Why ASEAN matters - in the era of great power competition

[OPSSG]

Post 1 of 2: ASEAN must reject Locsin’s obnoxious approach — stupidity in international diplomacy should not be encouraged

1. Beijing maintained that it "enjoys sovereignty" over Bajo de Masinloc — which it calls Huangyan Island — and its surrounding waters. It urged the Philippines not to escalate disputes. Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal, is a chain of reefs in the South China Sea that lies around 120 nautical miles from the nearest Philippine coast and 470 nautical miles from the nearest coast of China. I can understand the Philippine government’s desire to stand firm in patrolling the West Philippine Sea, but schoolboy antics of Teodoro "Teddy Boy" Locsin Jr., as the dummest diplomat in ASEAN, do not help. This is what Locsin wrote this on Twitter:

“China, my friend, how politely can I put it? Let me see… O…GET THE FUCK OUT. What are you doing to our friendship? You. Not us. We’re trying. You. You’re like an ugly oaf forcing your attentions on a handsome guy who wants to be a friend; not to father a Chinese province …​

He doesn’t have a uterus. If he tried to give birth to a Chinese province it would be a ball of crap at best and the end of the regime. What is it so hard to understand about Duterte’s UN declaration that the Arbitral Award made all maritime features Philippines; no one else’s?”​

2. As I said before, Indonesia and Singapore are friendly to China but retain an ability to act in a sovereign manner. Less so with the Philippines — who does not have bargaining power or military capability to strike a good deal in the event of a disagreement with China.

3. Locsin's Monday tweet followed a statement by the Philippine foreign affairs department, which protested the "illegal presence" of Chinese vessels in parts of the South China Sea. The elegant reply by Michael Swaine below seems appropriate to apply:

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https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1389060943842250753

“Just to be clear, you are the Foreign Secretary of the Philippine Government, correct? That usually means the chief diplomat. Your job is to defend your nation’s interests by using diplomacy, not the language of a school boy. This is embarrassing for you and your country.”​

For some strange reason, some Pinoy followers of Locsin’s Twitter feed do not understand the harm he and Duterte are doing to the credibility of his country.

4. Locsin’s past and current obnoxious behaviour ensured that other ASEAN nations cannot support the statements and initiatives of the Philippines on the South China Sea, for the remaining duration of Duterte’s term of office till Jun 2022.

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(a) The Philippines, as a greedy weak state is not sovereign within its own undisputed territory but also makes an illogical claim on Sabah (which is part of Malaysia). In addition, Duterte’s half hearted attempt to terminate the VFA with the Americans is seen as evidence of short sighted flip-flopping to other ASEAN members.​

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(b) By way of contrast to the rude Pinoys, the polite Indonesians in: (i) the TNI AU operate 3 squadrons of MRFs; (ii) the TNI AL operate a quite a few frigates and corvettes that are armed with anti-ship and anti-air missiles; and (iii) the TNI AD have a mature territorial defence doctrine on the use of their Leo 2A6 MBTs. When you see Indonesian diplomats in action (over their disputes with China), they are firm but diplomatic; which opens the way for limited cooperation not only under ADMM Plus but also on a bilateral level (for salvage of their submarine).​

5. IMHO, it can be argued that the process of Finlandization (in the 2017 to 2021 time frame) has started for the Philippines, viz a viz a rising China, as it is a country:

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(a) without an airforce capable of air combat;​

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(b) that has a navy armed like a coast guard; and​

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(c) that has an army without MBTS that struggles to win against multiple insurgencies.​

 

[Musashi_kenshin]

5. IMHO, it can be argued that the process of Finlandization (in the 2017 to 2021 time frame) has started for the Philippines, viz a viz a rising China, as it is a country:

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(a) without an airforce capable of air combat;​

​

(b) that has a navy armed like a coast guard; and​

​

(c) that has an army without MBTS that struggles to win against multiple insurgencies.​

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They only have themselves to blame. Whilst large economies like Japan can get away with spending 1% of GDP on defence, a small country like the Philippines can't. If they want to be able to stand up to China even in a limited way, they need to boost spending. Otherwise they'll be mostly limited to throwing out crowd-pleasing insults on social media.

