The Royal Navy Discussions and Updates

[swerve]

I have spoken to the MoD Press Office today. I was told that -

Contrary to rumour, Queen Elizabeth will not enter service as an LPH in 2016. Construction will be delayed, & she will be held back until Prince of Wales is complete. The plan to complete her on schedule for use as an LPH is a proposal that was considered, but rejected before the SDSR was published.

Prince of Wales & Queen Elizabeth will both, on current plans, be ready for service in 2020.

It has not been definitely decided whether to complete both, or one (& if so which) with cat & trap (& the pleasant voiced, young-sounding woman who I spoke to said 'cat & trap'..

No decision has been made on which ship will be the active carrier, & which will be placed in reserve.

 

[WillS]

I have spoken to the MoD Press Office today. I was told that -

Contrary to rumour, Queen Elizabeth will not enter service as an LPH in 2016. Construction will be delayed, & she will be held back until Prince of Wales is complete. The plan to complete her on schedule for use as an LPH is a proposal that was considered, but rejected before the SDSR was published.

Prince of Wales & Queen Elizabeth will both, on current plans, be ready for service in 2020.

It has not been definitely decided whether to complete both, or one (& if so which) with cat & trap (& the pleasant voiced, young-sounding woman who I spoke to said 'cat & trap'..

No decision has been made on which ship will be the active carrier, & which will be placed in reserve.

That's what I'd assumed from reading the published 'strategic' defence review PDF. So, what does that mean with regards to the LPH role between 2014 and 2020? Does Illustrious solider on? Does Ocean get reactivated? Do we do without and provide an excuse for the bean counters to sell both PoW and QE (well, you've done without for 5 years....)?

"ready for service" presumably means some sort of operating capacity rather than merely finished and handed over?

WillS

 

[1805]

I have spoken to the MoD Press Office today. I was told that -

Contrary to rumour, Queen Elizabeth will not enter service as an LPH in 2016. Construction will be delayed, & she will be held back until Prince of Wales is complete. The plan to complete her on schedule for use as an LPH is a proposal that was considered, but rejected before the SDSR was published.

Prince of Wales & Queen Elizabeth will both, on current plans, be ready for service in 2020.

It has not been definitely decided whether to complete both, or one (& if so which) with cat & trap (& the pleasant voiced, young-sounding woman who I spoke to said 'cat & trap'..

No decision has been made on which ship will be the active carrier, & which will be placed in reserve.

My god they really didn't want them...they should be renamed HMS Unloved & Unwanted. If we don't get at least one the RN will fall so far down the power projection league table. At least with CVA01 there were the Invincibles, now there will be 10 years with no chance of fixed wing aircraft and maybe 5 years with nothing at all.

 

[WillS]

I have spoken to the MoD Press Office today. I was told that -

It has not been definitely decided whether to complete both, or one (& if so which) with cat & trap (& the pleasant voiced, young-sounding woman who I spoke to said 'cat & trap'..

No decision has been made on which ship will be the active carrier, & which will be placed in reserve.

There's an opportunity here. I don't think any of us believe this review is anything more than an attempt to address funding shortfalls over the next 5 years (pre Afghanistan withdrawal). With enough pressure, better economic news and (crucially) no realistic buyers for carrier #2, I still think there's a chance the RN could, eventually, get both.

Of course, the RN would need to play a blinder in the meantime. Demonstrating competence and innovative thinking. Both of which seem in short supply within the upper reaches of the senior service.

WillS.

 

[1805]

There's an opportunity here. I don't think any of us believe this review is anything more than an attempt to address funding shortfalls over the next 5 years (pre Afghanistan withdrawal). With enough pressure, better economic news and (crucially) no realistic buyers for carrier #2, I still think there's a chance the RN could, eventually, get both.

Of course, the RN would need to play a blinder in the meantime. Demonstrating competence and innovative thinking. Both of which seem in short supply within the upper reaches of the senior service.

WillS.

And there must be contractual commitments to buy some F35. I appreciate in the game of alphabet soup we seem to be playing, the RAF could get these changed from"c" to "a"

 

[swerve]

That's what I'd assumed from reading the published 'strategic' defence review PDF. So, what does that mean with regards to the LPH role between 2014 and 2020? Does Illustrious solider on? Does Ocean get reactivated? Do we do without and provide an excuse for the bean counters to sell both PoW and QE (well, you've done without for 5 years....)?

"ready for service" presumably means some sort of operating capacity rather than merely finished and handed over?

WillS

It's what I thought the SDSR meant, but the web is full of people arguing otherwise.

