F-35 Program - General Discussion

[Clueless]

Lockheed have developed a handling demo for the F-35 display at Paris next month. Really looking forward to seeing the vids when that happens. I know it means absolutely zero in combat but it might just shut up a few more of the detractors...well I can hope anyway

Lockheed, Not USAF, Will Pilot F-35 At Paris Air Show | Combat Aircraft content from Aviation Week

 

[gf0012-aust]

the germans have now sought INT info on f35

 

[Air Force Brat]

Lockheed have developed a handling demo for the F-35 display at Paris next month. Really looking forward to seeing the vids when that happens. I know it means absolutely zero in combat but it might just shut up a few more of the detractors...well I can hope anyway

Lockheed, Not USAF, Will Pilot F-35 At Paris Air Show | Combat Aircraft content from Aviation Week

Its a real mistake to assume the F-35's outstanding maneuverability means 0 in combat, nothing could be further from the truth, AF-02 has been flown to 9.9 G's and 105 degrees angle of attack and recovered no sweat, you won't be doing that in actual combat, but it does illustrate what a safe, happy aircraft this is.

More important, with sensor fusion and the outstanding battlespace awareness, this aircraft has "all" the tools to win, consistently and decisively!

 

[StobieWan]

the germans have now sought INT info on f35

That was a surprise - or rather, the timing is - I always figured they'd be a decade away, I wonder if there's a serious intention to purchase in the near future?

 

[Blue Jay]

Its a real mistake to assume the F-35's outstanding maneuverability means 0 in combat, nothing could be further from the truth, AF-02 has been flown to 9.9 G's and 105 degrees angle of attack and recovered no sweat, you won't be doing that in actual combat, but it does illustrate what a safe, happy aircraft this is.

More important, with sensor fusion and the outstanding battlespace awareness, this aircraft has "all" the tools to win, consistently and decisively!

I thought it was 110 degrees AoA? Regardless, it doesn't really matter. Impressive performance either way. Just imagine what Top Gun-style movie shenanigans hollywood could make out of that

The avionics of the F-35 are fantastic (as we already know). Knowing this forum, twelve other, smarter people have probably already said this before, but the F-35 really deserves an E/F/A-35 designation with all its capabilities.

Interesting snippet: it appears that the F-35C may have a nickname: Raven.

https://www.reddit.com/r/F35Lightning/comments/5rxpgy/any_nicknames_yet/

 

[gf0012-aust]

but the F-35 really deserves an E/F/A-35 designation with all its capabilities.

already been discussed in here... - and its more than just an E designation for what it brings to the table..

 

[Volkodav]

already been discussed in here... - and its more than just an E designation for what it brings to the table..

I will probably be slapped down for saying this again, but the capabilities the F-35 brings makes small STVOL carriers worth while. As the F-35A demonstrates its synergies with AEGIS and naval platforms in general, I expect navies will become reluctant to go anywhere potentially threatening without them.

Perhaps our fleet could limit itself to war like ops within a couple of hundred nautical miles of a fighter base, as was planned post Melbourne, then again, how expensive would the F-35 actually be, as well as the ships to operate them? The new frigates are possibly going to have AEGIS back ends with scaled up CEAFAR, a large, strike length VLS and a pair of Romeos. A small carrier with space for maybe 20 aircraft, and a normal group of six or eight F-35B, two Romeo, a couple Sierras or MRH90s, as well as various UAVs or even ARHs, could even work out cheaper than the planned frigates.

Such a ship could replace the frigates one for one, say three carriers supporting six frigates (the original number planned under a Gillard and Abbott) and the three DDGs. They could reuse the CMS and other systems from the ANZACs and their aitlrgroups would consist of in service types, no extras. The only addition would be buying Bs instead of As, or UAVs for the final batch of new gear to replace the SHs.

 

[aussienscale]

I will probably be slapped down for saying this again, but the capabilities the F-35 brings makes small STVOL carriers worth while. As the F-35A demonstrates its synergies with AEGIS and naval platforms in general, I expect navies will become reluctant to go anywhere potentially threatening without them.

