If it hadn't been for all of other nations amphibious ships which helped during the East Timor crisis, Australia would not have been able to supply their large number of peacekeepers there. There are Australian islands not as close to the mainland as East Timor, one comes to mind named Tasmania. A very capable amphibious ship was missed, it is a shame the troopship Sydney wasn't replaced by something larger than Tobruk. In the world of military adventures supply is very, very important. Australia needs sealift and amphibious ships if Australia desires to be a force to be reckoned with in the Southwest Pacific, that is in their surrounding areas. Notice New Zealand also took note and addressed this issue with the Canterbury at the likely expense of a naval frigate.
Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates
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t68
Well-Known Member
Not exactly sure on what you are implying about Tasmania, but I rather suspect you are talking about ship to shore connectors and the lack off port facility in most of the south pacfic island chains when working under HADR outside of wartime conditions.
I guess in the RAN case the LHD might be seen as overkill in most situations, it may have some merit of investing into something like a Frank S Besson LSV to service the SP as well as smaller landing craft.
http://www.army.mil/article/326/New_Army_Vessel_Arrives_in_Hawaii/
Ironically the Tarawa class LHA design was offered upas a possible Melbourne replacement in the 1970s, now a pair of them to replace Melbourne and Sydney would have been something, especially if the Skyhawks were replaced with Harriers.
Imagine the Fiji coups if the RAN had these, the intervention in the Solomons, Australian participation in the 91 Gulf War and the War on terror. Not to mention the many occasions where they would have been a game changer in a humanitarian response.
Imagine the Fiji coups if the RAN had these, the intervention in the Solomons, Australian participation in the 91 Gulf War and the War on terror. Not to mention the many occasions where they would have been a game changer in a humanitarian response.
I think you may have misread those posts. I stated at one point that from the information I read that the LCM1E's have a limit of 12t when transferring from barge to barge/LCM1E to LCM1E.
There's also another very capable ship that I see everyday that could potentially filled the role.
[ame="http://www.flickr.com/photos/legoblock/6111140128/"]Toll Shipping's 'Tasmanian Achiever' docked at Webb Dock | Flickr - Photo Sharing![/ame]
We have always needed that capability, but Tarawa class is still big and man power intensive. The RAN would have struggled to acquire and operate 1. Time frame of the builds I would imagine would fit, but with an Invincible on offer at discount rates why not go with her (until the Uk wanted her back).
With our two LHD's, we should be able to surge a capability not far short of one american Wasp class LHD. But its that type of capability we have really missed.
Any operation in our region is done with crumbling infrastructure and insecurity. If we had to go into East timor (or Samoa or PNG etc) today with 1000-2000 troops, there would be problems with sanitation, clean water, fuel etc. Local hospitals struggle to cope with existing peace conditions. Security even in peacetime can be problematic. So even a peacekeeping or humanitarian mission is effectively impossible with what we have with a dicey logistics train that would mean we may have to pull out if a cyclone/storm approaches that may damage port facilities.
Throw in any sort of opposition or conflict and there are very limited range of options open to Australia.
We have had long running security and humanitarian issues in East Timor, PNG, Fiji and Samoa. You can pretty much book a LHD at each of these countries elections, in the case of Fiji, elections will only occur once the LHD is operational. I think GF even joked that DFAT could end up paying for the LHD as they will be very interested in their use. Having two 30,000 ton floating islands of Australia that can move around the region is going to be tremendously powerful. In the countries I've listed, its most likely enough to keep things in check just by being present so citizens don't have to worry what the Police or the local military are backing (and if they are backing opposing sides).
By being active in the region they can start building real goodwill towards Australia as we will make a significant presence. Aid/Disaster relief will move into a new level, I would imagine some of the cash aid will decrease in favor of more specific aid administered. But its the soft stuff that going to have influence. International training exercises will also move to a much bigger spectrum, with many more involved in greater depth.
And that's just in the local region. Internationally puts us in a position to make meaningful contributions to US and UK lead forces. To participate globally. When deployed with a UK carrier, Australia might supply the entire amphibious capability for a mission for example (training). So they scale up to major conflict
Spain originally called it a Strategic Projection Ship (BPE). That is a much more accurate explanation of what they are. They aren't just sea control, they aren't just an amphib or a landing helicopter docks. They are big enough to influence regions and small nations.
a4skyhawk1
New Member
I wasn't shouting - capitals were for emphasis only. I'm too old fashioned to be bothered changing my style to suit new grammar (or lack thereof). Cool?
