T-90 in Comparison to Western Armour

[Waylander]

No, it just means that they are not as affected by heavy ERA as older KEs are.
As you said, it's the old game of armor vs firepower.

And no needs to apologize. You did nothing wrong. This text floats around the net for some time now.

 

[peschernik]

I am agree with u.
One my acquaintance in the Internet - old marksman of Abrams has told the following:
«ERA is not the panacea, far from it, but it works well when you know how to build it. The latest Russian stuff can be a nightmare for a Tank Gunner and a tiring task for the loader, lol! …
Russia is so far the only one to field decent ERA. All the others ~France, Israel, the UK and some other Eastern Nations (China comes to mind) are only fielding NERA or weak ERA.»

Waylander, before you have told: «It's difficult to say who would have been victorious.» However if we will look at forces of the NATO and on WarPac forces, we will see that WarPac forces surpassed the NATO in quantity of soldiers and quantity of мilitary units (tanks, armoured troop-carriers, guns, multiple rocket launchers, self-propelled surface to air missiles, and others) several times! (Even aircrafts USSR had much more than the NATO.) The мilitary technology of the USSR was good (at that time, may be best in the world, - Russia uses war-technology of the USSR even now!), and the fighting spirit of USSR`s soldiers was above than soldiers of modern Russia (but and now soldiers of Russia is not puppies). So, chances to reflect of attack WarPac forces (for the NATO forces) was small. Many experts agree with this opinion.

 

[Waylander]

Numbers don't mean much if you run into killzones because of inflexible planning, or when your means of command & control or logistics can't support such a huge mass of maneuvering forces.

Not to say that probably the first supermarket over the border would attract some interest by the WarPac soldiers...

NATO would fight a defensive war and in such a war a numerical superiority might very well shrink away very fast.
If the WarPac doesn't manage to perform the needed operational breakthroughs in time they are in for a nightmare.

As I said, it's not possible to say who would have won.

 

[Teren_UA]

WarPac forces surpassed the NATO in quantity of soldiers and quantity of мilitary units (tanks, armoured troop-carriers, guns, multiple rocket launchers, self-propelled surface to air missiles, and others) several times! (Even aircrafts USSR had much more than the NATO.)

And what? Remember the quantity of Soviet tanks and planes on the 22/06/1941. The quantity is not the main advantage in modern war anymore.

The мilitary technology of the USSR was good (at that time, may be best in the world, - Russia uses war-technology of the USSR even now!),

Yes, it was good enouph. But was it the best? I can't remember none of soviet guns (except strategic missiles) which would be better than the NATO's.

and the fighting spirit of USSR`s soldiers was above than soldiers of modern Russia (but and now soldiers of Russia is not puppies).

That's why Caucasians soldiers are mocking Russians soldiers in Russian army? "Thanks" to vodka, GULAG, mass cillings of elites and the atmosphere of total fear for more than 70 years we have a situation, in which slaves are not good soldiers anymore. It is awful, but it is truth.

So, chances to reflect of attack WarPac forces (for the NATO forces) was small. Many experts agree with this opinion.

If it would be so, don't you think that Soviet tyranny would attack NATO's forces?

 

[Feanor]

And what? Remember the quantity of Soviet tanks and planes on the 22/06/1941. The quantity is not the main advantage in modern war anymore.

Defeat in early WWII had to do with the quality of the officer corps in the Soviet Army much more so then anything else. The quality of Russian and Soviet military officers had been deteriorating for quite some time, and by the revolution the Imperial officers were no longer able to effectively lead their men. After the revolution the newly established military education facilities were simply atrocious. The result was that when the time came, the RKKA fell apart at the seams. It wasn't defeated, it simply collapsed.

After WWII the USSR not only had a large number of capable and combat tested officers, but also an effective military doctrine, and and whole crop of capable upper-level leadership. (something notably absent before the war) The result was that Soviet military academies became much more sophisticated, and turned out much better officers.

Yes, it was good enouph. But was it the best? I can't remember none of soviet guns (except strategic missiles) which would be better than the NATO's.

By guns you mean... arty? And by better you mean...?

