NZDF General discussion thread

Twickiwi

New Member
Seems silly to not have an armed maritime UAV for instance, some 5000km's from NZ, detecting an "enemy" surface vessel and not being able to take it out!
Good ideas that I support for the NZDF over the next 10-15 years:

4x Maritime UAV (or more)
Army support UAV
Indirect fire support weapon
Direct fire support weapon/vehicle
Devonport relocation
P-3 replacement
2x ANZAC II
14x F/A-50
Hercules replacement
2+x OCV (Resolution, Manawanui replacements plus)
JSS (Endeavour replacement)
4 more A-109LUH
Maritime Helo replacement
Southern Ocean Research/Patrol/Logistics Vessel
Plenty of things I've left out.

A lot of this is just long deferred expenditure, but the money will still need to be budgeted. Lets hope there's oil in the Great Southern Basin.
 

MrConservative

Super Moderator
Staff member
Good ideas that I support for the NZDF over the next 10-15 years:

4x Maritime UAV (or more)
Army support UAV
Indirect fire support weapon
Direct fire support weapon/vehicle
Devonport relocation
P-3 replacement
2x ANZAC II
14x F/A-50
Hercules replacement
2+x OCV (Resolution, Manawanui replacements plus)
JSS (Endeavour replacement)
4 more A-109LUH
Maritime Helo replacement
Southern Ocean Research/Patrol/Logistics Vessel
Plenty of things I've left out.

A lot of this is just long deferred expenditure, but the money will still need to be budgeted. Lets hope there's oil in the Great Southern Basin.
Yep - that looks about right.

I have not given Devonport NB relocation much thought so I jumped on Google earth and had a look at possible candidates. Spotted an interesting 20ha unused immediately south of the Port of Northland. I think it is a good potential site - close to the main commercial shipping lanes and northern fishing fleet. Close to Marsden Point. Close to Auckland - still close to Whenuapei where 6Sqd lives. A commercial airport close by that once was a WW2 RNZAF base, Cheap local housing costs for those who live off base (Seriously someone on even a Commodores salary would struggle to pay a mortgage in the Devonport-Stanley Bay area) - Probably would get mega millions for the current DNB site considering the Yuppie neighbours - might be cost neutral. Had a look at Tauranga less room there, but probably a better city and more popular option with the rank and file. There is GSB Oil, however how much of it is there is the question. Recently I heard on Newstalk ZB some expert saying that it may be bigger than the North Sea find. Their seems to be positivity in this. Which might mean long johns for the navy - even in the summer! I think your list indicates what we need to do even if the GSB is dry - if the GSB find is of North Sea proportions - it will move us into a completely different security paradigm. Who knows the tables might completely be upturned - we could all be on here as Kiwi's posting in 2029 that the Aussies need to stop being hippies, pull finger and start spending more on defence. The irony! ;)
 

recce.k1

Well-Known Member
Just been reading the latest in the "Britain may sell one of its 2 QE class carrier to India" thread. Very interesting themes, that can be seen here in NZ previously but on a very much smaller scale - eg the way public debt puts pressure on defence, the forces squabble (seems the same as NZDF in the 1990's till say 2002-ish), pollies pick off the easy targets be that navy or air force, army not funded properly for operations (seems like NZ in Bosnia & Timor 99). Thankfully the NZ Army has been on a steady upgrade path (let's just forget about the RNZAF ACF being cut though and RNZN 3rd Frigate too - I'm not meaning to revisit past Army v AF tensions etc).

But other themes are also interesting eg that of expeditionary warfare, counter-insurgency and other asymetric threats (which we understand here of course).

I also see though in the latest (NZ) Navy Today (Nov), but not online yet (when it does hopefully the link will be http://www.navy.mil.nz/downloads/pdf/navy-today/nt149-web.pdf) there's an excellent interview with Dr Stephen Hoadley, Dept of Political Studies at AK Uni who is interviewed on the issue of "Secuity Implications of the World Recession" and how that will affect NZ defence and foreign policy wise etc.

Many themes but one I will mention is the pragmatists view of cutting defence spending because:

"Pragmatists see some of the defence budget pruning as overdue and acceptable, inasmuch as main force war is increasingly unlikely and many govt's are reconfiguring their forces for low-intensity manoeuuvre combat, peace support operations, sea, air, or land constabulary duties, and counter terrorism. These configurations also enjoy political support amongst (Western) publics which are increasingly pacifistic. The expensive air and navy platforms so prominent in the Cold War are to be replaced by smaller, more precise and versatile weapons, operated by highly skilled personnel supported by high-speed communications and real-time intelligence. Thus the pragmatists' arguement goes, a credible deployment capability can be maintained at a lower cost".
Seems like alot of what we have been witnessing in the WoT & related etc, and in many respects it seems NZ's defence reorientation a la the last administration, to an extent.

But Prof Hoadley also talks about the pessimists view, which is:
"A more pessimistic assessment points out that governments thought to be hostile to the West continue to build up their inventories of missiles, ships, submarines, combat and strike aircraft, and tank and artillery forces. While North Korea and Iran come immediately to mind, there are also uncertainties surrounding the intentions of Russia (in Georgia and Ukraine, for example) and China (regarding Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the Indian Ocean, for example), and even India and Pakistan regarding their long-standing animosity. Pessimistic analysts assess that financial hardship will have little impact on non-democratic leaders, who are driven by nationalism, ambition, or grievance. They can deprive their people of welfare in favour of providing their state apparatus with weapons for the pursuit of power-and status-enhancing goals, or worse, open aggression".
He then goes on to say:
"A dangerous asymmetry is the result. Western governments, assuming that major conflict is unlikely, and responding to the economics slump, are reducing their expenditures on combat capability, whilst hostile governments ignore the slump and continue arming".
This is alot more to the interview, but I don't wish to reproduce it here when hopefully it will appear on line soon.

Anyways, stuck down here in the bottom of the A-P region, this does apply somewhat to us in NZ. Certainly not all Western Govts are reducing their espenditures - some have including NZ, but of course Australia hasn't, it is still maintaining cold war levels and undergoing a massive upgrade programme. And we're on the edge of the threat by these less democratic nations etc.

So I raise this for a couple of reasons.

Firstly, hopefully the new NZ Defence Whitepaper will adjust policy away from the pure peace-keeping reorientation of the last administration, but whilst acknowledging that this is still vital for NZ's interests into the forseeable future (think Army/NZDF in Afghan/Timor/Solomons/Terrorism etc), BUT also acknowledge that conventional threats still exist. Whilst NZ can't fund both equally as well, we can, with some increase in expenditure maintain and enhance some combat abilities.

So as one example from above, for the ANZAC replacement (noted as two ANZAC II Frigates by Twickiwi - no doubt as a strating point for conversation), I'd suggest all being equal, when push comes to shove when NZ and Australian Govts hammer out NZ's participation in the project (hopefully), will NZ be asked to purchase 2 (the current number of NZ Frigates), or 3 (NZ's minimum for deploying at least one Frigate on pro-longed operations) or will Aussie say 4, as in the original ANZAC I deal?

Perhaps they will go for 4 or 3 (I don't think Aus Gov and even this current NZ Gov expect that 2 are realistic). So maybe 4 then? Personally I say 3 max, and as I said before use the funding for a potential 4th instead for a better sealift ship with dock and 3-4-5 helo landing spots.

That way NZ has the min Frigate force (3) for power projection into SEA with its allies (which coincidentally seems to be politically acceptable to the Aussies that post on the subject here), but also give NZ a better sealift ship for expeditionary warfare (and thus better to support the NZ Army on operations in the region, which let's face it won't be going away etc). With allied forces of course eg RAN LPD's etc. Wonder if there is a cut down version of the RAN LDP (sorry haven't looked at the Navantia site of late) that would fullfil NZ's needs? These are all long term things of course.

In the meantime for the RNZN, and to support Army and RNZAF operations overseas and in this region, the best thing this current Govt could do to get the ball rolling is replacing the AOR Endeavour with what it seems the Navy wants, which is a larger, JSS type ship with fuel, water and the ability to carry Army vehicles port-to-port, a couple of helo spots (and hanger/storage for what, maybe 3 or so helos)?
 

Gibbo

Well-Known Member

Gibbo

Well-Known Member
My 2 cents worth .... I also agree that for NZ, UAV technology, especially for maritime survellience in particular, but also overland survellience has to happen in due course, and that NZ Defence should be provided the funding prompt smart by the Govt to investigate these trends with partner nations (and no doubt NZ is investigating, but at an uninformed guess, we're probably not up there with Australia for example at the high end, more like at the lower end etc).

Another area of importance is the ship launched UAV's that Australia has been trialling with its Armidale patrol boats (and for inclusion in their future OCV's. FF's and AWD's etc). Think how much such technology would enhance NZ's current IPV's, OPV's and Frigates etc....... :D
RNZN is plannig to trial a home-made 'Kahu' mini-UAV from an IPV next year.
 

recce.k1

Well-Known Member
- Delivery of the first P3-K2 is scheduled for the first half of 2011 - what was the original date?
- Tenative dates for OPV delivery too, although I suspect the 1st of these won't be met!?!
I've snatched this from a public website (and I'll post more about it when I get the time, it's very, very interesting):

However, what was clear though was that much of the capability that had been sought under Project Sirius was inherent in Project Guardian. (‘It’s better actually’, one well-placed source commented.) The successful tenderer was L-3 IS Communications Integrated Systems (L-3), the company which, trading under its previous name of Raytheon Corporation, had been chosen as preferred contractor for Project Sirius.[67] Project Sirius was to have cost NZ$562.10 million (US$236 million at the then current exchange rate of US$0.42/NZ$ or US$229 million without a sub-surface capability). Project Guardian was agreed to in 2004 with a contract price of NZ$352 million (US$232 million at an exchange rate of US$0.66/NZ$). The sophisticated radar, the ELTA EL/M–2022 (v)3 series, which was sought for Sirius, is central to the upgrade. The electro-optics system, the Wescam MX-20 infra-red camera, provides a significant capability; and central to the Orion’s developing role is a Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI). Handling the large volumes of information will be L-3’s Integrated Data Handling System (IDHS). The result is ‘an optimised platform that can operate over land and sea as well as providing air-to-air surveillance’.[68]

With the signing of the contract in October 2004, the Project Guardian upgrade began in 2005 with the installation of the electro-optics system as a first stage. The full upgrade was started on the first aircraft in 2006 at L-3’s base in Texas, with system proving, testing and completion to be undertaken by 2009. The remaining five aircraft are to be modified by Safe Air Ltd in Blenheim, to be delivered by 2011.
Good news on the OPV's, the RNZN will be receiving a nice Christmas present!
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
So as one example from above, for the ANZAC replacement (noted as two ANZAC II Frigates by Twickiwi - no doubt as a strating point for conversation), I'd suggest all being equal, when push comes to shove when NZ and Australian Govts hammer out NZ's participation in the project (hopefully), will NZ be asked to purchase 2 (the current number of NZ Frigates), or 3 (NZ's minimum for deploying at least one Frigate on pro-longed operations) or will Aussie say 4, as in the original ANZAC I deal?

