Interesting first-hand information Geddy, thanks. What you write here is pertinent because there is a rise of Chinese nationalism, especially among the younger generations in China. This, as their history shows us, doesn't mix too well with communism. Certain elements in the PLA argue for a short, sharp campaign against Japan as they did in 1962 against India, and in which they hope to get away with a land-grab. Many if these officers are not under the control of the CPC and believe the US is bluffing in regards to its commitments to go to war to defend Japan. Without a doubt, in my mind, the most dangerous region on the planet.
Chinese 'air defence identification zone' in East China Sea
- Thread starter cdxbow
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The PRC is already sort of going there with the territorial dispute.
If the international community acceded to their new claims to the ECS and SCS however, that would make pretty much all waters inside the second island chain their territorial waters, and a nation is free to set whatever laws it wants within their territorial waters. The special conditions of transit passage would not apply as the ECS and SCS are not straits, and the restrictions on innocent passage can be much more broadly interpreted.
The Soviet economy wasn't integrated with the West, but that didn't mean it was moribund or weak. In general the Soviet economy is a fascinating subject in its own right, and it had some remarkable strengths, as well as spectacular weaknesses. However because of the critical differences in regards to integration into the global economy, it's basically useless to compare the Soviet economy to the current Chinese one.
cdxbow
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Apologies comrade. I know it had strengths. For example during the depression, it was essentially unaffected by the economic mess that western capitalism had created. Indeed one of the appeals of communism for many in the west at that time was the way the Soviet economy was growing. Part of this was, as you point out because it wasn't integrated with the West. Clearly by the 1970 it had become inefficient, non-competitive and stagnant. (all those together probably gets close to moribund). I would be interested to know what other strengths it had?
PRC is currently second largest economy in the world and will sometime in the near future will overcome the USA. I don't think the Soviets ever got to within about a third to a half of GDP of the USA. In some ways the cold war, as long as it remained cold, was always going to be 'won' by the west. Same with the American civil war, the North was always going to win because of industrial muscle, and once the USA joined WWII the allies were always going to win for the same reason.
I read last week that the politburo have taken over direct control of the PLA, so if that is indeed the case, that will take care of any PLA personnel who don't follow the party line (please excuse the pun). Anyway Xi is ensuring that he controls the PLA and one way he is doing this is by promoting young generals. From what I understand Xi is also more a party theorist and he will ensure that the PLA will make “unremitting efforts to arm servicemen with socialist theories of Chinese characteristics and ensure their purity, reliability and firmness in ideological fronts.” Xi Consolidates Control Over the Military | The Diplomat Another point is the PLA has its own economic empire and if Xi forces them to give up that independence, they will not take to it too kindly because I would think that a lot of senior officers will face losing substantial income streams. Finally an old political trick is if you want to divert attention from problems at home you focus your populations attention on a foreign problem. The trouble for us is the we are on the outside looking in and are not familiar with the inner workings of the relationships between factions within the PLA, within the politbiro and the relationship between the politburo and the PLA. So if the report I read last week is true, theperhaps things have changed, because Xi has appeared to have stepped around the Central Military Commission and made the PLA directly responsible to the politburo hence exerting more control and further consolidating his power. Unfortunately I can't find the link to that story at the moment.
In terms of Chinese motivations, I've been having a look around and found this think tank analysis on the subject. Posted it elsewhere in the forum but now I see this is where I ought to have asked... what do you guys reckon to the analysis here? I think the points around the fact that China doesn't seem very interested in actually enforcing the ADIZ terms are quite convincing:
RUSI - China’s Air Defence Identification Zone and its role in Chinese Geo-Strategic Policy
RUSI - China’s Air Defence Identification Zone and its role in Chinese Geo-Strategic Policy
Lcf
Member
Surely, China is in a much better position compared to USSR given that China is already pass the 50% of the US economy and keeps growing and unlike USSR they have much less ideological constraints when it comes to reforms.
