Europe and 5th generation aircraft

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Feanor

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Hang on, if a strike package has just penetrated your IADS and hit a C4I node, and taken 20% casualties to do so (very high casualty rate), look at the disparity in effect. The attacker has lost ~2 platforms. The defender has just lost his ability to communicate with his advanced formations just as a large offensive has been launched against him. Who has lost more? Do that 10 times and the attacker has lost 20 platforms, and if they are a comparable power to the AWAC's, fighter & S-300 equipped IADS defender they have 100+ platforms with comparable or better ISR capability (because they didn't spend all of their pennies on a defense centric IADS). They've taken 20% casualties, the defender's entire system (not just the IADS) can no longer function intelligently at a theater level. What that means is his formations in the field will be out-maneuvered, out-fought and slaughtered.
We are comparing different things. I'm comparing two countries with ~equal capabilities across the spectrum, but one has a modern networked IADS and the other one doesn't. You're again comparing a country with an air force vs. a country with SAMs. Two different things. My whole point was that SAM's offered a critical advantage and could effectively create problems for the attacker by simply being there. They would also give a critical advantage to the defending air force.



I believe you said 8 batteries, 3~4 batteries per battalion thats ~2 battalions.
From my knowledge the S-300 works like this 1 battalion = 1 TEL with missiles +radars +logistics infrastructure+crews. 1 regiment is two battalions. Purchasing 8 systems = 8 battalions, 4 regiments.

Thats the difference between tactical effects and strategic effects. On a tactical level it might do some good, but by that point you've lost on a strategic level i.e. your C4I infrastructure is toast. The point isn't to do your best, its to win, and by that point you've lost.
Again you seem to be comparing a scenario where SAM's are supposed to be a miracle cure, where you accept by fiat that the defenders air force has already lost. I'm looking at a scenario where the defenders air force engages the strike group at the same time as the IADS. The IADS is not something separate from the air force. They are part of the same network meant to control the air space. And in that regard even minor tactical networking between front line air superiority fighters and tac-SAMs is significant because it allows you to push your umbrella of airspace control outward as your forces advance.

I'm operating on the assumption that if you've invested that heavily in your IADS you are either at a competitive disadvantage in the air or your defense centric anyway. Look at the US, how dense is their IADS? How many PATRIOT batteries are operational night now in CONUS? You know why inferior powers have superior IADS, because the US have invested heavily in offensive capability.
That doesn't contradict my main point, which is that an IADS can be an effective way to protect your ground forces from enemy air. I'm not working on the assumption that your own airforce is worthless and SAMs are your only hope. I'm talking about a situation where your own air force can still contest the air. In addition you have SAMs (being the defender). The attacker does not. Your constant attempts to differentiate between an defenders airforce and IADS are really strange to me, when they are one and the same. An AD network that includes all of their fighters, AWACS, SAMs, radars, and C3. One network with multiple redundant nodes and mobility to cover for any immediate losses.

There is a major point your missing, and its what i meant by a dis-jointed view of modern warfare. Its not air force vs IADS, its entire war-fighting system vs entire war-fighting system. Even if mobile AD command posts take up some of the slack (which would be easy pray considering their EM footprint), you have impaired the whole war-fighting system at the head. That will have strategic effects i.e. on every other aspect of the conflict. The loss of 15% of the attackers AF order of battle (huge, worst case losses) will have moderate tactical effects in this type of scenario, at best.
I absolutely agree. Lets look at the systems as a whole. Why are you differentiating between the air force and the IADS when they are one and the same?

No, not on their own, unless your other military arms aggressively win the conflict.

I'm not saying SAM's are sh%t and anyone who buys them are idiots, that would mean the majority of the planets armed forces. I'm saying that the money is much better invested in assets that will actually win you air superiority over the other guy. IADS like all other forms of defensive fortifications do not constitute a war-fighting strategy on their own.
So we're both saying the same thing.... we just don't see it that way...... :rolleyes: :p:

Again this is a defense centric view. What should be limiting the opponents air forces freedom of action should be your air force hitting their C4I & logistical infrastructure and destroying them on the ground or over their airfields. Same with every other parameter. Sure some sort of GBAD is needed, even for an air power as capable as the US. But GBAD should only be intended to handle leaker's that survived your fighters & strikers.
Why not both? Constrict enemy freedom of air operations via SAMs coverage, and then using the SAM/AD fighters umbrella to cover your rear strike at their C4I and infrastructure.

