Royal New Zealand Air Force

[Todjaeger]

My point was that for the primary defence of NZ, ( the primary role of any defence Force ) a frigate has a very limited influence due to the amount of time it takes to reach any point of threat and the limited range of its weapons. the combat aircraft can cover a very wide area very quickly and effectively It is noted that the strike aircraft are not much use against Subs,but frigates are only effective against subs in their immediate area and there are a hell of a lot of things frigates are not effective against., a frigate has a very limited area of influence and we have a very large area both on land and the sea around us to consider. I think that doubling the defence vote is a little over the top. the last figures I had on the cost of strike wing was those supplied to the parliamentary select committee in 1998, that out of a defence operational vote of $1.1 B strike wing cost $50m ,$30 m for the skyhawks and $20m for the Macchi's I know Helen Clark claimed they cost 10% of the defence budget but she included depreciation , the capital charge, proportioned charges and the strike wing share of the cost of running Ohakea, to justify her intention to close strike wing down. While these figures are very old percentage wise they would not be to far out.
Of interest the cost of running a frigate then , from memory was about $22m. and a treasury report about 2003/4 note that the actual savings for defence accrued by the scrapping of strike wing was $30m per year.

The defence situation will very much depend on what form the hostiles take, and where they are located. A modern incarnation of the old A-4 Skyhawk ACF could potentially handle some maritime strike and air to air engagements in and around NZ, or if the the ACF got forward deployed somewhere.

A frigate could potentially handle surface, subsurface, and aerial targets, all depending on where the frigate was located relative to the threat(s). A potential key advantage for something like a frigate is that they can operate for prolonged periods of time a long way away from NZ proper, which could allow the NZDF to use the 'tyranny of distance' to it's own advantage for defence in depth.

If the primary threat would be a maritime threat, then it would be worth devoting more resources to both maritime surveillance and strike. Given the surveillance capabilities of aircraft like the Poseidon, as well as the strike capabilities when armed with standoff munitions like the Harpoon, SLAM-ER, or any of the other PGM's which could be integrated... I would still go with more armed MPA than fighters to cover maritime strike. Even within NZ's EEZ, the NZDF would need some asset to detect and alert NZ to a potential threat, before the ACF could be queued for a response. IMO it would be better (and likely faster) if the surveillance asset responsible for the initial detection was able to deliver a response. An AShM salvo launched from within the MPA's detection range, but well outside the engagement range of the target ship's possible air defence systems seems a better option than waiting for fighter aircraft armed with the same AShM to get close enough to detect and launch on the target. An MPA also provides the potential to engage in ASW operations.

 

[MrConservative]

Getting back to the FAMC one of the key acquisition variable is the ongoing O & S cost. This is where the mature C-130J design for the tactical component comes to the fore.

The C-130H in a 2002 paper published by the USAF Institute of Technology found that the J's O&S cost was 50% less per annum than the legacy H and its flight-line availability was improved. This will translate to millions of dollars saved p.a and increased utilisation rates for 40Sqd.

One C-130 variant yet to be discussed here is the new C-130J-SOF which does tick many of the FAMC requirement boxes other than outsize loads and has synergies with the FASC RFI as well.

Lockheed Martin Announces C-130J-SOF Super Hercules Dedicated to Supporting International Special Operations Forces - Jun 20, 2017

Likely to cost USD$85m (MDE only) according to DoD Buzz.

https://www.dodbuzz.com/2017/06/20/lockheed-c130j-sof-international-specops/

 

[MrConservative]

If the threat level was such that P-8's were engaging targets in our back yard then it is not just a little late to assume that they alone will save the day.

 

[Todjaeger]

If the threat level was such that P-8's were engaging targets in our back yard then it is not just a little late to assume that they alone will save the day.

Particularly since a P-8 could potentially be on station 1,200 n miles away from base, detect a target a further 200+ n miles away, and then engage it once it came within ~145 n miles of the P-8. This is assuming a SLAM-ER was used. If something like LRASM was used (~259 n mile range), the engagement envelope could equal or potentially exceed the MPA's detection range.

In point of fact, if a target was engaged relatively close to NZ, a likely reason would be that the target was not detected until it got that close. More likely though would be that the target was either not ID'd or confirmed as a threat until it got close enough for someone to really take a look at it.

 

[Rob c]

If the threat level was such that P-8's were engaging targets in our back yard then it is not just a little late to assume that they alone will save the day.