Perhaps they will go for 4 or 3 (I don't think Aus Gov and even this current NZ Gov expect that 2 are realistic). So maybe 4 then? Personally I say 3 max, and as I said before use the funding for a potential 4th instead for a better sealift ship with dock and 3-4-5 helo landing spots.

That way NZ has the min Frigate force (3) for power projection into SEA with its allies (which coincidentally seems to be politically acceptable to the Aussies that post on the subject here), but also give NZ a better sealift ship for expeditionary warfare (and thus better to support the NZ Army on operations in the region, which let's face it won't be going away etc). With allied forces of course eg RAN LPD's etc. Wonder if there is a cut down version of the RAN LDP (sorry haven't looked at the Navantia site of late) that would fullfil NZ's needs? These are all long term things of course.

In the meantime for the RNZN, and to support Army and RNZAF operations overseas and in this region, the best thing this current Govt could do to get the ball rolling is replacing the AOR Endeavour with what it seems the Navy wants, which is a larger, JSS type ship with fuel, water and the ability to carry Army vehicles port-to-port, a couple of helo spots (and hanger/storage for what, maybe 3 or so helos)?
If the NZDF had the choice between a 4th Anzac II frigate (or whatever it ends up being called...) or a second lift ship, I would personally prefer the 4th frigate, unless the Canterbury was sold or retired.

Better still would be to use the funds to expand Army and/or reactivate a limited ACF as Mr. C suggested with a dozen or so KAI TA-50s.

My reluctance for the RNZN to attempt for a second lift ship is as follows. The Canterbury MRV itself is brand new, and while not the best lift ship and IMO clearly showing what happens when one cuts corners by going with a lowest cost fitout, is still designed to be able to transport a company. Given how much Army just like the rest of the NZDF has atrophied and all the various deployments for peacekeeping, I am dubious if the NZDF could in fact rapidly deploy a company if it had to. To my way of thinking, this suggests that much of the time, even if the HMNZS Canterbury were in a training or maintenance cycle, it could be prepped to transport a company in about the same amount of time it would take Army to prepare the unit for transport.

While it would be nice if the RNZN lift ship had features like a well dock, I am doubtful of whether is would be the most effective use of that defence allotment as it could be. Attempting a surge deployment of two (or more) companies would IMO likely break Army.

As for the Endeavour replacement, I do think it should have a heli hanger and be able to both operate and transport helicopters around the world. Not sure if the ability to land equipment would be a positive one or not, since I would expect such abilities to have a negative impact to upon the AO's ability to operate as a tanker. My personal preference would actually to have the RAN and RNZN sit down and create a set of basic criteria for both RNZN and RAN ship replenishment programes.

-Cheers
 

MrConservative

Super Moderator
Staff member
If the NZDF had the choice between a 4th Anzac II frigate (or whatever it ends up being called...) or a second lift ship, I would personally prefer the 4th frigate, unless the Canterbury was sold or retired.

Better still would be to use the funds to expand Army and/or reactivate a limited ACF as Mr. C suggested with a dozen or so KAI TA-50s.

My reluctance for the RNZN to attempt for a second lift ship is as follows. The Canterbury MRV itself is brand new, and while not the best lift ship and IMO clearly showing what happens when one cuts corners by going with a lowest cost fitout, is still designed to be able to transport a company. Given how much Army just like the rest of the NZDF has atrophied and all the various deployments for peacekeeping, I am dubious if the NZDF could in fact rapidly deploy a company if it had to. To my way of thinking, this suggests that much of the time, even if the HMNZS Canterbury were in a training or maintenance cycle, it could be prepped to transport a company in about the same amount of time it would take Army to prepare the unit for transport.

While it would be nice if the RNZN lift ship had features like a well dock, I am doubtful of whether is would be the most effective use of that defence allotment as it could be. Attempting a surge deployment of two (or more) companies would IMO likely break Army.

As for the Endeavour replacement, I do think it should have a heli hanger and be able to both operate and transport helicopters around the world. Not sure if the ability to land equipment would be a positive one or not, since I would expect such abilities to have a negative impact to upon the AO's ability to operate as a tanker. My personal preference would actually to have the RAN and RNZN sit down and create a set of basic criteria for both RNZN and RAN ship replenishment programes.

-Cheers
Though 4 frigates would be ideal – I just have a hunch that they will get 3. However the 3 they acquire will be pretty much ‘state of the art’ as surface combatants go circa 2020. If they went for 4 frigates it would be back to the fitted for but not with scenario of the current Anzacs. That’s me reading the tea leaves.

One of the things which will come out of this defence review is a company sized RRF capability in the Army. My other hunch is that it will probably come under the recently established Special Operations Force and not under 1RNZIR. That will happen pretty quickly as they have already started the recruitment process for the new Commando Squadron. I sense the influence of MAJGEN Dunne in the review process.

I do think the Army is in better shape than the other services – the numbers are growing from those low-points in the middle of the decade, which was its main problem. Morale is on the up and up which is a big help and for the first time in a while they have two Defence Ministers who are enthusiastic about defence matters and wanted the jobs.

Point is - that by the time a JSS arrives ( I know that the RNZN are keen on this concept) I’m fairly confident that the Army could deploy two companies concurrently using a JSS and Canterbury as well as 40 Sqd. If there was a crisis today - well all hell would break loose and the cracks would widened. But, I think in 5 years time things will be better.

BTW
You have to feel for the RNZAF this week as they tragically lost one of their long serving NCO's during an EOD exercise. :( Then to make a bad week worse a B757 with the Prime Minister and four other Pacific leaders on board broke down in Honolulu on the way to a Commonwealth leaders meeting. Thankfully they got it going and the Boss did not miss his big meeting with QEII.
 

recce.k1

Well-Known Member
Thanks for your replies and thoughts there, Todjaeger and Mr C, all very sensible and I certainly understand your rationale. Such as the funding for a fourth Frigate (if it were possible of course), could be used for (obviously) the 4th Frigate, or to expand the Army and/or a proficient training type ACF.

All have their advantages:

1. Fourth Frigate: allows the Govt to deploy the Navy (one or two Frigates at once) to demonstrate internationally that NZ is prepared to assist the global community with peace enforcement operations eg be that Somalia anti-piracy, Gulf/terrorism related, or supporting our SE Asian community friends etc. With another Frigate in dock maintenance and the other working up/standing down, this would allow the Navy to be able perform tasks as required without straining ship availablility/crews (giving them the required time for training/professional development and time with family etc).

2. Expand the Army: The two RF battalions (one roled as Cav and the other light infantry), plus other units (eg we've read of the gunners) have been extensively deployed on light infantry duties over the last several years, causing obvious strains. Although recruiting and retention has vastly improved (due to recession and Govt special investment eg DSI etc), plus greater use of TF Reservists in recent times has helped, and no doubt Govt/Defence assessing organisational structure, things should hopefully be positive in some respects. But the figures I saw the other day were something like 20% of NZDF (or Army) are now deployed compared to something like 12% a few years ago, sorry for not being precise, means still that of course Defence and Army (i.e Army plus supporting Air Force/Navy elements) are still over stretched.

It means NZ can deploy 2+ companies concurrently (currently Afghanistan & Timor plus some in Solomons with the TF), but again it seems to me at the expensive of say 1RNZIR , the supposed Cav battalion, and of course those gunners & others etc. It also means (following Australian Army discussions in recent days) it would make things hard for NZ to commit a company to an ANZAC battalion if there were a future reason to do so, in Afghanistan that is etc).

So clearly the Army need more people. Currently greater support is being provided to the TF's and they are deploying more (has anyone seen any numbers for comparison over the years, eg since ET till now, by chance?). And noted Mr C.'s comments about a possible RRF, coming under the SAS maybe (seems sensible to me. Although I have read some of that new SAS history book, and boy oh boy the inter-Army politics of the Regulars looking upon the SAS as inferiors, how things are changing)!

So could this be current thinking:

Deploy SAS only when reqquired, otherwise RRF, via Airlift.
Deploy RF Infantry afterwards.
Deploy TF's later when fully stabalised?

However NZ could still only engage properly in one or two places at a time. The fact is, like most Western nations, NZ is engaged all over the place (with trouble regularly popping up all over the place, and with other potential timebombs waiting top go off). It would seem sensible to me that the Army, like the Australian Army expanding, gets their long awaited third battalion (I'd rate this higher than a 4th Frigate, personally, if it were between the two). NZ would have two light infantry battalions plus the LAV batt. This gives the Govt options of, deploying light infantry to the likes of the Asia-Pacific region (Timor/Solomons plus whatever the next one will be to blow) and/or the option of sending in the Cav Co or as a short term eg one year battalion deployment, to assist with more troublesome areas (thinking Afghanistan, as part of an ANZAC battalion etc). I really can't see anything else is but tinkering to make some aspects better but delaying the inevitable to make all aspects better etc.