Also you suggestion that I read back in this thread is a little harsh. I have already said that I DID read back but there are over 800 pages and reading ALL of them is a little much to expect don't you think.
Judging by the comments since my initial post I would say that it's a sub-topic that is both relevant and of interest. Even if it only involves different views, updates or new information
I'm new here and would like a little slack please.
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a4skyhawk1
New Member
Yep. NAVANTIA originally described these ships as Strategic Projection Ships, "Aircraft Carriers with the ability to conduct and support over beach operations."
I think the emphasis was changed so Australia (and others?) would look at these ships as Amphibious Assetts NOT Aircraft Carriers. NAVANTIA even offered to remove the ski-jump (adding another Helo spot) at no charge which made it more comparable to the Mistral Class. We've kept the ski-jump! Why? Could it be that someone is actually thinking ahead to a "possible" buy of F35-B's?
With the proliferation of Aircraft Carriers in the world right now it is naïve to think that we can protect our assets wth missiles alone. The Hobart Class appear to be almost exactly the right ship for the us, BUT, compared to missiles fast jets go further, add an entire layer to the defence umbrella AND provide the flexibility lacking in a missile only umbrella. Had the Captain of the USS Vincennes had fighter cover he wouldn't have shot down an innocent civilian airliner and over 100 innocent civilians would have not died.
knightrider4
Active Member
USS Vincennes
As for the USS Vincennes, it was human interference with Aegis command and decision system that lead to the Iranian liner going down. If the system was left to do it's job there would not have been an issue.
The only option the RAN may have in the future for fixed wing naval airpower is if a 3rd LHD is purchased and fitted out as sole use carrier. The current layout just won't sustain the required rate of effort for meaningful carrier ops. The RAN does not have the logistical capacity to sustain carrier ops for any length of time.
As for the USS Vincennes, it was human interference with Aegis command and decision system that lead to the Iranian liner going down. If the system was left to do it's job there would not have been an issue.
cdxbow
Well-Known Member
If the captain of the USS Vincennes had fighter cover he probably would have shot them down! He was a cowboy and as pointed out in the previous post, the errors were entirely with the 'human interface' that consistently misread the data in a way to make it threatening, when in fact it wasn't. The Fogarty commission believed it was a case of "scenario fulfilment syndrome" in which the people are responding not to the environment/information as it is, but to what they imagine is happening. It tends to occur more often in stressful situations with a authoritarian leader who has established a strong narrative of events. The Fogarty commission identified some issues with design of the displays and the difficulties operating in a complex environment.
I sometimes wonder if the alleged WMD in Iraq was something similar on a larger scale rather than simple deceit.
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The reason people say to read the thread (or use the search function to find related threads) is because the topic of using the LHDs as aircraft carriers is somewhat of a "zombie" - it dies, then comes back later, then dies again, then comes back again, and so on. So some of us who have seen the back and forth multiple times tend to expect new members to read through what's already been posted instead of answering the same questions over and over. I understand that's not an ideal solution when you have such a long thread, but have a look through the Navy forums and you'll find other, smaller threads that cover the topic, too.
From what I understand the LHDs, while they are capable of operating fixed wing jets, are far from optimised for that role, as they lack the fuel and munitions bunkerage to maintain a useful sortie rate. And I've heard from people whose opinions I've learned to trust that Australia is most definitely not looking at an F-35B purchase at this present time.
I would love for Australia to get back into the carrier game, but it's not going to happen with the LHDs and personally I don't think it's going to happen at all. A shame, but it is what it is. I don't know why you're bringing up the USS Vincennes disaster as a point in favour of carrier capability - you're talking about an isolated incident and a questionable set of decisions on the part of the Vincennes' CO. A fighter pilot ordered to engage a contact at BVR distances could make the same mistake.
