Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates

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t68

Well-Known Member
I dont like the idea that we are going to start building our new class of submarines in about 2030 or later. I and a lot of other posters here will be pushing up daisys by then. Why cant we start the build as soon as they have the design ready? We are going to increase our sub fleet from 6 to 12, so why cant some of the increase occur before the Collins start to retire?
From a layman like myself I'd say whilst it's a clone off an existing design it still has to be certified for the changes, we don't want another repeat of the dysfunctional media coverage like the Collins class in the early days, nor do we want to see them go they way of the spanish S-80 with miscalculations at the engineering stage, if that was to happen I guess these would be the last submarines built in Australia.
 

vonnoobie

Well-Known Member
I dont like the idea that we are going to start building our new class of submarines in about 2030 or later. I and a lot of other posters here will be pushing up daisys by then. Why cant we start the build as soon as they have the design ready? We are going to increase our sub fleet from 6 to 12, so why cant some of the increase occur before the Collins start to retire?
The intended commissioning's are to start from 2030, As in first boat in the water around 2030. The build will likely start much sooner (2025?).

While wanting them sooner is all well and good there is a benefit to delaying them as it allow's for one get everything in order including suppliers, designs and tech.

There is also no definite that the Collins class will be retired and sub number's lowered before the Shortfins are delivered. Has already been mentioned that at least a few of the Collins class boats will have to go through an FCD and as the first decade seen them little used (as pointed out by others here) they still have some life in them.
 

hauritz

Well-Known Member
The intended commissioning's are to start from 2030, As in first boat in the water around 2030. The build will likely start much sooner (2025?).

While wanting them sooner is all well and good there is a benefit to delaying them as it allow's for one get everything in order including suppliers, designs and tech.

There is also no definite that the Collins class will be retired and sub number's lowered before the Shortfins are delivered. Has already been mentioned that at least a few of the Collins class boats will have to go through an FCD and as the first decade seen them little used (as pointed out by others here) they still have some life in them.
Would it be feasible to build additional Collins submarines?

Pretty much just the current design with all of the fixes that have been made to it.

A couple of extra Collins class subs would quickly boost the fleet size and give some extra cover if there are any delays to the new Barracudas.
 

hairyman

Active Member
The dysfunctional media coverage in the early days of Collins was mostly driven by the conservative government that had just been returned to power. As the Collins was a Labour initiative the tories did not support it but attacked it at every opportunity.

Much has been made of defences 1.60% of gdp under Gillard, but not much is said about it being 1.62 under Howard. It was never under 2% in all the time Hawke was PM.
 

vonnoobie

Well-Known Member
Would it be feasible to build additional Collins submarines?

Pretty much just the current design with all of the fixes that have been made to it.

A couple of extra Collins class subs would quickly boost the fleet size and give some extra cover if there are any delays to the new Barracudas.
Feasible I'd say yes but practical no.

By time any are built we would be give or take half a decade away from getting the Shortfins, That is a big investment in a submarine not suitable for future use (in what we want to load them up with, specifically drones) that would cover such a small gap.
 

Alf662

New Member
At 13.6m wide and 32.6m long with a 6 man crew this may be an issue. The LCM1E is 23.3m long and 6.4m wide and you get four of them in.

The L Cat would have to self deploy as I doubt it will fit in the dock after of the divider with the door shut.

Speed advantage loaded is 1.5Knots (15 verses 13.5) but the LCM1E is a tad faster empty

The L Cat also has a significant air drafts may be a bit of a squeeze in the dock area.

Personally some LSH/LST would be better for us as they would provide for independent regional work.
I can not remember if this has been posted before:

https://www.bmtdsl.co.uk/media/6097... Implications for the Force Mix_MAST 2015.pdf

But it does give a good insight into the lift capacity and speeds of of the LCAT, LCAC and FLC. Whilst the LHD's need to be modified to accommodate the LCAT and LCAC, as far as I can tell four the FLC will fit into the LHD's without any modification.

