Europe and 5th generation aircraft

[DarthAmerica]

The key elements are the political pressure and nuclear weapons. Everything else is seconday. Keep in mind that Russia's military doctrine emphasizes nuclear weapon use, even preventively.

Russia has to fear a limited war in which it's pitted against a proxy of European and American forces with NATO providing air support to their allies. For example if Russia were to have to occupy Georgia (please don't tell me it's not going to happen, I know that, I'm just giving an example of a nightmare scenario for the Russian Army).

EDIT: Darth I would appreciate a reply to my earlier statement in regards to AD network capabilities. Your opinions have been very interesting so far, and I would like to continue the discussion.

I think the Russian AD network is probably very dangerous. If I had to guess they have multiple EW radars covering Europe, they could put AEW aircraft up at will. They have comprehensive coverage and protection against cruise missiles in the form of the Mig-31 and other hard kill systems. It's impractical to cover every sq km of frontage even with a gazillion air defense systems so they with use intel and poor OPSEC to determine likely air avenues of approach. Thats where you will encounter the most serious concentrations of air defenses and fighters. The cities and fixed sites will have the most coverage of systems like the S-300 ect.

The ground combat forces and mobile assets will have organic mobile battlefield SAMs and AAA. In the vicinity of high value targets is where you will find the short ranged missiles and point air defense systems. They will use fighters(Su-27/Mig-29) to cover gaps and dead space. All of this will be redundantly networked to some form of C3. I don't know the exact configuration but I would guess its a combination of land lines and RF connections.

All of that will be supported by HUMINT/ELINT/COMINT/IMINT all the way back to the source. For example if a conspicuous number of tankers start collecting at bases near their territory it could be hard to conceal. They will dig deeper and that could be an issue in FSU states where FSB and other intel services likely still have contacts. They will adjust off of that information.

Other than the technological and numerical differences when compared to previous IADS western aircraft have dealt with the Russians will also have considerable offensive capabilities that can reach all the way to Europes west cost if necessary. It will be a lot more effective than Iraqs SCUDs and insurgents.

Challenging the Russian IADS and penetrating into the interior in any kind of sustained campaign would be a very serious undertaking. My question to advocates of this is where would Europe stage for something like this? Poland, Georgia, Estonia, Lavtia, Turkey?

-DA

 

[gf0012-aust]

And this has what to do with my post ?

Forum rules: quote: We encourage detailed comparison of weapon systems /end quote

http://defencetalk.com/forums/rules.php

slabs of data as a vehicle of comparison - without rigorous input is not in the spirit of exercised debate.

feel free to PM me offline.

 

[Ozzy Blizzard]

But could it hit harder quickly enough? The U.S. is currently stretched thin as is. If the US had to quickly back up Taiwan against a Chinese invasion right now, the assets available would be limited. Morever the time scale to do it in would also be limited. We are talking about days, rather then weeks. Within that small time frame the cost (in casualties or money) to overcome a concentrated IADS might become unacceptable if the goal is only to support the RoC, which has a fairly good chance of winning on it's own.

The USAF would not have to disect the PROC's IADS near the Taiwan steireight to have a decicive impact on any attempt at an amphibious campaign, Desert Storm style. Strategic air power and forward deployed USN assets would be plenty. Therefore this is a poor example.

Everything is temporary. You only need enough time for your ground troops to win (or lose) the battle. The purpose of an AD network is to keep the enemy air away from your ground troops and key installations long enough for them to do their job, not to hold of an indefinetly long air campaign. The Serbian and Iraqi examples are actually abnormal, since essentially the countries had no chances of winning no matter what. This created a situation in which their IADS had to do something is wasn't made for. It had to fight an air war, rather then just buy time and keep the enemy busy.

This is a dis-jointed view of modern combat. The IADS doesnt exist to allow your grownd forces enough time to fight, it exisits primarilly to defend your C4I and secondarilly your logistical infestructure, whole you go about destroying your enemies. That proscess envolves all the arms of the military.