But back in the days, when the USSR fell apart in 1991, its economy was roughly half the size of Americas. And I don't think the West was that optimistic 'bout "wining", in fact, based on available data in the '60s some economists were sure the Soviet economy could overtake the economy of the United States by the year 2000. The rest is history.
I would not say that. That analysis is by outsiders looking in, who may not be fully aware of the dynamics and thought processes that are occurring within the higher echelons of the Chinese state and politburo. They do not think like us in the west and have different priorites and world view. I agree that this particular ADIZ is a tool in the attempt of asserting eventual Chinese over the Senaku / Daiyou Islands and the resources that lie with that area. Extrapolating that the PRC do not appear interested in enforcing their will on the ADIZ and its environs is incautious. It is very early days yet and this is a long game.
cdxbow
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Too true. I will probably be dead before the end game.
The article nails two of the reasons, establishing a quasi legal case and testing the US commitment. I think there are another couple. It gives a trigger should PRC want to escalate, that's why it involves Japan. Testing how an ADIZ works, before more are established is another. Again, that's why it involves Japan. If it does escalate through some miscalculation and a 'short sharp warning' is required, Japan would be the preferred target.
If the above is true then you would expect things to quieten down a bit as the PRC and waits to see what happens. If nothing much happens then expect more ADIZ.
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
I do not think it was declared to 'test' how an ADIZ works. If that was what the PRC really wished to do, it could have declared a smaller ADIZ much closer to the mainland which would be easier to conduct air intercepts in, and did not include disputed territorial claims, or overlap existing ADIZ's belonging to either South Korea or Japan.
-Cheers
There are. Some times, they lead to things like this.
And as CB90 correctly mentions, the PRC does this anyway in the South China Sea with some regularity (though I don't think they've done it to the US in a few years). To some degree, it's actually feasible in the SCS, in a way it's not in the ECS (namely because the Japanese alone have the wherewithal to resist such efforts, in a way countries like the Philippines and to a lesser extent, Vietnam don't).
From an operational perspective, the Chinese would have a much harder time enforcing an ADIZ in the South China Sea as the area is located much further away from the Chinese mainland than the East China Sea. A big advantage the Chinese have over the South China Sea however is that Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines all have different ideas as to how to handle the Chinese and the Spratly's issue; as opposed to the situation up north with Japan and South Korea with both countries basically having a common stand.
And South Korea responds:
SEOUL, South Korea: SKorea expands air defense zone after Chinese move | World | The State
The new South Korean ADIZ (purple line) appears to overlap parts of the new Chinese ADIZ and the Japanese ADIZ.
This appear to be more of an attempt to force China to negotiate rules for ADIZ's rather than simply imposing them. South Korea also claims that 'South Korea's zone did not infringe upon any country's airspace and that Seoul had sufficiently explained its action to its neighbors before the announcement'.
SEOUL, South Korea: SKorea expands air defense zone after Chinese move | World | The State
The new South Korean ADIZ (purple line) appears to overlap parts of the new Chinese ADIZ and the Japanese ADIZ.
This appear to be more of an attempt to force China to negotiate rules for ADIZ's rather than simply imposing them. South Korea also claims that 'South Korea's zone did not infringe upon any country's airspace and that Seoul had sufficiently explained its action to its neighbors before the announcement'.
Sampanviking
Banned Member
It is interesting that one of the main criticism made of the CADIZ is that it threatens to change the Status Quo. It does beg the question of how anyone can think that a new Super Power can emerge without the Status Quo being changed.
I still however have a strong sense of “The Elephant in the Living Room” on this subject and that the true nature of the status quo under threat is not being openly admitted and discussed. Most of the commentary concentrates purely on the Diayou Islands dispute as if they were an end in themselves. I see them more as a means to an end, with the actual end being a far greater Geopolitical objective than simply a few small dots in the ECS, no matter how rich the surrounding energy deposits may or may not be. An ADIZ is not an Exclusion Zone and neither do you need to declare an ADIZ to set up or enforce an Exclusion Zone. It is undoubtedly a useful thing to have in conjunction and no doubt it does make a useful first step if you really wanted to declare an exclusion zone at a later date.
