T-90 in Comparison to Western Armour

[Abraham Gubler]

And where are the T-64s or T-72s being manufactured now?

Which is why I referred to the "T-64 and T-72 family" of vehicles. Which includes the T-80, T-84 and T-90 and others. If I had said "Patton family" only the most facetious debater would assume this did not include everything up to the Sabra rebuild of Turkish M60Ts.

Of the thousands of these tanks (T-64 and T-72 family, including the T-80, T-84 and T-90) produced and still in service only a handful have thermal sights. While of course any model of tank can theoretically be fitted with just about any component wishful thinking does not substitute for through night and obscurant vision.

The lack of thermal vision is not just a handicap in battle against such equipped tanks but in all sorts of battle situations. Though I find it very hard to believe that there is anyone realistically arguing that T-64 to T-90s don't need thermal vision because the chance of tank to tank combat with Leopard 2 to K-2 is very low. Maybe some people making excuses for the lack of combat power inherent in these tanks, but not anyone seriously involved with them.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

Thats wrong. The T-72 was not made to sit behind crests.

Which is true and shows quite simply that anyone other than the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany planning on invading north west Germany in a rapid assault should not be buying this tank. Unless there were no other alternatives (which is a very strong reason behind T-72 and other T-64 to T-90 tank export success).

Using terrain or man made firing holes is a crucial element in winning in tank on tank battles. Tanks like the T-64 to T-90 that can't depress their gun barrels enough to use a reverse slope are like infantryman who need to stand erect to fire their rifles. This exposes them to return fire and significantly increases their chance of being destroyed. Apart from the battle run rapid assault its a nightmarish tactical situation to be placed into.

 

[eckherl]

Neither T-64s nor T-72s are being manufactured. The T-90 all include thermal sights as far as I know, with the exception of the initial batch of baseline T-90 models from the '93-'94 tranche. T-64's are currently being modernized in Ukraine to the BM standard, and T-72s are modernized in Russia fairly regularly (for example Iranian ones and Algerian ones were done recently), but those upgrades don't include thermals as far as I know.

Even the Ukrainian T-64BM are being upgraded without the Burans due to lack of funds, different story though with T-80UD and T-84, both are equipped with Buran Catherine thermals.

Russia actually designed a thermal in the the early eighties for the T-80 series, sight was called AGAVA - 2, it was never shoe horned into a tank that I am aware of due to cost and reliability issues. Reliability is still to this day a major issue when using thermal sights in T-80 and T-90 series due to vehicle ventilation matched up with turret size, if you ever have been in a T-80 turret you would know why, heat is a killer for this type of sighting system. Thales company offeres the most reliable sight for the T-90 thus the reason why Russia signed a agreement with them (with in the last 2 years), this deal made some legal waves with the U.S requiring Thales having to pay fines.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

Even the Ukrainian T-64BM are being upgraded without the Burans due to lack of funds, different story though with T-80UD and T-84, both are equipped with Buran Catherine thermals.

Maybe in upgrade but the T-84s supplied to Pakistan didn't have the Buran thermal sight.

 

[eckherl]

Maybe in upgrade but the T-84s supplied to Pakistan didn't have the Buran thermal sight.

Did not say that they Pakistan T-80UD came equipped with Burans, most likely Sagem thermals. Both Sagem and Thales were tested during Pakistan tank trials.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

There are other considerations in armoured combat than expensive new targeting systems, like old fashioned numbers

Or old fashioned dumb-arse-ness... as appears to be the case here. If you want to quote CFE vehicle numbers then you can at least be so kind as to return the favour to other nations rather than just remain exclusive to Russia. The Russian Army does not have 5,000 MBTs in unit service west of the Urals, it has a total number of 5,000 MBTs. Just in the same way the German Army does not have only <400 MBTs it has a plan to retain 400 in unit service.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

The tanks you speak of are MEDIUM tanks intended for offensive operations as part of an all-arms team, not sitting behind terrain.

Strangely enough even offensive combat teams like to use terrain to avoid being blown up. The racing across the valley thing is only a small part of an offensive maneuver. The Soviets were prepared to make this sacrifice because they planned to achieve tactical dominance through other means. AFAIK there isn't a single Army since the Soviet Army that can achieve this tactical dominance so subsequent users of the T-64 to T-90 vehicles are at a real disadvantage.