I said that they were very dense, and they are. IADS in places like central Russia or over Taiwan (in conjunction with the VVS or RoCAF units based there) is in my opinion more then any European nation can overcome right now.

This is a moot point because there is no way, logistically, that the "EU" could put sufficient assets in those theaters anyway.

A coalition might be able to do it in a lengthy attrition campaign, but no rapid kick the door down campaign would be possible, which again means the actual ground war would likely be decided if not just plain over before the IADS is suppressed enough for air superiority to become possible. Keep in mind also that even once the IADS is down to a non-networked level, with division level tac-SAMs and MANPADS and AAA, you still have the enemy air force to content with, and if it's datalinked to the C2 structures of the tac-SAMs, then a more or less networked AD is still possible, at least temporarily and in small critical areas (for example the spearhead of an armored offensive).

Once your enemies IADS is down to a non networked level, even if it is still lethal in some area's, it has failed bacause it allows you to hit C4I nodes and installations. Once that proscess has begun you significantly inhibit the bad guys ability to function on a theater wide level and your winning. Remember in a war of national survival (or something close, say between comperable powers) casualties will be tollerated to achieve that goal. Large chunks of the IADS may still be viable, but you've allrady gained a decicive advantage. Rememberall of the air campaigns of the 90's were limited conflicts with arguably little value to joe blow in London or Chicago, therefore the whole threat had to be decapitated and attrited to a point where blue on blue is the greatest threat, before the grownd war.

My point exactly. When the Coalition of the Willing can take their sweet-ass time to bomb Iraq into sawdust before actually going in on the ground, and when it enjoys complete superiority in almost all (if not completely all) areas, then sure no IADS can change the outcome. But when the two sides are at least within the same order of magnitude in terms of capabilities, things begin to change, and within the time frame of the conflict, the IADS can indeed be effective.

Even without massive overmatch, a modern IADS can still be penitrated with devistateing effect. Just look at the arab/isreali conflics in the last century.

You dont have to compleatly decimate the threat IADS and gain air dominance before you can have a deciceive effect on the other elements of the conflict. If your not casualty averse, you just need to punch the holes you need to acsess C4I instalations/assets. Once you inhibit your enemies ability to react at a command level its allready over. This can be done without killing every operational S-300 in the battlespace.

 

[DarthAmerica]

This is a dis-jointed view of modern combat. The IADS doesnt exist to allow your grownd forces enough time to fight, it exisits primarilly to defend your C4I and secondarilly your logistical infestructure, whole you go about destroying your enemies. That proscess envolves all the arms of the military.

Could not agree more. If I can add to a great comment I would say that if you are hiding behind SAMs and AAA fighting over your own territory you are violating the principle of offense.

-DA

 

[Feanor]

This is a dis-jointed view of modern combat. The IADS doesnt exist to allow your grownd forces enough time to fight, it exisits primarilly to defend your C4I and secondarilly your logistical infestructure, whole you go about destroying your enemies. That proscess envolves all the arms of the military.

It exists to provide cover to your ground forces and key installations for the duration of the conflict. That was my statement, do you disagree with it? Remember I'm not just talking about strategic positioned theater SAMs, I'm talking about the network as a whole. All aspects of it, from tac-SAMs with range of a dozen kilometers, and MANPADS, to theater SAMs, air defense fighters, and AWACS all data linked into a network. My main point was that teh IADS does not exist to indefinetly shield your inferior air force, infrastructure, and ground forces, from a numerically and technologically superior opponent who has time to conduct a lengthy air campaign to roll back you IADS.

This is a moot point because there is no way, logistically, that the "EU" could put sufficient assets in those theaters anyway.

With arms proliferation such networks could appear over Algeria, and Libya within the forseeable future. Both signed large complex packages, and the Algerian one included iirc 8 S-300PMU2 and a number of Tors.