That's why Caucasians soldiers are mocking Russians soldiers in Russian army? "Thanks" to vodka, GULAG, mass cillings of elites and the atmosphere of total fear for more than 70 years we have a situation, in which slaves are not good soldiers anymore. It is awful, but it is truth.

The problem of zemlyachestvo in the current Russian Army did not exist under the USSR. In fact the problem of zemlyachestvo did not exist 4 years ago in the Russian Army of today. It rose when the institution of dedovschina was effectively dismantled by cutting the service time to one year. Essentially it's a problem of the existing enlisted rank structure being unable to control the soldiers. Sergeants which served the same amount of time as their privates, and probably went through boot camp (KMB) with them don't have the authority to run the show. The result is various informal institutions.

It's interesting to note that units with high percentages of contract sergeants tend to suffer much less from this. I suspect once the new crop of professional sergeants from the RVVDKU show up, zemlyachestvo will take a harsh blow. It's a much less established institute then dedovschina, and rests heavily on the lack of solid control in the barracks.

If it would be so, don't you think that Soviet tyranny would attack NATO's forces?

A judgement call we can make today with the benefit of hindsight might not have been so obvious 30 years ago.

 

[Teren_UA]

By guns you mean... arty? And by better you mean...?

Sorry for my awful mistake. I wanted to say "weapon", not "gun". I didn't speak or write in English for a few years and it is not easy to remeber even that scanty knowledge that I had.

 

[STURM]

Defeat in early WWII had to do with the quality of the officer corps in the Soviet Army much more so then anything else.

Yes the cream of the officer corps that were eliminated during the purges and the political apointees had a disastrous effect on the Soviet army's performance. A key victim of the purges was Tukhachevsky, one of the main brains behind the idea of deep penetration operations. I think there were also other key factors that led to the drubbing the Soviets received in the early years such as oganisational shortcomings and flawed/disastrous orders forced upon field commanders from the top leadership. But by 1944 the Soviet army, after going through a very steep and painful learning process, was a totally different army, one that learnt from it's mistakes and one that had permanently seized the strategic initiative from the Germans.

And what? Remember the quantity of Soviet tanks and planes on the 22/06/1941. The quantity is not the main advantage in modern war anymore.

Despite the overall Soviet numerical superiority in tanks, the Germans on many occasions at local points of contact had numerical superiority in tanks, this was because of organisational and doctrinal differences between both armies.

 

[Feanor]

Yes the cream of the officer corps that were eliminated during the purges and the political apointees had a disastrous effect on the Soviet army's performance. A key victim of the purges was Tukhachevsky, one of the main brains behind the idea of deep penetration operations. I think there were also other key factors that led to the drubbing the Soviets received in the early years such as oganisational shortcomings and flawed/disastrous orders forced upon field commanders from the top leadership. But by 1944 the Soviet army, after going through a very steep and painful learning process, was a totally different army, one that learnt from it's mistakes and one that had permanently seized the strategic initiative from the Germans.

I knew someone would bring up the purges. The key point here is that there was no cream of the crop. The purges (contrary to popular mythology) eliminated only a small part of the officer corps, and the officer corps itself was in a very poor state regardless of the purges. One could well make the argument that the purges of the upper military did more good then harm, as the personnel at the highest level became more interested in playing political games then leading the military, and began to extend networks of patronage and influence throughout the RKKA.

Despite the overall Soviet numerical superiority in tanks, the Germans on many occasions at local points of contact had numerical superiority in tanks, this was because of organisational and doctrinal differences between both armies.

It was a result of staggering failures of command. Mark Solonin's Hoops and Barrels has an excellent analysis of what happens, and Viktor Suvorov's (Rezun) book The Cleansing (Очищение) analyses the purges thoroughly, demonstrating both why it was convenient for Soviet propaganda to blame the early war failures on the purges, and why this was not true.

Characters like Mehlis and Kruschev (yes that one) were not an exception, they were the norm long before the purges.

 

[STURM]

I knew someone would bring up the purges. The key point here is that there was no cream of the crop. The purges (contrary to popular mythology) eliminated only a small part of the officer corps, and the officer corps itself was in a very poor state regardless of the purges. One could well make the argument that the purges of the upper military did more good then harm, as the personnel at the highest level became more interested in playing political games then leading the military, and began to extend networks of patronage and influence throughout the RKKA.