 

[Feanor]

To comment on a few things. First off, the point Abraham made was absolutely valid. The older Soviet tanks are now at a disadvantage because they lack thermals. New Russian tanks are now getting thermals to try to correct this. The gun depression issue is indeed a major one. However there are other factors at play too. The T-90 costs a fraction of a new M1A2 or Leo 2A6. In the India and Algeria case, transitioning from T-72s to a T-90A is easy. To an M1 or Leo 2.... not so easy. So the decision to buy them is not entirely political. The T-90A offers a good tank for the money.

I don't know exactly how many tanks are in active service with the Russian Army, but the total tank numbers in unit service I would estimate at around 4000-5000, before the recent military reforms (simply based on looking at the OrBat, and then accounting for 31 per bltn, 3 bltns per rgt). After the reforms... who knows... we have yet to find out the make up of the average motor-rifles and armored brigade, never mind how many of them will be formed. Counting the thousands of tanks sitting in depots (commonly cited as around 20 000 by Russian sources) is sort of pointless. The time to mobilize them is rather large, and they're mostly older models. Much older.

 

[FutureTank]

Or old fashioned dumb-arse-ness... as appears to be the case here. If you want to quote CFE vehicle numbers then you can at least be so kind as to return the favour to other nations rather than just remain exclusive to Russia. The Russian Army does not have 5,000 MBTs in unit service west of the Urals, it has a total number of 5,000 MBTs. Just in the same way the German Army does not have only <400 MBTs it has a plan to retain 400 in unit service.

Thats quite a record being called a smart ass and a dumb ass in the same day
I guess only an analyst can tell these things.

In total Russia had about 27,000 tanks in 2007 although more commonly the figures seen are 12,000 or 15,000 due to expected reductions
West of Urals it has about 5,000 tanks although over 6,350 is allowed by the treaty.
In 2007 the numbers were about
200 Т-90 C
9000 Т-72 various
3500 Т-80 various
4000 Т-64 various
8000 Т-62 various (about 30% M)
100? Т-54/55 various, about 20% M)
1100 PТ-76 (about 60% M)

The unconfirmed plan is to produce about 1900 T-90s by 2020. At the same time most of the T-80 park will be brought up to the tactico-technical level of the T-90s. About 3/4s of the T-72 park are various upgraded versions and they will continue to be progressively upgraded to the T-90 level as budget permits. It is expected that most of the T-64s will be scrapped or retained in storage since scrapping is expensive. Same applies to the remaining T-62s and T-55s.

Unit service? Most of the Russian tanks are in conservation. Unit service park amounts to about 1700 tanks in total. T-62s are being used for driver training to preserve the newer models, and are being scrapped as they wear out. This is the process that existed with T-34s and T-55s in the USSR time.

So what does a German Army (Bundeswehr) have? Actually, I don't care. The only way to compare T-90 to a Leopard II is to have them engage each other under the sort of tactical and operational circumstances they were designed for. We are not going to see that. Hopefully ever.

I wasn't comparing raw numbers. There is nothing to compare. So what if Germany has X number of tanks with Y type of equipment?

I did state that numbers, i.e. the Principle of Mass, is a valid way of looking at relative comparison of forces. That's what the Soviet operational manoeuvre doctrine counted on.

Numbers is why the CFE was implemented in the first place because numbers is what NATO was worried about. If NATO thought that it could handle numbers by fitting its tanks with advanced targeting equipment, maybe it would not have agreed to the CFE reductions, or even proposed it. Raw numbers is a meaningless comparison. Tanks do not operate on their own. Soviet tankers were not taught to look for an opportunity to present themselves as targets to hull down NATO tanks.

But hey, what do I know. I'm not an analyst...

 

[eckherl]

Main emphasis (thinking) for the former Soviet Union was for total offensive posture, if they came on to any type of enemy strong point the given was to saturate the area with artillery fire, break off a few units to ensure constant pressure and by pass it with their main elements, they never really cared about how much better technology that NATO had in their tank designs, they knew we would eventually run out of ammunition and if they could keep us pinned in position, choke off our logistical support or just by pass us all together we were through. If they would of been successful with this doctrine is something up for debate.

This type of thinking for them did change with the reduction of Russian equipment and the lessoning threat in that part of the world, so now they can fine tune their chariots of fire in which they presently are doing, how good is that upgraded equipment remains to be seen with a vehicle that was initially designed for offensive fast fluid battle doctrine, now they will be fighting with less replacements and on a given occasion total defensive posture.

