency response.
- 12/40 RTR is to become an RFSU.
- The army is to grow by nearly 5000 personnel over the next couple of decades.

7. Earlier, you tried to make a point after your response to guidance by Raven22. I would like to see you make a defence of that point with logic or reason. Not just throw away comments.

 

[ADMk2]

After all all the work and upheaval / restructuring the Australian Army has gone through to finally meet it’s requirement to be capable of generating a deployable and sustainable brigade sized formation, we should just discard the formation that allows us to do that, “because”?

Yeah, no…

 

[Redlands18]

https://adbr.com.au/land-forces-2021-navantia-Australia-unveils-amphibious-watercraft-designs/

Navantia have put forward there possible options for Land 8710 phase 1.
The Platypus a LARC-V replacement with twin Diesels a 40% larger Cargo capacity, a onboard Crane, a road speed of 80kph, water speed of 15kt. It is a collaboration with Rheinmetall, so probably built at the Milvehcoe facility in Brisbane.
For the LCM-8 replacement they intend to offer the Kodal(Torres straight Islander for Crocodile) class based on the LLC and could be scaled up to 120t capacity if required

 

[John Newman]

Yes I saw that too, I also note that Austal also made an announcement that they were also intending to put designs forward for the two replacement craft too.

But it does bring up an interesting question, where does Navantia Australia propose to build their designs? They don’t have a build yard here in Oz.

My understand is that all ‘minor’ ADF boats/ships are to be built in WA, no doubt Austal will use their existing facilities, I would imagine that Navantia might have to ‘lease’ space, the very large Civmec assembly hall would probably be the obvious location.

Probably the start of a longer term relationship with Civmec too, especially if the Navantia Australia JSS design is chosen for the RAN.

Cheers,

 

[Redlands18]

Yes I saw that too, I also note that Austal also made an announcement that they were also intending to put designs forward for the two replacement craft too.

But it does bring up an interesting question, where does Navantia Australia propose to build their designs? They don’t have a build yard here in Oz.

My understand is that all ‘minor’ ADF boats/ships are to be built in WA, no doubt Austal will use their existing facilities, I would imagine that Navantia might have to ‘lease’ space, the very large Civmec assembly hall would probably be the obvious location.

Probably the start of a longer term relationship with Civmec too, especially if the Navantia Australia JSS design is chosen for the RAN.

Cheers,

Navantia have teamed up with Rheinmetall so that would almost certainly have to mean the MILVEHCOE facility in Brisbane for the Platypus and would be able to use the ADF facilities at Bulimba for Water testing.
The ADF may even nominate the build sites for the LCMs and follow on LCH replacements irrespective of who wins the contract as per the Subs, Frigates and OPV.s

 

[Anthony_B_78]

5. Please explain your last few throw away comments. I don’t understand the points you are trying to make. After all the one proposing change has to provide the logic of change from Plan Beersheba.

I don't think I made "throw away comments". My contribution was brief, but I thought my point was made. Will happily expand on it in the context of your thoughts.

If you go back several pages you will find a post by Raven that included a link (now not working, unfortunately) to a Defence presentation on planned restructuring of the Australian Army. Raven also summarised some of the key points.

The one that I would bring to your attention is that 1 Brigade is to be split. The brigade will lose the South Australian based 1 Armoured Regiment and 7RAR (a mechanised battalion). It will gain a re-raised 4RAR, which will be structured along the lines of 2RAR, and dedicated to that amphibious pre-landing force role. Meanwhile, the aforementioned 1 Armoured and 7RAR will join 9 Brigade, which will become a predominantly regular formation, and will gain a SP artillery regiment, among other supporting units and sub-units.

Where does this leave us? Two like brigades, one more focused on armoured warfare, and one light / amphibious. Is this not the death of Beersheba's three like brigades?

Further, I was never saying the Australian Army should have fewer brigade headquarters, and certainly not units, but talking about the structuring of those units, and "filling out" a battalion that is really at half-strength. Raven was making the point, I assume, that you can't have everything, and I agree, so I was also looking at other options. i.e. Not re-raising 4RAR, converting 5RAR to the amphibious role instead, and only having two, rather than three, mechanised battalions. The latter could mean a reduced buy of the Land 400 Phase 3 IFV, potentially saving a lot of money.