I think most if not all of us would agree that the end result, irrespective of the actual numbers of officers purged and even if the purges had never happened, would have been the same - many Soviet units being destroyed/decimated in 1941 and the Germans advancing as far as they did - due to a whole list of Soviet shortcomings And as you pointed out the quality of the Soviet officer corps during that period was not high to begin with. But would you agree that amongst the victims were officers [the most well known being Tuchachevsky] that could have later played a vital contribution in the Soviet Army's performance in the field and it's later recovery?

I had no idea that the number of officers liquidated in the purges were inflated for political reasons or as an excuse for the Red Army's poor performance in the early stages of the German invasion, thanks for pointing that out. Similiarly I have no idea how accurate his statement was but in an interview conducted the 70's, included in the 'World At War' series, a former Red Army officer claimed that in the Kiev military district many divisions lost even their regimental and battalion commanders due to the purges.

 

[peschernik]

And what? Remember the quantity of Soviet tanks and planes on the 22/06/1941. The quantity is not the main advantage in modern war anymore.

Right, but don't forget in WW2 the USSR have destroyed 650 German divisions. You can't imagine to yourself what big military experience have received the USSR in this war.
And when to huge army, the big military experience is added, it is terrible (for its opponents, of course)!

Yes, it was good enouph. But was it the best? I can't remember none of soviet guns (except strategic missiles) which would be better than the NATO's.

T-80U. In cold war the NATO hasn't made anything that could argue with it.
What about aircrafts? Su-27 and Mig-29 is the best fighters of cold war. The first: all NATO’s fighters of 4th generation can't be compared to them on maneuverability. The second: In time of cold war Su-27 and Mig-29 have helmet mounted display-sight and high maneuverable rockets R-73. (NOTO not to have it in cold war.) General Ronald Yates has told: «If he (that is the enemy with the helmet mounted display-sight and rockets R-73) sees you, you are a dead man. You will be not salvaged even by maneuvering with ninefold overloads.» Other senior officer has declared: «Absence on the planes of the Air Forces and Naval Forces helmet mounted display system and modern high maneuverable rockets of near fight — absolutely criminally»
(The NATO could solve the problem just now: they made maneuverable АIМ-9Х.)
What about fleet of the USSR?
Type 949А (Oscar class) – unique nuclear submarine. 13 units are produced. Experts call it «aircarrier-killer». Special ability of this 949А is that: this submarine can destroy aircarrier (and yet 20 more targets) from distance in 600 km. Any other submarine in the world can't make this.
Kirov class – the strongest missile cruiser in the world. (The USSR has made 4 units).

That's why Caucasians soldiers are mocking Russians soldiers in Russian army? "Thanks" to vodka, GULAG, mass cillings of elites and the atmosphere of total fear for more than 70 years we have a situation, in which slaves are not good soldiers anymore. It is awful, but it is truth.

Atmosphere of total fear! Who has told to you this bosh? You don't know anything about life in the USSR. You didn't live in the USSR, but I lived. And I will tell to you - life in the USSR was better than in modern America and in modern Russia: life in USSR was much more purer, much more quieter, much more protected, much more healthy.
Now in Russia and all over the world it is a lot of heart attacks, strokes and mental illnesses. But in the USSR, It was very very not much. (it is the medical fact). At people in the USSR was much less problems than now, therefore such illnesses was much less.

If it would be so, don't you think that Soviet tyranny would attack NATO's forces?

Russians didn't attack, because in the first: Russians are very humane. And in the second: USA declared: if the USSR will attacks the western Europe than the USA will attack the USSR by nuclear weapons.

 

[T.C.P]

Russians didn't attack, because in the first: Russians are very humane. s.

What do you mean?

 

[Feanor]

I think most if not all of us would agree that the end result, irrespective of the actual numbers of officers purged and even if the purges had never happened, would have been the same - many Soviet units being destroyed/decimated in 1941 and the Germans advancing as far as they did - due to a whole list of Soviet shortcomings And as you pointed out the quality of the Soviet officer corps during that period was not high to begin with. But would you agree that amongst the victims were officers [the most well known being Tuchachevsky] that could have later played a vital contribution in the Soviet Army's performance in the field and it's later recovery?