Perhaps our fleet could limit itself to war like ops within a couple of hundred nautical miles of a fighter base, as was planned post Melbourne, then again, how expensive would the F-35 actually be, as well as the ships to operate them? The new frigates are possibly going to have AEGIS back ends with scaled up CEAFAR, a large, strike length VLS and a pair of Romeos. A small carrier with space for maybe 20 aircraft, and a normal group of six or eight F-35B, two Romeo, a couple Sierras or MRH90s, as well as various UAVs or even ARHs, could even work out cheaper than the planned frigates.

Such a ship could replace the frigates one for one, say three carriers supporting six frigates (the original number planned under a Gillard and Abbott) and the three DDGs. They could reuse the CMS and other systems from the ANZACs and their aitlrgroups would consist of in service types, no extras. The only addition would be buying Bs instead of As, or UAVs for the final batch of new gear to replace the SHs.

I agree Volk, but don't think it will happen But I also think on that discussion though, we can't limit the chatter to purely STOVL operations, I think the B has a lot to offer the RAAF in many ways, but operations over the top end & north west from bare bases and the ability to add an austere capability should not be under estimated in what it can bring to the mix

Cheers

 

[Stampede]

I agree Volk, but don't think it will happen But I also think on that discussion though, we can't limit the chatter to purely STOVL operations, I think the B has a lot to offer the RAAF in many ways, but operations over the top end & north west from bare bases and the ability to add an austere capability should not be under estimated in what it can bring to the mix

Cheers

Yes I have bored many with my quest for the F35B off our LHD's but you raise an equally important subject ;that of the planes ability to conduct operations off austere locations.
I am interested in this regard as to how it compares to the old Harrier which is certainly a much more basic platform yet has proved operationally the flexibility to forward deploy.
I wonder in a comparison between the two what the logistic and maintenance burden would be to sustain forward austere operations. Something that often comes up with the F35B is the downward heat generated for VTOL flight. How will this be solved off a bitumen road or an ad hock dirt landing site. Will this be a deal breaker or is there no issue. I would certainly hope not. After all, Australia is not that flush with northern sealed air fields, so an aircraft with austere capabilities certainly has merit.

Regards S

PS Not a comparison between the Harrier and F35 when in the air.
Supportability only

 

[ngatimozart]

I agree Volk, but don't think it will happen But I also think on that discussion though, we can't limit the chatter to purely STOVL operations, I think the B has a lot to offer the RAAF in many ways, but operations over the top end & north west from bare bases and the ability to add an austere capability should not be under estimated in what it can bring to the mix

Cheers

When people talk about amphib capabilities they most often think in terms of from ship to objective manoeuvre, however this concept can also be used from land basing to operate behind enemy lines as well. As an example using an amphib ops rationale, to distract the enemy from one area, landing, temporarily basing and operating a force in a remote area in the enemies rear using rotary and fixed wing assets is quite feasible. This is where a platform such as the F-35B would be quite an asset.

 

[t68]

When people talk about amphib capabilities they most often think in terms of from ship to objective manoeuvre, however this concept can also be used from land basing to operate behind enemy lines as well. As an example using an amphib ops rationale, to distract the enemy from one area, landing, temporarily basing and operating a force in a remote area in the enemies rear using rotary and fixed wing assets is quite feasible. This is where a platform such as the F-35B would be quite an asset.

Agree, I belive it's an area the RAAF has failed to exploit (no fault of their own) with Distributed Aviation Operations (DAO) away from fixed infrastructure such as the bare base concept. Had we replaced Melbourne R21 with Invincible and bought Harrier the RAN could have been in a better position to fully exploit *DAO operations.

**

 

[gf0012-aust]

Agree, I belive it's an area the RAAF has failed to exploit (no fault of their own) with Distributed Aviation Operations (DAO) away from fixed infrastructure such as the bare base concept. Had we replaced Melbourne R21 with Invincible and bought Harrier the RAN could have been in a better position to fully exploit *DAO operations.

