Australian Army Discussions and Updates

[FormerDirtDart]

For the US it used to be a mech BDE was one tank and two inf btns while and arms BDE was two tank and one inf btn. I believe their current structure is square, i.e. two tank plus two inf btn per heavy BDE. Cav used to be an ACR at Corps level and a Sqn at division. We are actually quite Cav heavy, or perhaps more accurately, tank and infantry light.

US Armor BCTs are not square. Current orbat:
1x Cav SQN (BN) with 3X Armor Recon Troops (Company) & 1x Tank Company, 1x Forward Support Company (attch from Spt Bn)
2x Armor BN (CA) with 2x Tank Company, 1x Mech Infantry Company, 1x Forward Support Company (attch from Spt Bn)
1x Mech BN (CA) with 2x Mech Infantry Company, 1x Tank Company, 1x Forward Support Company (attch from Spt Bn)
1x Field Artillery Bn with 3x SP Howitzer Battery (6x cannon), 1x Forward Support Company (attch from Spt Bn)
1x Eng BN with 2x Eng Company, 1x MI company, 1x Signal Company, 1x Forward Support Company (attch from Spt Bn)
1x Support BN with 1x distribution Company, 1x maintenance Company. 1x Medical Company

Prior to 2016 ABCT's briefly had 3 Combined Arms Battalions with 2 each Tank Companies & Mech Infantry Companies. No Tank Company in Cav Sqn
When initially formed under the Brigade Combat Team format the Heavy BCTs (Armor) had 2 each Combined Arms Battalions with 2 each Tank Companies & Mech Infantry Companies. No tank Company in Cav sqn, FA BN only 2 batteries of 8 cannon, Eng Bn was Special Troops Bn with only 1 Eng Company

I can do Pre-BCT, Division XXI & AOE before that, if you like...LOL

 

[Volkodav]

US Armor BCTs are not square. Current orbat:
1x Cav SQN (BN) with 3X Armor Recon Troops (Company) & 1x Tank Company, 1x Forward Support Company (attch from Spt Bn)
2x Armor BN (CA) with 2x Tank Company, 1x Mech Infantry Company, 1x Forward Support Company (attch from Spt Bn)
1x Mech BN (CA) with 2x Mech Infantry Company, 1x Tank Company, 1x Forward Support Company (attch from Spt Bn)
1x Field Artillery Bn with 3x SP Howitzer Battery (6x cannon), 1x Forward Support Company (attch from Spt Bn)
1x Eng BN with 2x Eng Company, 1x MI company, 1x Signal Company, 1x Forward Support Company (attch from Spt Bn)
1x Support BN with 1x distribution Company, 1x maintenance Company. 1x Medical Company

Prior to 2016 ABCT's briefly had 3 Combined Arms Battalions with 2 each Tank Companies & Mech Infantry Companies. No Tank Company in Cav Sqn
When initially formed under the Brigade Combat Team format the Heavy BCTs (Armor) had 2 each Combined Arms Battalions with 2 each Tank Companies & Mech Infantry Companies. No tank Company in Cav sqn, FA BN only 2 batteries of 8 cannon, Eng Bn was Special Troops Bn with only 1 Eng Company

I can do Pre-BCT, Division XXI & AOE before that, if you like...LOL

Thanks for that, I wasn't sure and I haven't stayed across things as much in recent years. I steered away from suggesting combined arms btns for the ARA, not realising the US Army had embraced them, they do make sense in a lot of ways, especially for smaller armies.

A lot of food for thought, thanks.

 

[Bob53]

@Bob53
@Takao answered this question a couple of pages back as he says you end up having to pay for 2 relatively small Fleets of Aircraft that have no value other then being Attack/ARH Helicopters. They are useless as anything else other then maybe personal Tpt for a General.

Hi Redlands yes I read that opinion but this is a current and active capability at a time when there seems to be plenty of opinion that we need more. My question was really could anyone see any benefit in retaining the tigers in addition to the Apaches

I’m not sure the 2 small fleet argument flies in all cases...there are quite a few small fleets in the ADF P8, E7, Chinooks to name a few. Even the option to make a decision once all Apaches are in service makes sense to me.