Again, usually nations that invest heavily in the biggest, baddest, scariest IADS are usually at a competitive disadvantage in the air, and they usually loose. Look at the Israeli's, outnumbered and surrounded by hostile states did they invest heavily in defensive AD systems? No, they made sure they had the assets, people and tactical doctrine needed to take the initiative when the time came. It was their numerically superior enemies who invested heavily in GBAD, and it was their numerically superior enemies who lost.
Their numerically superior enemies lost because they invested in SAMs to the detriment of their air force. This is not what I am advocating.
 

Fritz

New Member
Feanor has a point here: to my knowledge, Iraq didnt even have any AWACs, and Iraqi fighters didnt even try to defend the airspace, thus 2/3, or 66% of the AD was out before the battle. In ground forces, a division is concidered worthless when 50% is taken out.
Well 66% of Iraqi AD was out of the picture before the action even began.
And yes, i concider AWACs and fighters make up at least 33% respectivly in AD.
But in the case of Iraq vs USA, the outcome was a given tnx to the incredible overmatch of USAF, let there be no doubt about it.
 

DarthAmerica

Defense Professional
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Feanor has a point here: to my knowledge, Iraq didnt even have any AWACs, and Iraqi fighters didnt even try to defend the airspace, thus 2/3, or 66% of the AD was out before the battle. In ground forces, a division is concidered worthless when 50% is taken out.
Well 66% of Iraqi AD was out of the picture before the action even began.
And yes, i concider AWACs and fighters make up at least 33% respectivly in AD.
But in the case of Iraq vs USA, the outcome was a given tnx to the incredible overmatch of USAF, let there be no doubt about it.
None of what you are saying is true. The Iraqi Airforce did try. Look at the dates...

http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_217.shtml

Also, the Iraqis still had significant amounts of fighters throughout the duration of the war even after the losses and those that fled for Iran are accounted for. Why do you think after Desert Storm during the no fly zone patrols coalition aircraft still fought with Iraqi fighters? Iraq also had AEW aircraft based on the IL-76. One was destroyed at TQ airbase and 2-3 fled to Iran...

http://www.airliners.net/open.file?id=1315765

So not only did the Iraqis fight back, they also had a relatively comprehensive IAD system.

Now, what does this suggest to you about your assertions?

If you get out systemed, you can have the bravest warriors, best equipment, even the most equipment and still lose. People so often underestimate the Iraqis because the media made ODS look so easy. Looks are deceiving. At lot of work went into what happened in 1991.

-DA


EDIT: FYI- This may be "Baghdad 1", Iraq's first IL-76 AEW conversion in Iran:
http://maps.google.com/maps?ll=35.690467,51.297321&z=15&t=h&hl=en
 
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Feanor

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But the Iraqi air force was in large part inferior and thus incapable of actually putting up a real fight. They didn't get a single air to air kill in the entire war. And like you mentioned most of their AEW flew to Iran (along with a large chunk of the fighter fleet). So yes they never had their air force capable of seriously contesting the sky.
 

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
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But the Iraqi air force was in large part inferior and thus incapable of actually putting up a real fight. They didn't get a single air to air kill in the entire war. And like you mentioned most of their AEW flew to Iran (along with a large chunk of the fighter fleet). So yes they never had their air force capable of seriously contesting the sky.
The Iraqi airforce was dislocated because the specforces and ewarfare teams rendered the bulk of the co-ordination and dispersed networking capability deaf and dumb.

it was a SYSTEMS event. The US deliberately degraded sectors of their grids to cause overload etc....