**

if there was a viable need to do this then scenarios would have resulted in changes to the combat capability vignettes - and they haven't changed towards organic naval fixed wing combat air at all

you (empirical and rhetorical) either do it properly / full throttle or not at all

I cannot see in any form or fashion where organic naval fixed wing combat air has been identified as a shortfall in any of the combat capability vignettes (used to assess combat requirements and and inform acquisitions) are deficient or where there is an overwhelming need to turn the next 30 years of acquisitions on its head just to satisfy a perfect ORBAT

platform necessity does not just look at service or "fleet" requirements in the vignettes - (as in class of platform, not in the maritime traditional sense)

it looks at all the vignettes and how they influence an outcome

distributed air ops (or any distributed ops) has to consider the efficiency and choice of an effect.

australia for example will never be involved in a single state conflict against a superior force - remove "never" if we change our alliance structure

the combat capability vignettes reflect the above. its a real politik issue as well as force structure issue

 

[aussienscale]

Yes I have bored many with my quest for the F35B off our LHD's but you raise an equally important subject ;that of the planes ability to conduct operations off austere locations.
I am interested in this regard as to how it compares to the old Harrier which is certainly a much more basic platform yet has proved operationally the flexibility to forward deploy.
I wonder in a comparison between the two what the logistic and maintenance burden would be to sustain forward austere operations. Something that often comes up with the F35B is the downward heat generated for VTOL flight. How will this be solved off a bitumen road or an ad hock dirt landing site. Will this be a deal breaker or is there no issue. I would certainly hope not. After all, Australia is not that flush with northern sealed air fields, so an aircraft with austere capabilities certainly has merit.

Regards S

PS Not a comparison between the Harrier and F35 when in the air.
Supportability only

It has already been done by the USMC, with F-35B operations in the desert on a set up austere base, the runway was a special laid out matting, they were like massive camping mats, on the sand, IIRC there were no issues identified and everything worked fine.

So I would be guessing that the B would out perform the Harriers every day of the week in this regard, much easier to handle for takeoff and landings. There would be extra maint due to the environment, but that would be no different or unique to the B as it would any other aircraft.

There is actually video of it with takeoff, landings and crew activity, but for the life of me, and lack of time, I can't find it ? Someone else may remember where it was, would have to be somewhere on Youtube, but time to go to kids soccer matches the joys of a Sunday

Cheers

 

[ngatimozart]

Agree, I belive it's an area the RAAF has failed to exploit (no fault of their own) with Distributed Aviation Operations (DAO) away from fixed infrastructure such as the bare base concept. Had we replaced Melbourne R21 with Invincible and bought Harrier the RAN could have been in a better position to fully exploit *DAO operations.

**

Don't drag up historical what ifs and derail this thread.

The point behind my post is to illustrate that the F-35B capabilities are not just restricted to classical amphib ops.

 

[t68]

if there was a viable need to do this then scenarios would have resulted in changes to the combat capability vignettes - and they haven't changed towards organic naval fixed wing combat air at all.

Would have thought that would have come down what the politicians wanted to fund, defence dosn't always gets what it wants and they have to look at alternatives.

To a degree the politicians mindset is still stuck with Defence of Australia and not forward deployed. I think we are slowly getting there in terms of expeditionary capabilty. Inthink there is a wish list but Canberra keeps them in check.

Whilst I would like to see a return on fast jet FAA I know it's just not going to happen, but that dosnt mean the ADF should not have the capabilty to mix things up, converting the last 28 JSF (aircraft 73-100) capabile of Distributed STOVL Operations (DSO)is another feather in its cap, after all even working with our coalition partners in the future does not guarantee we will have access to the nessacary infrastructure to forward deploy even with such things as AAR crew fatuige is the limiting factor.

 

[gf0012-aust]

Would have thought that would have come down what the politicians wanted to fund, defence dosn't always gets what it wants and they have to look at alternatives.

Govt has no input into the CCV's - I doubt any politician outside of the NSC is even aware - and even then they would only see a subset - and that's first going to be to the PM when he/she gets woken up at 0300 by a snr adviser to say that things have gone pear shaped and we are at war. even then he/she will only be provided with the likely CCS identified by CDF

To a degree the politicians mindset is still stuck with Defence of Australia and not forward deployed. I think we are slowly getting there in terms of expeditionary capabilty. Inthink there is a wish list but Canberra keeps them in check.

disagree, even the battiest idea will get dealt with in a considered, structured manner by CDF

quite a few of have had a road to damascus awakening once they get informed
The NSC military presentations have a way of sobering up the fruitcakes

 

[t68]