Another point about Plan Beersheba is that it was a product of a time when Australia had a sustained commitment of forces on operations, and there was a lot of thinking around trying to structure around that, so it's very much built on sustainability. Realistically, a Beersheba brigade would not be deployed as is, but rather deployments would either be smaller or in the case of a brigade-size deployment (not seen since INTERFET) you'd be mixing and matching - so to speak - units from different brigades to suit the mission and operating environment. I would also add that there are a number of capabilities in the Army that don't work on a rule of three, so it's not like there was an overriding commitment to the concept.

Edit to add: In fairness, I should say the post by Raven I was referencing was way more than several pages ago. It was post 7414 on page 371. Also worth reading is post 7417 and several on the following page. Oh, and it looks like you "liked" Raven's post 7429, where he explained the changes in the context of Beersheba and its like brigades:

I don't think it is necessarily a case of the identifcal brigades not working, it is more a case that the environment has changed, and the drivers behind the identical brigades (as well as the force generation cycle) are no longer relevant.

For example, the main drivers behind the like Beersheeba brigades was the need to generate forces for ongoing deployments, as well as to simplify combined arms training. Clearly, there are no longer ongoing deployments, and most future contingencies don't forsee endless rotations, but shorter, more decisive conflicts. At the same time, the enabling brigades will take over from the combat brigades as the centre of the combined arms training focus. You can also sprinkle in things like massively increased international engagement, more of a focus on national resilience, and the desire to get more out of the reserve etc etc. Put all those things together, and the move away from like brigades makes sense.

Interestingly, however, the slide shows both 3 and 7 Brigades to be unchanged. Personally, I don't like this. If we are going away from like brigades, lets do it properly and make one a mech brigade and the other a light brigade. That way you remove the problem of having to sustain every capabability in every brigade at the same time, as well as creating brigade structures you can actaully fight with. With the aviation centre of excellence and a watercraft det being at Townsville, as well as the AFV forward basing at SWBTA, it would make sense to make 7 Bde the mech brigade and 3 Bde a lighter rapid deployment brigade.

 

[Stampede]

I don't think I made "throw away comments". My contribution was brief, but I thought my point was made. Will happily expand on it in the context of your thoughts.

If you go back several pages you will find a post by Raven that included a link (now not working, unfortunately) to a Defence presentation on planned restructuring of the Australian Army. Raven also summarised some of the key points.

The one that I would bring to your attention is that 1 Brigade is to be split. The brigade will lose the South Australian based 1 Armoured Regiment and 7RAR (a mechanised battalion). It will gain a re-raised 4RAR, which will be structured along the lines of 2RAR, and dedicated to that amphibious pre-landing force role. Meanwhile, the aforementioned 1 Armoured and 7RAR will join 9 Brigade, which will become a predominantly regular formation, and will gain a SP artillery regiment, among other supporting units and sub-units.

Where does this leave us? Two like brigades, one more focused on armoured warfare, and one light / amphibious. Is this not the death of Beersheba's three like brigades?

Further, I was never saying the Australian Army should have fewer brigade headquarters, and certainly not units, but talking about the structuring of those units, and "filling out" a battalion that is really at half-strength. Raven was making the point, I assume, that you can't have everything, and I agree, so I was also looking at other options. i.e. Not re-raising 4RAR, converting 5RAR to the amphibious role instead, and only having two, rather than three, mechanised battalions. The latter could mean a reduced buy of the Land 400 Phase 3 IFV, potentially saving a lot of money.

Another point about Plan Beersheba is that it was a product of a time when Australia had a sustained commitment of forces on operations, and there was a lot of thinking around trying to structure around that, so it's very much built on sustainability. Realistically, a Beersheba brigade would not be deployed as is, but rather deployments would either be smaller or in the case of a brigade-size deployment (not seen since INTERFET) you'd be mixing and matching - so to speak - units from different brigades to suit the mission and operating environment. I would also add that there are a number of capabilities in the Army that don't work on a rule of three, so it's not like there was an overriding commitment to the concept.

Edit to add: In fairness, I should say the post by Raven I was referencing was way more than several pages ago. It was post 7414 on page 371. Also worth reading is post 7417 and several on the following page. Oh, and it looks like you "liked" Raven's post 7429, where he explained the changes in the context of Beersheba and its like brigades:

Realistically who knows what the Army will actually look like in 10 years time.
The proposed changes to Army proposed in the presentation ( P371 ) certainly raise a lot of questions.
Will it come to fruition...............don't know; yet still puzzled somewhat as to the rationale for many of the changes.