 

[Volkodav]

Hi Redlands yes I read that opinion but this is a current and active capability at a time when there seems to be plenty of opinion that we need more. My question was really could anyone see any benefit in retaining the tigers in addition to the Apaches

I’m not sure the 2 small fleet argument flies in all cases...there are quite a few small fleets in the ADF P8, E7, Chinooks to name a few. Even the option to make a decision once all Apaches are in service makes sense to me.

When you have two small fleets doing different niche roles, you cop the associated overheads. When you have two small fleets doing the same job you are doubling up on the overheads for no reason, you are better off increasing the size of one of the fleets and divesting the overheads associated with the other.

 

[Massive]

what if two were structured more as "light" formations and two as "heavy"?

Doesn't work for me.

I am not in any way convinced of the value of non-specialised light infantry in the regular army in peacetime.

The more I read the more I feel that light infantry is not going to be effective on a modern battlefield.

More generally, I am against penny-packet capability that results in token land-power.

Regards,

Massive

 

[Massive]

We are actually quite Cav heavy, or perhaps more accurately, tank and infantry light.

I feel that this is the right mix though - we deploy Cav all the time and as the Cav units become more powerful the more roles they can play.

Regards,

Massive

 

[Anthony_B_78]

I am not in any way convinced of the value of non-specialised light infantry in the regular army in peacetime.

If it helps, might be better to think of them as multirole. I mean, yes we tend to give them Bushmasters and call them "motorised", but they're still your standard infantry battalions, able to be deployed as such without their vehicles by air or sea, and very much trained to function as infantry always have.

In terms of the wider thought bubble, worth noting that really I was only suggesting going from three mechanised battalions to two, and three motorised or "light" battalions to four. That would also save money on Land 400 Phase 3. And, after all, would anyone be surprised if we end up ordering less than the figure currently stated?

 

[Raven22]

I feel that this is the right mix though - we deploy Cav all the time and as the Cav units become more powerful the more roles they can play.

Regards,

Massive

I actually disagree that we are cavalry heavy in the first place. About 20% of Australian manoeuvre sub-units are cavalry. In the US Army, for example, about 28% of manoeuvre sub-units are cavalry. Australia has two cavalry sub units for every tank sub-unit - in the US Army the ratio is about 1.83.

You could make the charge stick we are infantry heavy - we are certainly not cavalry heavy.

 

[Volkodav]

I actually disagree that we are cavalry heavy in the first place. About 20% of Australian manoeuvre sub-units are cavalry. In the US Army, for example, about 28% of manoeuvre sub-units are cavalry. Australia has two cavalry sub units for every tank sub-unit - in the US Army the ratio is about 1.83.

You could make the charge stick we are infantry heavy - we are certainly not cavalry heavy.

Fair call.

I was thinking in terms of ACRs being corps and maybe division level elements, but forgot about the cavalry squadrons at brigade level and the troops and platoons as low as battalion level in the US.

If you look at how some support elements have been stripped from the various battalions and regiments, for example pioneers, assault troops etc. I can't help but wonder if maybe we need to stop concentrating certain skills into specialist regiments and battalions and spread them out again.

 

[Volkodav]

If it helps, might be better to think of them as multirole. I mean, yes we tend to give them Bushmasters and call them "motorised", but they're still your standard infantry battalions, able to be deployed as such without their vehicles by air or sea, and very much trained to function as infantry always have.

In terms of the wider thought bubble, worth noting that really I was only suggesting going from three mechanised battalions to two, and three motorised or "light" battalions to four. That would also save money on Land 400 Phase 3. And, after all, would anyone be surprised if we end up ordering less than the figure currently stated?

Disagree.

It's harder to raise train and sustain armoured infantry than light infantry so if anything we need the ratio should be skewed in favour of heavy. It is quite conceivable to have reserve IMV mounted infantry, but lynx or redback would likely be impossible.

