T-90 in Comparison to Western Armour

[FutureTank]

The Russian Army lacks the huge level of logistics and operational equipment that the Soviet Army had to sustain such a doctrine. The sustainment of T-90 tank production has a lot more to do with trying to sustain the industry that the Russian Government and export sales as failed to fund for a much needed technology upgrade. The Russians have no choice but to build T-90s because they lack the factory tooling to build anything else. That tooling is on its last legs as well and will soon (~10 years) breakdown and they won’t be able to produce anything.

Sure they can design a big tank on paper and even hand build a prototype. The seven road wheel, ~60 tonne Black Eagle is a classic example of this. But can they produce one? Not without a multi-billion investment in upgrading Russian industrial infrastructure. There is only so much you can get out of factories that have not seen more than a new coat of paint and some COTS PCs since the fall of the Soviet Union.

I think the question is, does Russia see a threat that requires development of a new tank. The answer for them is seemingly no.

Ahh great, more made up stuff...

Outside “FutureTankWorld” there is the XM1200 series of vehicles developed by the Future Combat System (FCS) program. The tank variant, the XM1202 MCS, will have more armour protection than the latest M1 not to mention active protection and far more SA. It will only weigh 27 tonnes. This is the difference between starting to design a tank in 1960 (T-90 and co) and in 2005.

Maybe you have other information, but it seems form open sources that the XM1200 series will be a modular design that for the XM1202 will include armour that will be added on as required by the combat environment. Lat I read they are still experimenting with various options and the 27ton you refer to is the basic 1200 hull and turret.
However, what you seem to be saying is that the XM1202 will squeeze 5 tons of armour into a 27 ton "whole" package. Of course that implies that a way was found to increase the density of material by a factor of greater than 2. This is molecular density we are talking about.

"not to mention active protection and far more SA", what is SA here?

Well, sure starting to design a tank in the late 90s is different to designing a tank in the late 60s. But of course the Soviet Army had tanks in the 1980s that were better than the Pattons, and there were more of them. The M1 begun to enter units in quantity in 1986 after a development of over a decade. Same with the Leopard II and Challenger.

The FCS will probably take two decades since the money just are not there. Technology in another sector, the financial one, has utterly failed you see. Since the Soviet/Russian economy had to commence restructuring in the 1990s, it will probably complete the process earlier than the USA which not only has to restructure its financial sector, but actually has to start recovering from its production slide, just like Russia, and become an exporter rather than an importer again. My prediction is that FCS as a program will not see production until 2020 at the earliest.

The T-90 meanwhile is clearly an interim design for the Russian park since it will only be produced in the 2,000 units mark to satisfy any immediate and unforeseen conflicts of the coming decade. The larger park will likely be reduced to about 12,-15,000 units, and will be replaced by whatever comes after T-90.

 

[FutureTank]

Future Tank declared CFE numbers, and operationally deployed numbers are two very different things. For example as far as I know not T-64s are in line service. Some T-62s are operational in the 42nd MRD, and some T-72s are actually in storage. When looking at the principle of mass we have to look at how many troops can be deployed to the potential conflict zone. For example Russian superiority in Ossetia had little impact, as there was only one two-lane road leading into S. Ossetia, and as a result Russian forces had to be committed piece by piece as they entered.

The point I make is that there is no reason to upgrade older tanks when there is no threat to prepare them for. The technological superiority of Western tanks is therefore entirely academic, at least for Russia.

There are tanks all over the place. Almost every tank educational institution and Army level training unit had at least one or two of each type of tanks from T-55 to T-80, so there are probably hundreds of T-55s, T-62s, T-72s and T-80s strewn all over Russia in storage.

Having said that, where there is no tank, even a T-34/85 is a tank The Russian tanks proved adequate to the task in South Ossetia. If the US transfers M1s to Georgia, and if Georgia decides it wants to reintegrate S.Ossetia and Abkhazia again, we may find the confrontation interesting since it will be in the terrain more suited to the M1 design, BUT there are a lot of ifs in that sentence.

 

[Feanor]

The example I was providing was in regards to your attempt to use CFE numbers and the principle of mass as some sort of basis for modern Russian military operations. This is not correct because the principle of mass is context-dependent, and because the CFE numbers are not indicative of actual deployable forces.

Combat units are armed primarily with the T-72, with smaller numbers of T-80 and T-90 tanks in service. The T-62 is only in active service with the 42nd MRD as far as I know. Hence why when estimating what tanks you are likely to be facing you need to 1) define the conflict zone, 2) look at units that could/would be deployed there and 3) look at the equipment of those individual units.