Once your enemies IADS is down to a non networked level, even if it is still lethal in some area's, it has failed bacause it allows you to hit C4I nodes and installations. Once that proscess has begun you significantly inhibit the bad guys ability to function on a theater wide level and your winning. Remember in a war of national survival (or something close, say between comperable powers) casualties will be tollerated to achieve that goal. Large chunks of the IADS may still be viable, but you've allrady gained a decicive advantage. Rememberall of the air campaigns of the 90's were limited conflicts with arguably little value to joe blow in London or Chicago, therefore the whole threat had to be decapitated and attrited to a point where blue on blue is the greatest threat, before the grownd war.

Again an IADS may lose it's strategic elements, the bulk of it's theater SAMs and the more powerful radars, but still be able to form temporary local networks consisting of division level tac-SAMs datalinked to air defense fighters, and covered by SPAAGs and MANPADS at short range. This would not nearly be as effective as a strategic theater wide network, but is still possible. I don't see where we disagree, except that your scenario seems to involve the US military pounding away at some third world nation, where as I'm referecing a case where the opponents are of comparable strength.

Even without massive overmatch, a modern IADS can still be penitrated with devistateing effect. Just look at the arab/isreali conflics in the last century.

In most of them Israel had massive overmatch in capability, although not in numbers. Yes an IADS network can be breached. I never disputed that. My whole point was, one more time, that an IADS can provide an effective way to contest air superiority. Nothing any of you have said invalidates this, because all you've done is brought up empirical and theoretical examples of ways to overcome an IADS. I never said that it was invincible.

You dont have to compleatly decimate the threat IADS and gain air dominance before you can have a deciceive effect on the other elements of the conflict. If your not casualty averse, you just need to punch the holes you need to acsess C4I instalations/assets. Once you inhibit your enemies ability to react at a command level its allready over. This can be done without killing every operational S-300 in the battlespace.

Naturally. But if when you punch those holes, the enemy quickly relocates other assets to plug them, then you're back in the same situation. Another question is how many losses are you taking? And what are the enemies air superiority fighters doing during this conflict?

 

[Fritz]

Even without massive overmatch, a modern IADS can still be penitrated with devistateing effect. Just look at the arab/isreali conflics in the last century.

This is a really poor example if you want to prove IAD to be pointless.
In 1973 Yom kippur war: Israel lost 100 planes to SAM's, and Egypts army was practically invulnerable to Israeli air attacks due to the SAM umbrella.

 

[Chrom]

This is a really poor example if you want to prove IAD to be pointless.
In 1973 Yom kippur war: Israel lost 100 planes to SAM's, and Egypts army was practically invulnerable to Israeli air attacks due to the SAM umbrella.

Ya, for anyone thinking SAM's are useless... and giving examples of defeated Syria/ Iraq / Vietnam / Yugoslavia / whatever... Just look at how much they airforces achieved compared to SAM! This comparison should clear some minds...

 

[DarthAmerica]

Ya, for anyone thinking SAM's are useless... and giving examples of defeated Syria/ Iraq / Vietnam / Yugoslavia / whatever... Just look at how much they airforces achieved compared to SAM! This comparison should clear some minds...

When SAMs boost a record of less than .0017% in the last 20 years of conflict their utility is questionable in the case of the United States. SAMs and AAA have never stopped air power historically even when they cause attrition because of the principle of offense. Moreover most if not all IAD networks aren't designed to handle an opponent with the size and capabilities of the United States. In the case of Russia and China things are a bit more challenging since that represents the high end of the threat spectrum but the principle of offense still applies. If those nations do not take offensive action and simply remain contained withing their territory while under attack the SAMs would not help them ultimately. Not even against the European nations. Russians would still need to aggressively contest the skies and strike at Europeans.



-DA

 

[Chrom]

When SAMs boost a record of less than .0017% in the last 20 years of conflict their utility is questionable in the case of the United States. SAMs and AAA have never stopped air power historically even when they cause attrition because of the principle of offense. Moreover most if not all IAD networks aren't designed to handle an opponent with the size and capabilities of the United States. In the case of Russia and China things are a bit more challenging since that represents the high end of the threat spectrum but the principle of offense still applies. If those nations do not take offensive action and simply remain contained withing their territory while under attack the SAMs would not help them ultimately. Not even against the European nations. Russians would still need to aggressively contest the skies and strike at Europeans.