For what I know of Russian armor Mr. Marsh Again said it right with his post, do not under estimate the Russians, they have been doing this armor thing for awhile also.

 

[lancejackCF]

Thats wrong. The T-72 was not made to sit behind crests.

silhouette has nothing to do with sitting behind crests - thats gun depression

like u said its an offensive tank

 

[Feanor]

Future Tank declared CFE numbers, and operationally deployed numbers are two very different things. For example as far as I know not T-64s are in line service. Some T-62s are operational in the 42nd MRD, and some T-72s are actually in storage. When looking at the principle of mass we have to look at how many troops can be deployed to the potential conflict zone. For example Russian superiority in Ossetia had little impact, as there was only one two-lane road leading into S. Ossetia, and as a result Russian forces had to be committed piece by piece as they entered.

 

[Chrom]

Main emphasis (thinking) for the former Soviet Union was for total offensive posture, if they came on to any type of enemy strong point the given was to saturate the area with artillery fire, break off a few units to ensure constant pressure and by pass it with their main elements, they never really cared about how much better technology that NATO had in their tank designs, they knew we would eventually run out of ammunition and if they could keep us pinned in position, choke off our logistical support or just by pass us all together we were through. If they would of been successful with this doctrine is something up for debate.

.

You make it sound like USSR never cared about own tanks effectiveness and like USSR agreed with "inferior" russian tanks. In reality, contrary, USSR always laid major emphasis on ground forces equipment QUALITY, and tanks here are one of the best examples.

We all know what T-64/T-72/T-80 were at least as good as western counterparts, in most cases even better. Moreover, post-WW2 USSR, in tank designs, introduced in broad service probably more innovation than rest of the world combined, let alone any country.

APFSDS, smoothbore cannons, composite armor, gun-launched ATGM's, ERA, APS - to name only few.

The strategy was indeed deep operations after breakthrough with help of concentrated artillery, aviation, etc. But this common strategy is basically also carried by all other major military mights - NATO countries, China, India, etc. Only very small countries, without any independent military capability (like f.e. Finland or Switzerland) concentrate exclusively on defense.

 

[FutureTank]

Main emphasis (thinking) for the former Soviet Union was for total offensive posture, if they came on to any type of enemy strong point the given was to saturate the area with artillery fire, break off a few units to ensure constant pressure and by pass it with their main elements, they never really cared about how much better technology that NATO had in their tank designs, they knew we would eventually run out of ammunition and if they could keep us pinned in position, choke off our logistical support or just by pass us all together we were through. If they would of been successful with this doctrine is something up for debate.

This type of thinking for them did change with the reduction of Russian equipment and the lessoning threat in that part of the world, so now they can fine tune their chariots of fire in which they presently are doing, how good is that upgraded equipment remains to be seen with a vehicle that was initially designed for offensive fast fluid battle doctrine, now they will be fighting with less replacements and on a given occasion total defensive posture.

For what I know of Russian armor Mr. Marsh Again said it right with his post, do not under estimate the Russians, they have been doing this armor thing for awhile also.

I think the recent statements that the T-90 will see production over the next decade at least suggest that the offensive thinking in the Russian doctrines has not changed. Probably it is so ingrained in the military establishment that several generations of peace would be required before it affects (percolates) down to design bureaus.

Having said that, if they can design a T-90, what is to say they can't develop a tank comparable in design to the last generation of Western tanks..IF there is a need. Designing a 70ton package after five decades of being restricted to 45ton is a lot easier than, in the case of Western designers, to design a 45ton tank from five decades of weight creep experience.

This makes for an interesting possibility to compare any one of the World's forces' units equipped with the T-72 variants to any unit of the US Army equipped with the "light-weight" XM1202 (MCS), which I imagine being "light weight" by comparison to the M1 would be at around 45ton with enough armour hung on it, and heralding US design return to medium tank designs. Of curse it will not be a tank in the strict sense of the word, but it will pass for one.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

You make it sound like USSR never cared about own tanks effectiveness and like USSR agreed with "inferior" russian tanks. In reality, contrary, USSR always laid major emphasis on ground forces equipment QUALITY, and tanks here are one of the best examples.

We all know what T-64/T-72/T-80 were at least as good as western counterparts, in most cases even better. Moreover, post-WW2 USSR, in tank designs, introduced in broad service probably more innovation than rest of the world combined, let alone any country.