3. Limited ACF (primarly tasked with training).

All good, I support ... but of course want to ensure the P-3K's are armed properly & then replaced, plan/introduce long range UAV's too, as a higher priority, so won't dwell on the pros and cons of the ACF (and the shape of it etc) until we know whether there is a Govt committment to ensuring NZ maintains an effective long (and short range) maritime patrol and attack capability etc. However I have no problem with this Govt expending some $50M-$100M now, upgrading most of the Macchi's though with glass cockpit etc and use them for training roles for Army/Navy/P-3's coordinating attacks (and training all pilots) in the interim whilst the longer term ACF options are studied.

If not the Macchis i.e. not economic, then get them some 6 or so RNZAF Learjets or whatever instead, paint them dark grey and use them for advanced multi-engine jet training (pre-757/P8?), flying low simulating attacks on Navy Frigates, and fit some coastal survellience & datalink gear too (for additional short range coastal patrol and intelligence gathering back to HQ etc). (Heh heh, Learjets or similar, whilst not the real thing (jet fighters) of course, certainly wouldn't harm RNZAF recruiting, if they are "allowed" to fly them low and fast over Foxton beach etc suprising the locals like I used to see the Macchis in their day, oops, I didn't say they did, did I)?!

4. In terms of my original suggestion of a mini LHD for the RNZN, I still think this has merits. But not at the expense of the Army expanding, possibly at the expense of a 4th Frigate though (because the more Frigates we have, there has to be a committment to expend almost as much money for 10-15 year refit/upgrades etc, and ensure they are/mostly are fitted with the gear - not fitted for but not with etc. Otherwise the Frigates are mostly useless and can't be deployed to trouble spots without fear of being sunk etc). And for the reasons as described above should be independent of the ACF issue.

I take on board the thoughts that the Army most likely won't have a spare company to have on board or do deploy via sea (but similarly one could suggest the same could be said for Australia deploying battalions via LHD's - how likely etc). But perhaps I'm thinking of something else which is (and perhaps this is what the RAN/Army LHD concept has in mind) NZ (& Aus) will rapidly deploy by Air in this region (so somewhere in the mix that we haven't discussed here has to be greater NZ supporting airlift etc). Ship borne assets are important but will follow up once the area/ports are secure etc.

But what if we either have an area that is troublesome to secure (i.e. there is still fighting going on, not necessarily regular, could be sporadic) and "they" occassionally motar the ANZAC HQ (usually consisting of tents or use of a commandeered govt/civilian building etc). Wouldn't it be better for NZ to have a mini-LHD that was sent in following up the air deployment, with command and control HQ safely on board, helos for RRF/RF insertion, recce, attack and medivac etc, Dock to allow LCM's to deploy in bad weather or to reach areas in the region that don't have ports - that's alot of them - to counter attack or capture remote rebel bases, drop off divers or SF to sabotage etc. I'd say this is quite a likely scenario for NZ even in this greater pacific region, think Timor or Solomons rugged and inhospitable Weather Coast (let alone Timor part 2, maybe Fiji heh heh, or somewhere near PNG ahem).

So do we need a mini-LHD (with Canterbury as a backup, after all we cannnot rely simply on one Canterbury) or just simply a second Canterbury to give us that flexibility (eg one ship resupplying a natural disaster zone and the other on a mission etc)? If another Canterbury, then we can improve on the design eg shift the RHIB's etc. Pretty cheap and quick to build and get into service.

Also, politically, I read there was a Foreign Affairs select committee meeting a few days ago and Chris Carter (Labour) criricised the NZDF for "responding slow " to the Samoa Tsunami eg not sending Canterbury sooner. But I feel this is somewhat unfounded, the first responders arrived via air, along with local medical and construction staff being on hand, to move the rubble. So in my mind Canty left at more or less the right time with follow up supplies for rebuilding, Army trucks, aid and containers filled with community donations etc). So I can see two needs - military and civil - being able to be in two places for two different stakeholders (and as noted above some stakeholders critical comments can be more damaging if NZDF is placed in a precarious position eg only one ship, but sitting in dry dock or engaged elsewhere)!
 
Last edited:

Lucasnz

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Thanks for your replies and thoughts there, Todjaeger and Mr C, all very sensible and I certainly understand your rationale. Such as the funding for a fourth Frigate (if it were possible of course), could be used for (obviously) the 4th Frigate, or to expand the Army and/or a proficient training type ACF.

All have their advantages:

1. Fourth Frigate: allows the Govt to deploy the Navy (one or two Frigates at once) to demonstrate internationally that NZ is prepared to assist the global community with peace enforcement operations eg be that Somalia anti-piracy, Gulf/terrorism related, or supporting our SE Asian community friends etc. With another Frigate in dock maintenance and the other working up/standing down, this would allow the Navy to be able perform tasks as required without straining ship availablility/crews (giving them the required time for training/professional development and time with family etc).

2. Expand the Army: The two RF battalions (one roled as Cav and the other light infantry), plus other units (eg we've read of the gunners) have been extensively deployed on light infantry duties over the last several years, causing obvious strains. Although recruiting and retention has vastly improved (due to recession and Govt special investment eg DSI etc), plus greater use of TF Reservists in recent times has helped, and no doubt Govt/Defence assessing organisational structure, things should hopefully be positive in some respects. But the figures I saw the other day were something like 20% of NZDF (or Army) are now deployed compared to something like 12% a few years ago, sorry for not being precise, means still that of course Defence and Army (i.e Army plus supporting Air Force/Navy elements) are still over stretched.

It means NZ can deploy 2+ companies concurrently (currently Afghanistan & Timor plus some in Solomons with the TF), but again it seems to me at the expensive of say 1RNZIR , the supposed Cav battalion, and of course those gunners & others etc. It also means (following Australian Army discussions in recent days) it would make things hard for NZ to commit a company to an ANZAC battalion if there were a future reason to do so, in Afghanistan that is etc).

So clearly the Army need more people. Currently greater support is being provided to the TF's and they are deploying more (has anyone seen any numbers for comparison over the years, eg since ET till now, by chance?). And noted Mr C.'s comments about a possible RRF, coming under the SAS maybe (seems sensible to me. Although I have read some of that new SAS history book, and boy oh boy the inter-Army politics of the Regulars looking upon the SAS as inferiors, how things are changing)!

So could this be current thinking:

Deploy SAS only when reqquired, otherwise RRF, via Airlift.
Deploy RF Infantry afterwards.
Deploy TF's later when fully stabalised?

However NZ could still only engage properly in one or two places at a time. The fact is, like most Western nations, NZ is engaged all over the place (with trouble regularly popping up all over the place, and with other potential timebombs waiting top go off). It would seem sensible to me that the Army, like the Australian Army expanding, gets their long awaited third battalion (I'd rate this higher than a 4th Frigate, personally, if it were between the two). NZ would have two light infantry battalions plus the LAV batt. This gives the Govt options of, deploying light infantry to the likes of the Asia-Pacific region (Timor/Solomons plus whatever the next one will be to blow) and/or the option of sending in the Cav Co or as a short term eg one year battalion deployment, to assist with more troublesome areas (thinking Afghanistan, as part of an ANZAC battalion etc). I really can't see anything else is but tinkering to make some aspects better but delaying the inevitable to make all aspects better etc.

3. Limited ACF (primarly tasked with training).

All good, I support ... but of course want to ensure the P-3K's are armed properly & then replaced, plan/introduce long range UAV's too, as a higher priority, so won't dwell on the pros and cons of the ACF (and the shape of it etc) until we know whether there is a Govt committment to ensuring NZ maintains an effective long (and short range) maritime patrol and attack capability etc. However I have no problem with this Govt expending some $50M-$100M now, upgrading most of the Macchi's though with glass cockpit etc and use them for training roles for Army/Navy/P-3's coordinating attacks (and training all pilots) in the interim whilst the longer term ACF options are studied. If not the Macchis i.e. not economic, then get them some 6 or so RNZAF Learjets or whatever instead and use them for pilot training/757/P8? training and fly low at the Navy Frigates etc (and fit some simple coastal survellience gear too). (Heh heh, Learjets or similar, whilst not the real thing (jet fighters) of course, certainly wouldn't harm RNZAF recruiting, if they are "allowed" to fly them low and fast over Foxton beach etc suprising the locals like I used to see the Macchis in their day, oops, I didn't say they did, did I)?!

4. In terms of my original suggestion of a mini LHD for the RNZN, I still think this has merits. But not at the expense of the Army expanding, possibly at the expense of a 4th Frigate though (because the more Frigates we have, there has to be a committment to expend almost as much money for 10-15 year refit/upgrades etc, and ensure they are/mostly are fitted with the gear - not fitted for but not with etc. Otherwise the Frigates are mostly useless and can't be deployed to trouble spots without fear of being sunk etc). And for the reasons as described above should be independent of the ACF issue.

I take on board the thoughts that the Army most likely won't have a spare company to have on board or do deploy via sea (but similarly one could suggest the same could be said for Australia deploying battalions via LHD's - how likely etc). But perhaps I'm thinking of something else which is (and perhaps this is what the RAN/Army LHD concept has in mind) NZ (& Aus) will rapidly deploy by Air in this region (so somewhere in the mix that we haven't discussed here has to be greater NZ supporting airlift etc). Ship borne assets are important but will follow up once the area/ports are secure etc.

But what if we either have an area that is troublesome to secure (i.e. there is still fighting going on, not necessarily regular, could be sporadic) and "they" occassionally motar the ANZAC HQ (usually consisting of tents or use of a commandeered govt/civilian building etc). Wouldn't it be better for NZ to have a mini-LHD that was sent in following up the air deployment, with command and control HQ safely on board, helos for RRF/RF insertion, recce, attack and medivac etc, Dock to allow LCM's to deploy in bad weather or to reach areas in the region that don't have ports - that's alot of them - to counter attack or capture remote rebel bases, drop off divers or SF to sabotage etc. I'd say this is quite a likely scenario for NZ even in this greater pacific region, think Timor or Solomons rugged and inhospitable Weather Coast (let alone Timor part 2, maybe Fiji heh heh, or somewhere near PNG ahem).

