Naval Ship & Submarine Propulsion Systems

[gf0012-aust]

Norway has confirmed HDW has won the order for 4 new submarines, based on the 212, delivery between 2025 & 2028, I heard this on the roadio this morning, sorry no link.

Its been on various defence web banners when I was at work, so will be around somewhere

Norway joins forces with Germany to procure new submarines

https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2017/02/norway-teams-germany-new-submarines

Norway picks Germany for partnering on submarine buys - UPI.com

just as a sidebar - there's some hysteria in the press that Australia will get 12 subs by 2030 and the end of the world will have occurred by then

Norway are getting 4 circa same timeframe - and the world won't be ending - and these are off an existing design

reinforces the lack of comprehension by broader media outlets about the issues around building in general

 

[oldsig127]

just as a sidebar - there's some hysteria in the press that Australia will get 12 subs by 2030 and the end of the world will have occurred by then

Norway are getting 4 circa same timeframe - and the world won't be ending - and these are off an existing design reinforces the lack of comprehension by broader media outlets about the issues around building in general

It being only 13 years away and the start of construction still optimistically at least a couple of years away I'd be astonished if we have 12 new subs by then. Maybe we'll match Norway and have four. If all goes well and the production falls swiftly into a two year beat.

oldsig

 

[pussertas]

Powering the future submarine.

Powering the Future of Submarine Fleets
(Source: Australian Department of Defence (DST); issued Sept 05, 2017)
Defence researcher Kane Ivory is charged with establishing DST’s Lithium-ion (Li-ion) Battery Safety Research Facility.

Over the last few years, Ivory and his DST colleagues have been working to build that capability, while collaborating with US experts at the Naval Surface Warfare Centre in the United States.

Australia’s existing Collins Class submarines are conventionally powered by diesel engines and a lead-acid Main Storage Battery. Li-ion batteries are an exciting new technology that many navies around the world are considering for future upgrades of their submarine fleets. The potential benefits of this technology include improved endurance (particularly at sprint speeds), efficiency and operational life, but they come with new safety risks, primarily due to the flammable nature of the electrolyte used in Li-ion batteries.

:dance

 

[ADMk2]

Powering the Future of Submarine Fleets
(Source: Australian Department of Defence (DST); issued Sept 05, 2017)
Defence researcher Kane Ivory is charged with establishing DST’s Lithium-ion (Li-ion) Battery Safety Research Facility.

Over the last few years, Ivory and his DST colleagues have been working to build that capability, while collaborating with US experts at the Naval Surface Warfare Centre in the United States.

Australia’s existing Collins Class submarines are conventionally powered by diesel engines and a lead-acid Main Storage Battery. Li-ion batteries are an exciting new technology that many navies around the world are considering for future upgrades of their submarine fleets. The potential benefits of this technology include improved endurance (particularly at sprint speeds), efficiency and operational life, but they come with new safety risks, primarily due to the flammable nature of the electrolyte used in Li-ion batteries.

:dance

They have spent millions creating this facility 'just in case' we should look to utilise a Li-on based battery tech, eh?

Shyeah! Right...

 

[swerve]

Lithium-ion new? Hardly.

Much more expensive than lead-acid, & needs careful management for safety. I'm wondering when something better will come out for this sort of application.

 

[pussertas]

Sonar for the Barracuda Class Submarines?

The older generation Eledone (technology- based) sonars such as the TSM-2233 are being phased out by newer sonars like the S-Cube and the UMS-3000. (The UMS-3000 appears to be the designation for the system intended for the Barracuda class SSNs and Le Triomphant class SSBNs.)

Forecast International’s market forecasts for the UMS-3000 and S-Cube systems are based upon the procurement of submarines (platforms) that host these sonars, such as the Scorpène class subs under construction for Brazil, India, and Spain. They are also based on expected retrofits and upgrades to various Type 209 submarines.