In terms of comparing individual items of technology in the main this is true. But a tank is a complete weapon system and in this case the Soviets made several key capability trade offs.

The most important issue of armoured vehicle design is internal volume. The less internal volume you have tends to mean the less external surface area (unless your tank is a pancake), which means less area needed to be protected, which means less total volume of armour, which means less weight. In the case of the T-64, T-72, T-80, T-84, T-90, Black Eagle, Oplot, etc internal volume was significantly reduced by reducing turret and hull height. This had two key advantages: reduced need for surface area requiring armour (as above) and reduced silhouette height resulting in reduced chance of detection compared to higher vehicles (all things being equal). It however resulted in significantly reduced main gun depression.

The later is not so important if your tactical usage is entirely focused on offensive battle runs. That is driving through the enemies field of fire without making any attempt to reduce your exposure to fires by other than active means (smoke, suppression, etc). This severely hampers your tactical options.

In particular the use of terrain to mask the tank’s firing position. Which is not just a defensive tactic but one of the best forms of offense where one advances to a firing position and uses it to pour in flanking fires or fires into the enemies rear. If said firing position is a reverse slope then you can keep up fires for longer because your casualties will be lower.

For the Soviet Army it wasn’t so bad as the only way they planned on using their tanks was in battle runs with no time for stopping despite the level of casualties. But for every other army it’s a disaster. As has been seen every time tanks from this family have been used in high intensity combat such as the 82 Lebanon War and Operation Desert Storm.

The strategy was indeed deep operations after breakthrough with help of concentrated artillery, aviation, etc. But this common strategy is basically also carried by all other major military mights - NATO countries, China, India, etc. Only very small countries, without any independent military capability (like f.e. Finland or Switzerland) concentrate exclusively on defense.

Yes but no one else then and since has come close to the concentrated destruction the Soviets were capable of. Nor are other armies in such an operational situation where they are quite willing to accept high casualties in the pursuit of extremely rapid advances.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

I think the recent statements that the T-90 will see production over the next decade at least suggest that the offensive thinking in the Russian doctrines has not changed. Probably it is so ingrained in the military establishment that several generations of peace would be required before it affects (percolates) down to design bureaus.

The Russian Army lacks the huge level of logistics and operational equipment that the Soviet Army had to sustain such a doctrine. The sustainment of T-90 tank production has a lot more to do with trying to sustain the industry that the Russian Government and export sales as failed to fund for a much needed technology upgrade. The Russians have no choice but to build T-90s because they lack the factory tooling to build anything else. That tooling is on its last legs as well and will soon (~10 years) breakdown and they won’t be able to produce anything.

Having said that, if they can design a T-90, what is to say they can't develop a tank comparable in design to the last generation of Western tanks..IF there is a need. Designing a 70ton package after five decades of being restricted to 45ton is a lot easier than, in the case of Western designers, to design a 45ton tank from five decades of weight creep experience.

Sure they can design a big tank on paper and even hand build a prototype. The seven road wheel, ~60 tonne Black Eagle is a classic example of this. But can they produce one? Not without a multi-billion investment in upgrading Russian industrial infrastructure. There is only so much you can get out of factories that have not seen more than a new coat of paint and some COTS PCs since the fall of the Soviet Union.

This makes for an interesting possibility to compare any one of the World's forces' units equipped with the T-72 variants to any unit of the US Army equipped with the "light-weight" XM1202 (MCS), which I imagine being "light weight" by comparison to the M1 would be at around 45ton with enough armour hung on it, and heralding US design return to medium tank designs. Of curse it will not be a tank in the strict sense of the word, but it will pass for one.

Ahh great, more made up stuff...

Outside “FutureTankWorld” there is the XM1200 series of vehicles developed by the Future Combat System (FCS) program. The tank variant, the XM1202 MCS, will have more armour protection than the latest M1 not to mention active protection and far more SA. It will only weigh 27 tonnes. This is the difference between starting to design a tank in 1960 (T-90 and co) and in 2005.

 

[Feanor]

The Russian Army lacks the huge level of logistics and operational equipment that the Soviet Army had to sustain such a doctrine. The sustainment of T-90 tank production has a lot more to do with trying to sustain the industry that the Russian Government and export sales as failed to fund for a much needed technology upgrade. The Russians have no choice but to build T-90s because they lack the factory tooling to build anything else. That tooling is on its last legs as well and will soon (~10 years) breakdown and they won’t be able to produce anything.

