Grand Danois I think this argument is running into a dead end.
I think you're right. I'll let it go.
Despite this, it's quite obvious what the problem with BMD proliferation is, and why practically any Russian leader (except for one bending over backwards to please America) would object to it's development. You can justify it's existence easily, but that's not the point. It's not a matter of justifying this BMD. It's a matter of justifying exiting out of the BMD treaty, and beginning unchecked development of the systems. If a limited size system is needed against rogue states, why not sign a new treaty limiting number of missile defense radars, and number of interceptors. You only need 10-100 interceptors against Iran, at most. You'd need many more against Russia. So if interceptors were capped at say 250 units, then if 10-20 (give some for future growth) are pointed at Iran, and maybe another 30-50 at North Korea, that leaves a maximum of 200 to point at Russia. Less then the number of Russian ICBMs and practically never to be increased. Russia's happy. Europe's happy. America's happy. Assuming that America really does only want BMD against rogue states. Or do we all understand that the USA may only be building BMD against Iran now, but certainly plans to point them at Russia, China, and other countries?
First a technical injection. The GBI has a mid-term spiral development allowing for intercept of multiple incoming warheads - sort of a "MIRV'ed" interceptor. Second, I believe Russia is capable of building a credible, not a perfect, BMD. The problem is less about Russian technical capability but more about geography.
For such deals to work, you need several things. Principally opportunity and trust. That comes before technical and political relevance. Opportunity went down OIF, IMV. Not Serbia, not BMD, but Iraq. It takes decades to build trust when talking about a former foe and it is questionable if the required trust was ever there.
I don't think we over time will see the US continue to go it alone, though they are currently on a "We can do it - alone" powerdrive. There will be windows of
opportunity which is why confidence building measures are a most important, not much recognised tool. And this tool has now been emasculated by:
Russia withdrawing from cooperation with NATO
EU deferring that trade deal
US shelving a nuclear deal
<<etc.>>
If just Russia had slapped Georgia over the wrist instead exploiting the situation - only made their stay in Georgia proper a short stay, not recognised SO & ABK - Russia could have gone away with a military and prestige victory.
Instead everybody is growing anxieties about what the Russians are up to.
Let me give you an example: Russia signed UNCLOS a couple of years ago and this year they reaffirmed by signing a declaration at Illulisat. Now, yesterday Medvedev starts talking about a new security strategy for the arctic; it might be that this will defined inside the UNCLOS framework (seeking solution) and it's just rethorics, or it might be that we'll see another zero-sum spoiling strategy (seeking advantage). We'll have to wait untill December, then we'll know.
Anyhow, Georgia is seen as an example of Russia seeking advantage, not solution, for many reasons, and does not exactly build confidence and the necessary trust.
There are many failures along the way. One of them are "Old Europes" failure to take "New Europes" real or percieved security concerns seriously. They had better
opportunity to cater this concern without feeding the real or percieved Russian concerns about being encircled by the US. They didn't and logically the US moved into the "vacuum" as those states turned for partners.
In brief: I don't think a technical agreement like SALT is the solution here - cooperation on trust and confidence building - e.g. informal coordination and shared data on BMD.
EDIT: Grand Danois the article you linked to is a dead link.
It works for me, but here it is again.
http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displayStory.cfm?source=hptextfeature&story_id=12262231