As far as I am aware the FLC's are more suited to army operations as they are able to operate away from the parent LHD for a period of time.
 

SteveR

Active Member
I dont like the idea that we are going to start building our new class of submarines in about 2030 or later. I and a lot of other posters here will be pushing up daisys by then. Why cant we start the build as soon as they have the design ready? We are going to increase our sub fleet from 6 to 12, so why cant some of the increase occur before the Collins start to retire?
No sorry Hairyman there were early problems with the Collins - why did we need to contract General Dynamics to fix them? That is why Kockums got upset because we gave away their IP to GD. There were flow noise problems, propeller problems and diesel problems. I recall an ABC program interviewing a NZ Orion crew which had bounced a Collins off Darwin in the late 90s talking about noise like a rock concert - definite flow noise problems.

The recent Australian Defence supplement noted that ASC started cutting metal on the Collins with only 10% of the drawings finalised - a definite recipe for rework. They launched the Collins hull on schedule but with much of the Combat System yet to be installed - a lot of equipment had to be squeezed through the small hatches then set to work inside.
I worked with a senior QA engineer who left ASC about 1993 in dismay.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
No sorry Hairyman there were early problems with the Collins - why did we need to contract General Dynamics to fix them? That is why Kockums got upset because we gave away their IP to GD. There were flow noise problems, propeller problems and diesel problems. I recall an ABC program interviewing a NZ Orion crew which had bounced a Collins off Darwin in the late 90s talking about noise like a rock concert - definite flow noise problems.

The recent Australian Defence supplement noted that ASC started cutting metal on the Collins with only 10% of the drawings finalised - a definite recipe for rework. They launched the Collins hull on schedule but with much of the Combat System yet to be installed - a lot of equipment had to be squeezed through the small hatches then set to work inside.
I worked with a senior QA engineer who left ASC about 1993 in dismay.
Not exactly, the flow noise was at high speed and outside of the specified performance envelope, the issue was the Collins was much faster and more maneuverable than the RAN was used to so had not been specified. Within the specified speeds the platforms radiated noise was lower than required with many systems being undetectable on acoustic ranges.

Many of the issues with flow noise were due directly to the fact the cylindrical sonar array in the bow was raised during the design phase to increase its coverage aft. The mod worked a treat at low speeds (i.e. the speeds the RAN thought they would be operating at based on O boat experience) but caused flow noise at higher speeds. Same with the propeller, fine at the speeds the navy thought they would be using but a different matter when rpms increased.

This is where EB and the USN were so helpful, they had extensive experience in dealing with noise at higher speeds, for example the fillet that now blends the sail into the casing and reprofiling the propeller. There were other issues that were mostly the sort of teething problems encountered with any new project, ironically many of them coming from experienced contractors and suppliers who had been supplying other navies for decades. The propeller shaft seals fall into this category, as do the diesels (RAN and ASC both wanted MTU but were over ruled).

The combat system was never going to work, the RAN assessment team actually recommended a perfectly good enough Dutch system but the senior sirs wanted Star Ship Enterprise capabilities with 1980s tech. ASC reported and demonstrated Rockwells non conformance continually as CS delays were impacting on schedule but nothing was done. In hindsight Rockwell should have been found in breach of contract and the project rebaselined while the CS was replaced during build.

Overall the cutting edge features, with the exception of the CS and attack periscope worked and worked well. The advanced battery, the automated platform control system, flank arrays, towed array, fully rafted machinery and systems (more extensive i have been told than Soryu), anechoic tiles, the steels used, the new welding processes developed (though the Swedes screwed up the two hull sections they fabricated on Collins), were all leading edge and successful.