Some are mistaking the decapitation of their FCS and C3 systems as an air event - it was a precursor issue.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
The Iraqi airforce was dislocated because the specforces and ewarfare teams rendered the bulk of the co-ordination and dispersed networking capability deaf and dumb.

it was a SYSTEMS event. The US deliberately degraded sectors of their grids to cause overload etc....

Some are mistaking the decapitation of their FCS and C3 systems as an air event - it was a precursor issue.
So..... if this wasn't done the Iraqi AF would have stopped the coalition dead in it's tracks? Because unless that's what you're implying it doesn't really matter. The main issue is that the Iraqi IADS was never complete in the first place, since it's air force was too grossly overmatched.
 

gf0012-aust

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So..... if this wasn't done the Iraqi AF would have stopped the coalition dead in it's tracks? Because unless that's what you're implying it doesn't really matter. The main issue is that the Iraqi IADS was never complete in the first place, since it's air force was too grossly overmatched.
no, what I am saying is that people are dumbing this down to a binary event.

If the US hadn't been able to degrade and dislocate the Iraqi C2-C3 by Compass/Rivet/Prowler/F-117/Specwar Ops/TLAM/ etc then they would have killed it or degraded it by any other means available.

The Iraqis were blind, their comms was degraded at critical nodes, their air traffic ontrol system was corrupted and deliberately infected, the deliberately left open nodes were done so in the knowledge that all comms would be redirected to available pipes - they would then overload and the users would start to panic.

It was a calculated system overmatch event.

The same capability exists to various degress within the Israeli and NATO systems.

The Iraqi IADS was a complete and coherent system - but in the first 24-48 hrs of war the US (in particular) saw to it that it was completely decapitated and that decapitation led to an inability for them (the iraqis) to respond in a coherent manner. The amount of overmatch planning and overlap redundancy should be a clue as to how seriously the IADS was regarded.

Look at the opening stages of war, look at how it was conducted, look at the interconnects on how the US planned an overmatching redundancy of systematic destruction of the comms.

It's a systems event, don't look at the players.

It's not rocket science. The speed and efficiency of decpatitation of that system should not be dismissed on the basis of it being third rate. It was not. In fact some of their interconnects were far superior to some of the NATO members of the time.
 

DarthAmerica

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But the Iraqi air force was in large part inferior and thus incapable of actually putting up a real fight. They didn't get a single air to air kill in the entire war. And like you mentioned most of their AEW flew to Iran (along with a large chunk of the fighter fleet). So yes they never had their air force capable of seriously contesting the sky.
What is this real fight you mention? What are you expecting? Top Gun or something else more dramatic? FYI, this is what a real fight is like when done properly. Also, have you read anything about Desert Storm? On 17 Jan 91 a Mig-25 did shoot down an F/A-18C benefiting from a hiccup in the US C3 and now there is a massive US base named in the pilot's honor.


-DA
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
What is this real fight you mention? What are you expecting? Top Gun or something else more dramatic? FYI, this is what a real fight is like when done properly.
This is a real fight done properly by a huge first world coalition with complete overmatch vs. a third world nation. I'm discussing nations with relatively equal capabilities, simply because discussions on the usefullness of IADS only have meaning in a context of other capabilities being relatively equal. Otherwise we end up with the situation where of course an IADS doesn't matter, because the enemy is going to win no matter what. Complete superiority across the board.


Also, have you read anything about Desert Storm? On 17 Jan 91 a Mig-25 did shoot down an F/A-18C benefiting from a hiccup in the US C3 and now there is a massive US base named in the pilot's honor.


-DA
Hmm, I recall a quote that said that the only Iraqi A2A kill was a friendly fire. But now that I'm looking it up, I guess that was in reference to the second war. I've done very little reading on the Gulf War. Pretty much limited to reading through a few online publications.
 