That's what she seemed to be saying: two ships with operational capacity, both commissioned, but one active & one put into reserve.

 

[KiwiRob]

My god they really didn't want them...they should be renamed HMS Unloved & Unwanted. If we don't get at least one the RN will fall so far down the power projection league table. At least with CVA01 there were the Invincibles, now there will be 10 years with no chance of fixed wing aircraft and maybe 5 years with nothing at all.

Sorry but you really need to cut down on the negativity.

 

[1805]

Sorry but you really need to cut down on the negativity.

Agreed cheer me up with a positive comment. Actually Wills is right if they stripped out all waste and run lean for 10 years, with an upturned economy they might get both and fixed wing aircraft. But they will not give up there gold plated T26 or anything else until its taken away from them.

 

[riksavage]

Ownership is very interesting. The RAF will fight very hard and probably win, and as we know cannot be trusted with Naval affairs (Harrier or MR4). I was looking at the capability of attack helicopters and they really are fairly poor compared to an A10 (hitting power and protection). Do they exist in such numbers because airforces do not let armies have fixed wing aircraft?

The A10 is likely to be replace by F35 but would the US Army chose it? In the same way the RAF has chosen Tornado over Harrier, when all the evidence is that the Army and Certainly the Navy would have retained the Harriers.

The issue of GR9 Harrier is a contentious one, and the RAF have pulled an absolute blinder. In A-Stan the GR9 maintained a much greater sortie rate over the GR4. Both have surveillance pods, both can deploy the latest generation of Paveway. The GR9 has CRV-7, whilst the GR4 has 27mm cannon. The UK is one of the lucky few to have a high level of owned CAS assets on station, with Apache (fitted with hot & high engines) and .50 equipped Lynx Mrk9 (fitted with hot & high engines) adding to existing RAF fixed wing close support.

Comparing the two:

The Tornado GR4 is a day or night, all-weather attack aircraft, benefitting from a two crew layout - Load wise it carries Storm Shadow, Brimstone, ALARM, AIM-9 Sidewinder, Paveway II, Paveway III, Enhanced Paveway, General Purpose Bombs, Mauser 27mm cannon and a Raptor Surveillance Pod

Harrier GR9/9A provides excellent close air support for a single seat aircraft - Load wise it carries AIM-9 Sidewinder, Maverick, Paveway II, Paveway III, Enhanced Paveway, General Purpose Bombs, CRV-7, Lightening Surveillance Pod.

If we look at potential future flashpoints, which might require UK participation such as Iran/NK, then the RAF would argue a combination of GR4/Typhoon operating out of Saudi (BAE has thousands of employees/engineers in-country) or Pusan SK is a better combination than Typhoon/GR9. The long range GR4, fitted with Storm Shadow can undertake deep strike missions against selected high net-worth targets protected by coalition CAP, something the GR9 can't. Any UK maritime force (Commando) in a Iran/NK scenario will operate alongside a USMC task group. They will benefit from USN/USMC CAP/CAS and its own Apache/MK9 find and kill fleets operating from either Lusty or Ocean (hopefully the former).

Even if we see increased sabre rattling in the Falklands, a mix of Storm Shadow equipped GR4's, Typhoon and Apache supported by increased Army assets on the ground would be enough to deter all but the most determined antagonists.

As far as I know GR4 is the only UK airframe capable of carrying Storm Shadow? If they had ditched GR4 instead of GR9 that capability would have been lost until F35 arrives.

Pleased to hear both QE's will be fitted for fixed wing (make then very attractive for sale, particualry as they are designed for low TLC). UK's financial status will dictate whether we end up with just one, with one in reserve, or just one (the other sold off). Thinking out the box maybe NATO should buy one and operate it as a pooled asset, the same way they plan to pool a limited number of C17? Keep one with cat & trap plus ramp, allowing it to operate F35B, C & Rafi. Rotate it through UK, French & Spanish command flying a mix of each countries STOVL & conventional cat & trap aircraft. France and UK can then dovetail their respective carrier downtimes with the availability of the NATO owned vessel.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

Various rumours floating that the typical mix (PW) is going to be 12 F35C (CAP), 6 Wildcat (find), 6 Apache (kill) and 6 Merlin (carry) plus MASC?