With the construction of nuclear-powered submarines moving out of its traditionally narrow base, it appears that the S-Cube sonar in particular has become available for export to equip such boats. The requirements for sonars on nuclear-powered submarines differ from those for sonars on diesel-electrics. Developing one sonar from the other is cost-prohibitive unless a contract is already in hand, so S-Cube may have a lock on this emerging sector.

A mere handful of these systems will likely be built over the next few years, with production to total two or three units per year through 2019, followed by production of one unit annually through 2022.

No production is forecast beyond 2022, as more technologically advanced and capable units will likely be available by that time.

 

[Muar River]

Hugh White and others at the Press Gallery gave their view of the status of the new submarine project. Did anyone else listen to presentation and if so can further information be provided?

I caught only end pieces included a suggestion of an interim buy of "off the shelf" Scorpene or German subs with US comms systems plus a submarine tender to overcome range issues. I believe this to be a contingency should there be a delay with the Shortfin Barracuda. This they costed at less than 10bn.

A LOTE of the Collins class is not supported for the reason it would cost 15bn and last 10 years.

I did hear that the new submarines may not be based on the French nuclear sub and may in fact be designed from scratch?

There was a suggestion there is difficulties with the programme re cost, performance and schedule.

 

[hauritz]

Hugh White and others at the Press Gallery gave their view of the status of the new submarine project. Did anyone else listen to presentation and if so can further information be provided?

I caught only end pieces included a suggestion of an interim buy of "off the shelf" Scorpene or German subs with US comms systems plus a submarine tender to overcome range issues. I believe this to be a contingency should there be a delay with the Shortfin Barracuda. This they costed at less than 10bn.

A LOTE of the Collins class is not supported for the reason it would cost 15bn and last 10 years.

I did hear that the new submarines may not be based on the French nuclear sub and may in fact be designed from scratch?

There was a suggestion there is difficulties with the programme re cost, performance and schedule.

First I have heard of it ... but if there is any slippage in the new submarine program we could find ourselves with a big capability gap in the 2030s.

Not sure why would want to pick up any Scorpene or German subs though.

If Australia really found itself in a situation where we desperately needed new subs that were fitted with US weapon systems the obvious answer would be to build extra Collins class subs. The infrastructure is mostly there and the bugs have mostly been sorted.

 

[ADMk2]

Hugh White and others at the Press Gallery gave their view of the status of the new submarine project. Did anyone else listen to presentation and if so can further information be provided?

I caught only end pieces included a suggestion of an interim buy of "off the shelf" Scorpene or German subs with US comms systems plus a submarine tender to overcome range issues. I believe this to be a contingency should there be a delay with the Shortfin Barracuda. This they costed at less than 10bn.

A LOTE of the Collins class is not supported for the reason it would cost 15bn and last 10 years.

I did hear that the new submarines may not be based on the French nuclear sub and may in fact be designed from scratch?

There was a suggestion there is difficulties with the programme re cost, performance and schedule.

Yep, based their plan on publicly known costings and schedules of the Scorpene and their opinion on a life extension of the Collins would be too expensive / too risky.

Accordingy to them, we should introduce a whole new sub type into RAN service as an interim like the Super Hornet decision to mitigate the cost / risk issues of the Future Submarine and a submarine tender we could pre-position to mitigate the range issues of the Scorpene... The report they commissioned is here:

http://www.insighteconomics.com.au/reports/2017_Insight_Economics_Submarine_Report.pdf

 

[alexsa]

Hugh White and others at the Press Gallery gave their view of the status of the new submarine project. Did anyone else listen to presentation and if so can further information be provided?

I caught only end pieces included a suggestion of an interim buy of "off the shelf" Scorpene or German subs with US comms systems plus a submarine tender to overcome range issues. I believe this to be a contingency should there be a delay with the Shortfin Barracuda. This they costed at less than 10bn.

A LOTE of the Collins class is not supported for the reason it would cost 15bn and last 10 years.

I did hear that the new submarines may not be based on the French nuclear sub and may in fact be designed from scratch?

There was a suggestion there is difficulties with the programme re cost, performance and schedule.