I agree with you on this as we would have a small number of these aircraft whether P8 or P1 I would say that risking such a high value asset in a combat situation is not something you want to do if possible. I remember the thinking back in the early 1980's when the air force was looking at anti ship options they chose the maveric over the harpoon on the basis that it was better to lose a Skyhawk than a far more valuable Orion. For the MPA to project their full value they need backup.

 

[Rob c]

Particularly since a P-8 could potentially be on station 1,200 n miles away from base, detect a target a further 200+ n miles away, and then engage it once it came within ~145 n miles of the P-8. This is assuming a SLAM-ER was used. If something like LRASM was used (~259 n mile range), the engagement envelope could equal or potentially exceed the MPA's detection range.

In point of fact, if a target was engaged relatively close to NZ, a likely reason would be that the target was not detected until it got that close. More likely though would be that the target was either not ID'd or confirmed as a threat until it got close enough for someone to really take a look at it.

There will always be individual situations where one platform is superior to a different platform, but overall the simple fact is that a frigate has a small area of influence and gets their slowly and an ACF has a very much larger are of influence and gets their quickly. From a defence of NZ point of view a frigate can control a small fraction of sea on the approaches, an ACF can exercise control over the total over the total approaches to NZ, both over the sea and land and deal with surface and air threats.

 

[Todjaeger]

There will always be individual situations where one platform is superior to a different platform, but overall the simple fact is that a frigate has a small area of influence and gets their slowly and an ACF has a very much larger are of influence and gets their quickly. From a defence of NZ point of view a frigate can control a small fraction of sea on the approaches, an ACF can exercise control over the total over the total approaches to NZ, both over the sea and land and deal with surface and air threats.

We are approaching this with some assumptions which are entirely different, which in turn leads to adopting different solutions because the underlying premise is different.

A key capability for the NZDF to have in my set of assumptions is to detect and have the ability to start responding to a threat to NZ while it (the threat) is as far away from NZ as possible. The surveillance and long-range capabilities are IMO significantly more important than the potential rapid response an ACF could provide.

To give an idea of how problematic range in the NZ context could be, an F-16 has a combat radius of ~300 n miles. This would mean that hypothetical Kiwi F-16's based at Whenuapai would be close to the edge of their combat radius responding to something just off the coast of Wellington. Those same F-16's would find Invercargill well outside their combat radius if operating from Woodbourne.

What that in turn would mean is that in order for such a hypothetical ACF to provide the needed coverage of the air and maritime approaches to NZ either additional RNZAF facilities are needed distributed around the country, or aerial tankers are needed distributed around the country to refuel the ACF while in flight. The target will still get closer to NZ than I would like before land-based fighters could realistically respond.

There is also the matter of situational awareness. Before the ACF could respond to a threat, that threat needs to be at a minimum detected. At present MPA and the frigates (especially if naval helicopters are embarked) can provide a much larger area under surveillance than nose-mounted fighter radars can. The ACF on its own could not provide the level of surveillance required without a massive number of aircraft. This means that the ACF would be reliant upon other assets to detect what might require an ACF response and provide information on where a potential target is. Most of the platforms which could provide that target data, could also be used to respond to the target in place of waiting for the ACF to arrive and respond. About the only threat where this might not work would be if the threat was an aerial one like a hijacked airliner or a hostile bomber... At the same time though, detecting potential aerial targets would require either a ground/naval-based air search radar, or an AEW capability which NZ does not currently have. Given the horizon limits for ground & sea-based radars, this would mean either ringing NZ with radar arrays (ATC radar systems alone are insufficient) and assuming that pilot of a hostile incoming aircraft would not fly low to stay below the radar horizon as long as possible, or adding an AEW capability as well as an ACF. A third potential option would be to fund or purchase OTHR radar systems or OTHR track data from Australia.

Given the limited funding available for the NZDF to purchase new kit, operate and then sustain that kit when coupled with the high cost for all the systems required for an ACF to provide an effective response, as well as the unlikely nature where an ACF would be the best/only response... I just do not think advocating for an ACF at this point is advisable. Had the ACF never been disbanded, then allocating funding to sustain the capability and replace the aircraft would be a very different story. At this point though, with the loss of the corporate ACF knowledge, to raise it again seems too high a price for too little a likely return, particularly when there are a wide range of still extant capabilities which requiring funding lest they too get disbanded.

 

[ngatimozart]

Whilst people have been suggesting the C295W and / or the C-27J for the FAMC, what do people think about replacing the King Airs with the CN235.
The CN235 is the precursor to the C295 and Airbus still manufacture it in Indonesia. The USCG operate a variant, HC-144 Ocean Sentry.