DarthAmerica

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This is a real fight done properly by a huge first world coalition with complete overmatch vs. a third world nation. I'm discussing nations with relatively equal capabilities, simply because discussions on the usefullness of IADS only have meaning in a context of other capabilities being relatively equal. Otherwise we end up with the situation where of course an IADS doesn't matter, because the enemy is going to win no matter what. Complete superiority across the board.
This is the problem. To a lot of people, war is viewed in the context of a "contest". Like a boxing match when in fact it's more like a mugging in a dark alley from behind. Thats how warriors think of it. When I decide to engage an enemy, I don't wait for a fair situation. I shoot them in the back whenever possible. Chris Rock could kill Bruce Lee in that situation. In war you want to be the mugger.

Having said that, where are you going with this continuous IAD discussion? YES IADS complicate attacks. YES IADS can shoot down aircraft. But its an inherently defensive posture and by itself not likely to win the battle. And even the strongest IAD you could think of. Picture an area completely covered by Patriots and S-300s will have vulnerabilities. SAMs in particular have very poor combat records historically. Even the USN which probably boast the worlds most deadly IADS protecting it's CVNs still expects leakers and have CIWS. What more do you have to say? What do you want to hear? YES two third world nations with IADS can attrit themselves on the others IADS. You can read about the Iran-Iraq war. They fought for almost a decade in the kinds of "fair" fights you keep bringing up. They got nothing out of it because neither side could effectively take the fight to the enemy. Are you expecting different results? Try Iraq vs Kuwait 1990. What principle of war did the winner of that fight practice?


-DA
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
YES IADS complicate attacks. YES IADS can shoot down aircraft. YES two third world nations with IADS can attrit themselves on the others IADS.
That about summs up my whole point. That and the fact that no nation should ignore IADS. No offense meant but you guys were the ones that responded with lengthy descriptions of how IADS can easily be oversome (3rd world of course) by an attacking air force (1st world of course).

This is the problem. To a lot of people, war is viewed in the context of a "contest". Like a boxing match when in fact it's more like a mugging in a dark alley from behind. Thats how warriors think of it. When I decide to engage an enemy, I don't wait for a fair situation. I shoot them in the back whenever possible. Chris Rock could kill Bruce Lee in that situation. In war you want to be the mugger.
You're absolutely right, but since our discussion was an abstract one, about the practicality of IADS, rather then a particular one (for example like the practicality of the Serbian IADS), we have to take other variables as more or less equal.
 

DarthAmerica

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That about summs up my whole point. That and the fact that no nation should ignore IADS. No offense meant but you guys were the ones that responded with lengthy descriptions of how IADS can easily be oversome (3rd world of course) by an attacking air force (1st world of course).
No one suggested IADS should be ignored or that they were easy to overcome. In fact we have all stressed to you the level of effort put into suppressing them. What we have told you is that the SAM component of an IAD is not sufficient by itself or particularly effective against sustained offensive action. The reason why SAMs stand out so much and why SAMs erroneously =IAD to people is because it is usually all that is left after an IAD is disintegrated. Thats simply because a TEL or AAA gun is able to conceal itself longer when not operating among all the other threat vehicles or unknown locations compared to the fighter and C3 nodes which are fixed and highly visible and thus immediately vulnerable to targeting. In that situation though they are proven to be highly ineffective historically when operated in this disintegrated and completely defensive way.


-DA
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
No one suggested IADS should be ignored or that they were easy to overcome. In fact we have all stressed to you the level of effort put into suppressing them. What we have told you is that the SAM component of an IAD is not sufficient by itself or particularly effective against sustained offensive action. The reason why SAMs stand out so much and why SAMs erroneously =IAD to people is because it is usually all that is left after an IAD is disintegrated. Thats simply because a TEL or AAA gun is able to conceal itself longer when not operating among all the other threat vehicles or unknown locations compared to the fighter and C3 nodes which are fixed and highly visible and thus immediately vulnerable to targeting. In that situation though they are proven to be highly ineffective historically when operated in this disintegrated and completely defensive way.


-DA
I have stated pretty much this same thing in various posts in this thread. It's actually pretty funny (well maybe only to me with my Russian sense of humor :unknown) that we were saying the same thing, just not seeing it that way. Except that I think that AD fighters and AEW also needs to be included in the IADS, or at least in the AD-network as a whole for the analysis to be complete.
 