I have a personally very negative opinion of Tukhachevsky and his contributions. I strongly encourage you to order one of his books and to try to read it. His disaster in 1920, against Poland (I mean of all countries to lose to, Poland!) is an excellent demonstration of what kind of contributions one could expect from him.

I had no idea that the number of officers liquidated in the purges were inflated for political reasons or as an excuse for the Red Army's poor performance in the early stages of the German invasion, thanks for pointing that out. Similiarly I have no idea how accurate his statement was but in an interview conducted the 70's, included in the 'World At War' series, a former Red Army officer claimed that in the Kiev military district many divisions lost even their regimental and battalion commanders due to the purges.

The document commonly mis-cited as ~39 000 executed, actually speaks of ~39 000 retired. Out of which ~20 000 are arrested, and ~3-5 000 executed. Over 25 000 of those "retired" return to military service (including those arrested) by iirc 1941. The overwhelming majority are back in military service by 1942. Their return however does little to save the RKKA the embarrassing defeats of the summer of '42 in Ukraine (Kharkov) and the North Caucus.

To put it bluntly Stalin couldn't execute the competent officers because he never had any.

 

[Feanor]

Just thought you guys might be interested to know, the venerable T-55 is indeed still in service, most notably with the machine-gun artillery division on the Kuril Islands. It's planned for replacement, but to me personally it came as a shock. I know some T-55s were replaced with T-80s on Sakhalin in 2005, and always thought that was the last of them. Apparently not.

 

[Bonza]

Russians didn't attack, because in the first: Russians are very humane. And in the second: USA declared: if the USSR will attacks the western Europe than the USA will attack the USSR by nuclear weapons.

Oh, knock it off. The relative "humanity" of a given culture has nothing to do with tanks, so take your moralising elsewhere.

 

[Teren_UA]

Oh, knock it off. The relative "humanity" of a given culture has nothing to do with tanks, so take your moralising elsewhere.

+++! Let's talk about tanks, tactic of their using and so on.

 

[IronsightSniper]

But if Soviets were counting on operational level breakthroughs, what advantages their tanks had against Western in this angle? What is the specific of this kind of war operations? Soviet tanks had to take part in this attack in two roles. First, when motorized infantry had to break holes in NATOs defense, tanks should help them (in front of every motorized company there was a tanks platoon). Second, tanks were planned to be flinged in this holes to destroy NATOs communications and rear.

Let's suppose that the second role was more important. We need to compose a list of requirements for tank, which mission is to take part in such operational level breakthroughs.
1) Manoeuvrability and shipping quality (because of Soviet vans could capture only 60 tons not more);
2) High speed;
3) Autonomous (to have an opportunity to fight far from their bases);
4) Ergonomically (crew need a very comfortable tank because of they almost lived their for a long term);
5) Good devices for reconnaissance and information acquisition to coordinate with their activity;
6) Let's suppose that its electronics, thermals, gun and armour are not so important (but I'm sure they are important anyway).

In which components of this list Soviet tanks were good?
Manoeuvrability? Similar as Western.
Speed? Similar.
Reliability? More than doubtful (just look at Soviet cars and you will understand everything ).
Ergonomic? As one Russian general said, after two hours in soviet tank you lose 80 % of your physiological abilities . The volume of T-72/80/84/90s turrets is near 2,5 m3, the same for the Leo II – 5 m3.
Reconnaissance and information acquisition opportunities? Weak optics, no thermals (don’t know about quality of French ones, but now we are talking about Soviet tactics and tanks).
The advantages were weight and price only. I don’t know the exact price for T-90, but comparable Ukrainian T-84 costs 3.5 mln. $ and Russians press was writing about dumping from Ukrainian side. Suppose that their price is the same. The price of Abrams is 6,9 mln. $, Leo II – less than 6 mln., Merkava IV – 5 mln. $. The fact is, ex-soviet tanks are almost as cheaper, as lighter.

One additional thing that the T-90 (and maybe T-80 too?) is missing is a 360 degree sight. A 360 degree sight allows for Hunter killer operations, which would be great for impromptu AT warfare.