Although the CN-235 was initially the result of cooperation between CASA and ITPN of Indonesia, CASA has developed its own series and versions, with increases in weights, ground performance improvements, etc. CASA's aircraft is therefore the product of continuous development, not just in the military sphere, but also in civil areas and this is illustrated by the fact of having been approved by the FAA, FAR-25, JAR-25 and the Australian CAA among others. The CN-235 is the ideal platform for the development and integration of a wide variety of versions like the Maritime Patrol Version (PERSUADER) Electronic Warfare (ESM/ECM and ELINT/COMINT), Early Warning, Navigation School, Photogrammetry, etc. The CN-235 is a leader in its class, with more than 220 aircraft sold to 29 operators and about 500,000 flight hours.
https://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/row/cn-235.htm

It could undertake all the roles that the King Airs currently do with the added advantage of being able to carry pallets / small vehicles. If we were to use modular sensors and palletised work stations, we could acquire say 8 CN235s and 3 or 4 sets of sensors and workstations so that the sensors and workstations could be moved between aircraft with ease. range could be extended by slinging external tanks underneath the wings. Also for SAR work liferafts etc., can easily be dropped via the ramp.

 

[ngatimozart]

I think that with all the discussion about the P-8 and ACF, we are forgetting that replacements for the C-130H(NZ) should have a higher priority at the moment than the P-3K2 replacements, because the Hercs have less time left than the Orions, especially according to the RFI, the Herc replacement is supposed to have one aircraft in NZ by the end of February 2020. That's only 2 years and 3 months away. Both the strategic airlifter and the FASC have a greater time frame with the first strategic airlift no due until February 2024 and the FAS around 2025.

Regarding the ACF argument around providing something to deal with a rogue aircraft in NZ airspace, there is no reason why the FASC platform could not be fitted for AAMs and fitted with if required. The FASC platform could undertake CAS if required and also maritime strike.

 

[Todjaeger]

Whilst people have been suggesting the C295W and / or the C-27J for the FAMC, what do people think about replacing the King Airs with the CN235.
The CN235 is the precursor to the C295 and Airbus still manufacture it in Indonesia. The USCG operate a variant, HC-144 Ocean Sentry.

It could undertake all the roles that the King Airs currently do with the added advantage of being able to carry pallets / small vehicles. If we were to use modular sensors and palletised work stations, we could acquire say 8 CN235s and 3 or 4 sets of sensors and workstations so that the sensors and workstations could be moved between aircraft with ease. range could be extended by slinging external tanks underneath the wings. Also for SAR work liferafts etc., can easily be dropped via the ramp.

Where I would be concerned is the relative acquisition and sustainment costs. IIRC a USCG HC-144 plus the workstation pallets for the MPS role costs something like USD$50 mil. with a 'green' airframe before having FITS and the sensors installed cost ~USD$30 mil. Granted AFAIK much of the work is/was being done in the US which could drive the price up, the airframe cost alone is nearly 4x that of a Beech King Air 350ER.

If the funding could be found and committed to both acquire and then operate/sustain a CN-235 variant with capabilities similar to the USCG's Ocean Sentry, I would be quite to have a number purchased to cover portions of the tactical airlift and lower tier maritime surveillance requirements.

Purchasing or perhaps leasing a small number of King Airs for initial MEPT would probably still be a good idea though, as I suspect a smaller and lighter aircraft which is readily available in the civilian market would be significantly less to operate and sustain for just an initial training role.

 

[Novascotiaboy]

Over time I have advocated on this forum for the acquisition of aircraft in various sizes for the NZDF. I know it costs more. I know the NZDF isnt what it used to be. I also know that the citizenry of any civilized country will not be too concerned about the purchase and sustainment of transport aircraft. They get the benefits these aircraft provide.

For roughly NZ$50 million a C295W can be acquired. These aircraft are not suitable replacements for the Hercules but are multi purpose aircraft that have had a place in NZ operations. The 295 is only slightly more than the 235 so why not lay out the cash for the improved capabilities if the cash is available.

I have witnessed the effectiveness of the B350 in operation here in Atlantic Canada. It works. It provides cost effective EEZ patrol with a data transfer capability allowing its eyes to be seen from shore.

But as good as it is i agree the larger platform has its place as a multi tasker able to be a transport and second tier MPA if equipped with FITS. Numbers have a strength all their own. One aircraft cant be in multiple places.