Out of the tanks in service the T-90A is the new tank, and it's the only one currently in production. It does carry a TI meaning that our MoD obviously does see a need for it. The only problem is that it will be some time before it's introduced into the entirety of the armed forces. The question may be academic in terms of relations with western armor, but it doesn't mean that lack of a TI is not a major shortcoming even against countries such as Georgia.

 

[FutureTank]

silhouette has nothing to do with sitting behind crests - thats gun depression

like u said its an offensive tank

If you see my other post on the use of terrain undulations, you will see that the silhouette is almost invariably used with crests, albeit very low crests. The only difference is in the tank moving or not moving.

The design thinking that led to greater gun depression in Western designs is in fact an interesting one. In the case of the Germans it was a self-convincing argument that their ambush tactics in the later part of the Second World War would have stopped the Red Army if they had enough tanks. The tactics were successful, but the Wehrmacht lost at the operational and strategic levels.

In the case of the Allies there were two factors in the post-war designs that led to greater gun depressions, one accidental and the other intentional.
The accidental feature was that the M4 was design by redesigning the M3. Because of this, the gun received a lot of clearance due to the construction of the M3 hull and its transmission, and this proved fortuitous as the Allied crews discovered they could not engage German tanks on equal terms, and sitting behind crests, though not very comfortable for the loaders, proved a good tactical solution.
The intended feature in the later M26 and M46 designs was that the Americans at least were so impressed with the Panthers and Tigers that they in many ways emulated their designs. So did the British to some degree with the Centurion. There was also the influence of the German version of the Eastern Front that the Allies received early in the Cold War that influenced their doctrinal development. This changed profoundly in the 1980s, but the M1 had by then begun rolling off the production lines.

In fact the only way to halt Soviet-style offensive operations was not by having greater gun depression, advanced optics or heavier armour, but through nullifying the lag factor, i.e. speed. Germans knew this, but hated to admit that the Red Army also learned this, and surpassed them, so they largely omitted this detail from their memoirs. The only other people that seems to understand this were Patton and some of the officers that served under him, but for political reasons Patton was not liked, and after the war, was shunted aside by the reliance on wrong lessons learned.

 

[FutureTank]

The example I was providing was in regards to your attempt to use CFE numbers and the principle of mass as some sort of basis for modern Russian military operations. This is not correct because the principle of mass is context-dependent, and because the CFE numbers are not indicative of actual deployable forces.

Combat units are armed primarily with the T-72, with smaller numbers of T-80 and T-90 tanks in service. The T-62 is only in active service with the 42nd MRD as far as I know. Hence why when estimating what tanks you are likely to be facing you need to 1) define the conflict zone, 2) look at units that could/would be deployed there and 3) look at the equipment of those individual units.

Out of the tanks in service the T-90A is the new tank, and it's the only one currently in production. It does carry a TI meaning that our MoD obviously does see a need for it. The only problem is that it will be some time before it's introduced into the entirety of the armed forces. The question may be academic in terms of relations with western armor, but it doesn't mean that lack of a TI is not a major shortcoming even against countries such as Georgia.

Sorry, yes I should have made it clearer that aggregate numbers are not related to tactical or operational unit performance. I just added the numbers for clarity.

By the way the numbers are hard to estimate because it seems the scrapping proceeds at a slow and inconsistent pace because the scraping facilities are also having some sort of scheduling problems. Apparently, based on one source, one such plant has several hundred tanks that have been sitting in the fields around it for years. The issue seems to be in acquiring the cutting tools which in the Soviet era were rare and had not been used since the T-34s were scrapped in the late 1960s. So, ChTZ at least decided they are going to rebuild old tanks and sell them off.

 

[FutureTank]

Combat units are armed primarily with the T-72, with smaller numbers of T-80 and T-90 tanks in service.

By the way, combat units are not armed primarily with T-72s. They primarily use early T-72s and variants for training, which is why they are more often seen in the media. The newer T-72, T-80 and T-90 tanks are also there, but less used to preserve their combat worth for longer. In fact the Russian Army has found itself in the luxurious position of having two sets of tanks for every remaining high combat readiness unit, one for peacetime and one for combat operations.

 

[Feanor]

By the way, combat units are not armed primarily with T-72s. They primarily use early T-72s and variants for training, which is why they are more often seen in the media. The newer T-72, T-80 and T-90 tanks are also there, but less used to preserve their combat worth for longer. In fact the Russian Army has found itself in the luxurious position of having two sets of tanks for every remaining high combat readiness unit, one for peacetime and one for combat operations.