 

[peschernik]

Teren_UA - You repeat myths and hearings.
«Reconnaissance and information acquisition opportunities? Weak optics, no thermals.» USSR optics was very good. No thermals? USSR uz night vision devices from very old time, for example: IKN-8 (ИКН-8) night vision device for tank Т-34-85 (1944).

All your statements were erroneous. Behind еrgonomically (But the general has exaggerated). However it hasn't prevented for USSR`s tanks to reach Berlin (in 1944).

Manoeuvrability isn't identical, it above.

High speed, Autonomous, Good devices.
Looks:

TM60 Patton (Produced 1960-1987)
Gun 105 mm
Night sight device, night vision device, laser rangefinder and electronic fire control.
Max. operational range 500 km. Speed 48 km/h (road)

T-64
Gun 125 mm
PN-1-49-23 night sight, night vision TBN-4PA for the driver and a TNP-165A for the tank leader,
TPD-43B (ТПД-43Б) sight - laser rangefinder, cross-wind sensor, ballistic calculator, navigation device.
ERA Kontakt-1.
Operational range 700 km (road, with external tanks). Speed 60 km/h
T-72
Gun 125 mm
night sight device, night vision device, laser rangefinder and electronic fire control, navigation device, devices for underwater driving of the tank in a river (not more than 1000 m).
Operational range 700 km (road, with external tanks). Speed 60 km/h

M1 Аbrams (1981)
Gun 105 mm
Operational range 480 km with NBC system: 565 km. Speed Road: 72 km/h

T-80U
Gun 125 mm
1A46 fire control system includes a laser range finder, a ballistics computer, and a more advanced 1G46 gunner's main sights, as well as thermal imaging sights. ERA Kontakt 5.
Operational range 600 km (road, with external tanks). Speed 80 km/h
T-80U(M) TO1-PO2 Agava gunner's thermal imaging sight.

Reliability? Simplicity in use and reliability are known qualities of the weapon of the USSR.

Old tanks of the USSR perfectly work even now. 40 years after their production. Look: war with Georgia. Only T62\64 and T-72 was there (indeed all the tanks with Kontakt-5). It is old quality!

 

[Feanor]

Teren_UA - You repeat myths and hearings.
«Reconnaissance and information acquisition opportunities? Weak optics, no thermals.» USSR optics was very good. No thermals? USSR uz night vision devices from very old time, for example: IKN-8 (ИКН-8) night vision device for tank Т-34-85 (1944).

How does that disprove his statement about lack of thermals?

M1 Аbrams (1981)
Gun 105 mm
Operational range 480 km with NBC system: 565 km. Speed Road: 72 km/h

T-80U
Gun 125 mm
1A46 fire control system includes a laser range finder, a ballistics computer, and a more advanced 1G46 gunner's main sights, as well as thermal imaging sights. ERA Kontakt 5.
Operational range 600 km (road, with external tanks). Speed 80 km/h
T-80U(M) TO1-PO2 Agava gunner's thermal imaging sight.

I find it very interesting that you compare the T-80U to the baseline M1.

Old tanks of the USSR perfectly work even now. 40 years after their production. Look: war with Georgia. Only T62\64 and T-72 was there (indeed all the tanks with Kontakt-5). It is old quality!

T-64s were not used. The T-62s did not have K-5 or even K-1 for that matter. The T-62M models had applique armor upgrades, the T-72Bs mostly had older Kontact ERA, only the few BAs upgraded recently sported K-5.

I would also hardly consider this a point of pride. When Georgia has more capable MBTs then Russia, that's pretty embarrassing.

 

[peschernik]

IronsightSniper You is right (about T-90).
But Teren_UA repeat myths (about tanks of USSR).
«Reconnaissance and information acquisition opportunities? Weak optics, no thermals.» USSR optics was very good. No thermals? USSR uz night vision devices from very old time, for example: IKN-8 (ИКН-8) night vision device for tank Т-34-85 (1944).