I do like the common three Brigade structure.
Could / should the Brigades evolve and be modified?
For sure.
We need a dynamic Army to evolve with the times.
The question is, if we add additional numbers to Army, do we add to the existing structure evenly or break parts down to create something new.
One example is the proposed re raised 4 RAR as a mirrored amphibious unit to 2 RAR.
If we need additional Amphibious capacity that's fine ,why not initially just add another Company or two to the existing 2RAR.
If this proves inadequate for our needs, then sure raise another Battalion.
But If this is the case, does that need to come from bastardising the existing common Brigade structure?
If the north needs more teeth, ok fine do what's needed, but please leave the other three Brigades as a common structure.
The hardware numbers we seem to be acquiring seem to indicate that we have enough platforms for the rule of three.
Let's do justice to any gaps in the existing Brigades first before we get to adventurous and raise new units.

Anyway we'll see what happens I guess.



Regards S

 

[Massive]

In summary, tanks are cheap and tanks are necessary.

The discussion should be more around do we have enough tanks as opposed to should we have tanks.

The other question is whether only having protected transport (Bushmaster) for the infantry battalions is sufficient, and whether armoured transport (Boxer) is required id required.

Regards,

Massive

 

[Volkodav]

In the later part of WWII the UK, NZ and South Africa (I also believe Canada) converted a considerable part of their infantry into armoured units. A primary factor in this is that armoured brigades and divisions required fewer men.

Australia went the opposite direction, disbanding armoured units to free up men for the infantry divisions, as light / jungle infantry was seen as more critical than even balanced infantry divisions with integral cavalry.

It is true that Tanks need infantry, but if your infantry is adequately equipped and supported, more tanks is a good thing.

Australia has never really gone beyond the one armoured btn/regt per division scale (nine infantry btns) but traditionally in an armd div is five tank to four infantry btns, and a mech div is four tank to five infantry. The brigades being armd two tank, one inf, and mech being one tank and two inf, an armd div having two armd and one mech bdes and a mech div one armd and two mech bdes.

Basically Australia has not had sufficient modern armour to stand up a single mech, let alone, armd bde ever. Ironic as manpower is our greatest limitation and our allies have been willing and ready to cascade us tanks as good or better than we have had if we ever asked.

At the end of the day armoured infantry can dismount and deploy as light infantry as they are still infantry. They may need training and acclimatisation but nowhere near as much as light infantry converting to armoured, mechanised or motorised needs. As for working with tanks, if you don't have sufficient tanks for at least a squadron per bde, how are the infantry meant to be proficient in working with them.

 

[Anthony_B_78]

In the later part of WWII the UK, NZ and South Africa (I also believe Canada) converted a considerable part of their infantry into armoured units. A primary factor in this is that armoured brigades and divisions required fewer men.

Australia went the opposite direction, disbanding armoured units to free up men for the infantry divisions, as light / jungle infantry was seen as more critical than even balanced infantry divisions with integral cavalry.

It is true that Tanks need infantry, but if your infantry is adequately equipped and supported, more tanks is a good thing.

Australia has never really gone beyond the one armoured btn/regt per division scale (nine infantry btns) but traditionally in an armd div is five tank to four infantry btns, and a mech div is four tank to five infantry. The brigades being armd two tank, one inf, and mech being one tank and two inf, an armd div having two armd and one mech bdes and a mech div one armd and two mech bdes.

Basically Australia has not had sufficient modern armour to stand up a single mech, let alone, armd bde ever. Ironic as manpower is our greatest limitation and our allies have been willing and ready to cascade us tanks as good or better than we have had if we ever asked.

At the end of the day armoured infantry can dismount and deploy as light infantry as they are still infantry. They may need training and acclimatisation but nowhere near as much as light infantry converting to armoured, mechanised or motorised needs. As for working with tanks, if you don't have sufficient tanks for at least a squadron per bde, how are the infantry meant to be proficient in working with them.

You have to consider here where you're fighting; the environment, the enemy, etc. Your example from WW2 actually shows that. The countries mentioned first were fighting in the European Theatre; Australia was dedicated to the Pacific.