-DA

Aye.

We can rephrase also it is that way:

In the case of USA enemy airforces never stopped USAF. Moreover, these airforces have much, much lesser impact and inflicted order of magnitude less damage to USAF than SAM's.

Moreove, " most if not all airforces aren't designed to handle an opponent with the size and capabilities of the United States."

See it?

SAM's are not some magical mean to stop AF of any size and ability. It can be defeated. But this usually require much higher resources, time and losses than defeating comparable sized and aged AF.

 

[gf0012-aust]

Ya, for anyone thinking SAM's are useless... and giving examples of defeated Syria/ Iraq / Vietnam / Yugoslavia / whatever... Just look at how much they airforces achieved compared to SAM! This comparison should clear some minds...

who overflew who's airspace cross country recently?

 

[Chrom]

who overflew who's airspace cross country recently?

Please explain.

 

[Fritz]

When SAMs boost a record of less than .0017% in the last 20 years of conflict their utility is questionable in the case of the United States.

When the superpower USA attack some third world country with less then 1% of its military spending,-what do you expect ? how many percent did their a/c boost record ? - probably zero. You really need to put their budget in perspective.

www.globalissues.org/Geopolitics/ArmsTrade/Spending.asp

SAMs and AAA have never stopped air power historically even when they cause attrition because of the principle of offense.

SAMs and AAA has stopped airpower historically,-in Yom kippur war 1973.
Israel lost 100 a/c to SAMs, and 4 a/c to Egypts airforce.

Moreover most if not all IAD networks aren't designed to handle an opponent with the size and capabilities of the United States.

Definitely agree on this one,-so judging any defence system based on their success vs USA is pointless, -in particular a third world country that cant do anything but sit and wait for the inevitable while USA build up their forces to guarantee complete success.
USA spend 48% of the whole worlds spending on military. To get at least partly parity you would need to combine the forces of Europe, China and Russia,- then we can see how well their defence systems will hold against USA. Nothing less would have the resources to make any counter-attack.

 

[Grand Danois]

SAMs and AAA has stopped airpower historically,-in Yom kippur war 1973.
Israel lost 100 a/c to SAMs, and 4 a/c to Egypts airforce.

I'd question if the '73 War qualify as an example of GBAD success in this context. The IDF/AF had close to zero SEAD/DEAD capability at the time.

 

[DarthAmerica]

SAMs and AAA has stopped airpower historically,-in Yom kippur war 1973.
Israel lost 100 a/c to SAMs, and 4 a/c to Egypts airforce.

OK my bad. So ONE TIME SAMs and AAA temporarily stopped Israel from providing CAS sorties for a brief moment before the Israelis adjusted, took territory from Syria and cut off the Egyptian 3rd Army. Hooray for SAMs and AAA!

That is not a very good example. SAMs were a new concept back then and Israeli aircraft didn't have appropriate ECM. Also, like I said, the SAMs were used in the spirit of offense during a surprise attack. This is quite different from all the other instances where the attacker, most often the United States has put together an armada of the latest aircraft equipped with state of the art ECM and support and bombs at will.

 

[Fritz]

That is not a very good example.

Exactly my point with nearly the same phrase even

This is a really poor example if you want to prove IAD to be pointless.

with regards to

Even without massive overmatch, a modern IADS can still be penitrated with devistateing effect. Just look at the arab/isreali conflics in the last century.

This is quite different from all the other instances where the attacker, most often the United States has put together an armada of the latest aircraft equipped with state of the art ECM and support and bombs at will.

Exactly my point again.

Definitely agree on this one,-so judging any defence system based on their success vs USA is pointless, -in particular a third world country that cant do anything but sit and wait for the inevitable while USA build up their forces to guarantee complete success.