High speed, Autonomous, Good devices, Armor, Armament.
Looks (tanks of cold war):

TM60 Patton (Produced 1960-1987)
Gun 105 mm. Armor: vs KE Turret 210 Hull front:170-250, vs CE Turret: 250
Night sight device, night vision device, laser rangefinder and electronic fire control.
Max. operational range 500 km. Speed 48 km/h (road)
Leopard 1 (1965)
Gun 105 mm. Armor: vs KE Turret: 180-190 Mantle: 230 Glacis:140 Lower front hull: 120 Turret: 200-270, vs CE Turret: 200-270
Operational range 600 km (on road) Speed 62 km/h

T-64
Gun 125 mm
Armor: According to a declassified CIA report from 1984, the US then assessed that the T-64A and T-64B had the same protection level of 370-440mm vs KE and 500-575mm vs CE. The T-64 was designed to be protected against all 1960s 105mm ammunition. BTVT estimates T-64A max as glacis 335mm vs KE/450mm vs CE, turret 410mm vs KE/450mm vs CE. GSPO estimates T-64B as 380-450mm versus KE and 500-560mm versus CE. BTVT estimates T-64B as 350-500mm versus KE and 450-600mm versus CE.
PN-1-49-23 night sight, night vision TBN-4PA for the driver and a TNP-165A for the tank leader,
TPD-43B (ТПД-43Б) sight - laser rangefinder, cross-wind sensor, ballistic calculator, navigation device. ERA Kontakt-1.
Operational range 700 km (road, with external tanks). Speed 60 km/h

T-72
Gun 125 mm
Armor (T-72B & S w/K-1 ERA): vs KE Turret: 280-550 Glacis: 485 Lower front hull: 250 vs CE Turret: 580-850 Glacis: 670-910 Lower front hull: 250. BTVT estimates T-72B max as glacis 485mm vs KE/900mm vs CE; turret 540mm vs KE/900mm vs CE.
night sight device, night vision device, laser rangefinder and electronic fire control, navigation device, devices for underwater driving of the tank in a river (not more than 1000 m).
Operational range 700 km (road, with external tanks). Speed 60 km/h

M1 Аbrams (1981)
Gun 105 mm
Armor: vs KE Turret: 400 Glacis: 400, vs CE Turret & Glacis:700-800.
Operational range 480 km with NBC system: 565 km. Speed Road: 72 km/h
M1A1 (1985) Gun 120 mm. Armor: vs KE Mantle & Turret: 450 Glacis: 350-490 Lower front hull:430-470, vs CE Turret: 800 Glacis:510-800 Lower front hull: 570-790
Leopard 2 (In service 1979-present)
Gun 120 mm. Armor: vs KE Turret: 550-600 Glacis: 250-300, vs CE Turret: 800
Operational range 550 km. Speed 72 km/h

T-80U
Gun 125 mm
Armor: BTVT estimates T80U w/K-5 max glacis 800mm vs KE, turret 860mm vs KE; turret 1200mm vs CE glacis 1100mm vs CE
1A46 fire control system includes a laser range finder, a ballistics computer, and a more advanced 1G46 gunner's main sights, as well as thermal imaging sights. ERA Kontakt 5.
Operational range 600 km (road, with external tanks). Speed 80 km/h
T-80U(M) TO1-PO2 Agava gunner's thermal imaging sight.

Reliability? Simplicity in use and reliability are known qualities of weapons of the USSR.

Old tanks of the USSR perfectly work even now. 40 years after their production. Look: war with Georgia. Only old T62\64 and T-72 was there.

 

[Mindstorm]

We had this quote here before.
Over at Tanknet the ones which actually own the Janes Review said that no such article actually exists in it.

A T-72B (Not to talk of A/M/M1) is not going to be immune to modern KE rounds although modern heavy ERA is affecting KEs. Note that modern KEs like DM53/63 or M829A3 are also developed with heavy ERA in mind.

What do you mean with : "no such article actually exists in it." ?

Are you serious ? This article is not only one of the most famous Jane's International Defence Review articles and surely one of the most cited in some of the most authorative studies of the sector, but has also another "twin" article , publied just an year before, (vol 29 n. 7 July 1996) always on Jane's International Review named "Russian tanks immune to attack says German expert " on the tests conducted by the equipe of Manfred Held (naturally with the same empyrical results) which, in a first istance, persuaded the Pentagon at envoy L. Ness to validate the results obtained by the german equipe .

Truly i don't understand what is your point ; i have noted that you have even accepted apologies from another poster on this subject when ,of course it was completely right !!!

Please can you clarify your position ? Thanks .