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
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Verified Defense Pro
No offense meant but you guys were the ones that responded with lengthy descriptions of how IADS can easily be oversome (3rd world of course) by an attacking air force (1st world of course).
Not once have I even discussed the issue of superior airspace management by an airforce over IADS.

I've tried to point out that in every major military campaign since 1990 the focus has been to use a variety of disparate but coherent systems to dislocate and decapitate control systems.

Why do you think that every major military has refocussed their efforts on improving battlespace management and ewarfare capability? The revolution in battlespace management that everyone is undertaking has a direct reference bck to 1991. The major shift in chinas stance has been acknowledged even within their own stars as being attributed to the demonstrable advantage that systems co-ord and ewarfare systems bring to the fight.

There is no such thing as a fair fight, it's all about the nation that can best bring overmatching capability to the fight and is then able to visit the maximum appropriate destruction available onto the enemy at that point in the battlespace


Note that I said appropriate destruction, because as the US demonstrated in Iraq, selective dislocation of the enemies C2,C3 will cause overstress on those nodes that are deliberately left open. Thats because the psychological impact of an enemy that has what he thinks is available comms, but cannot utilise that comms causes even more havoc on the ability to respond.

The other thing that is clearly not being understood is that IMO it's ridiculous to separate US capability just to make a case on some faustian joust between equals.

The US has to be included as its a tacit demonstration of theatre dominance in the battlespace - not just battlefield dominance in selected space. The lesson being that overmatch at theatre level has to be considered as it generates compression on the enemy forces fielded - Battlefield comparisons are not the same as Theatre events - and the nation that dominates the theatre has demonstrated not only complex and contested space dominance, but also the fact that its logistical leverage can assist in overwatch/overmatch.

Wars of attrition amongst equals is not how nations fight, nations seek advantage.

eg all of the Israeli battlefield wars fought since 1948 were against nations that had superior numbers, superior technology in the majority of cases, and definitely had superior reserves of equipment and redundnacy in said equipment. The Israelis won through superior craft (skills) and a better undertanding of manouvre warfare as well as superior training. They have now developed technical superiority across numerous vectors to assist in their lack of numerical advantage.
 
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Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Again you're separating between an IADS and an air force, when they're part of the same thing. If we're going to discuss the practicality of AD networks as a concept we have to make several assumptions (without them our discussion becomes a discussion of a particular military conflict rather then a discussion about military theory).

1) Opponents are of equal or comparable capability.
2) The only variable we are looking at is the IADS (just like in a scientific experiment, we have to isolate the variable to look at how it would affect the battlefield)
3) We have to look at all relevant parts of the situation, not just a limited scenario (i.e. your continuing separations of IADS and the air force is something artificial, in reality they would operate in conjunction)

While what you say is true, I don't see how it contradicts my initial points.

The other thing that is clearly not being understood is that IMO it's ridiculous to separate US capability just to make a case on some faustian joust between equals.
We are not making a case for a faustian joust, we're talking about the practicality of networked AD in principle.

Note: We are not (or at least I was not, you seem to be :confused: ) talking about the practicality of IADS by a third world nation against the USA. Nothing short of nuclear weapons has practicality against the USA in the hands of a third world military. Again the USA spent 45% of the worlds military spendings in 2007. USAF and USAF capabilities are not the rule, they're the exception. This is why if we want to understand how something will affect a conflict we have to look at the variable in isolation.
 

Ozzy Blizzard

New Member
We are comparing different things. I'm comparing two countries with ~equal capabilities across the spectrum, but one has a modern networked IADS and the other one doesn't. You're again comparing a country with an air force vs. a country with SAMs. Two different things. My whole point was that SAM's offered a critical advantage and could effectively create problems for the attacker by simply being there. They would also give a critical advantage to the defending air force.
In other words I'm being realistic. Have a look around, the only nations that have a big bad scary IADS are at a competitive disadvantage in the air vs their enemies. That is the real world, even between comparable powers that is the norm, simply because if you had the competitive advantage in the air you wouldn't invest heavily in GBAD. Personally i don't see the point in creating extremely artificial scenario's simply to illustrate a systems potential capability.


