No sorry Hairyman there were early problems with the Collins - why did we need to contract General Dynamics to fix them? That is why Kockums got upset because we gave away their IP to GD. There were flow noise problems, propeller problems and diesel problems. I recall an ABC program interviewing a NZ Orion crew which had bounced a Collins off Darwin in the late 90s talking about noise like a rock concert - definite flow noise problems.
The recent Australian Defence supplement noted that ASC started cutting metal on the Collins with only 10% of the drawings finalised - a definite recipe for rework. They launched the Collins hull on schedule but with much of the Combat System yet to be installed - a lot of equipment had to be squeezed through the small hatches then set to work inside.
I worked with a senior QA engineer who left ASC about 1993 in dismay.
Not exactly, the flow noise was at high speed and outside of the specified performance envelope, the issue was the Collins was much faster and more maneuverable than the RAN was used to so had not been specified. Within the specified speeds the platforms radiated noise was lower than required with many systems being undetectable on acoustic ranges.
Many of the issues with flow noise were due directly to the fact the cylindrical sonar array in the bow was raised during the design phase to increase its coverage aft. The mod worked a treat at low speeds (i.e. the speeds the RAN thought they would be operating at based on O boat experience) but caused flow noise at higher speeds. Same with the propeller, fine at the speeds the navy thought they would be using but a different matter when rpms increased.
This is where EB and the USN were so helpful, they had extensive experience in dealing with noise at higher speeds, for example the fillet that now blends the sail into the casing and reprofiling the propeller. There were other issues that were mostly the sort of teething problems encountered with any new project, ironically many of them coming from experienced contractors and suppliers who had been supplying other navies for decades. The propeller shaft seals fall into this category, as do the diesels (RAN and ASC both wanted MTU but were over ruled).
The combat system was never going to work, the RAN assessment team actually recommended a perfectly good enough Dutch system but the senior sirs wanted Star Ship Enterprise capabilities with 1980s tech. ASC reported and demonstrated Rockwells non conformance continually as CS delays were impacting on schedule but nothing was done. In hindsight Rockwell should have been found in breach of contract and the project rebaselined while the CS was replaced during build.
Overall the cutting edge features, with the exception of the CS and attack periscope worked and worked well. The advanced battery, the automated platform control system, flank arrays, towed array, fully rafted machinery and systems (more extensive i have been told than Soryu), anechoic tiles, the steels used, the new welding processes developed (though the Swedes screwed up the two hull sections they fabricated on Collins), were all leading edge and successful.
Australia should be proud of the achievement as the project had fewer issues than any submarine class I can think of, bar maybe the Virginias (even they had the NG weld certification scandal and the counterfeit titanium forging issue). Instead two decades on we still get the same old, disingenuous claptrap spouted. I was at ASC when little Johnnie dropped in for his photo op behind the periscope on HMAS Waller, to announce he had fixed Labors flawed submarines. No one in the know was particularly impressed as we were dealing with a raft of obsolescence and upgrade solutions that related directly to performance, availability, safety and through life costs that the government hadn't funded. Many of these had solutions ready to go, trialed tested and certified, but no money to install. Upgrades for the diesels, automatic safety systems, etc. all waiting for authority to proceed, or worse, actually scheduled then dropped from availability after availability. If it wasn't sexy, i.e. warrie, or operational there was no money for it.
It wasn't just subs, the entire fleet suffered from the late 90s as maintenance and training budgets were cut leaving many capabilities relying on a can do attitude and short cuts, work was often deferred so long that preventative maintenance became a breakdown. This is how we ended up with one sub in FCD, one in preFCD (a bs thing invented because the government was laying up boats) and one laid up prior to pre FCD, this is how the Sea King was lost, this is why no ships were available for HADR after cyclone Yasi. The navy didn't just lose numbers in engineering and depth of corporate knowledge they needed to maintain capability, they (as well as DMO and industry) lost the authority to do anything about it, no one was in a position to even report deficiencies to a government that was only interested in their own narrative and actually punished or removed people who attempted to conduct their duties and provide advice without fear or favour. As found by Rizzo, not only was naval engineering gutted, but reduced funding and investment also resulted in neither government or industry being able to train the required technical and engineering staff, leaving no one to ensure technical integrity in a government driven environment that was concerned solely with short term operational matters.