So do we need a mini-LHD (with Canterbury as a backup, after all we cannnot rely simply on one Canterbury) or just simply a second Canterbury to give us that flexibility (eg one ship resupplying a natural disaster zone and the other on a mission etc)?

Also, politically, I read there was a Foreign Affairs select committee meeting a few days ago and Chris Carter (Labour) criricised the NZDF for "responding slow " to the Samoa Tsunami eg not sending Canterbury sooner. But I feel this is somewhat unfounded, the first responders arrived via air, along with local medical and construction staff being on hand, to move the rubble. So in my mind Canty left at more or less the right time with follow supplies for rebuilding, trucks, aid and containers filled with community donations etc). So I can see two needs - military and civil - being able to be in two places for two different stakeholders (and as noted above some stakeholders critical comments can be more damaging if NZDF is placed in a precarious position)!
Given a choice between a 4th frigate and the ACF (even in a mainly training role) I think I'd take the ACF, given the flexibility that it would provide the NZDF. Thats assuming we don't by a frigate like vessel like the Absalom class as a 3rd Frigate. The only way I can see a 4th frigate coming online given the need to replace key strategic assets like the P3 and C130 is to buy now and extend the ANZAC life out to 30 years so that theirs a gap.

If you search under "Defence" on stuff there is a comment by the deputy defence minister that regular forces are expensive and that expansion of the reserves is the way to go. I fail to see how the government could ignore the critical need for a 3rd Battalion, has pointed out by others on the board, given the deployment levels.

The key issue with Canterbury is that its only form of rapid insertion is by helicopter. With only 2 landing spots the ability to land in force is limited, as noted by the requirement for limited tactical mobility. A mini LPHD would be nice; but given need to replace the tanker and aquire addition combat capability for the navy and equip a 3rd infantry battalion, I think the LPHD issue needs to be looked at as a replacement for Canterbury in the years to come. There is a strong case for New Zealand letting this capability naturally evolve with replacement ships as the RNZN builds up experience in Amphib ops.
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
Given a choice between a 4th frigate and the ACF (even in a mainly training role) I think I'd take the ACF, given the flexibility that it would provide the NZDF. Thats assuming we don't by a frigate like vessel like the Absalom class as a 3rd Frigate. The only way I can see a 4th frigate coming online given the need to replace key strategic assets like the P3 and C130 is to buy now and extend the ANZAC life out to 30 years so that theirs a gap.

If you search under "Defence" on stuff there is a comment by the deputy defence minister that regular forces are expensive and that expansion of the reserves is the way to go. I fail to see how the government could ignore the critical need for a 3rd Battalion, has pointed out by others on the board, given the deployment levels.

The key issue with Canterbury is that its only form of rapid insertion is by helicopter. With only 2 landing spots the ability to land in force is limited, as noted by the requirement for limited tactical mobility. A mini LPHD would be nice; but given need to replace the tanker and aquire addition combat capability for the navy and equip a 3rd infantry battalion, I think the LPHD issue needs to be looked at as a replacement for Canterbury in the years to come. There is a strong case for New Zealand letting this capability naturally evolve with replacement ships as the RNZN builds up experience in Amphib ops.
I quite agree about allowing the RNZN amphibious capability to allow to evolve over time... If things were to be done over again, or the Canterbury was up for replacement, then I would definately be advocating for some form of LPD or LHD. As it stands now though if both lift ships were operational at one time, the RNZN would be hard pressed (unless there were four frigates) to be able to safely escort both vessels if necessary.

Additionally, given the relatively low levels of assets available to the rest of the NZDF, attempting two simultaneous company deployments would IMO cause systemic failures which would only grow worse as the deployments continued in duration.

Consider for a moment the currently expected equipment for the next decade.
8 NH90 TTH
6 A109 (or was it the A129, I keep forgetting...) Training/LUH
5 C-130H transports
2 B757 transports

Two fully equipped companies away on deployment from RNZN lift ships would likely require all the NH90s. This means that not only are the aircraft under regular use and not undergoing the periodic maintenance cycles, they are also not available for the rest to the NZDF to use for training. Also, unless the two companies were on a deployment together or very close by, the RNZAF would likely be hard pressed to maintain air transport to the deployed units given that there would only be a total of 7 aircraft available. It could of course be done for a period of time, but IMO anything longer than a month deployment would likely have a serious impact on the maintenance and training cycles throughout the rest of the NZDF which would continue for some time.

Currently there are ~9,800 Regulars in the NZDF, with ~2,200 in the Reserves. Of this, Army has ~4,500 Regulars, with ~2,000 Territorials. According to the NZDF site, there are currently 889 personnel on deployments away from NZ. Given that a number of the deployments appear to be peacekeeping deployments, I expect a good portion of these deployed personnel to come from Army. In essence, Recce's estimate of about 20% of Army being on deployment does sound about right to me. This is yet another reason why I do not see NZ being able to deploy a second company for a lift ship. A company level deployment would comprise about 5% of Army's total Regular force, or about 12% of the Territorials. A single company deployment would be a 25% increase in the number of personnel deployed, as well as totaling 25% of Army Regulars away on deployments. It that was increased to two company-level deployments, nearly a third of Army would be away on deployment assuming it was drawn from the Regulars. The situation would be slightly different if there was a Territorial company deployment, but I (strongly) suspect that such a deployment could not be made for a year, even if there were not so many other deployments going on throughout the rest of the NZDF.

With the numbers presented above, here is some additional food for thought. It appears to be a generally true rough approximate, that in order for a force to be deployed and then have the deployment sustained, the total number of personnel involved in the deployment is tripled. In other words, if NZ were to deploy a company to Timor Leste for ongoing operations, once the initial deployment was completed, two additional companies become involved. What there would be is the company just returned which would be undergoing rest and refitting, the actually deployed company, and another company which is undergoing training and perparing for deployment.

Given the current sustained deployments, that would mean that ~60% of Army is either returned from, away on, or preparing for overseas deployments. That leaves less than half of Army for general training not specific to current situations or available for use in new 'problem' areas which might arise. Hence my concerns about the possibility of 'breaking' Army if another deployment is undertaken.

I have other concerns with regards to a RRF and the commando company, but I need sleep so they will have to wait...

-Cheers
 

recce.k1

Well-Known Member
Building up sealift/amphibious skills and watching them evolve over time is of course sensible. These are new capabilities for the RNZN which other larger navies take for granted. We need to learn to walk first before running etc. Fair enough.

Though no doubt key RNZN staff are familiar with the way other Navies operate sealift, eg opportunities arise for RNZN staff to study their overseas counterparts on board such ships etc. Thinking longer term then, if the Govt is attempting to plan defence for the next 20-30 years (in the Whitepaper etc) then it could be wise to think about eventual sealift acquisitions.

Eg. From 2010 (Whitepaper release) to 2020 (10 years).

Should the RNZN operate one Sealift vessel and one Tanker / or JSS replacement (as currently)?

Or should the RNZN acquire a second Sealift vessel, bearing in mind one will not always be available, RNZN has become proficient in sealift operations, and/or there is an operational requirement? If yes, then:

Short term (eg 2010-2015) - another Canterbury? Or a slightly more capable vessel, eg a larger Canterbury or Enforcer with maybe 3 helo landing spots?

Mid term (eg 2015-2020) Forget something of Canterbury's size but perhaps a slightly more capable vessel, eg a larger Canterbury or Enforcer with maybe 3 helo landing spots? Or a baby LHD with maybe 5-6 helo spots?

Longer term (eg post 2020) - Slightly more capable or baby LHD = starts competing with ANZAC Frigate replacements.

I might be getting all "academic" here and also running before learning to walk, and maybe it seems no-one thinks a second similar sealift vessel is needed. After all, the RAN will be there. But I'm not so sure the RAN would be pleased if Canterbury was out of service and NZ expected the RAN to fill in so to speak,especially if the RAN were busy themselves. So does NZ need to be more reliable in having its own second sealift ship, and if so, when does one plan for one?

No/Yes? If yes, just another Canterbury - advantages, cheap, familiar with design and operation etc? (Incidentally, did the Canterbury actually get ice strengthened in the end as once was mooted as an option? If so, would it be suitable for rougher Southern Ocean to Antarctic resupplying, despite its original design as a coastal ferry etc? Or do we need a different design eg Enforcer)?
 

recce.k1

Well-Known Member
Given a choice between a 4th frigate and the ACF (even in a mainly training role) I think I'd take the ACF, given the flexibility that it would provide the NZDF. Thats assuming we don't by a frigate like vessel like the Absalom class as a 3rd Frigate. The only way I can see a 4th frigate coming online given the need to replace key strategic assets like the P3 and C130 is to buy now and extend the ANZAC life out to 30 years so that theirs a gap.
Y'know, if the money was there and the choice was simply between a 4th Frigate and an ACF or ACF (training) it would be an interesting call.

For the Frigate, it would give better flexibility for the Navy/Govt in when and where to deploy. It would ensure commonality of training, support and operations etc. Also the Frigates would be deployed i.e. used.

But flip the coin and for the ACF, even training, would give immense benefits in a range of other areas, to support the Navy, Army and the Air Force itself. They may not be deployed though, but that wouldn't matter if they were strictly for training. It would take a few years to get things going assuming additional funding is found to employ new support crews etc.

(On the other hand if somehow FA50's or who knows, could even be F16's or Grippens if the Govt somehow sorted out a deal, then all well in good, but that would take a lot more money, possibly more than a 4th Frigate, surely, to build up the support skill base over many years i.e. recruit hundreds of additional personnel etc).

Even still IMO I'd go ACF (training) or better, funding permitted ... over the 4th Frigate, because of this extra flexibility and capability.

But Govt thinking on ACF doesn't appear to be positive. They too seem to want to get rid of the old ACF fleet. Whether that means it is a cue for NZ to get out of the game once and for all, or it is simply to rid NZ of pretty much outdated technology, and start afresh with something else more relevant to the 21st century, who knows, except that the latter is no doubt wishful thinking.

So if the Govt gets out of fast jets once and for all, what then?

Maybe nothing then, game over .... but that's not good enough! There's still the NZDF missing out on vital training with fast jets!