You're right in principle. Russia does not have the money to produce anything else. However the UVZ production line was upgrade in 1999 for the production of the T-90A, and has since seen some investment into new equipment. The same goes for many other Russian defense plants including but not limited to NAPO, IAPO, KnAAPO, and others. We do not currently have the funds to shift to the production of a completely new tank, but there are certainly enough funds to keep the existing production facilities open and even modernized.

Of course another issue is the fact that the T-95 seems to be close to a public debut some time soon, which means that the T-90A might be on the production list at the moment simply while they wait for the development of a new tank to complete, making transitioning to the Black Eagle unnecessary.

 

[FutureTank]

In particular the use of terrain to mask the tank’s firing position. Which is not just a defensive tactic but one of the best forms of offense where one advances to a firing position and uses it to pour in flanking fires or fires into the enemies rear. If said firing position is a reverse slope then you can keep up fires for longer because your casualties will be lower.

This is a myth.

The ambient ground undulation around the World, and in Europe, generally offers 1-3m hull-down positions, sometimes even in ploughed 'level' fields. All AFV drivers, Western included, are trained to look for such undulations during tactical movements. It is a skill that allows the driver to reduce the workload on the commander by being tactically aware without being told what to do. In a sense the driver, though lacking the gadgets of the modern MBT turret is often a second most important person in the team because of this skill.

Besides that, the opportunity to find an ideal position that provides the best hull-down based on the tank's gun depression is only possible for a unit with a defensive posture and lots of time on its hands. Defensive posture spells only one thing, loss of initiative. Tankers are best when they are movers and chargers, or so thought some of the best tank warfare practitioners in all armed forces since 1930s. Armour creates initiative for other combat arms. It is a force of change on the battlefield, a catalyst.

Then there are impediments to such positions like inadequate LOS, the average in Europe (West Germany) being 500-1200m. It is really hard to miss a tank's fire at those ranges, and the hoped for 2,500m+ LOSs are rare indeed.

There is also the immediate tactical disadvantage to the individual crews when they need to change the firing position. The very crest that had provided such good cover, now completely obscures the view of the enemy in it's elevation is above that of the commander's sights. This will often force several manoeuvring crews to rely on one of their overwatching platoon members to keep them informed of the change in enemy reactions to fire, leaving them vulnerable. Networked battlefield computers only serve to remove some of the anxiety when visual of the enemy is lost, particularly at close ranges.

As an aside thought, heights are clearly marked on maps, and I'm sure Soviet tankers were well aware of Western tank design parameters since they were advertised in every book on the Cold War. Those neat illustrations I remember usually showed a NATO tank sitting on a 2-3m incline with a convenient 30 degree slope. They also looked to have suspiciously level slopes. Concrete? http://images.absoluteastronomy.com/images/encyclopediaimages/h/hu/hull_down_tank_diagram.png

 

[FutureTank]

For the Soviet Army it wasn’t so bad as the only way they planned on using their tanks was in battle runs with no time for stopping despite the level of casualties. But for every other army it’s a disaster. As has been seen every time tanks from this family have been used in high intensity combat such as the 82 Lebanon War and Operation Desert Storm.

Yes but no one else then and since has come close to the concentrated destruction the Soviets were capable of. Nor are other armies in such an operational situation where they are quite willing to accept high casualties in the pursuit of extremely rapid advances.

This statement is not in fact true. Massive use of firepower was also attempted by the Allies in Normandy, but with considerably less effect because it relied on air power.

The comparing of Soviet operational manoeuvre theory with IDF's operations in Lebanon is not even to compare apples with oranges. Soviets did a lot of statistical analysis on the performance of their forces during the Second World War. One thing that showed is that although the intensity of operations, and in particular offensive operations by armoured forces increased substantially in scope and frequency over the duration of the war, the casualties decreased substantially over same time. One reason for this is the very nature of dynamic, high tempo operations of mobile forces that prevent incurring casualties most evident in attritional operations. The Allies also came to this conclusion, but after the Second World War. However, they had far less statistical data because virtually the only source for this data was the US forces commanded by Patton. On the other hand attritional model pursued by the British/Canadian troops in the north incurred same levels of casualties that the Soviet Army suffered in the 1941-42 period.