Australia should be proud of the achievement as the project had fewer issues than any submarine class I can think of, bar maybe the Virginias (even they had the NG weld certification scandal and the counterfeit titanium forging issue). Instead two decades on we still get the same old, disingenuous claptrap spouted. I was at ASC when little Johnnie dropped in for his photo op behind the periscope on HMAS Waller, to announce he had fixed Labors flawed submarines. No one in the know was particularly impressed as we were dealing with a raft of obsolescence and upgrade solutions that related directly to performance, availability, safety and through life costs that the government hadn't funded. Many of these had solutions ready to go, trialed tested and certified, but no money to install. Upgrades for the diesels, automatic safety systems, etc. all waiting for authority to proceed, or worse, actually scheduled then dropped from availability after availability. If it wasn't sexy, i.e. warrie, or operational there was no money for it.

It wasn't just subs, the entire fleet suffered from the late 90s as maintenance and training budgets were cut leaving many capabilities relying on a can do attitude and short cuts, work was often deferred so long that preventative maintenance became a breakdown. This is how we ended up with one sub in FCD, one in preFCD (a bs thing invented because the government was laying up boats) and one laid up prior to pre FCD, this is how the Sea King was lost, this is why no ships were available for HADR after cyclone Yasi. The navy didn't just lose numbers in engineering and depth of corporate knowledge they needed to maintain capability, they (as well as DMO and industry) lost the authority to do anything about it, no one was in a position to even report deficiencies to a government that was only interested in their own narrative and actually punished or removed people who attempted to conduct their duties and provide advice without fear or favour. As found by Rizzo, not only was naval engineering gutted, but reduced funding and investment also resulted in neither government or industry being able to train the required technical and engineering staff, leaving no one to ensure technical integrity in a government driven environment that was concerned solely with short term operational matters.
 

Stampede

Well-Known Member
Thanks ALF662

My guess is the LCM1E was designed in size to operate within the well deck of Spain's LHD and LSD. Going beyond the 6.4 m width of the LCM1E may prove problematic for safe operations within the dock for larger craft. Would like to be proved wrong as LCM mk10 and FLC sized craft with their slightly larger beam and length do translate to extra lift capacity.
Will watch with interest the LLC progress with the RAN and see what eventuates for safe lift capacity before seriously looking at other options.

Regard S
 

ASSAIL

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
I've tried, unsuccessfully, to,find details,of the upcoming PSR (Platform Systems Remediation) programme for the Anzacs.
Can someone post a link if you have one please?
Thanks
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
I've tried, unsuccessfully, to,find details,of the upcoming PSR (Platform Systems Remediation) programme for the Anzacs.
Can someone post a link if you have one please?
Thanks
I have nothing and would also be interested in seeing some detail on this. The has been a fair bit of rumour and hearsay about issues with the platform as well as some information I have picked up through comparisons of the ANZAC platform to the FFGs and how the detail layout of the FFGs was vastly superior in terms of maintenance, through life support and durability. Little things like how the bilges drain to allow easier pumping out and cleaning, how systems are easier to access and replace.

I don't have a link for this but apparently the FFGs are less expensive to operate and sustain than the ANZACs, with higher levels of availability as well, this is despite being considerably more complex ships. Again the RAN is pretty cagey officially but I do get the impression that there are platform design considerations that have resulted in TLS and operational issues, even in injuries to the crew.
 

Stock

Member
Thanks ALF662

My guess is the LCM1E was designed in size to operate within the well deck of Spain's LHD and LSD. Going beyond the 6.4 m width of the LCM1E may prove problematic for safe operations within the dock for larger craft. Would like to be proved wrong as LCM mk10 and FLC sized craft with their slightly larger beam and length do translate to extra lift capacity.
Will watch with interest the LLC progress with the RAN and see what eventuates for safe lift capacity before seriously looking at other options.

Regard S
As far as I know the RAN is not looking at any additional landing craft types for the LHDs or otherwise. The project to replace the LCHs - Phase 5 of JP 2048 - has been shelved or pushed back beyond 2025. No one really knows.

The LLC is not well suited to transporting M1 Abrams (63 tonnes) or the upcoming Land 400 CRV (30-36 tonnes) or IFV (35-40 tonnes) in anything above Sea State 2. How we intend to get them across the beach in non-permissive operational environments I do not know (not talking opposed landings here).