That's why I was suggesting Learjets as a fallback, not so much to give the Govt a way out, but more like to hold them accountable to at least something that is better than nothing! In the interim, until something else causes a rethink a bit later on!

Apparently Bombardier Aerospace have martime versions of the Learjet as a concept (along with the rest of their aircraft range). Otherwise there is the Canadian Aerospace - Challenger 604 MMA - Multi-Mission Aircraft - Surveillance Reconnaissance - CASR Background - Canadian American Strategic Review - Strategic Industries - Bombardier Aerospace - Canadair Challenger - Environement Canada - aircraft. Use them also for maritime survellience as well as for training purposes (eg 3 fitted out with the maritime search radar and electo-optics etc and another 3 for jet training and shifting people/cargo). Like I said, they can play attack the Navy. Perhaps though the Army miss out on FAC training, so maybe it isn't ideal, but if there's to be nothing, is this not better?
 

MrConservative

Super Moderator
Staff member
As usual Todjaeger, Lucasnz and Reccek1 good thoughtful posts.

Though Tod – a lot of what you say is correct – but in fairness the assumptions are based on current manpower levels – I take the two ministers at their word that their aim is to build up the Reserve Force from 2000 to the levels they had 10 years ago in 5 years and 20 years ago in 10 years. So we are looking to initially triple the AR size to 6000. Dr Mapp has said this to my face a few months ago when I bailed him up at a political function. Ms Roy has said similar to the media. The other point is that I get the feeling you are considering that we would be deploying companies for Chp VII level stuff as per the buildup-builddown cycle you describe – however I don’t think we would have two Chp VII’s going on at the same time. You possibly are partially underestimating the NZDF by saying that we could not do two concurrent Sealift movements. Granted I take the point that two Chp VII / Combat sealifts concurrently is a tall order - however we could do in my view what is most likely – move a company group into a low intensity conflict environment ala ET and also do a Tsunami relief operation ala Samoa. The RNZAF will also be there helping. That situation will happen probably on occasion and we could handle it just fine - we have already even without a sealift ship at times. I do not think two Chapter VII level ops at the same time would be likely. If it did happen we would make the call to take care of the one closest to us first, then worry about the second. However you can be rest assured that we would bust a gut to do all we can. We are coping with the PRT and SAS in A/stan, RAMSI with an enhanced TF platoon, a company in Timor, and we managed to do the Tsunami relief job in Samoa and Tonga. Also the NZDF more and more is a joint op in terms of our Chp VI and HSM missions. So when we do those things it is a tri-force set up. 1 Commando Squadron is a purple unit Navy, Air Force and Army for instance. The Commando is an expansion of the CTTAG – New Zealand has to have a CT Black role that can cope with Maritime and Urban environments in particular – we are holding a couple a major world events in the next couple of years. The Rugby World Cup for example is a very big deal involving 24 nations. More people watch a RWC final worldwide than a Super Bowl or World Series. The Commando Squadron is for domestic use and not for deployment – it is pure CT and not the Green Role. It is similar to the unit set up for the Sydney Olympics – it is not a local version of the Royal Marines. Anyway moving on.

The Portuguese Navy were / possibly still - considering the HWD 10000 design that was to cost around US$215m in the recent past. (Though I think they wanted to look at the similar but larger MHD-150 - not sure can’t remember all the details) It was a true MRV design in that it was part - tanker / sealift / amphibious LPD amongst other ancillary capabilities. From memory albeit hazy the design was 10500t and 157m with 3-4 landing spots. It is the smart solution in my view in that it can cover all the bases in one hit for a small navy.

Your mentioning of the Absalom Class Lucasnz raises a good point. There has been discussion about the Anzac II and we don’t know what it may involve. However, the Frigate version of the Absalom the F-370 Class, I understand will have the clever flexible system in that you can rotate two containerised weapon system packages amongst the three hulls or three amongst four. If the Anzacs are also going to use a standard flex concept it would be pleasing. I noted in my submission that the Frigate replacement had to to work to our NZ timeframe and costing requirements. If the ANZAC II concept will work for us great – if not pass.

The idea of a HWD-10000 type vessel and three (or four if the Navy wants to be a little checky) very capable frigates would be a useful addition. If 2-3 complete quick change containerised weapons packages were to be bought for said 3-4 hull platforms it starts to make a more cost effective asset, which then means we e can pursue with a little more vigour a modest and cost effective air combat capability - as you all know I am a bit of a fan of the F/A-50 concept for a smaller airforce that needs an affordable yet capable 2nd tier AC capability.

Now I can understand what Ms Roy means by maintaining establishment at the traditional two Infantry battalions. In the Forces Review of November 2000 – it was estimated that to add a 3rd Regular Force Infantry Battalion and still be able to do a Company sized operation (Disaster Relief in Samoa for Instance) concurrently would add 40% to the Army operational budget and increase the Regular Army size up to 7000. Plus there would be very large start up costs said to be in the vicinity of $500m – in year 2000 dollars. Of course I would prefer a 3rd Regular Infantry battalion but – if there is another option that can still deliver a third or fourth battalion rotation in a cost effective manner – it means that the precious defence commodity in NZ – Money – can then be re-directed to rebuild a 365 day a year surface combatant capability and possibly a modest air combat capability. And if it is a workable solution I would take it. I would get the combat capability working and embedded in the RNZN and RNZAF – because you can also always build up the RF 3/1 RNZIR as a light infantry over a period of a few years just on the sneaky sneaky – not like naval vessels or aircraft.

In some respects they are needing to develop numerically a new organisation with the increase in size of 1 NZSAS Group into the NZSOF. That is where they see the vital priority. I can see the sense in wanting to redevelop the Army Reserve (including the current TF) . I see the role of the reborn AR as providing an opportunity to do a lot of the lower spectrum but manpower intensive OOTW / SASO / HSM stuff in the Pacific (as well as civil disaster assistance domestically & rounding out the RF as usual). This can let the two infantry battalions be free to get on with training for combat / peace enforcement part of the spectrum and or deployment.

If the 3rd battalion was required then we would have a lead-up period to develop a 2nd & 3rd battalion rotation which may be built around 1 RNZIR companies and filled out with Army Reserve, a possible RRF Squadron or Special Reconnaissance Squadron or even an Army Reserve Rangers unit which I also think is doable and probably ‘sensible’ to develop as a ‘marketing or branding’ device for the Army Reserve anyway. I believe Ms Roy has an aim off getting the AR built back up to 6000 like the TF was in the late 90s (I wish her luck – maybe they will actually give Reservists compensation and benefits – a couple of years back Ms Roy was wanting 20000 but I think wiser heads said that would be over-reaching – if she can get it up by 600 good quality people a year for 5 years then it would be very beneficial in my view – an AR target of 5500 by 2015 with a Regular Force also of 5500 would be very useful . You have the numbers there to sustain a battalion group rotation at Chp VII and a concurrent short term company sized deployment at Chp VI - yet you have the flexibility to pick and mix the component parts.

Getting back to the second sealift capability – if there is to be 11000+ in the NZ Army and Army Reserve by 2015 as what Ms Roy is aiming for - then yes a second sealift capability is reasonable and logical request. Consider that we are likely to have a possible a Chp VII Battle Group deployment alongside the ADF somewhere and an operation in the Pacific for example – and along comes a Tsunami or Hurricane or altercation between a couple of tribes / groups that overwhelms a small island states security and they need back up like in Tonga in 2007 or the Solomon’s in 2002 & 2006? …. You get the picture!

The HWD-10000 design and the Canterbury would complement each other. Remember in the Sealift section of the November 2000 Land Forces Review the Army wanted 1000 lane meters so that they could lift an entire battalion (At the time it was researched and written late 99-early 2000 the Army was full on in ET and the rapid decline in Army numbers had not begun to bite). With a restoration in numbers planned another 400 lane meters is useful – in the wider context of both Defence and NZ Govt .

Recce as for Chris Carters comments I agree with your sentiments – it is a bit rich coming from a man who sat in a Cabinet that believed it could deliver seven ships of merchantable quality for only NZ$500m. Carter is Labours Foreign Affairs spokesperson, foreign affairs ….well I must not say anymore on that. I too have enjoyed Ron Crosby’s NZSAS book – I knew that some of the Regular Force officers were ‘difficult’ in the past – the old man still groans at the mention of some names from the past – what I did not appreciate was that it has only been post September 11 that the unit has become indispensible and its pre-eminence appreciated.
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
Sorry for the delay in response. A holiday up north pushed things back, and there was quite a bit to absorb from the post.

Though Tod – a lot of what you say is correct – but in fairness the assumptions are based on current manpower levels – I take the two ministers at their word that their aim is to build up the Reserve Force from 2000 to the levels they had 10 years ago in 5 years and 20 years ago in 10 years. So we are looking to initially triple the AR size to 6000. Dr Mapp has said this to my face a few months ago when I bailed him up at a political function. Ms Roy has said similar to the media. The other point is that I get the feeling you are considering that we would be deploying companies for Chp VII level stuff as per the buildup-builddown cycle you describe – however I don’t think we would have two Chp VII’s going on at the same time. You possibly are partially underestimating the NZDF by saying that we could not do two concurrent Sealift movements. Granted I take the point that two Chp VII / Combat sealifts concurrently is a tall order - however we could do in my view what is most likely – move a company group into a low intensity conflict environment ala ET and also do a Tsunami relief operation ala Samoa. The RNZAF will also be there helping. That situation will happen probably on occasion and we could handle it just fine - we have already even without a sealift ship at times. I do not think two Chapter VII level ops at the same time would be likely. If it did happen we would make the call to take care of the one closest to us first, then worry about the second. However you can be rest assured that we would bust a gut to do all we can. We are coping with the PRT and SAS in A/stan, RAMSI with an enhanced TF platoon, a company in Timor, and we managed to do the Tsunami relief job in Samoa and Tonga. Also the NZDF more and more is a joint op in terms of our Chp VI and HSM missions. So when we do those things it is a tri-force set up. 1 Commando Squadron is a purple unit Navy, Air Force and Army for instance. The Commando is an expansion of the CTTAG – New Zealand has to have a CT Black role that can cope with Maritime and Urban environments in particular – we are holding a couple a major world events in the next couple of years. The Rugby World Cup for example is a very big deal involving 24 nations. More people watch a RWC final worldwide than a Super Bowl or World Series. The Commando Squadron is for domestic use and not for deployment – it is pure CT and not the Green Role. It is similar to the unit set up for the Sydney Olympics – it is not a local version of the Royal Marines. Anyway moving on.
Actually Mr. C, you are incorrect. My (current) opposition to the NZDF acquiring a 2nd lift ship is in fact based upon 3 assumptions, all inter-related in effect.

