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Option One: Placing one Battle Group as the amphibious specialist battalion, similar to an Airborne Battle Group, and group enablers, such as fires, comms and logistics assets in support. This option would allow a high level of capability to be achieved, certifiable to US and UK standards. This option would however introduce significant force rotation and sustainment issues for Army, especially with our current operational commitments.
Option Two: Similar to the USMC MEUs and the UK’s 3 Cdo Bde (RM), an Australian Bde, grouped as a combined arms task force, may be best placed to be the Army’s amphibious specialist, providing entry and allowing heavier, or follow-on, forces to penetrate subsequent to the amphibious operation.1 This would provide capability comparable to the US and UK certifications levels.
Option Three: Similar to the French model where, until recently, annual changeovers occurred between battle groups as this would permit Army’s 10 Battle Groups exposure to amphibious capability. This would allow capability development to be broad but would potentially not achieve US and UK certification standards.
Linked to these options, the 2nd Commando Regiment will also be incorporated into the ‘on-line’ Landing Force as part of the advance force component. Similar to the MEU(SOC) approach of the USMC, or the Bde Recce Force of the UK RM, it will be necessary to rotate a Cdo Coy with the Landing Force.