As to comments about an ACF I just dont see the value for the money. IMHO there are many more places the money would have a greater impact. My preference is additional first tier MPA. As has been stated these aircraft offer the greatest capability to your government. Six aircraft today should be replaced with six aircraft when the time comes. Still not convinced of the P8 for NZ but so be it. I do not see NZ taking advantage of the changed CONOPS based on USN operations. To me the P1 best meets the needs and operating envelopes that NZ needs now and in the future. The airframe is a taxi to get the sensors onsite. There will be interoperability between platforms because the Japanese regularly talk to their US allies in a very hot area of the world. The flight profile of the P8 doesnt match the day to day needs of typical NZ operations in support of SAR, HADR and sovereinty patrols.

 

[t68]

The airframe is a taxi to get the sensors onsite.

How is that any different from a P8

There will be interoperability between platforms because the Japanese regularly talk to their US allies in a very hot area of the world. The flight profile of the P8 doesnt match the day to day needs of typical NZ operations in support of SAR, HADR and sovereinty patrols.

I had a view similar to that but GF gave a fair significant insight on the complexity of interoperability of the P1 and the P8 its not as straight forward as we think (pretty sure its on this thread about 12 mths ago)

 

[Rob c]

We are approaching this with some assumptions which are entirely different, which in turn leads to adopting different solutions because the underlying premise is different.

A key capability for the NZDF to have in my set of assumptions is to detect and have the ability to start responding to a threat to NZ while it (the threat) is as far away from NZ as possible. The surveillance and long-range capabilities are IMO significantly more important than the potential rapid response an ACF could provide.

To give an idea of how problematic range in the NZ context could be, an F-16 has a combat radius of ~300 n miles. This would mean that hypothetical Kiwi F-16's based at Whenuapai would be close to the edge of their combat radius responding to something just off the coast of Wellington. Those same F-16's would find Invercargill well outside their combat radius if operating from Woodbourne.

What that in turn would mean is that in order for such a hypothetical ACF to provide the needed coverage of the air and maritime approaches to NZ either additional RNZAF facilities are needed distributed around the country, or aerial tankers are needed distributed around the country to refuel the ACF while in flight. The target will still get closer to NZ than I would like before land-based fighters could realistically respond.

There is also the matter of situational awareness. Before the ACF could respond to a threat, that threat needs to be at a minimum detected. At present MPA and the frigates (especially if naval helicopters are embarked) can provide a much larger area under surveillance than nose-mounted fighter radars can. The ACF on its own could not provide the level of surveillance required without a massive number of aircraft. This means that the ACF would be reliant upon other assets to detect what might require an ACF response and provide information on where a potential target is. Most of the platforms which could provide that target data, could also be used to respond to the target in place of waiting for the ACF to arrive and respond. About the only threat where this might not work would be if the threat was an aerial one like a hijacked airliner or a hostile bomber... At the same time though, detecting potential aerial targets would require either a ground/naval-based air search radar, or an AEW capability which NZ does not currently have. Given the horizon limits for ground & sea-based radars, this would mean either ringing NZ with radar arrays (ATC radar systems alone are insufficient) and assuming that pilot of a hostile incoming aircraft would not fly low to stay below the radar horizon as long as possible, or adding an AEW capability as well as an ACF. A third potential option would be to fund or purchase OTHR radar systems or OTHR track data from Australia.

Given the limited funding available for the NZDF to purchase new kit, operate and then sustain that kit when coupled with the high cost for all the systems required for an ACF to provide an effective response, as well as the unlikely nature where an ACF would be the best/only response... I just do not think advocating for an ACF at this point is advisable. Had the ACF never been disbanded, then allocating funding to sustain the capability and replace the aircraft would be a very different story. At this point though, with the loss of the corporate ACF knowledge, to raise it again seems too high a price for too little a likely return, particularly when there are a wide range of still extant capabilities which requiring funding lest they too get disbanded.

I disagree with you in some area's. Your Radius of action quoted is a poor example dictated by its load and lack of underwing tanks. There is this article which gives some of the weapon combinations and the radius achieved for both the F16 and the F15.
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/documented_briefings/2007/DB102.pdf


For instance gives a radius of 900 km with 4 jadam 1000,s plus two 370g tanks and with 2 jadam's and 610 tanks 1000 km + The air intercept with large tanks is even greater.
I do not dispute that the detection ability is part of the equation and the air force has signalled a desire for air awareness in the FASC. It is noted that the Indian P8's were modified to achieve that and the P1 has an inherently good AEW ability.
It is realised that the road back to a fully functioning ACF will be significantly long but if you don't start you will never finish. My personal opinion is that our primary defence should be to detect possible threats and have the ability to control or destroy those threats.