I have good reason to believe that the Chinese have rather bigger fish to fry and that ultimately this all boils down to a single and irrefutable geopolitical fact. This is that the Pacific is the one direct frontier between the worlds two premier powers and that despite being a vast Ocean, that the Pacific has little geopolitical significance itself as it is not territory. This means that the real border/balance of power between these two nations can only exist in one of two locations; either 12 nautical miles of the East coast of China or 12 nautical miles off the West Coast of the ContUSA.
Currently it lies 12 nautical miles of the East Coast of China and the Chinese would like this to change.
Key to this situation holding or changing, is who holds the most influence or even control over the 1st Island Chain – Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines. The US is undoubtedly determined to maintain the status quo and the repivot to Asia is as much a reinforcement of this single direct border.
The Chinese ADIZ is by extension a way to put the alliances of the region under pressure and to seek to exploit weaknesses between the key nations in the Chain and Washington.
Even this though, is not exactly anything imminent. The consequences of the US holding the 1st Island Chain in possible containment of China is a Strategic Irritant rather than any danger that is Clear, Present or Existential.
The main reason for active containment would be to prevent access to markets in the Americas or greater Pacific Region. Clearly China has no obstacles in this department and has very active trading activities with all these nations. The potential danger is that the US could turn this trade off. True but probably easier said than actually done. The US would not need to activate military containment to prevent its own trade with China, simply close its own ports, so such a measure would target trade with third party nations. Trade is a two way street and China is the main trading partner of virtually every nation in the Americas and the Pacific. Interdiction of Chinese trade would be interdiction of a large slice of global trade and the globe is unlikely to welcome such a move.
Moreover is China in any position to “break out” of the 1st Island Chain?
Even a precursory look says no.
This would mean having a large and Battle Ready Blue Water Navy and currently this does not exist, Chinese Naval Aviation is still in its Infancy and while there is a major modernisation programme spitting out new ships, these are simply replacing old and obsolete platforms and at nothing like a one for one ratio, which is hardly the definition of a traditional Arms Race.
In addition, simply look at which ships are being mass produced currently. Its mainly 056 Light Frigates (Corvettes) and the 054a Frigates. On top you have a few new Subs and a handful of new 052D Destroyers.
Anything else is rumours. This includes some indigenous fixed wing Carriers of about 70,000 tonnes (no physical evidence to date) – some intriguing pictures of steel sections which could represent one or two LHA of about 30 – 40,000 tonnes. Rumours of a new 055 Heavy Destroyer/Cruiser Class, of which there is no physical evidence.
All in all no navy capable of such a breakout for at least another ten years.
China is happy to play a slow game and the ADIZ is unquestionably a piece of it. The target of this move is in my opinion the stability of the US Japanese alliance. It is an attempt to sting the nationalist sentiment of the Japanese to take a more robust and Independent Foreign Policy and Defence stance. A Japan under Abe is definitely one that is more rather than less likely to respond to such a stimuli.
I also believe that China has a more immediate objective in its strategy and one that recognises the reality and significance of US Core Strategic Interest:
Any threat to the integrity of the position of the current border between China and the USA that is prejudicial to the US interest, will be countered and this will be a further reinforcement of that border. A reinforcement or a redeployment is highly suggestive of forces being brought in from elsewhere. I think the elsewhere is the significant factor in this equation.
In this instance the elsewhere would seem to be Central Asia and the Middle East, areas in which China is busy building its modern Silk Road land trade routes, pushing through to Europe and of course down to Africa itself.
I really have little doubt that the immediate aim of the CADIZ was to force the US to abandon its Strategic ambiguity regarding its own priorities and by so doing weaken further its influence in Central/South Asia and the Middle East. So in the space of one month, the US shows solidarity with Japan with a pair of B52’s but causes despair in Saudi Arabia and Israel by cutting a deal with Iran, hot on the heels of pulling the plug on project regime change in Syria.
The message from Beijing seems to these nations clear enough, some friends of Washington's are more important than others and so some might do better seeking new friends instead.