From my knowledge the S-300 works like this 1 battalion = 1 TEL with missiles +radars +logistics infrastructure+crews. 1 regiment is two battalions. Purchasing 8 systems = 8 battalions, 4 regiments.
Using normal terminology that would be a battery (PATRIOT batteries are organized in that manner, as are their larger formations i.e. a battalion). But in line with the Russian way of doing things that wouldn't surprise me if they called 1 system a battalion, just like an infantry battalion is a regiment, a fighter squadron is a regiment, ect. Whatever they call it 8 systems and some point defense does not constitute an IADS.

Again you seem to be comparing a scenario where SAM's are supposed to be a miracle cure, where you accept by fiat that the defenders air force has already lost. I'm looking at a scenario where the defenders air force engages the strike group at the same time as the IADS.
It actually pisses me of when people do this. When did i ever say "SAMs and no Air force"? When i refer to an IADS i do mean all of its elements, airborne included. When I'm referring to SAM's alone I'll say GBAD. Remember this?:

Ozzy Blizzard said:
Do that 10 times and the attacker has lost 20 platforms, and if they are a comparable power to the AWAC's, fighter & S-300 equipped IADS
Specifically referred to airborne elements of said IADS.

The IADS is not something separate from the air force.
No sh*t sherlock! Do you think that adding fighters to an IADS (they were there anyway) somehow drastically alters the balance? Airborne elements can be dislocated, outmaneuvered and penetrated as easily as GBAD by superior EW & ISR capability. And remember if your not the guy who invested heavily in a IADS, you spent your pennies on those very systems.

They are part of the same network meant to control the air space. And in that regard even minor tactical networking between front line air superiority fighters and tac-SAMs is significant because it allows you to push your umbrella of airspace control outward as your forces advance.
Again you miss the primary point I've been making since the first paragraph i wrote in this conversation. Yes at a tactical level you may have some defense against air power, my point is so what? If you have lost your C4I capability, and if your IADS is reduced to tactical elements you can bet your ass you have, then that formation that your tac-SAM's are protecting will out-maneuvered, out-fought and decimated.

That doesn't contradict my main point, which is that an IADS can be an effective way to protect your ground forces from enemy air. I'm not working on the assumption that your own airforce is worthless and SAMs are your only hope. I'm talking about a situation where your own air force can still contest the air. In addition you have SAMs (being the defender). The attacker does not. Your constant attempts to differentiate between an defenders airforce and IADS are really strange to me, when they are one and the same. An AD network that includes all of their fighters, AWACS, SAMs, radars, and C3. One network with multiple redundant nodes and mobility to cover for any immediate losses.
Your still missing my point. If we are talking about comparable powers (if we are not then there is no way the IADS would be under attack) and the defender has AEW, SAM's, a significant fighter presence, C3 redundant communications and mobile C2 ect, then the attacker will have more capable ISR, EW and air power. If they didn't they wouldn't be attacking. Therefore even with all of that stuff the attacker is most likely going to reach your C4I infrastructure, the only question is at what cost. Even at 20% (huge) casualties, if the attacker has taken away your ability operate in an organized manner at the theater level, and the rest of their comparable war fighting system is going to end up dissecting, out-maneuvering and (dare i say it again) decimating your war fighting system. What that means is you failed on a strategic level and you loose.

Here's the critical point, relying on a defensive strategy in a scenario like this is going to end up in you loosing in 9 out of 10 cases.

I absolutely agree. Lets look at the systems as a whole. Why are you differentiating between the air force and the IADS when they are one and the same?
Does that need a reply?:rolleyes:

So we're both saying the same thing.... we just don't see it that way...... :rolleyes: :p:
No we don't, I think the disagreement is more fundamental than the capability or contemporary tech. All of the points you have made in this conversation are on the merits of an IADS dealing with a attacker, "contesting air superiority" and the like. My point is a defensive strategy will most likely lead to strategic failure and defeat in this type of scenario.