Rule of thumb, if a capability is too complex for reserves to deliver, then the regs should have more if it while reserves do what they can do.

 

[Anthony_B_78]

Disagree.

It's harder to raise train and sustain armoured infantry than light infantry so if anything we need the ratio should be skewed in favour of heavy. It is quite conceivable to have reserve IMV mounted infantry, but lynx or redback would likely be impossible.

Rule of thumb, if a capability is too complex for reserves to deliver, then the regs should have more if it while reserves do what they can do.

I don't disagree with your reasoning. For me though, it comes down to what demand is likely to be placed on different capabilities and what makes most sense with regard to investment. I'm very much one who doesn't want to be accused of "fantasy fleets" or what have you. So I'm happy to say what I think we could do with less of as well as more of.

 

[old faithful]

A few facts about training soldiers. An infantryman takes 74 days, not including weekends to train properly, an armoured Corp crewman takes 71 days. Not much difference in training. It's not 1940 any more, and 6 weeks to train a grunt is not possible any more.

 

[Anthony_B_78]

A few facts about training soldiers. An infantryman takes 74 days, not including weekends to train properly, an armoured Corp crewman takes 71 days. Not much difference in training. It's not 1940 any more, and 6 weeks to train a grunt is not possible any more.

Yes, and 80 days before that for the basic training course, and then I could imagine that new soldiers would need time and experience in a unit to be considered competent. So, yeah, it takes a while, and it's partly why these days you largely fight with what you have. So where does that leave us on this discussion, do you think?

 

[Volkodav]

A few facts about training soldiers. An infantryman takes 74 days, not including weekends to train properly, an armoured Corp crewman takes 71 days. Not much difference in training. It's not 1940 any more, and 6 weeks to train a grunt is not possible any more.

True but when you are talking armour infantry you are talking 74 days to be trained as an infantryman plus however long it takes to become an effective armoured infantryman.

Curious, how much longer did it take to become para qualified over being a rifleman in one of the other battalions? Armour isn't the same but there are skills and proficiencies required over and above those of a light infantryman.

Assault troops had their own IET as well, separate from infantry and vehicle crewman. While many cross qualified as crewmen they also had their own distinct skill sets differing from infantry.

One of the arguments for having Cav provide the vehicles and crews under Beersheba was the experience with the old 5/7 RAR mech where even senior privates were serving as crew commanders but had limitations in what they could do, putting a much greater technical load on the section commanders and platoon sergeants.

At the end of the day, if a unit needs to be capable in a role it's personnel not only need to be trained, they also need to retain and grow those skills through regularly practicing them, and need to be led and mentored by experienced people who have mastered those skills.

When talking modern armour, which is more complex that the aviation assets of a couple of decades ago, there is a need for junior infantry leaders who are more adaptable and competent than drivers, crew commanders, section commanders and maintainers of a couple of decades ago. No way on earth can proficiency be achieved in a reserve unit, let alone in an emergency mobilisation unit, it has to be the domain of the regular army and as many older, experienced people as they can retain.

 

[Anthony_B_78]

True but when you are talking armour infantry you are talking 74 days to be trained as an infantryman plus however long it takes to become an effective armoured infantryman.

Is that any different to extra training for operating from helicopters, Bushmasters, and landing craft? And wouldn't some of this training at least be inclusive of their infantry training?

Anyway, let me ask a bigger question, how confident are people that we will get 450 vehicles under Land 400 Phase 3?

A secondary question is should we get 450? That is, would it better to get less and invest the savings on other capabilities?

I don't think it's heresy to ask these questions.

When I was musing about fewer mechanised infantry battalions - really, with whichever vehicle wins, armoured infantry will probably become a more appropriate label - I was only talking of two instead of three.

Part of my thinking is that if deployed they're likely to form part of infantry-tank battlegroups, with two armoured infantry companies and a tank squadron, plus perhaps a cavalry squadron. And two battalions - plus three tank squadrons - means you can get three rotations out of such a force.