I still however have a strong sense of “The Elephant in the Living Room” on this subject and that the true nature of the status quo under threat is not being openly admitted and discussed. Most of the commentary concentrates purely on the Diayou Islands dispute as if they were an end in themselves. I see them more as a means to an end, with the actual end being a far greater Geopolitical objective than simply a few small dots in the ECS, no matter how rich the surrounding energy deposits may or may not be. An ADIZ is not an Exclusion Zone and neither do you need to declare an ADIZ to set up or enforce an Exclusion Zone. It is undoubtedly a useful thing to have in conjunction and no doubt it does make a useful first step if you really wanted to declare an exclusion zone at a later date.
I have good reason to believe that the Chinese have rather bigger fish to fry and that ultimately this all boils down to a single and irrefutable geopolitical fact. This is that the Pacific is the one direct frontier between the worlds two premier powers and that despite being a vast Ocean, that the Pacific has little geopolitical significance itself as it is not territory. This means that the real border/balance of power between these two nations can only exist in one of two locations; either 12 nautical miles of the East coast of China or 12 nautical miles off the West Coast of the ContUSA.
Currently it lies 12 nautical miles of the East Coast of China and the Chinese would like this to change.
Key to this situation holding or changing, is who holds the most influence or even control over the 1st Island Chain – Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines. The US is undoubtedly determined to maintain the status quo and the repivot to Asia is as much a reinforcement of this single direct border.
The Chinese ADIZ is by extension a way to put the alliances of the region under pressure and to seek to exploit weaknesses between the key nations in the Chain and Washington.
Even this though, is not exactly anything imminent. The consequences of the US holding the 1st Island Chain in possible containment of China is a Strategic Irritant rather than any danger that is Clear, Present or Existential.
The main reason for active containment would be to prevent access to markets in the Americas or greater Pacific Region. Clearly China has no obstacles in this department and has very active trading activities with all these nations. The potential danger is that the US could turn this trade off. True but probably easier said than actually done. The US would not need to activate military containment to prevent its own trade with China, simply close its own ports, so such a measure would target trade with third party nations. Trade is a two way street and China is the main trading partner of virtually every nation in the Americas and the Pacific. Interdiction of Chinese trade would be interdiction of a large slice of global trade and the globe is unlikely to welcome such a move.
Moreover is China in any position to “break out” of the 1st Island Chain?
Even a precursory look says no.
This would mean having a large and Battle Ready Blue Water Navy and currently this does not exist, Chinese Naval Aviation is still in its Infancy and while there is a major modernisation programme spitting out new ships, these are simply replacing old and obsolete platforms and at nothing like a one for one ratio, which is hardly the definition of a traditional Arms Race.
In addition, simply look at which ships are being mass produced currently. Its mainly 056 Light Frigates (Corvettes) and the 054a Frigates. On top you have a few new Subs and a handful of new 052D Destroyers.
Anything else is rumours. This includes some indigenous fixed wing Carriers of about 70,000 tonnes (no physical evidence to date) – some intriguing pictures of steel sections which could represent one or two LHA of about 30 – 40,000 tonnes. Rumours of a new 055 Heavy Destroyer/Cruiser Class, of which there is no physical evidence.
All in all no navy capable of such a breakout for at least another ten years.
China is happy to play a slow game and the ADIZ is unquestionably a piece of it. The target of this move is in my opinion the stability of the US Japanese alliance. It is an attempt to sting the nationalist sentiment of the Japanese to take a more robust and Independent Foreign Policy and Defence stance. A Japan under Abe is definitely one that is more rather than less likely to respond to such a stimuli.
I also believe that China has a more immediate objective in its strategy and one that recognises the reality and significance of US Core Strategic Interest:
Any threat to the integrity of the position of the current border between China and the USA that is prejudicial to the US interest, will be countered and this will be a further reinforcement of that border. A reinforcement or a redeployment is highly suggestive of forces being brought in from elsewhere. I think the elsewhere is the significant factor in this equation.