They're not rumours, just over enthusiastic and under informed speculation. The SDR is quite specific about swing role air wings:

We cannot now foresee circumstances in which the UK would require the scale of strike capability previously planned. We are unlikely to face adversaries in large-scale air combat. We are far more likely to engage in precision operations, which may need to overcome sophisticated air defence capabilities. The single carrier will therefore routinely have 12 fast jets embarked for operations while retaining the capacity to deploy up to the 36 previously planned, providing combat and intelligence capability much greater than the existing Harriers. It will be able to carry a wide range of helicopters, including up to 12 Chinook or Merlin transports and eight Apache attack helicopters. The precise mix of aircraft will depend on the mission, allowing the carrier to support a broad range of operations including landing a Royal Marines Commando Group, or a Special Forces Squadron conducting a counter-terrorism strike, assisting with humanitarian crises or the evacuation of UK nationals.

No mention of MASC/AEW in any of it. Rather by stating that the carrier is “unlikely to face adversaries in large-scale air combat” is actually a strong argument against organic AEW.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

It's what I thought the SDSR meant, but the web is full of people arguing otherwise.

That's what she seemed to be saying: two ships with operational capacity, both commissioned, but one active & one put into reserve.

Which is the best case scenario. The SDR also says they might sell one off if they can establish a joint carrier force with a close ally.

To maintain a single carrier they will need two hulls to ensure one is ready at all times. The same as the need for HMS Ark Royal as the third Invincible to ensure there are two carriers available at all times.

The difference between the current and the immediate past plan is the scope for air wing and mobilisation. With the 130 odd F-35Bs Joint Force STOVL the UK would have little trouble forming two 36 strong carrier air wings in time of need for a two carrier force/

Under the current plan of much less (48?) F-35Cs in Joint Force CTOL the UK could possibly form two 12-16 strong carrier air wings in time of need. Then of course there would only be enough sailors to man a single carrier…

To achieve the required savings and operate on the reduced budget the number of personnel are going to be much less. So while you may have some of the shiny new ships around you won’t have anyone to press the buttons that make them operate.

While the savage SDR cuts have been spurred by the depressing economic and financial situation of Europe behind this is a long term movement southwards in the UK’s defence expenditure. It has been at around 2.5% of GDP the past 10 years but clearly is on the way to a more European norm of 1.2-1.8%. Under which case good economic times or not you will never get the funding back.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

Knowing where you came from is a good first step to getting out of any mess. Since I can’t attach .pdfs of any reasonable size to this forum here are some links to some historical press reporting on the beginning of the Invincible class replacement scoping.

1997 | 0676 | Flight Archive

“.. .and RN details Invincible-class replacement options”
FLIGHT INTERNATIONAL 19 - 25 March 1997

royal navy | flight international | die rn | 1997 | 0800 | Flight Archive

“Invincible ideas?”
FLIGHT INTERNATIONAL 26 March - 1 April 1997

How could it all have gone so wrong…

 

[riksavage]

How could it all have gone so wrong…[/QUOTE]

GWII & A-Stan changed everything. The UK's determination to keep a brigade ++ in the field until 2015 has swayed the argument in favour of the RAF/Army. Further compounded by the fact the Government spends over 2.5 billion per annum running current operational deployments (not including pre-training) and will require further UOR's to meet changing circumstances, all this will continue to snap at the heals of other capital projects. Maybe the UK should just follow the Spanish/Dutch example and leave A-Stan once and for all and funnel the saved funds back into high profile capital projects?

The current cost presures are just the tip of the iceberg, we haven't even begun to look at the long term wear and tear issues on equipment committed to the campaign. I would love to see the airframe life span calculations of the Apache fleet before deployment and now they've been in theatre battered by sand for extended periods.

Populist opinion has swung away from the Navy. Regardless of the fact the RN has committed RM & FAA assets to the ground war they have failed to use the propaganda machine to its full potential unlike the other two services. Also lets not forget JS the last service chief was a former Tornado pilot.

The end of the cold war, ongoing land-locked military operations, no single easy to defined threat on the UK's doorstep (old Soviet Union) plus financial collapse has culminated in the perfect storm for the RN. Plus their PR department has been next to bloody useless.

In a worst case scenario MASC will consist of pallet radar for Merlin. Cost wise it's a pretty cheap option and though nothing like a fixed wing solution offers enough base level coverage.

Another insightful outcome of SDR was the retention of the hugely expensive PFI airtanker/transport fleet, another major coup for the RAF. I'm sure they argued, at the expense of the Navy, that this will (along with C17) allow them to maintain the strategic edge in keeping future adventures supplied with men and material from the Falklands to the ME based on the assumption of friendly host nation support. They are also fortunate that Brize Norton has already received an infrastructure upgrade complete with modern hanger/servicing facilities replacing the older 1960's vintage buildings.

The UK is committed to keeping military spending at the NATO minimum, 2% of GDP. Under the current economic climate this is reasonable, one can only hope that once things improve the country moves back to around 2.5%.