IAD will, however, greatly complicate things if the defender have somewhere near parity in fighters and AWACs as the attacker. I am more specifically thinking about keeping AWACs just behind SAMs to protect vs fighters, and using fighters to protect vs attack aircraft and cruise missiles.

 

[Grand Danois]

To iterate: The IDF/AF had not worked how to operate in a SAM environment into their doctrine, i.e. no training, equipment or tactics - despite the War of Attrition - they should have known. As such, it hold no use as an example for the present or the future, as the lesson has been learned - that you have to have E-M spectrum dominance. This is how SAM networks has been defeated later, Bekaa Turkey Shoot & the recent bombing of Syria.

So the example of the '73 War does not apply to what is being discussed here.

 

[Feanor]

Also, like I said, the SAMs were used in the spirit of offense during a surprise attack. This is quite different from all the other instances where the attacker, most often the United States has put together an armada of the latest aircraft equipped with state of the art ECM and support and bombs at will.

What stops modern mobile SAMs from being used offensively along side advancing forces? You seem to be arguing against a straw man. We (SAM proponenets) are not claiming that SAMs are a magic shield to protect you, we are claiming that they are an effective way of preventing enemy air from striking your ground forces and key installations for a limited period of time.

When SAMs boost a record of less than .0017% in the last 20 years of conflict their utility is questionable in the case of the United States. SAMs and AAA have never stopped air power historically even when they cause attrition because of the principle of offense. Moreover most if not all IAD networks aren't designed to handle an opponent with the size and capabilities of the United States. In the case of Russia and China things are a bit more challenging since that represents the high end of the threat spectrum but the principle of offense still applies. If those nations do not take offensive action and simply remain contained withing their territory while under attack the SAMs would not help them ultimately. Not even against the European nations. Russians would still need to aggressively contest the skies and strike at Europeans.



-DA

And why wouldn't they take offensive action? Why do you assume that we are proponents of sitting on our ass and hoping our magic SAMs kill everything that comes at us? Not to mention, as I already said, that against the US the only applicable measure is nuclear deterrence.

 

[DarthAmerica]

It's interesting that people keep saying things like parity. Attackers don't usually choose fair fights. That being the case, it's not likely in most cases that the defense relying on SAMs would be in a favorable position after it's defense has been mapped and planned for. In cases where a defense is superior it typically isn't tested for obvious reasons. I know some will read this and say this is all obvious but judging by the discussion it does seem to be.

-DA

 

[DarthAmerica]

What stops modern mobile SAMs from being used offensively along side advancing forces?

SEAD/DEAD, Logistics, EW and physics usually. I know they say these systems are mobile, but when you look at this at the system level you will see why the idea of Mobile SAMs, other than MANPADs and short ranged IR missiles in limited quantities is over exaggerated. SAMs by nature aren't that mobile even when on a nice mean looking TEL. There are issues like radar horizons, terrain features, spare tires, being able to keep up with modern tanks and APCs/IFVs, spare parts, SEAD/DEAD to think about. Even a same with a range of 90km doesn't really cover that much airspace. Without survivable external cuing and early warning these kinds of SAMs are very vulnerable. Think about it from a logistics and physics point of view. The kinds of terrain that favors land based SAMs also makes mech forces very vulnerable. Think about it. Remember, people are trying hard to kill you while you are advertising your precise location for hundreds of km. It has never worked. Not even in 1973 even of there was temporary success.


-DA

 

[gf0012-aust]

Not even in 1973 even of there was temporary success.


-DA

It worked for a grand total of 24-36hrs - at which point the Israelis compromised the entire SAM capability as well as that entire system as they debugged the system
.
IOW, the entire footprint for any sites using that SAM system were compromised anywhere in the world. Combat advantage is about temporal flux, and the israelis not only won a theatre event but through diligence were able to compromise the entire SAM footprint in every country using that capability. Guess how long it took for the US and NATO to get that data.....