Govt has no input into the CCV's - I doubt any politician outside of the NSC is even aware - and even then they would only see a subset - and that's first going to be to the PM when he/she gets woken up at 0300 by a snr adviser to say that things have gone pear shaped and we are at war. even then he/she will only be provided with the likely CCS identified by CDF



disagree, even the battiest idea will get dealt with in a considered, structured manner by CDF

quite a few of have had a road to damascus awakening once they get informed
The NSC military presentations have a way of sobering up the fruitcakes

So when former PM Abbott brought up F35B's to operate from the LHD would that have only been a single scenario which killed it or would they have taken an holistic approach on a number scenario and didn't find them to be credible to ADF doctrine for forward deployment such as a damaged main base airfield, something the A cant do but most likely the B can.

 

[gf0012-aust]

So when former PM Abbott brought up F35B's to operate from the LHD would that have only been a single scenario which killed it or would they have taken an holistic approach on a number scenario and didn't find them to be credible to ADF doctrine for forward deployment such as a damaged main base airfield, something the A cant do but most likely the B can.

the issue is

"whats the objective?"
"whats the best way to achieve it?"
"whats the level of risk?"
"whats the level of confidence across options?"
"what organic options does the chief give to PM?"
if no organic options "who can we call on?"

the last one is where we call on local partners with a capability to achieve the objective to assist
eg whats the impact difference between different CCS?

eg normal securing of a loc depending on threat could be staged as SOCOMD insertion, Commanos activated for follow through or support, ADG in place post securing of loc, big army to secure broader area and establish, , RAAF, that would be after all latent threats to that loc were neutralised.

the CCV'S are broad and complex, as well as flexible.

capability evolves, eg bill and ben, the phatships are acquisitions which were identified and fast tracked as a legacy of East Timor 99

 

[Stampede]

the issue is

"whats the objective?"
"whats the best way to achieve it?"
"whats the level of risk?"
"whats the level of confidence across options?"
"what organic options does the chief give to PM?"
if no organic options "who can we call on?"

the last one is where we call on local partners with a capability to achieve the objective to assist
eg whats the impact difference between different CCS?

eg normal securing of a loc depending on threat could be staged as SOCOMD insertion, Commanos activated for follow through or support, ADG in place post securing of loc, big army to secure broader area and establish, , RAAF, that would be after all latent threats to that loc were neutralised.

the CCV'S are broad and complex, as well as flexible.

capability evolves, eg bill and ben, the phatships are acquisitions which were identified and fast tracked as a legacy of East Timor 99

The questions raised to the question "The issue is" are fair and reasonable.
I would suspect defence postulate countless scenario's from small to large of how we achieve an outcome.

For myself, the question realy is, are we best served with 4 fast air CTOL squadrons or a mix of 3 CTOL and one V/TOL Squadron.

I would suggest the later combination offers greater flexibility,independence and options to government than the former.

Anyway.......that road to Damascus!
Opinion piece from a layman


Regards S

 

[gf0012-aust]

I would suspect defence postulate countless scenario's from small to large of how we achieve an outcome.

most modern militaries have their version of the CCV's in place. They act as the templates for how we will react with force against a given event - so there are "lots" of them in place ready for pulling out to act as the baseline template for an operation

For myself, the question realy is, are we best served with 4 fast air CTOL squadrons or a mix of 3 CTOL and one V/TOL Squadron.

I would suggest the later combination offers greater flexibility,independence and options to government than the former.

which would mean that if those were regarded as being a frequent operational requirement then there would be changes and proposals put foward for force modeling changes (eg bill and ben, phat ships etc...)

so the thoughts around CTOL barges, F35b's, nuke subs, FW combat air, armed UAS, have already been discussed by the various service force planners well before they appear as options to consider in places such as here

every now and then a pro-active PM or DefMin might result in extra gravitas being applied to different platform options (nuke subs, japanese subs, extended wheelbase M113's, Hawkei, F-22 etc...) some low yielders might get up for seat retention merit, but generally the batschitt crazy ones get batted away by presenting coherent force development logic

there has been a spectacular shortage of deep scholarly thinkers such as Beasley who had foreign policy nouse and a broad and deep appreciation of what the military needed beyond getting suckered by bright glossey brochures and free joy rides from industry - the last of the pragmatists IMO