On a final note, not a bad aticle

http://www.defencemanagement.com/feature_story.asp?id=14968

 

[Abraham Gubler]

GWII & A-Stan changed everything.

No they didn’t. It was perfectly obvious by the end of the 1990s that the forces of western countries would be tied down in police actions around the world for half a century of more until globalisation had brought everyone up to an approximation of stability.

The UK could well afford to keep their forces in Afghanistan and modernise the Navy and Air Force if their funding stayed at a level peg of >2.5% of GDP. But the nose dive in this baseline level of funding support from Government has caused the massive cuts. The police action commitment means the cuts are felt mostly by the Navy and Air Force. An ironic twist on pervious cuts which slashed the Army out of proportion because dirty grubby soldiers are so much more unpleasant than nice shiny ships and planes.

The question is why did the RN put all its eggs in one basket so they were so vulnerable to permutations in overall funding? While it may appear retrospective in motivation other Navies had sought during the same time frame as the CVF program to replace their carriers with LHDs – Spain and Italy. Providing a much more balanced approach to capability provision. The UK on the other hand launched LPD (Albion), LSD (Bay) and CVA (QE) programs. That they left the jewel in the crown (CV) until last has resulted in said jewel being hocked.

I’m sure there would have been at least one bright spark in the RN in the mid 90s who looked at Ocean, looked at Wasp and said why don’t we build LHDs instead of these LPDs and they can replace the Invincibles as well? Sure come 2010 and SDR the scond batch of 3 LHDs may be terminated but you would have retained a powerful fleet with no carrier holiday and no need to gut personnel to pay for 130,000 tonnes of ship you will hardly use.

 

[weasel1962]

Re:

The action in Iraq and Afghanistan did influence procurement decisions. More chooks, MRAP development, anti-mine detection, ISR, etc rather than the more traditional conventional warfare type of equipment. In that sense, it has changed requirements towards anti-insurgency equipment procurement and force structure eg flexible brigades. Even if a higher budget, that is still a changed trend.

Some of the cuts should have been performed even with a higher budget due to poor project management.

 

[riksavage]

The question is why did the RN put all its eggs in one basket so they were so vulnerable to permutations in overall funding? While it may appear retrospective in motivation other Navies had sought during the same time frame as the CVF program to replace their carriers with LHDs – Spain and Italy. Providing a much more balanced approach to capability provision. The UK on the other hand launched LPD (Albion), LSD (Bay) and CVA (QE) programs. That they left the jewel in the crown (CV) until last has resulted in said jewel being hocked.

I’m sure there would have been at least one bright spark in the RN in the mid 90s who looked at Ocean, looked at Wasp and said why don’t we build LHDs instead of these LPDs and they can replace the Invincibles as well? Sure come 2010 and SDR the scond batch of 3 LHDs may be terminated but you would have retained a powerful fleet with no carrier holiday and no need to gut personnel to pay for 130,000 tonnes of ship you will hardly use.[/QUOTE]

The Falklands obsession convinced many in the RN that a European spec'd LHD or larger Invincible type asset would not provide a genuine carrier strike capability able to generate the kind of sortie rates needed to defend the fleet. And lets be honest that still stands today. A single Canberra sized platform adapted to fly limited numbers of F35B and helos (assume other in dry-dock) would not pass the Falklands test as a stand alone unit. Many of the Admirals who pushed for the gold plated QE option were on the receiving end as young ensigns in 82, they would have realised the benefits of having a larger platform capable of hosting 30+ airframes. The argument being if we are restricted to two strike carriers, and only one of them is likely to be deployed on active service let's make sure it's big enough to win the day.

Now circumstances have changed, both financial and from a threat perspective, but having 1 x QE active, and 1 x PW in reserve is still a pretty good end-game subject to the size of the available air-wing. Even if the UK only has enough F35C's to fully equip one, more can be bought/leased to mitigate any attrition rates in the short-term. I seriously believe if the sticky stuff hit the fan and the UK was forced to act unilaterally, the US would transfer 2nd hand F35C's on a lend-lease agreement. The QE's having a 50 year life-span offers up huge opportunities to host a myriad of different systems introduced incrementally over time as funds become available, this could include more F35C's.

We all realise the knock-on impact of the QE project has definitely resulted in the downsizing of other surface assets, 6 DDG's, not 12 for one. However if only one Carrier is active 3-DDG's should be enough to provide credible area defence for the ARG, leaving one in maintenance, one in reserve and one on its training cycle. Same goes for T23/26 assets - 2-4 covering the ARG will be enough. Now many may argue that doesn't leave many options for single hulls to be deployed elsewhere, hopefuly this can be filled by cheap OPV's and the remaining T26's. Plus our NATO friends will have to step-up as they did in 82 and back fill UK standing commitments as RN ships deployed South.