There is a consistent thread in your argument based on the premise of Soviet acceptance of high casualties. Data does not back this up. Quite simply the greater killing power during the Second World War was in the artillery and the air forces, and these, just like their tactical microcosms, find it harder to affect a rapidly moving target. A dynamic offensive is likely to reduce not increase casualties. Even the countering of such offensives by conducting mobile defence will usually engage only the smaller part of the forces in seeking to cut the lines of communication for the group that entered ones' operational depth, and not the group itself, or the forces engaged in expanding or sealing the breach.

In terms of operating in the sort of combat environment that the IDF operated in during the 1982 Lebanon campaign, the better comparison would be the clearing of Rumanian and Hungarian territories in 1944-45 there often the 3sr and 4th Ukranian Front armies could not establish continuous front, and operations were conducted by smaller operational and tactical detachments against retreating Germans that used delaying tactics with lots of ambushes and use of "booby traps". This is a less "sexy" part of the Eastern Front experience that Germans did not like to write about, but which was covered extensively in the Soviet military publications before and during the war in Afghanistan as a way of learning from past lessons (the other lessons came from the 1942 mountain warfare in the Caucasus).

But of course we are not talking about operational concept in this thread, but in how to compare the T-90 to Western tanks. And the truth is that the T-90 was made primarily for just such an operational doctrine, while the Western tanks were not.

 

[FutureTank]

For the Soviet Army it wasn’t so bad as the only way they planned on using their tanks was in battle runs with no time for stopping despite the level of casualties. But for every other army it’s a disaster. As has been seen every time tanks from this family have been used in high intensity combat such as the 82 Lebanon War and Operation Desert Storm.

Yes but no one else then and since has come close to the concentrated destruction the Soviets were capable of. Nor are other armies in such an operational situation where they are quite willing to accept high casualties in the pursuit of extremely rapid advances.

This statement is not in fact true. Massive use of firepower was also attempted by the Allies in Normandy, but with considerably less effect because it relied on air power (heavy bombers).

The comparing of Soviet operational manoeuvre theory with IDF's operations in Lebanon is not even to compare apples with oranges.

Soviets did a lot of statistical analysis on the performance of their forces during the Second World War. One thing that showed is that although the intensity of operations, and in particular offensive operations by armoured forces, increased substantially in scope and frequency over the duration of the war, the casualties decreased substantially over same time. One reason for this is the very nature of dynamic, high tempo operations of mobile forces that prevent incurring casualties most evident in attritional operations. The Allies also came to this conclusion, but after the Second World War. However, the Allies had far less statistical data because virtually the only source for this data was the US forces commanded by Patton. On the other hand attritional model pursued by the British/Canadian troops in the north in 1944 incurred same levels of casualties that the Soviet Army suffered in the attempted offensives of 1941-42 period.

There is a consistent thread in your argument based on the premise of Soviet acceptance of high casualties. Data does not back this up. Quite simply the greater killing power during the Second World War was in the artillery and the air forces, and these, just like their tactical microcosms, find it harder to acquire and affect a rapidly moving target. A dynamic offensive is likely to reduce, not increase casualties. Even the countering of such offensives by conducting mobile defence will usually engage only the smaller part of the forces in seeking to cut the lines of communication for the group that entered ones' operational depth, and not the group itself, or the forces engaged in expanding or sealing the breach.

In terms of operating in the sort of combat environment that the IDF operated in during the 1982 Lebanon campaign, the better comparison would be the clearing of Rumanian and Hungarian territories in 1944-45 where often the 3rd and 4th Ukranian Front armies could not establish continuous front, and operations were conducted by smaller operational and tactical detachments against retreating Germans that used delaying tactics with lots of ambushes and use of "booby traps". This is a less "sexy" part of the Eastern Front experience that Germans did not like to write about, but which was covered extensively in the Soviet military publications before and during the war in Afghanistan as a way of learning from past lessons (the other lessons came from the 1942 mountain warfare in the Caucasus).

But of course we are not talking about operational concept in this thread, but in how to compare the T-90 to Western tanks. And the truth is that the T-90 was made primarily for just such an operational doctrine, while the Western tanks were not. The technological advantages that Western tanks may have acquired since mid-1980s over the older Soviet models are therefore no important when those tanks are not in place to use them, because they could not be everywhere as the Wehrmacht discovered in the 1943-45 period. After 1989 the issue became academic, and after 1993 it ceased to be an issue. Running this technological race now, it seems the designers in the West are the only competitors on the track.