We are comparing different things. I'm comparing two countries with ~equal capabilities across the spectrum, but one has a modern networked IADS and the other one doesn't. You're again comparing a country with an air force vs. a country with SAMs. Two different things. My whole point was that SAM's offered a critical advantage and could effectively create problems for the attacker by simply being there. They would also give a critical advantage to the defending air force.
In other words I'm being realistic. Have a look around, the only nations that have a big bad scary IADS are at a competitive disadvantage in the air vs their enemies. That is the real world, even between comparable powers that is the norm, simply because if you had the competitive advantage in the air you wouldn't invest heavily in GBAD. Personally i don't see the point in creating extremely artificial scenario's simply to illustrate a systems potential capability.
From my knowledge the S-300 works like this 1 battalion = 1 TEL with missiles +radars +logistics infrastructure+crews. 1 regiment is two battalions. Purchasing 8 systems = 8 battalions, 4 regiments.
Using normal terminology that would be a battery (PATRIOT batteries are organized in that manner, as are their larger formations i.e. a battalion). But in line with the Russian way of doing things that wouldn't surprise me if they called 1 system a battalion, just like an infantry battalion is a regiment, a fighter squadron is a regiment, ect. Whatever they call it 8 systems and some point defense does not constitute an IADS.
Again you seem to be comparing a scenario where SAM's are supposed to be a miracle cure, where you accept by fiat that the defenders air force has already lost. I'm looking at a scenario where the defenders air force engages the strike group at the same time as the IADS.
It actually pisses me of when people do this. When did i ever say "SAMs and no Air force"? When i refer to an IADS i do mean all of its elements, airborne included. When I'm referring to SAM's alone I'll say GBAD. Remember this?:
Ozzy Blizzard said:
Do that 10 times and the attacker has lost 20 platforms, and if they are a comparable power to the AWAC's, fighter & S-300 equipped IADS
Specifically referred to airborne elements of said IADS.
The IADS is not something separate from the air force.
No sh*t sherlock! Do you think that adding fighters to an IADS (they were there anyway) somehow drastically alters the balance? Airborne elements can be dislocated, outmaneuvered and penetrated as easily as GBAD by superior EW & ISR capability. And remember if your not the guy who invested heavily in a IADS, you spent your pennies on those very systems.
They are part of the same network meant to control the air space. And in that regard even minor tactical networking between front line air superiority fighters and tac-SAMs is significant because it allows you to push your umbrella of airspace control outward as your forces advance.
Again you miss the primary point I've been making since the first paragraph i wrote in this conversation. Yes at a tactical level you may have some defense against air power, my point is so what? If you have lost your C4I capability, and if your IADS is reduced to tactical elements you can bet your ass you have, then that formation that your tac-SAM's are protecting will out-maneuvered, out-fought and decimated.
That doesn't contradict my main point, which is that an IADS can be an effective way to protect your ground forces from enemy air. I'm not working on the assumption that your own airforce is worthless and SAMs are your only hope. I'm talking about a situation where your own air force can still contest the air. In addition you have SAMs (being the defender). The attacker does not. Your constant attempts to differentiate between an defenders airforce and IADS are really strange to me, when they are one and the same. An AD network that includes all of their fighters, AWACS, SAMs, radars, and C3. One network with multiple redundant nodes and mobility to cover for any immediate losses.
Your still missing my point. If we are talking about comparable powers (if we are not then there is no way the IADS would be under attack) and the defender has AEW, SAM's, a significant fighter presence, C3 redundant communications and mobile C2 ect, then the attacker will have more capable ISR, EW and air power. If they didn't they wouldn't be attacking. Therefore even with all of that stuff the attacker is most likely going to reach your C4I infrastructure, the only question is at what cost. Even at 20% (huge) casualties, if the attacker has taken away your ability operate in an organized manner at the theater level, and the rest of their comparable war fighting system is going to end up dissecting, out-maneuvering and (dare i say it again) decimating your war fighting system. What that means is you failed on a strategic level and you loose.
Here's the critical point, relying on a defensive strategy in a scenario like this is going to end up in you loosing in 9 out of 10 cases.
I absolutely agree. Lets look at the systems as a whole. Why are you differentiating between the air force and the IADS when they are one and the same?
Does that need a reply?
So we're both saying the same thing.... we just don't see it that way......
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No we don't, I think the disagreement is more fundamental than the capability or contemporary tech. All of the points you have made in this conversation are on the merits of an IADS dealing with a attacker, "contesting air superiority" and the like. My point is a defensive strategy will most likely lead to strategic failure and defeat in this type of scenario.
Why not both? Constrict enemy freedom of air operations via SAMs coverage, and then using the SAM/AD fighters umbrella to cover your rear strike at their C4I and infrastructure.
Now your talking about something all together different from the uber IADS described earlier with tipple digit SAMs, multiple (redundant) comm nodes, mobile & redundant C3, AWACS, fighters, tac-SAM's & AAA all networked and integrated, with MANPADS thrown in at low level. If you have all of that, and still posses the offensive capability to effectively penetrate the enemies defenses then you are probably dealing a lessor power anyway and you had no need for all of it in the fist place.
Like i said before GBAD & ADS defiantly has its place on the modern battlefield, but the most successful strategy in state on state conflicts for the last 50 odd years has been pre-emption & offensive warfare. Relying on your IADS as the centerpiece of the air element of your campaign, as you appear to advocate, goes against the grain of recent military history. If you are forced into that position by being put in a position of disadvantage in the air, then relying one an uber, GBAD centric IADS is the only option, and if your up against a casualty averse western power, inflicting as many casualties as possible may indeed have strategic effects.
Their numerically superior enemies lost because they invested in SAMs to the detriment of their air force. This is not what I am advocating.
By investing that heavily in your IADS you are doing so at the determent of your offensive capability. You have to look at the opportunity cost, there is only so much budget to go around.
) talking about the practicality of IADS by a third world nation against the USA. Nothing short of nuclear weapons has practicality against the USA in the hands of a third world military. Again the USA spent 45% of the worlds military spendings in 2007. USAF and USAF capabilities are not the rule, they're the exception. This is why if we want to understand how something will affect a conflict we have to look at the variable in isolation.