 

[Rob c]

I think that with all the discussion about the P-8 and ACF, we are forgetting that replacements for the C-130H(NZ) should have a higher priority at the moment than the P-3K2 replacements, because the Hercs have less time left than the Orions, especially according to the RFI, the Herc replacement is supposed to have one aircraft in NZ by the end of February 2020. That's only 2 years and 3 months away. Both the strategic airlifter and the FASC have a greater time frame with the first strategic airlift no due until February 2024 and the FAS around 2025.

Regarding the ACF argument around providing something to deal with a rogue aircraft in NZ airspace, there is no reason why the FASC platform could not be fitted for AAMs and fitted with if required. The FASC platform could undertake CAS if required and also maritime strike.

The only problem with fitting the FASC platforms with AAM's is they don.t have any speed advantage over a possible target to consistently achieve an intercept. they may get lucky some of the time but would mis out more often than not. Good for self defence possibly.
The C130 replacement should be first cab off the rank at this stage unless the pollies throw a spanner in the works.

 

[Todjaeger]

How is that any different from a P8

In broad terms, the airframe for something like an MPA or AEW is less important than the sensor and avionics fitouts, provided of course that the airframe can provide the needed range and loiter times to be useful. In the case of the P-8 though, having the airframe based on the B737 and with a high degree of commonality is actually a potential advantage since is design is still in large scale production and widely used. This means that parts for maintenance and repair of most of the aircraft systems should be readily available and at fairly reasonable prices.

IMO it is worth noting though that the scope and range of sensor capabilities aboard a P-8 does seem to be superior to every other MPA currently available. In effect, the P-8 has set a new standard in capability.

I had a view similar to that but GF gave a fair significant insight on the complexity of interoperability of the P1 and the P8 its not as straight forward as we think (pretty sure its on this thread about 12 mths ago)

As I understand it the avionics aboard the P-1 was designed to work/communicate with Japanese kit and some extra kit would need to be installed and integrated in order for the P-1 to communicate directly with RNZN, RAN, or USN assets. If the NZDF switched over to using the datalinks Japan uses then the P-1 would likely seamlessly communicate with other NZDF assets.

It is not so much about whether it could not be done, but that such a programme would have a cost and risk to enable a P-1 to have the same degree of communication that a P-8 will have with US, Australian and Kiwi forces. Japan has little incentive to develop and integrate the kit required because their forces do not particularly need it, in part due to the size of the JMSDF and then the tendency for Japan to not deploy forces in international/coalition operations.

 

[Todjaeger]

I disagree with you in some area's. Your Radius of action quoted is a poor example dictated by its load and lack of underwing tanks. There is this article which gives some of the weapon combinations and the radius achieved for both the F16 and the F15.
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/documented_briefings/2007/DB102.pdf


For instance gives a radius of 900 km with 4 jadam 1000,s plus two 370g tanks and with 2 jadam's and 610 tanks 1000 km + The air intercept with large tanks is even greater.
I do not dispute that the detection ability is part of the equation and the air force has signalled a desire for air awareness in the FASC. It is noted that the Indian P8's were modified to achieve that and the P1 has an inherently good AEW ability.
It is realised that the road back to a fully functioning ACF will be significantly long but if you don't start you will never finish. My personal opinion is that our primary defence should be to detect possible threats and have the ability to control or destroy those threats.

I took a look at the RAND report you linked to, and while the data is interesting I suspect the only area where it would be relevant is for air intercept/interdiction missions. The data in that report was from 1993 and the munitions load out for ground support utilized JDAMs which today would be unsuitable for many maritime strike mission profiles. The max effective range for a JDAM is ~28 km with GPS/INS guidance, though some have also been fitted with laser seekers. There has been a JDAM-ER developed which extends the range out to ~80km, but in either case not only would guidance to strike a ship be problematic, but the max launch ranges could still be within the protective air defence umbrella of a hostile warship.

While my hypothetical loadout did not include drop tanks, I did consider standoff AShM in the size/class of the AGM-84 Harpoon. Even with that, it would be possible for the launching aircraft to already be within the area air defence of a targeted ship, if the ship was armed with something like the SA-N-20 SAM.

If things devolve and a shooting war breaks out, one has to consider the use of standoff munitions. Unless air control (and this includes DEAD GBAD systems) has been achieved, it would likely be too dangerous to the strike aircraft and crew to get close enough to a target to use a non-standoff munition.

 

[Rob c]

I took a look at the RAND report you linked to, and while the data is interesting I suspect the only area where it would be relevant is for air intercept/interdiction missions. The data in that report was from 1993 and the munitions load out for ground support utilized JDAMs which today would be unsuitable for many maritime strike mission profiles. The max effective range for a JDAM is ~28 km with GPS/INS guidance, though some have also been fitted with laser seekers. There has been a JDAM-ER developed which extends the range out to ~80km, but in either case not only would guidance to strike a ship be problematic, but the max launch ranges could still be within the protective air defence umbrella of a hostile warship.