The same consideration holds today, and for Australia it is difficult because you could be fighting - as we have been recently - in the Middle East, where you want armour, or you could be going into an INTERFET-like situation, where you might take some, but not too much that they're not worth the logistical effort.

This is where the Beersheba brigades fell down a little too. How likely was it that a brigade so structured would ever be deployed as is? Much more likely, today and in the past, is that a brigade-size deployment would be task orientated.

I think where the Australian Army is moving, with 9 Brigade structured as a mechanised formation, including all the bells and whistles - SP artillery and armoured engineering, makes sense. Though, like Raven, I would wonder why we would still keep 1 and 7 brigades using the old Beersheba structure.

 

[Volkodav]

You have to consider here where you're fighting; the environment, the enemy, etc. Your example from WW2 actually shows that. The countries mentioned first were fighting in the European Theatre; Australia was dedicated to the Pacific.

The same consideration holds today, and for Australia it is difficult because you could be fighting - as we have been recently - in the Middle East, where you want armour, or you could be going into an INTERFET-like situation, where you might take some, but not too much that they're not worth the logistical effort.

This is where the Beersheba brigades fell down a little too. How likely was it that a brigade so structured would ever be deployed as is? Much more likely, today and in the past, is that a brigade-size deployment would be task orientated.

I think where the Australian Army is moving, with 9 Brigade structured as a mechanised formation, including all the bells and whistles - SP artillery and armoured engineering, makes sense. Though, like Raven, I would wonder why we would still keep 1 and 7 brigades using the old Beersheba structure.

After initially striping everything heavier than the Vickers machine gun and 3" mortar from the battalions deployed to SWP, heavy equipment, including tanks were progressively introduced / reintroduced.

Saying tanks were not needed in the Pacific is incorrect they were needed and were deployed in New Guinea, Borneo, and Bougainville, they were also needed in Malaya/Singapore but were not deployed.

They should have deployed to Korea but we were busy living the light infantry fantasy at the time and had to rely on allies, there were however deployed to Vietnam, apparently because the incoming task force commander, Donald Dunstan, remembered how effective they where when he served in the Pacific in WWII.

The first proposals to acquire armour were made in WWI and the 1st AIF was more extensively motorised in 1918 than the 2nd AIF was in its early years. This was because the army got some of what it needed during the war but left almost all the gear in Europe and the middle East when they returned home. Not sure but I believe a big part of out WWI debt was for equipment we paid for but didn't keep.

Tanks may not have suitable in the New Guinea highlands but they would have been invaluable if the Japanese had made it to Port Moresby. When people think Australia in WWII they tend to think Kakoda Track, but in truth the vast majority of terrain we fought in was suitable for tanks and when available we made good use of them.

 

[buffy9]

You have to consider here where you're fighting; the environment, the enemy, etc. Your example from WW2 actually shows that. The countries mentioned first were fighting in the European Theatre; Australia was dedicated to the Pacific.

The same consideration holds today, and for Australia it is difficult because you could be fighting - as we have been recently - in the Middle East, where you want armour, or you could be going into an INTERFET-like situation, where you might take some, but not too much that they're not worth the logistical effort.

This is where the Beersheba brigades fell down a little too. How likely was it that a brigade so structured would ever be deployed as is? Much more likely, today and in the past, is that a brigade-size deployment would be task orientated.

I think where the Australian Army is moving, with 9 Brigade structured as a mechanised formation, including all the bells and whistles - SP artillery and armoured engineering, makes sense. Though, like Raven, I would wonder why we would still keep 1 and 7 brigades using the old Beersheba structure.

The goal of Beersheba was never really to have the brigades deploy as they were structured - any operation would be task-orientated as required. RAMSI, Astute, Slipper, Okra, Highroad and the full range of Assist operations demonstrate that elements, whilst for the most part drawn from the ready brigade, would be ordered and organised as necessary to best complete the tasks required of them.

Beersheba was more about having combined centres for training and sustainment. The environment and threat will change - but the skills learnt and developed between different units will hold true.

There was a post a while ago referencing Donald Dunston (#136, P7), whose experience with tank-infantry fighting in Bougainville helped facilitate their use in the Battle of Coral-Balmoral - where they proved effective in carrying out their ordered tasks. This was facilitated by the understanding of how a particular system may be able to contribute to the efficiency of a force - something Beersheba will, ideally, give future commanders and staff.