The first assumption is that the personnel situation within the NZDF as a whole, and Army specifically would remain essentially the same.

The second assumption is that NZ still deploys Defence personnel in numbers, types and locations are it does currently. Even with some or all of the NZDF deployments being tri-service, that still means nearly 10% of Defence personnel are away on deployments. This effects training schedules and cycles, leaves, personnel available for additional deployments, in short, everything. An additional and related concern about the number of deployments that NZ participates in is NZ's ability to respond and support NZDF personnel if their deployment should go all pear-shaped.

The third assumption is that the NZDF budget allocation remains essentially the same as it does currently, ~0.6% GDP or ~NZ$1.5 billion in real terms.

With these assumptions in place, there would IMO be better places for NZ to spend the ~NZ$100 million to purchase a sistership to Canterbury, or the ~NZ$200 million+ to purchase a small LPD or LHD. One of the places where IMO it would make sense to spend it is on Army, specifically to raise the numbers of Regular and TF personnel. Once there were more personnel as well as supporting assets in the other services, then perhaps a second liftship would be sensible. If another liftship were then to be considered, I would argue against a sistership of the Canterbury. IMV, the only thing really going for Canterbury as a liftship is the low cost, and I also believe that one gets what one pays for...

As for my basing troop deployments on activities all at Chapter VII... Yes, and at the same time, no. From what I have seen and read, even for normal, non-combat deployments, there is a significant amount of time involved in preparing for and returning from overseas deployments. In fact, some of what I have come across suggests that for combat deployments, the workups prior to and the rest & refit/replacement period after a combat deployment should each be twice as long as the actual combat deployment in duration. The other element though has to do with the (hopefully) small possibility that any given deployment could end up degrading into a Chapter VII deployment. Again IMO it is better prepared for a tough fight and be on a peaceful, friendly deployment than be expecting an easy operation and encountering tough adversaries.

Can someone provide more information on NZ's Commando Squadron/Company? I am principally interested in finding out the approximate size and intended role/usage. For instance, is it intended to be something comparable to Australia's 2nd Commando regiment (IIRC the former 4 RAR) which is a direct action force? Or is it intended to have a strictly domestic CT role?

Also, does anyone have any additional information on the proposed or suggested Rapid Reaction Force? As I had indicated previously, I have some reservations about the NZDF attempting to maintain a rapid reaction force, given the assets currently available to draw upon.

My interest and concern regarding a Kiwi Rapid Reaction Force stem from a US rapid reaction force and how it was operated and maintained. The US 82nd Airborne Division, essentially from the time it returned to the US from the war in Europe during WWII, up until the US began restructing the US Army in the 1990's was largely kept in strategic reserve as a rapid reaction force. Operating from Fort Bragg/Pope AFB in North Carolina, USA the 82nd Airborne would maintain a regiment on constant alert, able to deploy anywhere in the world within 24 hours. The ready regiment would maintain the alert status for a 30 day period before the regiment would stand down and another regiment would stand up as the ready regiment. IIRC during this period, the 82nd Airborne operated 4 regiments, the 325th, 504th, 505th and 508th Parachute Infantry Regiments (PIR).

My questions and concerns for a Kiwi Rapid Reaction Force amount to how large it would be, how quickly it should be able to deploy, how far away it can deploy, how it would deploy, how long it would need to operate before being replaced or reinforced, and what it would deploy for.

As can be extrapolated from the example of the 82nd Airborne Division, in order to have a force constantly at the ready for deployment, a significantly larger pool of personnel is required to main the force. In effect, if the NZDF wanted to have a company-level RRF I would expect that a battalion-sized body of personnel would need to be kept aside to support the RRF personnel rotations.

However you can be rest assured that we would bust a gut to do all we can.
I have no doubt that if things went pear-shaped, the NZDF would go all out to do everything it could. My fear though is that the NZDF would indeed 'bust a gut' in doing so, that sort of injury, while not immediately fatal would grow progressively worse until it was. In the case of the NZDF I can foresee cases where personnel and equipment would strain to keep up with the pace of activities until they were overtaxed. Once that begins to occur, even less personnel and equipment would be available for operations because there would be injuries, equipment would be down and requiring repair, etc. As I had posted before, this is where the effects of systemic issues would begin to emerge, which is one of the things which I have been trying to get some Kiwis to realise so that they (the systemic issues) can be rectified prior to them causing serious problems, or worse.

-Cheers

PS Two things, I am glad that NZ is going to attempt to boost the numbers of Reserve/TF personnel, as that will swell the numbers potentially available. Additionally, could someone please post a link to the section describing the different Chapters I-VII of activities... I have read it, but I cannot remember where and wish to re-familiarize myself with the differences.
 

MrConservative

Super Moderator
Staff member
Sorry for the delay in response. A holiday up north pushed things back, and there was quite a bit to absorb from the post.



Actually Mr. C, you are incorrect. My (current) opposition to the NZDF acquiring a 2nd lift ship is in fact based upon 3 assumptions, all inter-related in effect.

The first assumption is that the personnel situation within the NZDF as a whole, and Army specifically would remain essentially the same.

The second assumption is that NZ still deploys Defence personnel in numbers, types and locations are it does currently. Even with some or all of the NZDF deployments being tri-service, that still means nearly 10% of Defence personnel are away on deployments. This effects training schedules and cycles, leaves, personnel available for additional deployments, in short, everything. An additional and related concern about the number of deployments that NZ participates in is NZ's ability to respond and support NZDF personnel if their deployment should go all pear-shaped.

The third assumption is that the NZDF budget allocation remains essentially the same as it does currently, ~0.6% GDP or ~NZ$1.5 billion in real terms.

With these assumptions in place, there would IMO be better places for NZ to spend the ~NZ$100 million to purchase a sistership to Canterbury, or the ~NZ$200 million+ to purchase a small LPD or LHD. One of the places where IMO it would make sense to spend it is on Army, specifically to raise the numbers of Regular and TF personnel. Once there were more personnel as well as supporting assets in the other services, then perhaps a second liftship would be sensible. If another liftship were then to be considered, I would argue against a sistership of the Canterbury. IMV, the only thing really going for Canterbury as a liftship is the low cost, and I also believe that one gets what one pays for...

As for my basing troop deployments on activities all at Chapter VII... Yes, and at the same time, no. From what I have seen and read, even for normal, non-combat deployments, there is a significant amount of time involved in preparing for and returning from overseas deployments. In fact, some of what I have come across suggests that for combat deployments, the workups prior to and the rest & refit/replacement period after a combat deployment should each be twice as long as the actual combat deployment in duration. The other element though has to do with the (hopefully) small possibility that any given deployment could end up degrading into a Chapter VII deployment. Again IMO it is better prepared for a tough fight and be on a peaceful, friendly deployment than be expecting an easy operation and encountering tough adversaries.

Can someone provide more information on NZ's Commando Squadron/Company? I am principally interested in finding out the approximate size and intended role/usage. For instance, is it intended to be something comparable to Australia's 2nd Commando regiment (IIRC the former 4 RAR) which is a direct action force? Or is it intended to have a strictly domestic CT role?

Also, does anyone have any additional information on the proposed or suggested Rapid Reaction Force? As I had indicated previously, I have some reservations about the NZDF attempting to maintain a rapid reaction force, given the assets currently available to draw upon.

My interest and concern regarding a Kiwi Rapid Reaction Force stem from a US rapid reaction force and how it was operated and maintained. The US 82nd Airborne Division, essentially from the time it returned to the US from the war in Europe during WWII, up until the US began restructing the US Army in the 1990's was largely kept in strategic reserve as a rapid reaction force. Operating from Fort Bragg/Pope AFB in North Carolina, USA the 82nd Airborne would maintain a regiment on constant alert, able to deploy anywhere in the world within 24 hours. The ready regiment would maintain the alert status for a 30 day period before the regiment would stand down and another regiment would stand up as the ready regiment. IIRC during this period, the 82nd Airborne operated 4 regiments, the 325th, 504th, 505th and 508th Parachute Infantry Regiments (PIR).

My questions and concerns for a Kiwi Rapid Reaction Force amount to how large it would be, how quickly it should be able to deploy, how far away it can deploy, how it would deploy, how long it would need to operate before being replaced or reinforced, and what it would deploy for.

As can be extrapolated from the example of the 82nd Airborne Division, in order to have a force constantly at the ready for deployment, a significantly larger pool of personnel is required to main the force. In effect, if the NZDF wanted to have a company-level RRF I would expect that a battalion-sized body of personnel would need to be kept aside to support the RRF personnel rotations.

I have no doubt that if things went pear-shaped, the NZDF would go all out to do everything it could. My fear though is that the NZDF would indeed 'bust a gut' in doing so, that sort of injury, while not immediately fatal would grow progressively worse until it was. In the case of the NZDF I can foresee cases where personnel and equipment would strain to keep up with the pace of activities until they were overtaxed. Once that begins to occur, even less personnel and equipment would be available for operations because there would be injuries, equipment would be down and requiring repair, etc. As I had posted before, this is where the effects of systemic issues would begin to emerge, which is one of the things which I have been trying to get some Kiwis to realise so that they (the systemic issues) can be rectified prior to them causing serious problems, or worse.

-Cheers

PS Two things, I am glad that NZ is going to attempt to boost the numbers of Reserve/TF personnel, as that will swell the numbers potentially available. Additionally, could someone please post a link to the section describing the different Chapters I-VII of activities... I have read it, but I cannot remember where and wish to re-familiarize myself with the differences.
When I read your post I realised that you are trying to compare your apples with my oranges and vice versa.