While my hypothetical loadout did not include drop tanks, I did consider standoff AShM in the size/class of the AGM-84 Harpoon. Even with that, it would be possible for the launching aircraft to already be within the area air defence of a targeted ship, if the ship was armed with something like the SA-N-20 SAM.

If things devolve and a shooting war breaks out, one has to consider the use of standoff munitions. Unless air control (and this includes DEAD GBAD systems) has been achieved, it would likely be too dangerous to the strike aircraft and crew to get close enough to a target to use a non-standoff munition.

The weapon its self is not relevant to the combat radius, the important issues are the weight and drag profile of the weapons load and those with similar drag/weight profiles will allow the aircraft to have a similar combat radius, the other thing to keep in mind when assessing the effective range of a ships defence is the radar horizon. A frigate sized ship will typically pick up an aircraft flying at 50 ft at about 30 km so the aircraft has the option of carrying a weapon that exceeds the max missile range of the ship or coming in lower under the radar horizon. The aircraft can get in closer than the 30 km due the ship reaction time and the missile flight time and with good planning can be back below and beyond the radar horizon before the missile arrives.
another issue with surfaced launched missiles is that their range drops dramatically as the altitude of the target drops. the sea level range can drop as low as 25%-35% of the high altitude range due to their high speed in very much more dense air. So some missiles have their high altitude range quote while others quote the minimum maximum rang at low altitude.

 

[Todjaeger]

The weapon its self is not relevant to the combat radius, the important issues are the weight and drag profile of the weapons load and those with similar drag/weight profiles will allow the aircraft to have a similar combat radius, the other thing to keep in mind when assessing the effective range of a ships defence is the radar horizon. A frigate sized ship will typically pick up an aircraft flying at 50 ft at about 30 km so the aircraft has the option of carrying a weapon that exceeds the max missile range of the ship or coming in lower under the radar horizon. The aircraft can get in closer than the 30 km due the ship reaction time and the missile flight time and with good planning can be back below and beyond the radar horizon before the missile arrives.
another issue with surfaced launched missiles is that their range drops dramatically as the altitude of the target drops. the sea level range can drop as low as 25%-35% of the high altitude range due to their high speed in very much more dense air. So some missiles have their high altitude range quote while others quote the minimum maximum rang at low altitude.

I tend to base my guestimates on worst-case scenarios.

With that in mind, planning on remaining below the radar horizon to avoid detection rapidly stops being a viable tactic without external support.

The sensor footprint of a modern frigate or destroyer alone is going far exceed the footprint of a fighter or strike aircraft. That is a function of the field of view of the radar(s), the size of the arrays, and their power output. What this means for a fighter or strike aircraft, especially one deliberately trying to stay below the radar horizon, is that some other asset is going to have to detect, track, and relay the ship's position. That other asset, if it can 'see' the warship, can most likely also be seen by the warship.

Where the wings really start to come off is if the warship has an embarked naval helicopter. The radar horizon for an OHP FFG with ~22 m radar mast height for something flying at an altitude of~15 m is ~35 km. If that same vessel has a naval helicopter aloft at an altitude of ~3,000 m, then the radar horizon using the helicopter's search radar goes out to ~240 km for an object flying at an altitude of 15 m.

So not only do the initial detection problems remain, but so do the problems a fighter or strike aircraft would have getting close enough to a hostile warship to even detect it or getting a non-standoff munition warshot off.

This all ties back in with what a number of us on DT have been talking about for several years, about how warfighting is no longer a platform-level event, but a system-level event. This is also why there has been so much development of system capabilities like comms, datalinks, a push towards network centric warfare, and CEC.

This is also why I have been advocating for more/more capable frigates and MPA having a much higher priority than reestablishing an ACF. If the NZDF does not acquire the proper type of kit and in sufficient quantities to engage in network centric warfare, and then becomes proficient at using such capabilities, the NZDF risks becoming deaf, dumb, and blind in future conflicts.

Just imagine the following hypothetical situation.

The NZDF has re-balanced NZ forces to raise an ACF again, but had to accept a reduction in the frigate and MPA forces. Given the time it would take to raise an ACF and having it reach FOC if things got started now, the timing would coincide with when the FFH's and P-3K Orion's replacements need to commence.