Why not both? Constrict enemy freedom of air operations via SAMs coverage, and then using the SAM/AD fighters umbrella to cover your rear strike at their C4I and infrastructure.
Now your talking about something all together different from the uber IADS described earlier with tipple digit SAMs, multiple (redundant) comm nodes, mobile & redundant C3, AWACS, fighters, tac-SAM's & AAA all networked and integrated, with MANPADS thrown in at low level. If you have all of that, and still posses the offensive capability to effectively penetrate the enemies defenses then you are probably dealing a lessor power anyway and you had no need for all of it in the fist place.

Like i said before GBAD & ADS defiantly has its place on the modern battlefield, but the most successful strategy in state on state conflicts for the last 50 odd years has been pre-emption & offensive warfare. Relying on your IADS as the centerpiece of the air element of your campaign, as you appear to advocate, goes against the grain of recent military history. If you are forced into that position by being put in a position of disadvantage in the air, then relying one an uber, GBAD centric IADS is the only option, and if your up against a casualty averse western power, inflicting as many casualties as possible may indeed have strategic effects.

Their numerically superior enemies lost because they invested in SAMs to the detriment of their air force. This is not what I am advocating.
By investing that heavily in your IADS you are doing so at the determent of your offensive capability. You have to look at the opportunity cost, there is only so much budget to go around.
 

lobbie111

New Member
Only thing is with wireless comms, your susceptable to jamming, in a radar jamming envirnment it will take 30 mins to run cables. (BM300)
 

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Note: We are not (or at least I was not, you seem to be :confused: ) talking about the practicality of IADS by a third world nation against the USA. Nothing short of nuclear weapons has practicality against the USA in the hands of a third world military. Again the USA spent 45% of the worlds military spendings in 2007. USAF and USAF capabilities are not the rule, they're the exception. This is why if we want to understand how something will affect a conflict we have to look at the variable in isolation.
Nope, I fundamentally disagree. If you are going to make a serious attempt to analyse how to deal with an IADS then you need to look at it as a systems response. If you are looking at systems responses then you have to consider current alpha capability and then start scaling it back to the relative capability that a given country can bring to bear.

Not only the US can deal electronically with IADS, not only the US can deal with IADS by inserting decap teams in conjunction with LOLR strike such as TLAMs. Any number of NATO nations, Israel and certainly an expanding cohort of nations will have battlefield capability within the next 5 years.

I get the same problems when evaluating other systems because some engineers will argue with me that a unique capability should not be factored in as it's abnormal. It's not abnormal. If the capability by "x" nation exists here and now, then it's a matter of time before other nations with latent capability and battlespace coherency will be able to emulate and deliver similar capability. The only difference is mass and the associated vectors of redundancy, saturation and logistics.

The Israelis are a classic example of latency that could be expanded per battlespace - france, uk etc... also have capability.

technically astute, sophisticated enabler holders exercise latency advantages - just not to the same scale.

At another level, do you think the mainland chinese ignore US capability because it's unique at a theatre delivery level? Not on your nelly.
 

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
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Only thing is with wireless comms, your susceptable to jamming
That's the common view - it actually does not reflect what happens now. Unsophisticated users - yes. Alpha participants? no

It's not that simple - or that easy. LOS hardwire is just as vulnerable for a variety of different reasons.

Look at the sophistication of the Iraqi fibre network, how DEEP it was buried and yet how quickly it was compromised by a knowledgeable attacker.
 

StingrayOZ

Super Moderator
Staff member
But is Iraq is a pretty easy open and shut case. The US knew heaps about the Iraqi setup, hell they sold and setup most of it, or had people who knew the details. The Iraqis weren't really in a strategic position.

Take another example. Say North Korea. Where the threat matrix is massively more complex as are the defences. I don't think anyone would be capable of simply unplugging that one. I don't think the North Koreans are banking the house on their airforce single handedly stopping intrusions. I think that is a more effective strategic approach.
 
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