We are talking about a measured transition within the NZDF to take it from where it is now to where it could possibly be in 2025. The main thrust in what I was discussing was in the post 2011 period through to 2021.

See I think you are getting the wrong end of the stick with your particular assumptions as they go against revised policy announcements and ministerial statements. That is why I think what you say is incorrect - but hey it wont be the first or last time we disagree - we usually are in accord. Its that I think they ignore the fact that our Timor deployment will end in 2011 and that the deployment to Afghanistan will end in 18 months - before the next NZ election. In fact no more increase in troops to Afghanistan or ET will happen from now on (according todays news). So from 2012 they will be home. The Prime Minister has mentioned these exit dates - they are set in political concrete. Also widely accepted politically is that there would have to be exceptional circumstances to deploy and committ the NZDF in any great numbers over the next half decade while it "recovers' was the word said to me by a current sitting MP.

RAMSI is more and more a NZ Police Force operation and will also wind down over the next 2-3 years thus it is unlikely NZDF personnel will be there post 2011 also. Thus your assumptions are mitigated by these PM directives and planned withdrawls. You are basing the future 10 years out on present conditions and criteria – as if they would be fixed. They wont be - as I said this is a transitional period and the challenge will be to manage the transition. Even the funding model may well change – and I have reason to believe that defence spend will increase over the medium to long term - true not during the current election cycle and recessionary period but as soon as that passes then defence spending can lift - not to Australian levels but a reasonable increase during next decade to make it sustainable.

The key point to take in is this - the regular force will be primarity out of the Chapter VI game as much as possible - this entirely changes the ballpark as we also have to factor in that the objective to dramatically increase the reserve forces over the next decade -means that they be primarily trained and tasked for the lower end of the Chp VI spectrum stuff and have the numbers to do this - whilst the RF will be trained and tasked primarily for the Chp VII stuff. (If a third BG rotation is to eventuate that can be planned for from the increased Reserve)

Again I stress that this has been told to me to my face by the current DefMin at a conference I attended a few months ago. The rationale is that the regular force have been overwhelmed with many small and relatively non complex operations - and this has lead to systemic stress (not yet failure) which an improved Reserve with increased numbers could handle appropriately.

That is how they are going to manage the organisational stress - without having boost budgets and increase the regular Army by 40%. Anyway this is the envisaged policy.

Lets deal with the other matters:

The Commando is strictly for domestic CT (as was stated in the post) – look at the latest November Army Today magazine that can be downloaded from the website.

The RRF concept is at a discussion stages only – it was originally a ‘kite flying’ exercise by the current Def Min when he was in opposition. His plan was basically for a light infantry company that can quickly respond to events in the Pacific. Yes the Pacific - it is not for other purposes. It is essentially a support and stabilisation force that have high level combat skills – not an invasion force and cannot be compared to the 82nd Airborne. One of the options that may be revisited is to dedicate one of the 1RNZIR rifle companies and maintain it at DLOC and then rotate through the other companies. The other option is the much discussed ressurection of the Rangers Squadron which used to exist in the late 1980's

From the UN website you can download the UN Charter. The main chapters of defence interest in terms of ACHL are Chapters - VI, VII and VIII.

Lastly – A second dedicated sealift ship no one really seriously considered – however a second multirole ship to replace the Endeavour that has additional sealift capability to supplement the Canterbury is a very sound idea - that is what I have long supported. As I outlined – the NZ Army/NZDF usually has up to 2 to 4 company group sized tasks of varying complexity – running concurrently in different places so to have the flexibility of a vessel that can supplement sealift gives the NZDF greater flexibility - less chance of systemic failure you could say.
 
Last edited:

recce.k1

Well-Known Member
Similarly I've not had the time to reply till now. My 2 cents. Just to get the Commando thing out of the way, they are part of the SAS and are the counter terrorism unit (best explained in the article/quote below) and will be employed within NZ (thus unlike the traditional Commandos as one would think of. That may upset some perhaps, but on the other hand when one thinks of the UK SAS/Iranian embassy hostage release a couple of decades ago, for the NZ public and media if NZ had to do the same here one day at least being called Commandos differentiates themselves from the Police's CT group and sounds a bit more sexy. I don't think the name would have been changed purely for these reasons, more as a result of better defining these various capabilities of what's now called NZ Special Operations Forces as per below, but at least there is a postive spin-off or two etc).

Here's the link to the Army News that Cadredave (and now Mr C) mentioned:
NZ Army - CTTAG to Change Name to Commandos

Here's a media article:
Anti-terrorist squad reborn as commandos | Stuff.co.nz

Anti-terrorist squad reborn as commandos
By HANK SCHOUTEN - The Dominion Post
Last updated 05:00 25/11/2009

New Zealand's specialist anti-terrorist squad members are being redesignated as commandos.

The secret squad, established four years ago as the Counter Terrorist Tactical Assault Group, will be known from December 5 as the commando squadron.

The group was established four years ago to augment the SAS which, until then, was also a counter-terrorist force.

Army spokesman Kristian Dunne said the commando squadron was based with the SAS in Papakura, Auckland. It is a third element, alongside the explosive ordinance disposal unit, in what is now known as the New Zealand Special Operations Forces.

Major Dunne said the name change to "commando" better reflected the squadron's anti-terror role because members were trained to work on land, air and sea. They are drawn from the army, navy and air force. Their commander is the head of the SAS and SAS members will at times be assigned to the commando squadron.

Major Dunne would not say how many were in the squadron. It has a wide range of weaponry and other equipment at its disposal, including body armour, gas masks, night-vision equipment, sniper rifles, pistols and sub-machine guns.

Commandos must have a wide range of skills that might be required in a counter-terrorist operation. They have to be able to operate out of helicopters, clamber around and get into buildings and operate in all types of terrain, or at sea, where they could be needed to deal with a ship hijacking, Major Dunne said.

Unlike the SAS, they will not be involved in overseas operations or long-range patrolling – the sort of work now being done by SAS troops in Afghanistan.

Commando squadron troops have to be on call at short notice in the case of a terrorist threat, when their skills would supplement the police special tactics group.

Commandos are usually elite light infantry and/or special forces units which specialise in amphibious landings, parachuting, rappelling and similar techniques to assault key military targets.

In World War II, British commando units were formed as highly mobile raiding and reconnaissance forces. They spawned more specialised units, including the Special Air Service, the Special Boat Service and Parachute Regiment.
Just quickly in terms of the other subjects eg that of Reserve and Regular force numbers, my opinion is simply that it is great that the Govt is addressing the issue to rebuild the Reserve forces over a reasonably "quick' timeframe. As for the Regulars, I hazard a guess we'll have to say what the Whitepaper says, next year, in terms of numbers. Whilst I and some others here advocate a third Regular battalion (cost $500M? - seems a reasonable figure considering one could easily afford that sort of expenditure for hardware etc), practically, other costs would be incurred to build a new Camp and infrastructure (or upgrade Pakakura etc) and support/logistics etc ... perhaps the same thing could be achieved by simply increasing the number of companies within the two exisiting Regular Force battalions etc, with additional (but probably less) expenditure on associated infrastructure and support/logistics etc?

In terms of a second sealift ship, I certainly accept that under the current NZDF structure/numbers there perhaps is no real justification for a second sealift ship. However I'm looking from a couple of different perspectives, which is I really doubt the exisiting sealift ship would transport troops much - only those very occassional instances like ET99 where the main force where brought in via Australian sealift once the port and surrounding areas were secured (usually by air and naval presence and the initial troops via airlift). So I envisage Canterbury will mostly be used to transport vehicles and supplies on a regular basis most of the time (seeing ET type threat scenarios are far and few between etc) and for other civilian aid type missions, in between training and patrolling etc. Hence would a second sealift vessel be useful if the first one is in drydock or is operating somewhere else? Yes a second would. Would it be justified though? I can't answer that as that depends on the Govt etc. And of course the other perspective is political. Already we see Labour criticising the Canterbury for supposedly deploying later rather than sooner (although Labour have been in criticise mode since the election so it is hard to guage whether this is genuine concern or points scoring, I'd say the latter). But imagine if Canterbury was still over in East Timor (on resupply) or maybe off somewhere else practicising with coalition forces, imagine the politcal outcry, especially from the Greens, they'd simply make milage that Canterbury was playing "war games" with the great satans rather than being available to help in a disaster etc. Yes, silly I know, but they would get sympathetic media coverage (as of course the media might not quite understand for one to be proficient in civil/military operations, one does have to practice with other nation's military/sealift assets on a regular basis etc). And alas for us here in NZ, it means these issues (via media and public info campaigns) get to over-ride public support for say, Frigates (eg so much noise is created that support for Frigates gets drowned out etc).

Anyway I agree a second sealift ship may not be on the table (however I raise the point in terms of planning and procurement, one needs to think about these things to get included in a long term type development plan etc).

In the interim though, these issues can be partially (not not of course totally) resolved via the intended AOR Endeavour replacement. Rather than a one-for-one tanker replacement I do hope the Govt sees that the Navy's proposed JSS type vessel would be a better concept. We've seen (for the public) in the Operation East Timor book that the Endeavour's duties included resupplying at sea via helo and apparently it was a very busy (and rewarding) period for the crew etc. Thus unlike Endeavour, with its sole helo spot/hanger designer for the then smaller RNZN Wasp helos, some thought is given to a larger landing spot/hanger to accomodate the larger ADF Chinooks (like the Canterbury's landing spots) and perhaps even two landing spots for those occasional but more intense operations. After all if NZ is serious about joint-interoperability with the Australians, we have to bear these things in mind in terms of even more joint deployments than at present. Plus also if NZDF is learning new skillsets to operate two helos at once (for the first time) on Canterbury, then it would make sense to be able to build-up and improve one's proficiency by utilising these skillsets by those deployed on the JSS etc.

