I wonder how the much-criticised MRV will fare on the voyage and training operations.
I hazard a guess that the new MRV will generally perform its tactical sealift role well, or at least it will be another great training opportunity for the crew to learn and improve on operational procedures and work with other Navies experienced in tactical sealift etc. No doubt the crew will give the usual kiwi 101% and see the Commander proud.
However how she fairs in rough weather, is the real concern, as expressed by others here recently. Some of the design flaws may be a grave concern. Let's hope they get rectified properly. Such as the RHIB alcove issue (and water tight issue). Surely the proposed solution of putting a door over the RHIB alcove should have been done in the first place (I suppose in laymans terms the force of any wave hitting the open alcove will result in a tremendous force bouncing back where it came from taking the RHIB with it (or maybe entering the ship), unlike on say a frigate where the force will be dispersed up/down/around/along the deck etc) but whether this will stop any water getting in further, it will be interesting to see what changes will need to be done.
Page 4 - The navy submitted to CDF in June 2003 a proposal to increase the services finanical baseline to enable personnel levels to be restored and sustained. CDF instead instructed the navy to reduce personnel to 1800 in order to stay with the 04-05 Budget.
Well that (bleep) sez it all. Navy sez "we need an additional X tens of millions to sustain a fully operational Navy". CDF, who like any CEO has certain financial constraints to work under, and upon whose job performance is based on, cannot possibly make this happen. Like a State Owned Enterprise or a Corporate or Commercial operation, the Navy has to shed staff to keep within budget and keep the (Govt) stakeholders happy. Navy suffers. NZDF suffers. But it is no problem because from another budget the Govt will instead inject $4.7 BILLION to the NZDF (overall) to address such issues long term. Talk about the good old ambulance at the bottom of the cliff scenario. (But hats off to former CDF and others in successfully making the case for the cash injection).
III - Most of the patrol vessel capability is being acquired to meet the needs of a number of civil agencies. There is no direct military requirement for these vessels.
This must be from the same git who directed the initial Maritime Patrol Review, totally downplaying the military aspects and contradicted some of the advice provided by the armed services in their submissions (in the appendices). The Review was directed by the Dept of Prime Minister and Cabinet, if i recall correctly, if so, so there you go, there's the conflict of interest.
IV - A second stage of the review was to have undertaken, but this did not occur, apparently as a consequence of the need to proced rapidly with the acquistion of vessels to meet civil agency patrol requirements and to replace HMNZS Canterbury.
Which is what you get when one ignores the advice/request from the Navy to LEASE a vessel for training to fill the gap when Frigate Canterbury was decommissioned in 2005 and the new Protector fleet was to become operational in 2006, make that 2007, err, make that 2008.
The failure to undertake the second stage resulted in incomplete policy and capability analysis and an incomplete business case. This lead to problems later in the project. One of the main disputes was whether there was a over the bench requirement for vehicles. In addition agencies questioned the justification for a helicopter capability and whether the MRV needed to resupply Scott Base.
This "Whole Of Government" approach sure did give the opinionated nutcakes their opportunity to tell Defence how to do its job. Questioning helicopter capability or resupplying Scott Base, oh pleeaaazeee! Maybe Defence can have the opportunity to tell other Govt agencies how to do their jobs, perhaps?
-Weapons capability was also questions but little was said on this. The impression I got was that some of the capability questions came of the Department of Prime Minister (DPMC).
There they are again, the non experts directing the experts they can't have their 76mm guns and fire control systems. Talk about political interference.
I suppose if East Timor implodes one day and if Indonesia decides to stabilise ET by force, the OPV's won't be able to provide escort, evacuation or shore bomardment. Hopefully an ANZAC Frigate won't be in dry dock or exercising in the Gulf or Indian Ocean at the time etc.
Page 51 - One official said the government did not require an over the taticial sealift capability and that Defence the governments policy and treasury questioned the capability in July 2002.
Page 52 - Goverment Defence statement in May 2001 however confirmed the requirement.
Too bad that official didn't read the Govt Defence Statement from the year before (obviously got caught out i.e. knew there was no whitepaper or properly formed policy thus concluded Sealift wasn't required. Must have forgotten all the DPMC has to do is issue a brief Statement, which is then the defacto policy.
But seriously, the "Whole Of Government" approach is becoming a joke if some officials use the opportunity to get on their soap box. No (beep) wonder the Air Force hasn't been able to get these agencies to agree on the medium range air patrol aircraft as per the Govt's Defence Long Term Development Plan.