Given events in Africa, the Mideast, South Asia, the SCS or ECS, tensions have risen significantly and if hostilities have not already broken out, they are about to. In order to demonstrate a capability (and a latent threat) a nation with interests in region which NZ would oppose at least diplomatically and politically if not also militarily decides to carry out a strike to neutralize the NZDF's ability to participate and sap the will of NZ to be involved. In many respects, this would be much like what Japan attempted to achieve with the strike on Pearl Harbor in 1941.

However, given the advances in weaponry and the very small size of the NZDF, a hostile country would not need to send an armada like the IJN did in 1941. Instead, a single surface vessel armed with LACM like the C-602 (or another design) could be sent. Targeting RNZAF bases from several hundred kilometres out to sea, the NZDF would be unlikely to either detect the hostile vessel or the inbound strike due to the reallocation of resources to establish the ACF having a negative impact on the NZ surveillance capability causing a reduction in situational awareness. With the launch of perhaps one or two dozen LACM, facilities and aircraft at the three RNZAF bases could be damaged or destroyed leaving the NZDF with little or no ability to strike back. Making the situation worse is that such a strike would likely make the NZDF surveillance capability dramatically worse, blinding NZ to future threats to an even greater extent.

There are other permutations of the above scenario and I do not consider such a scenario likely, but it does illustrate some potential capability gaps could be exploited to neutralize NZ.

 

[ngatimozart]

I'm just flying the CN235 kite to see where it goes and whether it's worthwhile pursuing such a path.

Where I would be concerned is the relative acquisition and sustainment costs. IIRC a USCG HC-144 plus the workstation pallets for the MPS role costs something like USD$50 mil. with a 'green' airframe before having FITS and the sensors installed cost ~USD$30 mil. Granted AFAIK much of the work is/was being done in the US which could drive the price up, the airframe cost alone is nearly 4x that of a Beech King Air 350ER.

If the funding could be found and committed to both acquire and then operate/sustain a CN-235 variant with capabilities similar to the USCG's Ocean Sentry, I would be quite to have a number purchased to cover portions of the tactical airlift and lower tier maritime surveillance requirements.

Purchasing or perhaps leasing a small number of King Airs for initial MEPT would probably still be a good idea though, as I suspect a smaller and lighter aircraft which is readily available in the civilian market would be significantly less to operate and sustain for just an initial training role.

Regardless of whether the King Air or the CN235 is utilised, sensors, work stations etc., will have to be procured. The point of them being modular is that less of these have to be acquired than the number of aircraft being acquired. Also the operating system doesn't have to be FITS. Possibly it could be the current one that the P-3K2, or its replacement, use. It would simplify training and conversion of students from the training environment to the operational environment. Regardless of the platform for the training / 2nd tier MPA role, NZDF is / will be providing the sensors as GFE.

For roughly NZ$50 million a C295W can be acquired. These aircraft are not suitable replacements for the Hercules but are multi purpose aircraft that have had a place in NZ operations. The 295 is only slightly more than the 235 so why not lay out the cash for the improved capabilities if the cash is available.

I have witnessed the effectiveness of the B350 in operation here in Atlantic Canada. It works. It provides cost effective EEZ patrol with a data transfer capability allowing its eyes to be seen from shore.

But as good as it is i agree the larger platform has its place as a multi tasker able to be a transport and second tier MPA if equipped with FITS. Numbers have a strength all their own. One aircraft cant be in multiple places.

The reason why I have gone with the CN235 is precisely because of its size. In NZ's case the C295 would be over kill and the CN235 would have the ability to move small sized loads the the current Hercs do. Big is not always better.

As to comments about an ACF I just dont see the value for the money. IMHO there are many more places the money would have a greater impact.

At the present point in time I agree, however it is something that most likely will have to be addressed in the near to mid future.

My preference is additional first tier MPA. As has been stated these aircraft offer the greatest capability to your government. Six aircraft today should be replaced with six aircraft when the time comes. Still not convinced of the P8 for NZ but so be it. I do not see NZ taking advantage of the changed CONOPS based on USN operations. To me the P1 best meets the needs and operating envelopes that NZ needs now and in the future. The airframe is a taxi to get the sensors onsite. There will be interoperability between platforms because the Japanese regularly talk to their US allies in a very hot area of the world. The flight profile of the P8 doesn't match the day to day needs of typical NZ operations in support of SAR, HADR and sovereignty patrols.

NZ will most likely follow USN / RAAF CONOPS because that is what will be used in any joint operation. This already happens and to have markedly different CONOPS to your allies / coalition partners makes for difficult integration.