Obviously the JSS ship wouldn't have landing craft but if it had the room to store other supplies (containers) then again the ship would be useful for carrying/supplying other large items when needed eg via helo or when docked at the wharf. Again if there is room to carry a few vehicles inside, offloaded by a door when docked, again that could be valuable and certainly valuable for civil aid emergencies if the Canterbury is elsewhere or unavailable. Add one large crane on each side and thus a means to offload in one of the may regional ports (without cranes) etc.

However I realise that the JSS type ship is primarily there for fuel replenishment, and could be deployed as far away as the Gulf, hence of course this takes priority as it is more likely to be used with coalition assets in company with warships over say the Canterbury.

In terms of NZ defence expenditure, the actual amount spent is less of course, when this capital charge is included, but expenditure for hardware is treated seperately i.e. isn't included in the annual operating budget, from my understanding of the issue. Eg I've posted this before but see page 5 of the PDF available at http://aspi.org.au/publications/publication_details.aspx?ContentID=124
 
Last edited:

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
When I read your post I realised that you are trying to compare your apples with my oranges and vice versa.

We are talking about a measured transition within the NZDF to take it from where it is now to where it could possibly be in 2025. The main thrust in what I was discussing was in the post 2011 period through to 2021.

See I think you are getting the wrong end of the stick with your particular assumptions as they go against revised policy announcements and ministerial statements. That is why I think what you say is incorrect - but hey it wont be the first or last time we disagree - we usually are in accord. Its that I think they ignore the fact that our Timor deployment will end in 2011 and that the deployment to Afghanistan will end in 18 months - before the next NZ election. In fact no more increase in troops to Afghanistan or ET will happen from now on (according todays news). So from 2012 they will be home. The Prime Minister has mentioned these exit dates - they are set in political concrete. Also widely accepted politically is that there would have to be exceptional circumstances to deploy and committ the NZDF in any great numbers over the next half decade while it "recovers' was the word said to me by a current sitting MP.

RAMSI is more and more a NZ Police Force operation and will also wind down over the next 2-3 years thus it is unlikely NZDF personnel will be there post 2011 also. Thus your assumptions are mitigated by these PM directives and planned withdrawls. You are basing the future 10 years out on present conditions and criteria – as if they would be fixed. They wont be - as I said this is a transitional period and the challenge will be to manage the transition. Even the funding model may well change – and I have reason to believe that defence spend will increase over the medium to long term - true not during the current election cycle and recessionary period but as soon as that passes then defence spending can lift - not to Australian levels but a reasonable increase during next decade to make it sustainable.

The key point to take in is this - the regular force will be primarity out of the Chapter VI game as much as possible - this entirely changes the ballpark as we also have to factor in that the objective to dramatically increase the reserve forces over the next decade -means that they be primarily trained and tasked for the lower end of the Chp VI spectrum stuff and have the numbers to do this - whilst the RF will be trained and tasked primarily for the Chp VII stuff. (If a third BG rotation is to eventuate that can be planned for from the increased Reserve)

Again I stress that this has been told to me to my face by the current DefMin at a conference I attended a few months ago. The rationale is that the regular force have been overwhelmed with many small and relatively non complex operations - and this has lead to systemic stress (not yet failure) which an improved Reserve with increased numbers could handle appropriately.

That is how they are going to manage the organisational stress - without having boost budgets and increase the regular Army by 40%. Anyway this is the envisaged policy.

Lets deal with the other matters:

The Commando is strictly for domestic CT (as was stated in the post) – look at the latest November Army Today magazine that can be downloaded from the website.

The RRF concept is at a discussion stages only – it was originally a ‘kite flying’ exercise by the current Def Min when he was in opposition. His plan was basically for a light infantry company that can quickly respond to events in the Pacific. Yes the Pacific - it is not for other purposes. It is essentially a support and stabilisation force that have high level combat skills – not an invasion force and cannot be compared to the 82nd Airborne. One of the options that may be revisited is to dedicate one of the 1RNZIR rifle companies and maintain it at DLOC and then rotate through the other companies. The other option is the much discussed ressurection of the Rangers Squadron which used to exist in the late 1980's

From the UN website you can download the UN Charter. The main chapters of defence interest in terms of ACHL are Chapters - VI, VII and VIII.

Lastly – A second dedicated sealift ship no one really seriously considered – however a second multirole ship to replace the Endeavour that has additional sealift capability to supplement the Canterbury is a very sound idea - that is what I have long supported. As I outlined – the NZ Army/NZDF usually has up to 2 to 4 company group sized tasks of varying complexity – running concurrently in different places so to have the flexibility of a vessel that can supplement sealift gives the NZDF greater flexibility - less chance of systemic failure you could say.
It is funny Mr. C, how we were talking about two different things, in different manners yet ultimately getting to the same place, just in different ways. Where I was heading with discussion of a 2nd lift ship was that the money would currently/near-terms be better spent on shoring up systemic weaknesses within Army than on another lift ship.

From the information Mr. C provided, Government appears to be taking a different approach to dealing with the weak points within Army (and the NZDF as a whole it would appear) through a combination of scaling back international commitments and not renewing others. This also helps to neatly reduce the risk that a deployment could go pear-shaped as well.

Still and all, I do think that the NZDF budget needs a boost. Partially to allow more purchases of kit, but also to boost operational and personnel budgets as well, personel particularly. Get the numbers up, Regular and TF, as well as boosting the pay to help retain those people who do join up. Having been poking around the NZDF site, I came across the following statistics this Parlimentary Report. The report itself covers the 2007-2008 financial year, prior to the election but the numbers are still telling, particularly with regards to personnel retention.

I do think that, once rebuilt, the TF/Reserve forces (depending on what if any restrictions there are on deploying TF personnel) would do well on short-term low intensity deployments of a month to three months duration. Even if the number of TF personnel did triple within the next 5 to 10 years, I doubt that longer term deployments of a year or more would be advisable for the TF. As we have witnessed recently in the US with year-long deployments of National Guard units to Iraq, such deployments cause a great deal of disruption within the lives of Guardsmen and their families, as well as effecting the local communities and businesses. Complicating the matter (for the US at least) is the use of the National Guard to respond to large scale civil emergencies and natural disasters. Having those personnel away on deployments for prolonged periods can interfere with government response in times of domestic crisis (a la Hurricane Katrina...) Attempting to do rapid rotations (monthly, bi-monthly, etc) so that individual TF personnel would not be on long deployments would IMO be somewhat counterproductive as extra effort would need to be expended getting personnel to and from the deployment area, as well as needing to keep familiarizing personnel new to the deployment area with the situation. In effect, it prevents continuity.

With respect to the Commando Company/Squadron, I will need to read further, though it does seem that the goal is more towards a unit like TAG or TAG(E) in the ADF, where personnel are drawn from either the SASR or Commando Regiment and trained for CT/CQB. This is quite a bit different what I had been thinking which was a smaller unit trained and operated like US Rangers or the ADF's Commando Regiment, both of which are direct action forces.

As for the RRF, it does seem that my use of the 82nd Airborne Division as an example was somewhat misunderstood. My point had nothing to do with what, how or why the 82nd Airborne would deploy, rather it was about force size of a RRF and what was/is needed to maintain a RRF of some size, therefore I will attempt to put it another way.

Speaking in general terms, in order to maintain a unit of size N ready for rapid/immediate deployment, then all other units subordinate to the parent unit of the size N unit must also be RRF units, which serve at the ready during their respective rotations. If the N RRF was platoon sized, then the entire RRF would be ~one company, if instead the size N was a battalion, the parent regiment or brigade would be the entire RRF instead, and so on.

In the case of NZ, I would expect that if the intent was to maintain a company at the ready as a RRF, then the entire RRF would be approximately a battalion in size. One company on its own could not keep itself ready constantly and remain operationally viable. Therefore, a total of 3-4 companies would been needed, all able to operate to the same degree, with each company taking their turn in the rotation as the RRF. Hope this clears up what I meant.

-Cheers
 

ThePuss

Defense Professional
Verified Defense Pro
Still and all, I do think that the NZDF budget needs a boost. Partially to allow more purchases of kit, but also to boost operational and personnel budgets as well, personel particularly. Get the numbers up, Regular and TF, as well as boosting the pay to help retain those people who do join up. Having been poking around the NZDF site, I came across the following statistics this Parlimentary Report. The report itself covers the 2007-2008 financial year, prior to the election but the numbers are still telling, particularly with regards to personnel retention.-Cheers
At my work...well until tomorrow when I post out (back to sea for me, YIPPIE!!!!!:D) I am in daily contact with RNZN sailors and I know firsthand that their wages are honestly pathetic to say the least. Not only is their core wage bugger all, they only get "Sea Going" wage when they are physically at sea. The layman may think this is fair enough but when you have to keep a duty onboard ever 5/6 days whilst alongside (if you are lucky) you should be compensated for it. I can only assume it is the same for the rest of the RNZDF. My Kiwi mates are great servicemen and they should get paid for it!.......Damn this post has reminded me that I will be keeping a duty every 5/6 days (if im lucky)BOOOO! :rolleyes:
 

Lucasnz

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
At my work...well until tomorrow when I post out (back to sea for me, YIPPIE!!!!!:D) I am in daily contact with RNZN sailors and I know firsthand that their wages are honestly pathetic to say the least. Not only is their core wage bugger all, they only get "Sea Going" wage when they are physically at sea. The layman may think this is fair enough but when you have to keep a duty onboard ever 5/6 days whilst alongside (if you are lucky) you should be compensated for it. I can only assume it is the same for the rest of the RNZDF. My Kiwi mates are great servicemen and they should get paid for it!.......Damn this post has reminded me that I will be keeping a duty every 5/6 days (if im lucky)BOOOO! :rolleyes:
Actually the wages of NZ service personnel took a huge boost a few years back to align it with NZ market rates. Compared to what they use to get paid its a huge improvement. Given the current wage freeze across the state sector at the moment however some of the gains will be lost, but thats life. The sea going / field allowance issue is not ideal I agree, but right now issues around housing etc for defence personnel need to be resolved. Some of the places they have to live in are dives.

Happy posting - enjoy the middle watch.:D
 
Last edited:
Top