Anyway, I do hope you find some of the threads I mentioned, and I understand if you're not keen on reading through a gigantic thread to find answers. I just hope you understand that if you detect a lack of patience it's not personal, it's just we field these questions all the time and it's easier to point people at existing discussions than repeat ourselves ad nauseum.
Cheers
One thing I have heard is that this is one big internal difference to Spain's JC1 who intend to operate fixed wing aircraft from, I read somewhere (forget where, apologies) that the internal configuration of those spaces is different for the Canberras and somehow makes it a bit more unsuitable than bunkerage alone.
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
As Bonza has said, the notion of a RAN carrier is a bit of a zombie.
Just wanted to answer the bit about the ski jump. That was retained because it was decided (not quite sure by who) that removing the ski jump from the existing Spanish designs would increase programme risk to unacceptable levels. Or at least, unacceptable levels for gaining an extra helicopter spot.
Deleting the ski jump AFAIK would have required a redesign of the entire bow of the LHD, which in turn would impact the buoyancy of the entire vessel. Given what that could do to construction times, build costs and ultimately programme success it makes sense that the ski jumps were retained.
Also keep in mind, the Seasprite debacle was almost at its conclusion so the ADF was rather risk adverse.
On the Vincennes there were also a number of blue on blue incidents during the post 91 no fly zones over Iraq involving AWACS. USAF F-15 firing BVR on designated targets that subsequently turned out to be friendly helicopters carrying a UN team and other less publicised occasions where USN aircraft, vectored by AWACS refused to fire BVR and visually identified the targets as friendlies avoiding an incident. Again the issue was the human interface but the USN, maybe due to Vincennes experience, appeared to be less reliant on the remote tactical picture.
If I recall correctly there was a RN frigate on patrol in the same area as Vincennes and repeatedly advised them that they were targeting a civilian airliner.
Back onto the Tarawa, the LHA actually had a smaller crew than the Melbourne with the majority of extra personnel being USMC. For a similar overall manning as required for Melbourne and Sydney, Australia could have crewed a pair of LHAs and when Sea Harriers / AV-8B+ became available have deployed a more powerful / capable air-group than Melbourne. Buying LHAs would have permitted the RAN to do without Tobruk.
The only down side would have been the loss of the Trackers and the outer zone ASW capability they provided but they would have gone with the Invincible option anyway.
The only down side would have been the loss of the Trackers and the outer zone ASW capability they provided but they would have gone with the Invincible option anyway.
t68
Well-Known Member
Wonder if an America class would be suitable for the SCB 125 mods as done to the Essex class ships, manning would obviously be a problem for the RAN.
I read the official US report. It's online somewhere, with bits blanked out. IIRC a couple of ships contacted, or tried to contact, Vincennes with that information, but the captain had ordered a lock down & it refused to accept the messages because it was in the middle of a fight. Doh!
An accumulation of errors by that ship, compounded by (IMO) an over-confident (unwilling to take advice) captain who was itching for a fight.
From what I recall, JC1 has a modular 'carrier kit' which can be installed to facilitate fixed-wing operations. IIRC there are containerised fuel tanks & munitions stores, & points for them to be fixed to in the vehicle deck, with appropriate connections (e.g. fuel lines).
t68
Well-Known Member
Yep AG said awhile ago one of the ex Essex was offered can remember which one it was. there was good model of the ship over at secret projects on what we missed out on.
Yes Abe dug up some interesting stuff in the national achieves that has now been scanned and is available for anyone to search. Basically it outlines the three options the RAN put to the government, new build CVA01, new build Essex or modernised surplus Essex operating Phantoms, Trackers and Tracers. The Army and in-particular the RAAF opposed this and the government agreed, ordering Skyhawks and Trackers for Melbourne instead.
Australia was offered Hermes as a hot transfer around 1968 including aircraft, Sea Vixen, Buccaneer, Gannet AEW but this was turned down.
Interestingly the RN had conducted a study into the Phantomisation of Hermes and determined that although it could be done the number of aircraft that could be operated was so small as to make the value on the conversion questionable, a far better option was suggested to be the procurement of Skyhawks of which Hermes would have been able to operate over 30.
Now there's a thought, Hermes in the RAN operating 24 Skyhawks, a squadron of Trackers and a squadron of Seakings, easily serving through to the mid 90s before needing replacement.
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