The only problem with fitting the FASC platforms with AAM's is they don.t have any speed advantage over a possible target to consistently achieve an intercept. they may get lucky some of the time but would mis out more often than not. Good for self defence possibly.
The C130 replacement should be first cab off the rank at this stage unless the pollies throw a spanner in the works.

The idea I floated is not for air combat against fats jet peer adversaries; it's for self defence against airborne threats and if needed against a rogue (hijacked) aircraft in NZ airspace.

 

[Rob c]

I tend to base my guestimates on worst-case scenarios.

With that in mind, planning on remaining below the radar horizon to avoid detection rapidly stops being a viable tactic without external support.

The sensor footprint of a modern frigate or destroyer alone is going far exceed the footprint of a fighter or strike aircraft. That is a function of the field of view of the radar(s), the size of the arrays, and their power output. What this means for a fighter or strike aircraft, especially one deliberately trying to stay below the radar horizon, is that some other asset is going to have to detect, track, and relay the ship's position. That other asset, if it can 'see' the warship, can most likely also be seen by the warship.

Where the wings really start to come off is if the warship has an embarked naval helicopter. The radar horizon for an OHP FFG with ~22 m radar mast height for something flying at an altitude of~15 m is ~35 km. If that same vessel has a naval helicopter aloft at an altitude of ~3,000 m, then the radar horizon using the helicopter's search radar goes out to ~240 km for an object flying at an altitude of 15 m.

So not only do the initial detection problems remain, but so do the problems a fighter or strike aircraft would have getting close enough to a hostile warship to even detect it or getting a non-standoff munition warshot off.

This all ties back in with what a number of us on DT have been talking about for several years, about how warfighting is no longer a platform-level event, but a system-level event. This is also why there has been so much development of system capabilities like comms, datalinks, a push towards network centric warfare, and CEC.

This is also why I have been advocating for more/more capable frigates and MPA having a much higher priority than reestablishing an ACF. If the NZDF does not acquire the proper type of kit and in sufficient quantities to engage in network centric warfare, and then becomes proficient at using such capabilities, the NZDF risks becoming deaf, dumb, and blind in future conflicts.

Just imagine the following hypothetical situation.

The NZDF has re-balanced NZ forces to raise an ACF again, but had to accept a reduction in the frigate and MPA forces. Given the time it would take to raise an ACF and having it reach FOC if things got started now, the timing would coincide with when the FFH's and P-3K Orion's replacements need to commence.

Given events in Africa, the Mideast, South Asia, the SCS or ECS, tensions have risen significantly and if hostilities have not already broken out, they are about to. In order to demonstrate a capability (and a latent threat) a nation with interests in region which NZ would oppose at least diplomatically and politically if not also militarily decides to carry out a strike to neutralize the NZDF's ability to participate and sap the will of NZ to be involved. In many respects, this would be much like what Japan attempted to achieve with the strike on Pearl Harbor in 1941.

However, given the advances in weaponry and the very small size of the NZDF, a hostile country would not need to send an armada like the IJN did in 1941. Instead, a single surface vessel armed with LACM like the C-602 (or another design) could be sent. Targeting RNZAF bases from several hundred kilometres out to sea, the NZDF would be unlikely to either detect the hostile vessel or the inbound strike due to the reallocation of resources to establish the ACF having a negative impact on the NZ surveillance capability causing a reduction in situational awareness. With the launch of perhaps one or two dozen LACM, facilities and aircraft at the three RNZAF bases could be damaged or destroyed leaving the NZDF with little or no ability to strike back. Making the situation worse is that such a strike would likely make the NZDF surveillance capability dramatically worse, blinding NZ to future threats to an even greater extent.

There are other permutations of the above scenario and I do not consider such a scenario likely, but it does illustrate some potential capability gaps could be exploited to neutralize NZ.

I agree with most what youve said and as I have always said , first of all we have to detect potential threats so obviously it would be stupid to reduce the ability to detect threats and we should in the long term increase our detection ability. also I favour an increase in the defense budget as do about 39% 0f the population in a recent poll (31% wanted it the same and 30% wanted a reduction) so the increase faction is the largest. I have also said once you detect a threat you need the ability to neutralize that threat whether it is by sea or air because it is a waste of time knowing about a threat if you can do nothing about it. and yes your detection platform would be system connected with your neutralizing platform to achieve the best result.
The frigate helicopter detection ability only comes into play if it is airborne, the majority of the time it is not and if it has a air awareness radar, most don't and they are not at this stage capable of anti aircraft missile fire control, though this may come in the future. however a active radar missile like the sea ceptor could could be fired in the general direction with a reasonable chance of success, however being at low level the engaement range is going to be significantly shorter than high level .
Detect and neutralize is the aim.