 

[ngatimozart]

You have to consider here where you're fighting; the environment, the enemy, etc. Your example from WW2 actually shows that. The countries mentioned first were fighting in the European Theatre; Australia was dedicated to the Pacific.

The same consideration holds today, and for Australia it is difficult because you could be fighting - as we have been recently - in the Middle East, where you want armour, or you could be going into an INTERFET-like situation, where you might take some, but not too much that they're not worth the logistical effort.

This is where the Beersheba brigades fell down a little too. How likely was it that a brigade so structured would ever be deployed as is? Much more likely, today and in the past, is that a brigade-size deployment would be task orientated.

I think where the Australian Army is moving, with 9 Brigade structured as a mechanised formation, including all the bells and whistles - SP artillery and armoured engineering, makes sense. Though, like Raven, I would wonder why we would still keep 1 and 7 brigades using the old Beersheba structure.

The US used armoured divisions in the Philippines. There are no reasons why armoured divisions couldn't be used in the Pacific conflict. Both the US Army and USMC used armour in their island campaigns. It was at this time that the USMC stood up its first armoured formations. Very recently they stood down last armoured unit.

@Volkodav Yes the NZ Army 2nd Division converted to the NZ 2nd Armoured Division sometime after El Alamein and before they went to Italy. The NZ 3rd Division was mostly an infantry division and undertook one or two amphibious landings in the Solomon Islands - New Britain area. My dad's oldest brother was in the Division.

 

[old faithful]

All this chat about re raising 4 RAR, why not do as suggested, re role 5 RAR, and de link 8 and 9 RAR, with A and B coy reforming 8 RAR and C and Support Coy raising 9 RAR, that way you could recruit and build both Battalions simultaneously over a 12 - 18 month period.

 

[Gryphinator]

I don't think 2 specialised, partial Battalions in 2 different locations really helps much. Adding to 2 RAR does and de-linking 8/9 does.

One question that may or may not have been asked before is why isn't 2 RAR in Sydney closer to our LHD's? Makes sense to me...

 

[Anthony_B_78]

Saying tanks were not needed in the Pacific is incorrect ...

Let's be really clear: I did not say that. My point was that there are times when you want more armour, and times when it is of limited utility and you want more infantry. It's challenging for Australia because we are liable - as history shows - to become involved in a range of operations. So the Army does need both, and we are seeing investment in strengthening the capability for armoured warfare, which is a good thing.

 

[Volkodav]

Let's be really clear: I did not say that. My point was that there are times when you want more armour, and times when it is of limited utility and you want more infantry. It's challenging for Australia because we are liable - as history shows - to become involved in a range of operations. So the Army does need both, and we are seeing investment in strengthening the capability for armoured warfare, which is a good thing.

It better to have them and not need them than to need them and not have them. This is especially the case as you fight with what you have because it takes years to expand a capability when that capability is reliant on equipment that can not be sourced locally.

 

[Anthony_B_78]

The US used armoured divisions in the Philippines. There are no reasons why armoured divisions couldn't be used in the Pacific conflict. Both the US Army and USMC used armour in their island campaigns. It was at this time that the USMC stood up its first armoured formations. Very recently they stood down last armoured unit.

Certainly armour - or, as the Americans would write it, "armor" - was used in the Pacific. Tanks are useful; tanks save lives. No argument from me.

I'm curious about which US armoured divisions were in the Philippines? The 6th Army is listed as having had six divisions, five infantry, plus 1st Cavalry, which, for all practical purposes, was at that stage an infantry division too. From what I can see the US Army raised 16 armoured divisions in WW2 and all fought in the European theatre.

 

[Anthony_B_78]

It better to have them and not need them than to need them and not have them. This is especially the case as you fight with what you have because it takes years to expand a capability when that capability is reliant on equipment that can not be sourced locally.

Agreed, and the same can be said of basically every capability. The question comes back to what is the right balance of forces. I wouldn't want to see fewer armoured or cavalry squadrons, though one fewer regular mechanised infantry? That I think could be argued. What we've really missed is having the full range of capabilities that allows you to commit forces to a wider range of contingencies, including higher intensity warfare. With SP artillery and armoured engineers, and more (upgraded) Abrams, you can potentially deploy an armoured / mechanised / "heavy" brigade in an invasion of Iraq scenario. (Whether you'd want to is another question.)