So, yeah, I don't think it would be a significant issue if the Army ended up with fewer IFVs and fewer battalions, but appreciate their are different opinions on that.

@Anthony_B_78

You are proposing a lot of significant changes based on your opinion. Numerous responses have been provided from those that have served, or are serving, and understand why the current structure is being put in place.

While there is no problem with seeking information (we encourage that) I suggest you need to consider the responses and do a bit more research before proposing any further dramatic changes to the Army. You may wish to consider the 2020 Force Structure plan and 2020 Strategic Outlook as these explain (in pretty simple terms) the thinking behind current and future purchases and organisational plan.

2020 Defence Strategic Update & 2020 Force Structure Plan | About | Strategy & Policy | Department of Defence

Alexsa

 

[old faithful]

If the infantry guys are to drive and maintain the vehicles, you could argue that they could run their own IET course in the battalion.
The average grunt operating out of a vehicle would take next to no extra training , a brief exercise would cover that. It's the maintaining the vehicles and learning how to crew the things that takes time, and drivers courses and CC courses can be run in house just like any specialist course. Extra reg sigs 6 wk course, needed, not sure about drivers course and CC but imagine also about 6 weeks. Each section responsible for the vehicle maintenance, learn in house, tactics covered by CC, de bussing and assaulting and working with the vehicle easily covered by normal exercises, starting at a basic level and working up throughout the cycle of the year.
A basic Para course is 3 weeks. 7-9 jumps including a night jump or 2. That's easy. It's the bigger picture of working as an airborne force, like rally procedure on the DZ, tac loading the aircraft, and working ad hoc when plans go to shite. The biggest thing with airborne forces is mental toughness and aggression. Lots of very long TABS (tactical advance to battle) which means man packing everything you need over what ever the distance is, and being fit enough at the end of that to carry out the mission. That is done in the battalion. Regularly. Lots of forced marches with very heavy packs and assaults at the end or a challenging range shoot at the end. Airborne forces bring some qualities to the army that other units don't, and unless you have been part of one it's very hard to explain it. If you don't want to be there, you are gone, it's as easy as handing in your wings, but in other infantry units, you could be stuck in a job you don't want to be in.
The aggressive thing is next level, it's nessasary as airborne units don't usually have the back up of field artillery etc of regular line units, so again, the actual para role is neiche.
However, of course they can still be used as light infantry, air mobile by helo, or motorised via use of car, and 3 RAR did this. I remember jumping into Victoria River Downs, and patrolling and marrying up with 2 Cav M113s, and continuing as mounted infantry until that mission was complete, then chopper's back to RAAF Katherine, a couple days rest, then back out to another AO. Airborne forces are much more flexible than most people realise, we had a saying, "if we were any more flexible, we could suck our own dicks".

 

[Volkodav]

If the infantry guys are to drive and maintain the vehicles, you could argue that they could run their own IET course in the battalion.
The average grunt operating out of a vehicle would take next to no extra training , a brief exercise would cover that. It's the maintaining the vehicles and learning how to crew the things that takes time, and drivers courses and CC courses can be run in house just like any specialist course. Extra reg sigs 6 wk course, needed, not sure about drivers course and CC but imagine also about 6 weeks. Each section responsible for the vehicle maintenance, learn in house, tactics covered by CC, de bussing and assaulting and working with the vehicle easily covered by normal exercises, starting at a basic level and working up throughout the cycle of the year.
A basic Para course is 3 weeks. 7-9 jumps including a night jump or 2. That's easy. It's the bigger picture of working as an airborne force, like rally procedure on the DZ, tac loading the aircraft, and working ad hoc when plans go to shite. The biggest thing with airborne forces is mental toughness and aggression. Lots of very long TABS (tactical advance to battle) which means man packing everything you need over what ever the distance is, and being fit enough at the end of that to carry out the mission. That is done in the battalion. Regularly. Lots of forced marches with very heavy packs and assaults at the end or a challenging range shoot at the end. Airborne forces bring some qualities to the army that other units don't, and unless you have been part of one it's very hard to explain it. If you don't want to be there, you are gone, it's as easy as handing in your wings, but in other infantry units, you could be stuck in a job you don't want to be in.
The aggressive thing is next level, it's nessasary as airborne units don't usually have the back up of field artillery etc of regular line units, so again, the actual para role is neiche.
However, of course they can still be used as light infantry, air mobile by helo, or motorised via use of car, and 3 RAR did this. I remember jumping into Victoria River Downs, and patrolling and marrying up with 2 Cav M113s, and continuing as mounted infantry until that mission was complete, then chopper's back to RAAF Katherine, a couple days rest, then back out to another AO. Airborne forces are much more flexible than most people realise, we had a saying, "if we were any more flexible, we could suck our own dicks".