Do you have a source on the bolded part, that indeed all high-readyness units use two sets of tanks? During the operation in Ossetia mechanical realibility was very poor, and all the deployed in combat tanks were T-72s (the 42nd MRD didn't get there in time from what I know). Which seems to indicate that 1) I'm correct and the T-72 is the main tank modernized or not and 2) that the tanks in service with those units were in poor shape.

 

[wittmanace]

i saw some pictures of t-62s in use by the russian army in south ossetia. if i remember correctly, this was during combat phase, not post-combat phase when they set up the roadblocks. ill see if i can find the pictures, they were at militaryphotos.net.

 

[Marc 1]

In fact the Russian Army has found itself in the luxurious position of having two sets of tanks for every remaining high combat readiness unit, one for peacetime and one for combat operations.

I remember reading about the "one set of superceded training tanks, and one set of newies" in many soviet era books/pams etc. Back when the soviet tank generations were basically being turned out every 10 or less years the gap in ability and capability would not have been that large and this may have been a good idea. But nowadays with the incredible differences in electronics etc, it would be like Jensen Button doing all his practice in a 1980's F1 car (manual gearbox, bugger all computerisation) then expecting him to drop into his 2009 car and set a competitive lap. The 'train as you plan to fight' does not seem to fit with this doctrine. Surely the Russians have abandoned this idea by now?

 

[FutureTank]

Do you have a source on the bolded part, that indeed all high-readyness units use two sets of tanks? During the operation in Ossetia mechanical realibility was very poor, and all the deployed in combat tanks were T-72s (the 42nd MRD didn't get there in time from what I know). Which seems to indicate that 1) I'm correct and the T-72 is the main tank modernized or not and 2) that the tanks in service with those units were in poor shape.

The South Ossetia was a different case. They were using their combat equipment because I don't think there are storage bases there.

I don't have sources other than a mentions that troops were sent to collect tanks from a storage base although their own virtually new tanks from the Soviet era remained in the boxes. This is in the Moscow military district.

I'll see if I can find that forum link again.

 

[FutureTank]

I remember reading about the "one set of superceded training tanks, and one set of newies" in many soviet era books/pams etc. Back when the soviet tank generations were basically being turned out every 10 or less years the gap in ability and capability would not have been that large and this may have been a good idea. But nowadays with the incredible differences in electronics etc, it would be like Jensen Button doing all his practice in a 1980's F1 car (manual gearbox, bugger all computerisation) then expecting him to drop into his 2009 car and set a competitive lap. The 'train as you plan to fight' does not seem to fit with this doctrine. Surely the Russians have abandoned this idea by now?

Driving and gunnery that wear out the engines, transmissions and gun tubes can be done on older tanks. Newer tanks are used for stationary training in the use of the equipment and of course some tactical training. For example for gunnery training the rounds used are those that were produced in the early 1970s and which were already written off from combat loads even in the Soviet times.

 

[Feanor]

I'm basing this on Russian news outlets which reported up to 30% breakdown rates among armored equipment. I have not seen the Janes report. Could you give me the issue which it was in?

I know what you're talking about in the Moscow MD. The T-80BV are being used to conserve the engine resource of the T-80UDs. Right now those units are transitioning to the T-90A, and as far as I know this situation does not occur in most of the Russian Army. If you know otherwise please post.

in Ossetia tactical regimental groupings from the 70th and 71st MRRs of the 42nd MRD were in the combat zone by the evening of Aug. 10th. By that time Georgian forces were already pulling back, and by the end of the next day none were left in S. Ossetia. Artillery units were still shelling Ts'hinval as of the end of the day on the 10th. I'm not sure if this continued on the 11th. No major combat action occured after this point. I also have not seen any photos of T-62s about to enter combat or just out of combat. Only photos of them on the march. Begin deployed to the conflict zone and being used in active combat are two different things.

 

[FutureTank]

I'm basing this on Russian news outlets which reported up to 30% breakdown rates among armored equipment. I have not seen the Janes report. Could you give me the issue which it was in?

I know what you're talking about in the Moscow MD. The T-80BV are being used to conserve the engine resource of the T-80UDs. Right now those units are transitioning to the T-90A, and as far as I know this situation does not occur in most of the Russian Army. If you know otherwise please post.

in Ossetia tactical regimental groupings from the 70th and 71st MRRs of the 42nd MRD were in the combat zone by the evening of Aug. 10th. By that time Georgian forces were already pulling back, and by the end of the next day none were left in S. Ossetia. Artillery units were still shelling Ts'hinval as of the end of the day on the 10th. I'm not sure if this continued on the 11th. No major combat action occured after this point. I also have not seen any photos of T-62s about to enter combat or just out of combat. Only photos of them on the march. Begin deployed to the conflict zone and being used in active combat are two different things.