In hindsight, 2 x Wasp Class sized assets would have been better based on todays circumstances, but it's TOO DAMN LATE, so lets go with what we've got, develop appropriate doctrine and use the QE's as hybrid strike carrier / LHD / C&C assets. I'm convinced they will set the benchmark for future innovation in many areas (electric drive, twin conning tower configuration, fully automated weapons handling, digitized all weather landing aids etc.), the same way the Invincibles did.

 

[kev 99]

The question is why did the RN put all its eggs in one basket so they were so vulnerable to permutations in overall funding? While it may appear retrospective in motivation other Navies had sought during the same time frame as the CVF program to replace their carriers with LHDs – Spain and Italy. Providing a much more balanced approach to capability provision. The UK on the other hand launched LPD (Albion), LSD (Bay) and CVA (QE) programs. That they left the jewel in the crown (CV) until last has resulted in said jewel being hocked.

Put simply the RN replaced ships in the order they needed replacing, oldest first.

As for the economic difficulties that have led to the decisions of the SDSR and those specifically affecting the RN; Hindsight is a wonderful thing but I can't see how you would expect the senior staff of a navy to predict an economic meltdown that most of the financial analysists didn't spot either.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

The Falklands obsession convinced many in the RN that a European spec'd LHD or larger Invincible type asset would not provide a genuine carrier strike capability able to generate the kind of sortie rates needed to defend the fleet. And lets be honest that still stands today. A single Canberra sized platform adapted to fly limited numbers of F35B and helos (assume other in dry-dock) would not pass the Falklands test as a stand alone unit.

Sorry but sortie rates/generation are not determined by gross size in a STOVL operating carrier. Unless you do something like the CVF Delta (?) which had two tram lines for higher density takeoffs. A Juan Carlos I class LHD with some minor customisation for more attention to STOVL will launch/recover/sustain Harriers/F-35Bs at just as fast a rate as a Queen Elizabeth class CVA.

The only thing large size gives you is more efficient carriage of your net number of aircraft. Two Queen Elizabeth class CVA will more efficiently carry 72 F-35Bs than three Wasp class LHD. Of course building 3-4 Wasp LHDs is a more flexible, sustainable approach than building 2 QE CVAs and 4 Bay LPDs.

In hindsight, 2 x Wasp Class sized assets would have been better based on todays circumstances, but it's TOO DAMN LATE, so lets go with what we've got, develop appropraite doctrine and use it as a hybrid strike carrier / LHD / C&C asset.

One benefit from such a cock up as the current RN is identifying the causes of the cock up so others (and even the RN) don’t repeat the same problem at a latter date. The point I’m trying to make is the RN squandered an opportunity back in either the early 1990s or the late 1990s to launch a more ‘survivable’ procurement of similar but more flexible capability. Of course I reliease I have no access to time travel and can’t change the current situation but that doesn’t invalidate this thought process.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

Put simply the RN replaced ships in the order they needed replacing, oldest first.

Of course I’m aware of this need. The point I made was that replacing two LPDs, five LSTs and three CVLs could have been with six LHDs rather than two LPDs, four LSDs and two CVAs. The timetable of new commissionings would not be effected by such a change.

As for the economic difficulties that have led to the decisions of the SDSR and those specifically affecting the RN; Hindsight is a wonderful thing but I can't see how you would expect the senior staff of a navy to predict an economic meltdown that most of the financial analysists didn't spot either.

You don’t need hindsight to realise that a giant five billion pound project in one decade is going to increase your vulnerability to acts of god of any nature. Anyone with staff level training or basic financial experience understands the need to manage risk exposure.

The Admiralty have been risk junkies in this regard and paid the price for it. Much like this guy:

 

[AndrewMI]

Sorry but sortie rates/generation are not determined by gross size in a STOVL operating carrier. Unless you do something like the CVF Delta (?) which had two tram lines for higher density takeoffs. A Juan Carlos I class LHD with some minor customisation for more attention to STOVL will launch/recover/sustain Harriers/F-35Bs at just as fast a rate as a Queen Elizabeth class CVA.

The only thing large size gives you is more efficient carriage of your net number of aircraft. Two Queen Elizabeth class CVA will more efficiently carry 72 F-35Bs than three Wasp class LHD. Of course building 3-4 Wasp LHDs is a more flexible, sustainable approach than building 2 QE CVAs and 4 Bay LPDs.

Wow. Where to start picking that apart....