t68
Well-Known Member
Bill & Ben show the persuasion of cabinet decsions which affect defence force planning, I'd bet my right nut with hindsight cabinet regret that when for money overall spent could have got the recommend ship that defence wanted in the first placewhich would mean that if those were regarded as being a frequent operational requirement then there would be changes and proposals put foward for force modeling changes (eg bill and ben, phat ships etc...)
The penny wise pound foolish approach. The final bill approached the original cost budget analysis. The B might fall into this category within the stratgic guidence.The THSS project was abandoned in May 1993, when the then Government decided that the proposal to construct a new ship, with an estimated cost of $494 million, could not be afforded in the context of the Government’s 1993–94 budget. However, in recognition of Australia’s strategic requirement for the capacity to transport, deploy and support an amphibious force,the Government gave approval for Navy to undertake a study of less costly options for acquiring the required capability.
I belive even Beasly wished he did things differently, he did come out and say we should have got eight Collins Submarine, just hope they don't regret latter on which variant would give the most options to goverment for not a lot of extra coin.there has been a spectacular shortage of deep scholarly thinkers such as Beasley who had foreign policy nouse and a broad and deep appreciation of what the military needed beyond getting suckered by bright glossey brochures and free joy rides from industry - the last of the pragmatists IMO
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