You hit the nail on the head there, 3 RAR were able to do what they did because of lots of training, lots of hard work and practicing the skills continually, exactly what armoured infantry will need to do.

My argument is that the more complex the role, the more time needs to be spent learning and honing the required skills. Armoured infantry need to be fully trained and qualified infantry, they also need to learn the specifics of operating with armoured vehicles, while still maintaining a level of familiarisation with other skills and methods of deployment. This is nothing you would not expect a professional soldier to be able to do, but that is the key, a professional soldier can learn and practice the required skills, achieving a high level of competency.

To me it makes more sense to leave the complex difficult roles that require a lot of training and practice to maintain proficiency to the full time soldiers, while the part time soldiers can become proficient in less complex roles, i.e. light infantry, supported by light cavalry (also reserves) with IMVs. It just makes sense.

 

[ADMk2]

You hit the nail on the head there, 3 RAR were able to do what they did because of lots of training, lots of hard work and practicing the skills continually, exactly what armoured infantry will need to do.

My argument is that the more complex the role, the more time needs to be spent learning and honing the required skills. Armoured infantry need to be fully trained and qualified infantry, they also need to learn the specifics of operating with armoured vehicles, while still maintaining a level of familiarisation with other skills and methods of deployment. This is nothing you would not expect a professional soldier to be able to do, but that is the key, a professional soldier can learn and practice the required skills, achieving a high level of competency.

To me it makes more sense to leave the complex difficult roles that require a lot of training and practice to maintain proficiency to the full time soldiers, while the part time soldiers can become proficient in less complex roles, i.e. light infantry, supported by light cavalry (also reserves) with IMVs. It just makes sense.

Collective training in the various roles is also crucial. It’s necessary of course for the individual soldier to have these skillsets, but the units and sub-units need time to train collectively in these varying roles, including lead up training specific to a particular exercise or deployment. The sum of all the parts, and all that…

 

[swerve]

...
To me it makes more sense to leave the complex difficult roles that require a lot of training and practice to maintain proficiency to the full time soldiers, while the part time soldiers can become proficient in less complex roles, i.e. light infantry, supported by light cavalry (also reserves) with IMVs. It just makes sense.

Except, of course, where the soldiers/sailors/etc. will perform much the same roles in the armed forces as they do in civilian life, such as medical personnel & various technical roles. Reserve training can then focus on the specifically military aspects of their roles, expecting them to maintain proficiency in their specialities in their civilian jobs.

 

[Volkodav]

Except, of course, where the soldiers/sailors/etc. will perform much the same roles in the armed forces as they do in civilian life, such as medical personnel & various technical roles. Reserve training can then focus on the specifically military aspects of their roles, expecting them to maintain proficiency in their specialities
in their civilian jobs.

True, another area where reserves earn their keep. A line I recall hearing once from a senior, cross qualified civilian nurse practitioner who was being told how to suck eggs by a full time paramedic, "I do your job as a hobby, I would like to see you try to do mine".

The thing is that there really is no civilian equivalent to Infantry, or armour for that matter. If you are a reservist you have to support a full time career and learn the often very different skills for your military career as an infantryman or vehicle crewman.