In this instance the elsewhere would seem to be Central Asia and the Middle East, areas in which China is busy building its modern Silk Road land trade routes, pushing through to Europe and of course down to Africa itself.
I really have little doubt that the immediate aim of the CADIZ was to force the US to abandon its Strategic ambiguity regarding its own priorities and by so doing weaken further its influence in Central/South Asia and the Middle East. So in the space of one month, the US shows solidarity with Japan with a pair of B52’s but causes despair in Saudi Arabia and Israel by cutting a deal with Iran, hot on the heels of pulling the plug on project regime change in Syria.
The message from Beijing seems to these nations clear enough, some friends of Washington's are more important than others and so some might do better seeking new friends instead.
Sampanviking that is quite an interesting analysis and I think you have it mostly right. I would add Hong Kong, Shanghai, and Taiwan to your list. I've just read an interesting article that discusses the time of the Warring States and comparing that to now. Why Chinese Study the Warring States Period | The Diplomat It's conclusions are that the current leadership do not want to repeat the mistakes that occured during the Warring States period, therefore they are ensuring the cohesiveness and survival of the current single Chinese sovereign state, the survivalof the current state system by using a strong military and state security system, ensuring that no rivals exist domestically and those that do are coopted into the system hence having a vested interest. The current leadership see Hong Kong, Shanghai, and Taiwan as areas where there is potential for rivals to rise and possibly seek independence from Beijing. I would also suggest that they would want to remove external threats further away from a single unified China which is another reason for a strong military.
IMO the key to understanding the way the Chinese are going about with their military modernisation programme is to take into account that they do not seek the capability to project power on a global scale; only their backyard - the Western Pacific and South China Sea - and if needed, in the Indian Ocean, to safeguard national shipping and China's access to energy supplies in the Middle East.
Not necessarily so. The reason why they have run their own "Great White Fleet" event is to demonstrate that they are a latent blue water navy - and that they will deploy to protect SLOCs - and the SLOCs are not just on Chinas seaboard
The string of pearls scenarios are generally regarded by analysts as increasing in importance circa 2025-2030 when they will be better placed to assert maritime will against most of their neighbours.
None of the analysis I've seen talks about a china exercising self constraint - and it flies in the face of the concerns of most countries in the PACRIM
The irony being that china was keen to isolate the US in what she sees as her mediteranean - and what she's done is actually get the majority of the nations in the region re-engaging with the US and letting the US know that they still regard her as the balance of power in the PACRIM
In all the conferences I've attended re PACRIM maritime power every country in attendance from that region has exercised caution about where they regard china is heading - and NONE of them regard china as a benign power in 2030-2040. None of them are concerned about US power, and in fact nearly all of them seek engagement with the US and PACOM in some form or fashion so as to determine future force development.
That's been a consistent pattern I've witnessed in the last 13 years. The acronymn TEOMEIMF applies for quite a few and they cleartly have concerns that as Chinas blue water capability firms up, and when the AMG/ESG firms up that china will start exercising trade threats and then military leverage to get her political advantage.
That's clearly the view of most if not all - despite the spin and sophistry that sometimes gets trotted out about a benign rise - they clearly politically and militarily don't believe it
This is not particularly surprising. The US is a known quantity, and has generally behaved quite well towards these countries in the recent decades. China on the other hand is unknown and has invaded it's neighbors in the past.
Out of curiosity does Vietnam also seek closer military ties with the US?
Yes, she has sought greater US engagement - in fact relations between the US and Vietnam are pretty good - there are also emerging military links.
cdxbow
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This isn't strictly to do with the ADIZ, but in the same vein. I didn't see this one at the time in the mainstream press - CNN has a little here U.S., Chinese warships come dangerously close – CNN Security Clearance - CNN.com Blogs and more here Chinese Naval Vessel Tries to Force U.S. Warship to Stop in International Waters | Washington Free Beacon
The USS Cowpens was carrying out "routine operation done to exercise its freedom of navigation near the Chinese carrier".
The USS Cowpens was carrying out "routine operation done to exercise its freedom of navigation near the Chinese carrier".
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