Maybe this is the case with the T-80s although in that forum it was implied that the tanks used were T-72s.

However, you can see the evidence yourself. Some images of Russian troops show tanks that are clearly not heavily modified and clearly not kept in 'parade ready' state. Even if they are not new, it is a favourite time of all Russian tankers to repaint their tanks to always look new

I have not identified which unit had the T-62s but at least one was lost in combat.

I'm speculating, but the problem of the approach routes in the area for the Russian troops forced a very long march distance, and it is not inconceivable that units not kept in top combat readiness, and using old equipment, would have suffered high rates of mechanical breakdown. However, even if they were using the last production batch of T-72Bs, they still did remarkably well for 20 year old tanks to sustain only a 30% breakdown on the march.

 

[FutureTank]

in Ossetia tactical regimental groupings from the 70th and 71st MRRs of the 42nd MRD were in the combat zone by the evening of Aug. 10th. By that time Georgian forces were already pulling back, and by the end of the next day none were left in S. Ossetia. Artillery units were still shelling Ts'hinval as of the end of the day on the 10th. I'm not sure if this continued on the 11th. No major combat action occured after this point. I also have not seen any photos of T-62s about to enter combat or just out of combat. Only photos of them on the march. Begin deployed to the conflict zone and being used in active combat are two different things.

See here http://www.memo.ru/hr/hotpoints/caucas1/msg/2005/01/m36694.htmre where the T-62s came from and why the T-72s didn't look so good

 

[Feanor]

I think we all know where T-62s come from... storage depos and such. I suspect the 42nd MRD will be getting T-90s within the near future.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

If you see my other post on the use of terrain undulations, you will see that the silhouette is almost invariably used with crests, albeit very low crests. The only difference is in the tank moving or not moving.

The design thinking that led to greater gun depression in Western designs is in fact an interesting one. In the case of the Germans it was a self-convincing argument that their ambush tactics in the later part of the Second World War would have stopped the Red Army if they had enough tanks. The tactics were successful, but the Wehrmacht lost at the operational and strategic levels.

In the case of the Allies there were two factors in the post-war designs that led to greater gun depressions, one accidental and the other intentional.
The accidental feature was that the M4 was design by redesigning the M3. Because of this, the gun received a lot of clearance due to the construction of the M3 hull and its transmission, and this proved fortuitous as the Allied crews discovered they could not engage German tanks on equal terms, and sitting behind crests, though not very comfortable for the loaders, proved a good tactical solution.
The intended feature in the later M26 and M46 designs was that the Americans at least were so impressed with the Panthers and Tigers that they in many ways emulated their designs. So did the British to some degree with the Centurion. There was also the influence of the German version of the Eastern Front that the Allies received early in the Cold War that influenced their doctrinal development. This changed profoundly in the 1980s, but the M1 had by then begun rolling off the production lines.

What an astounding load of garbage. I'm flabbergasted. There is no arguing/debating/discussing with this because it bares no resemblance to reality.

FutureTank, aka G.C., T.G., lives in his own world of tankness. It bears no passing resemblance to reality. To assume that gun depression is a byproduct of the redesign of the M3 to the M4 is an astounding lack of common sense not to mention historical reality and technical understanding. Gun depression is all about turret design, ie the provision of enough height to allow the recoiling of the depressed gun without striking the roof. Its not the appearance of the front of the tank but the height of the turret. Anyone with any partical knowledge of tank systems would be aware of this. Every other supposed explanation for tank design he presents is equally invalid.

Unfortunately this approach to reality is a constant across much of FutureTank's posts. He has his own viewpoint that is not informed by an practical or logical understanding. He also would appear to have far to much time on his hands and the ego driven desire to keep expressing this viewpoint. I for one do not have the time to waste on responding to his mass of posts. My only response after this one will be to look for the function on this forum which enables me to block all his posts so I don't have to read them: the Ignore List, it works a charm!

 

[FutureTank]

What an astounding load of garbage. I'm flabbergasted. There is no arguing/debating/discussing with this because it bares no resemblance to reality.