There's a serious capability disconnect looming in this area: Army combat manoeuvre elements are getting heavier and Navy can't deliver them ashore with the landing craft they have except under pond-like conditions.
 

Alf662

New Member
As far as I know the RAN is not looking at any additional landing craft types for the LHDs or otherwise. The project to replace the LCHs - Phase 5 of JP 2048 - has been shelved or pushed back beyond 2025. No one really knows.

The LLC is not well suited to transporting M1 Abrams (63 tonnes) or the upcoming Land 400 CRV (30-36 tonnes) or IFV (35-40 tonnes) in anything above Sea State 2. How we intend to get them across the beach in non-permissive operational environments I do not know (not talking opposed landings here).

There's a serious capability disconnect looming in this area: Army combat manoeuvre elements are getting heavier and Navy can't deliver them ashore with the landing craft they have except under pond-like conditions.
The DWP is silent on JP2048 Phase 5 so I think it has been shelved.

The limited lift capacity of the LCM1e's appear to be getting addressed but details are very vague.

Section 6.19 of the DIIP:
Over time the capability of the ships will be enhanced to better support
joint command and control, including upgrades to communications and
intelligence systems and semi-autonomous self-defence capabilities.
This will include communications systems that are compatible with all
amphibious force elements – watercraft, helicopters and amphibious
vehicles – allowing enhanced command and control and situational
awareness. The ships will also be fitted with systems that allow them
to collect, analyse and distribute intelligence. In the longer-term, the
existing landing craft used to transport people and equipment from the
Canberra Class ships to the shore will be replaced with new vessels.
 

Stock

Member
The DWP is silent on JP2048 Phase 5 so I think it has been shelved.

The limited lift capacity of the LCM1e's appear to be getting addressed but details are very vague.

Section 6.19 of the DIIP:
Over time the capability of the ships will be enhanced to better support
joint command and control, including upgrades to communications and
intelligence systems and semi-autonomous self-defence capabilities.
This will include communications systems that are compatible with all
amphibious force elements – watercraft, helicopters and amphibious
vehicles – allowing enhanced command and control and situational
awareness. The ships will also be fitted with systems that allow them
to collect, analyse and distribute intelligence. In the longer-term, the
existing landing craft used to transport people and equipment from the
Canberra Class ships to the shore will be replaced with new vessels.
Nice pick up. Wasn't aware of that. However, as long as the centreline baffle remains in place in the LHD's well dock (a major impediment to those ships utilising LCAC, LCAT or significantly larger landing craft; it is a fixed structure) I do wonder what additional capability a similar sized LLC could possess. Interesting though.
 

aussienscale

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Nice pick up. Wasn't aware of that. However, as long as the centreline baffle remains in place in the LHD's well dock (a major impediment to those ships utilising LCAC, LCAT or significantly larger landing craft; it is a fixed structure) I do wonder what additional capability a similar sized LLC could possess. Interesting though.
There is plenty out there, if you look back through the thread this exact subject was discussed at lenghth prior to the Canberra's coming on line, but as an example:

http://www.bmtdsl.co.uk/media/6098037/AMPD002_0214_Caimen90.pdf

Cheers
 

Stock

Member
There is plenty out there, if you look back through the thread this exact subject was discussed at lenghth prior to the Canberra's coming on line, but as an example:

http://www.bmtdsl.co.uk/media/6098037/AMPD002_0214_Caimen90.pdf

Cheers
Good payload and speeds but with a beam of 7.7m it might not be compatible with the dock lane. LLC has a beam of 6.4m. Caiman 90 would be a very tight fit.

Lanes are fixed spaces. At an overall dock width of 16.8m (and allowing about 1m for the width of the centreline baffle) this would leave around 7.9m of available width per lane.

The LLC (LCM-1E) has been designed specifically for the well dock of the LHD and I don't know how much free play is needed either side to enable safe movement in the dock during rough conditions. Don't think having 100mm tolerance each side of your craft would work somehow but I'm no expert.
 
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