This is a privately funded report from those with an axe to grind


No Cookies | The Advertiser


If you look at the "submarines for Australia" website at


www.submarinesforaustralia.com.au

You will see the sponsor (Gary Johnston) is a business man who is pro any option except the Shortfin option but propose looking at the nuclear option.


Not sure small boats and a submarine tender are really going to work in a war environment.

 

[ASSAIL]

Hugh White and others at the Press Gallery gave their view of the status of the new submarine project. Did anyone else listen to presentation and if so can further information be provided?

I caught only end pieces included a suggestion of an interim buy of "off the shelf" Scorpene or German subs with US comms systems plus a submarine tender to overcome range issues. I believe this to be a contingency should there be a delay with the Shortfin Barracuda. This they costed at less than 10bn.

A LOTE of the Collins class is not supported for the reason it would cost 15bn and last 10 years.

I did hear that the new submarines may not be based on the French nuclear sub and may in fact be designed from scratch?

There was a suggestion there is difficulties with the programme re cost, performance and schedule.

I watched the National Press club address by Hugh White and Dennis Keating. They have been funded by a private concern to conduct a study into the future capability problems, as they see it. Their premise is that the will be a resounding capability gap fro 2033 onwards as the Collins retire and the SEA 1000 is introduced. By their reckoning the gap will be substantial and risks losing a sub capability for decades during a period of huge regional uncertainty.

They see enormous risk to the project, risk in performance, cost and timing because of Defence's choice to buy a "nuclear submarine with diesel engines". They say the project is further challenged by a lack of Li batteries and no AIP ( they should have left this one to the experts)

They say all large Defence acquisition have risk in schedule, cost and performance and that SEA 1000 will be no different.

To rectify this risk they suggest that we should build or buy a MOTS submarine, preferably from DCNS and possibly from Germany, but six unit plus a submarine tender, all for $10bn, to plug the capability gap, while still proceeding with a revised plan for SEA 1000.

Despite my views about Hugh Whites strategic ideas generally, I think there was some merit in his point that navy should sacrifice some performance from its submarine fleet in the short term to ensure no capability gap ( he did make the point that where we are now is where we should have been 10 years ago).
He made the analogy that the RAAF did exactly this when F35 was delayed, they chose an interim capability transitioning from the F 111 to Super Hornet.

I thought the presentation was bumbling and simplistic but again, if in their view there will be a decades long capability gap where all expertise is lost, their solution has merit.

I'm waiting to hear Defence's response to their gap proposition.

 

[Redlands18]

Perhaps the strongest natural benefit to basing the Subs in Fremantle is their ability to sail out of Fremantle harbour and dissapear of the face of the Earth. Into the vastness of the Southern Indian Ocean one of the most empty Seas in the world and these people want to use Tenders to tell everyone where and when the Subs are.
Unbelievable.
One AShM and your Sub fleet is useless.

 

[ASSAIL]

Perhaps the strongest natural benefit to basing the Subs in Fremantle is their ability to sail out of Fremantle harbour and dissapear of the face of the Earth. Into the vastness of the Southern Indian Ocean one of the most empty Seas in the world and these people want to use Tenders to tell everyone where and when the Subs are.
Unbelievable.
One AShM and your Sub fleet is useless.

You're correct although delivery of that AShM could be difficult. In a period of rising tension in our region the subs could still "disappear " from somewhere like Yampi Sound in the Kimberley which is very defendable although somewhat hindered by shallow water approaches.
Even before a hot war situation a fleet of shorter range subs could still be based in Darwin with a tender. This gives adequate industrial and recreational support for men and material and the boats could still fulfill many valuable roles.

I'm no supporter but in this case something is better than nothing and if we consider that modern smaller boats have superior capability than our previous Oberons, and that no one complained about the roles they undertook, the proposition has some merit.

 

[ADMk2]

I watched the National Press club address by Hugh White and Dennis Keating. They have been funded by a private concern to conduct a study into the future capability problems, as they see it. Their premise is that the will be a resounding capability gap fro 2033 onwards as the Collins retire and the SEA 1000 is introduced. By their reckoning the gap will be substantial and risks losing a sub capability for decades during a period of huge regional uncertainty.