FutureTank, aka G.C., T.G., lives in his own world of tankness. It bears no passing resemblance to reality. To assume that gun depression is a byproduct of the redesign of the M3 to the M4 is an astounding lack of common sense not to mention historical reality and technical understanding. Gun depression is all about turret design, ie the provision of enough height to allow the recoiling of the depressed gun without striking the roof. Its not the appearance of the front of the tank but the height of the turret. Anyone with any partical knowledge of tank systems would be aware of this. Every other supposed explanation for tank design he presents is equally invalid.

Unfortunately this approach to reality is a constant across much of FutureTank's posts. He has his own viewpoint that is not informed by an practical or logical understanding. He also would appear to have far to much time on his hands and the ego driven desire to keep expressing this viewpoint. I for one do not have the time to waste on responding to his mass of posts. My only response after this one will be to look for the function on this forum which enables me to block all his posts so I don't have to read them: the Ignore List, it works a charm!

LOL. Sure, I am so wrong, that you can't bare to offer anything to prove me wrong, therefore I'm wrong....because you say so.

And of course journalists have no ego, own viewpoints, and do not post across at least half-dozen other forums.

I did not say "gun depression is a byproduct of the redesign of the M3 to the M4". As I said, it was the unintended by-product. The US armoured doctrine at the time (1941-42) suggested that the M4 could engage any German tank of the day. The fact that reverse slope positions were not considered are clearly seen in the M3 design, and in fact there is no mention of such tactics to be seen in the US Army. Only negative comments by the British, Russians and their own tankers on the mechanical/ergonomic/tactical utility of M3s convinced them to abandon the pre-war French design and go with a more conventional single main gun in a larger turret. This was a straight engineering decision with no doctrinal consideration, which did not change until the Normandy breakout. The refusal to adopt the British 17-pound gun confirms this because the US doctrine relied, and would continue to rely on the Tank Destroyer Branch. Only grudgingly was a US heavy tank capable of engaging German tanks on their own terms was fielded early in 1945.

The M4 turret was changed by, and during 1944-45, if you didn't know that, but for several reasons. However, the tankers had to adopt because they had no other way to fight German PzIVs with long 7.5cm guns, Panthers, Tigers and their accompanying tank destroyers except to try and run circles around them to engage from sides and rear at closer range. And, they had to do so while presenting as little of themselves to return fire as possible owing to the German combined-arms tactics where infantry tank destroyer teams and anti-tank guns were ever present.

This was not the intended use of the M4; the troops had to create their own tactics and doctrine as they went from June 1944. The T-34 crews did the same on the Eastern Front, and their turrets were also modified over time.

All of the above, coupled with the post-war 'swallowing whole' of the German description of what transpired on the Eastern Front, eventuated in the greater gun depression design in the NATO tanks, which was advertised as a significant advantage over the Soviet designs, on a one-to-one comparative basis. At no time was it ever advertised that the Soviet designs were so created because they were intend to be used in a different way operationally, something the NATO armoured commanders only came to appreciate in the early 1980s.

If you like, I can recommend a book for you to read, written by a Colonel no less, so you stop saying I live in my own world, but I think you don't take advice kindly.

As for my identity, does it matter? I don't have a pressing need to have my name in lights And what do you care what I do if I happen to have spare time?

 

[FutureTank]

To comment on a few things. First off, the point Abraham made was absolutely valid. The older Soviet tanks are now at a disadvantage because they lack thermals.

I just saw this

Hmmm, it seems to me the older Soviet designs don't lack thermals. The new Russian Army lacks a conflict where thermal technology would be required

They now have 44 of the Georgian upgraded T-72s with Elbit thermal systems installed (I think) to add to the T-90s

I guess if they like them, they can get more from Israel

 

[FutureTank]

I'm basing this on Russian news outlets which reported up to 30% breakdown rates among armored equipment. I have not seen the Janes report. Could you give me the issue which it was in?

Please see here http://www.janes.com/media/releases/pc080812_2.shtml though I can't seem to find the report now.

 

[Feanor]

I just saw this

Hmmm, it seems to me the older Soviet designs don't lack thermals. The new Russian Army lacks a conflict where thermal technology would be required

Thermals would have allowed for much more effective night time operations in the Second Chechen war. In particular during the initial assault.

They now have 44 of the Georgian upgraded T-72s with Elbit thermal systems installed (I think) to add to the T-90s

I guess if they like them, they can get more from Israel

I seriously doubt it. The T-72 and T-80 are definetly on their way out. Modernization and repair are still being carried out, but only minor stuff. From what I know the most advanced T-72 mod. the B2 Rogatka has not been implemented on any units, and instead T-90As will be bought in larger numbers. ~282 in the next 3 years.

Thanks for the article by the way.