They see enormous risk to the project, risk in performance, cost and timing because of Defence's choice to buy a "nuclear submarine with diesel engines". They say the project is further challenged by a lack of Li batteries and no AIP ( they should have left this one to the experts)

They say all large Defence acquisition have risk in schedule, cost and performance and that SEA 1000 will be no different.

To rectify this risk they suggest that we should build or buy a MOTS submarine, preferably from DCNS and possibly from Germany, but six unit plus a submarine tender, all for $10bn, to plug the capability gap, while still proceeding with a revised plan for SEA 1000.

Despite my views about Hugh Whites strategic ideas generally, I think there was some merit in his point that navy should sacrifice some performance from its submarine fleet in the short term to ensure no capability gap ( he did make the point that where we are now is where we should have been 10 years ago).
He made the analogy that the RAAF did exactly this when F35 was delayed, they chose an interim capability transitioning from the F 111 to Super Hornet.

I thought the presentation was bumbling and simplistic but again, if in their view there will be a decades long capability gap where all expertise is lost, their solution has merit.

I'm waiting to hear Defence's response to their gap proposition.

If they bother responding at all I’m sure it will be along the lines that any life extension of the Collins will in fact be cheaper, easier, more aligned with our existing force structure and naval capabilities, will not have the interoperability issues that a new un-modified French type will introduce, will not have the developmental risk that any new-build submarine has and will positively influence ASC’s future capability to build local submarines, whereas an overseas purchase won’t.

They seem to think you can just pick a submarine off a shelf and it will be perfectly fine. Perhaps they should have ‘consulted’ with India before they threw this out as an idea (as to how their Scorpene submarine project is proceeding) and perhaps with some actual naval experts (if any would talk to them) on the viability of a submarine tender in the A2/AD environment within the Asia Pacific region that they see as so dangerous...

It seems to me this discussion is about 18 -24 months too late and if it ever had any chance of getting up was probably before Government went full steam ahead on the future submarine project.

 

[alexsa]

You're correct although delivery of that AShM could be difficult. In a period of rising tension in our region the subs could still "disappear " from somewhere like Yampi Sound in the Kimberley which is very defendable although somewhat hindered by shallow water approaches.
Even before a hot war situation a fleet of shorter range subs could still be based in Darwin with a tender. This gives adequate industrial and recreational support for men and material and the boats could still fulfill many valuable roles.

I'm no supporter but in this case something is better than nothing and if we consider that modern smaller boats have superior capability than our previous Oberons, and that no one complained about the roles they undertook, the proposition has some merit.

The issue is we do not really want to fight on our coast line with our Subs. They need to deploy to choke points and need to do so at a reasonable transit speed. This is where the AIP option falls down as the speed of advice is very low.


High absorbed power and high generation capacity are king in this regard and this was the rational behind the Collins. The idea was to be able to deploy independently and quickly and stay there for a long time.


The submarine tender is pointless in this scenario. If we are stuck a LOTE on Collins is really the only option ... with all the ramifications.

PS: such operations really would be well served by the nuke options but we all know that has not a snowballs hope in hell at the moment.

 

[protoplasm]

The submarine tender is pointless in this scenario. If we are stuck a LOTE on Collins is really the only option ... with all the ramifications.

PS: such operations really would be well served by the nuke options but we all know that has not a snowballs hope in hell at the moment.

Was there a discussion, going back ages ago, and I can't for the life of me find it, on the potential of just putting the Collins boats through 1 more FCD? I remember something along the lines of there being no major deal breakers to doing that, and as such any potential capability gap would be covered by putting some or all of the boats through once more. I think it was pointed out that due to the low availability in the first 15 years or so the boats actually have a lot of life left in them.

 

[vonnoobie]

Ooo buy an interim submarine? Sounds so logical -_-. Maybe we can sell them to Canada after we are finished with them.

All jokes aside my personel 2 cents, Nothing wrong with the smaller submarines but even they take time to get into service and set up with the systems we use all the while also taking away personnel and resources fromn SEA 1000 further delaying that program so an MOTS submarine is not the way to go.

Submarine tender also stupid, More then a few locations with deep water that we can base our submarines, Perhaps even the Cocos keeling islands which has been talked about in last decade or so about expanding the airfield and even putting a naval base.

There are two options I see. We aid fellow friendly (Singapore, Malaysia, Canada?, hell even India) nations in the region to acquire there submarines in exchange for a period of access to them and/or we speed up the build schedule for the SEA1000 which appears to be around 30 months between commissionings down to 18 months between. Not going to happen but makes more sense then the interim MOTS submarine

 

[John Newman]

..... or we speed up the build schedule for the SEA1000 which appears to be around 30 months between commissionings down to 18 months between.

Without getting into the whole Hugh White comments (personally can't stand the guy), it is interesting to look at the proposed gaps between commissioning of each Collins replacement.

On the one hand 30mths might seem a bit long and 18mths between commissioning of each boat a bit optimistic, it's interesting to look at Japan's production cycle of the Soryu class boats (or drum beat as I believe it is called).

Yes on the one hand they commission a new Soryu every 12 months, usually in 'March' of each year (the drum beats every year at the same time).

But in fact they have 'two' yards alternating production, each yard is producing a new Soryu every 24 months.

Could we produce a new sub every 24mths? Maybe, but the problem is then the size of the overall fleet.

We have a plan to have 12 subs, the Japanese on the other hand are increasing their fleet from 16 to 22 boats in commission at any one time.

Japan having a larger fleet can continue to have two yards producing a new boat every two years, keep them in commission for approx. 22 years and have a 'continuous' build process until the end of time (they may eventually increase the fleet size, but it will continue on and on).

For us here in Oz, the Government is no doubt caught between a rock and a hard place, firstly increase the size of the fleet from 6 to 12 boats and also at the same time introduce a 'continuous' built program.

If we can produce them at a shorter 'drum beat' then there will be significant gaps between the end of one class and the introduction of the next class, boom and bust, valley of death, etc, etc.

Or on the other hand, if the goal is to have a continuous build program, then the gap between commissioning between each boat has to be at least 30mths.

Gives you a headache thinking about it!! It's a no win situation for the Government.

 

[StevoJH]

If we can produce them at a shorter 'drum beat' then there will be significant gaps between the end of one class and the introduction of the next class, boom and bust, valley of death, etc, etc.

Or on the other hand, if the goal is to have a continuous build program, then the gap between commissioning between each boat has to be at least 30mths.

Gives you a headache thinking about it!! It's a no win situation for the Government.

Whether that would be a problem or not would depend on how long the Submarines were expected to remain in service.

At a 24 month drumbeat, gives you a replacement time of 24 years which seems reasonable if the boats are worked fairly hard.

 

[John Newman]

Whether that would be a problem or not would depend on how long the Submarines were expected to remain in service.

At a 24 month drumbeat, gives you a replacement time of 24 years which seems reasonable if the boats are worked fairly hard.

Don't disagree that a 24mth gap for commissioning of each of the replacements is a reasonable gap, but....

Going back in time to look at the commission of the six Collins boats, the first was commissioned in July 1996 and the last in March 2003.

If the 'same' 24mth gap between commissioning (drum beat) had been applied back then, then the last boat would have commissioned in July 2006, more than three year later than what actually happened.

If the replacements for the Collins fleet is 24mths between commissioning, then it appears that some boats will be in service longer than others, if in fact it is a 30mth gap between commission of the replacements, well there will be significant gaps as some retire early or there will have to be additional docking cycles to at least maintain a 'minimum' of at least six boats in commission before the seventh hits the water.

This is the catch 22 that I see the Government (or future Governments) will be faced with, do you get all the boats in the water asap, to meet the RAN's needs or do you 'stretch' the build program to meet the 'needs' of industry, etc.

This is where I think the Government is caught between a rock and a hard place.