 

[StingrayOZ]

At nearly 110 million people, it isn't exactly a small country. While economically they may not be massive, man power intensive capabilities should be within their reach. Its not like they don't have any technical competency or manufacturing and maintenance capability. It just seem to not exist within government/military.

While various non-aligned/developing countries have made a hybrid of US/Russian/Euro gear, with tiny budgets, generally work at some level, the Philippines have struggled at any level. I'm not sure more funding would magically solve their problems.

Philippines imo could learn a lot from say Vietnam in terms of capability. While Vietnam doesn't win every engagement with China, there is a strong thread of competency and decent capability.

 

[OPSSG]

Post 2 of 2: ASEAN must reject Locsin’s obnoxious approach — stupidity in international diplomacy should not be encouraged

...the Philippines have struggled at any level. I'm not sure more funding would magically solve their problems.

Philippines imo could learn a lot from say Vietnam in terms of capability. While Vietnam doesn't win every engagement with China, there is a strong thread of competency and decent capability.

6. Agreed. No amount of increased aid funding will make the Philippines better at budget and defence management.

7. At a fundamental level, the Pinoys believe that their funding defence and improving their ability to enforce Filippino sovereignty in their EEZ, is your problem. ‘Your’ meaning, anyone giving them aid. President Rodrigo Duterte's office said the Philippines is not getting enough military assistance from its ally, the US, hence his recent ultimatum for the country to "pay" for its troops to stay in the Philippines. The US Embassy said last April 2020 that the Philippines is the largest recipient of US military assistance in the Indo-Pacific region, getting US$650 million (P33 billion) worth of planes, ships, armored vehicles, guns, and other equipment, apart from training Filipino soldiers.

8. Asked if Duterte was dissatisfied with these benefits, Presidential Spokesman Harry Roque said: "He wants compensation for use of our territory because it would be in a manner that would endanger lives of Filipinos."

9. To prove Duterte's point, Presidential Spokesman Harry Roque flashed a chart from a Stimson Center report showing the Philippines received the least amount of counter-terrorism aid among 12 countries in the list, from 2002 to 2017. The Americans will continue to help them but even the US DoD that is used to a high level of waste when giving aid, cannot afford to be too generous to the Pinoys.

 

[StingrayOZ]

Waste they can handle, I don't think I've ever seen a general concern about US saving money in military aid. Its the diplomatic slap in the face they find hard to stomach, as you said, they believe their problems are someone else's problems, so no amount of aid is ever enough to make them take ownership. In fact increasing aid, increases the belief that everything is someone's else's problems, that someone will do it for them.

Israel gets fantastical levels of aid, because it turns into political support within the US. The opposite happens with the Philippines.

There needs to be a complete rebuild of the strategy.

 

[OPSSG]

The Philippines and Vietnam Discussed — Part 1

1. If you compare their GDP, you know that the chronic under funding of defence by the Philippine Government is a political choice made by their leadership due to their reliance on US aid:

• 2020 Philippines GDP about US$398 billion
• 2020 Vietnam GDP about $355 billion

Its the diplomatic slap in the face they find hard to stomach, as you said, they believe their problems are someone else's problems, so no amount of aid is ever enough to make them take ownership. In fact increasing aid, increases the belief that everything is someone's else's problems, that someone will do it for them.

2. It’s not only the Americans that can’t stand this type of entitled Pinoy behaviour. The rest of ASEAN can’t stand Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte — who misses select ASEAN meetings to smoke pot in his hotel room — I wish I was kidding but it’s sadly true that the Philippines does not take ASEAN seriously.

3. Philippine Foreign Secretary Teodoro Locsin’s pro-regime propaganda is the the business of spreading of misleading information in support of a cause. The word propaganda is often used in a negative sense, especially for politicians like Locsin who make false claims to support his boss. As a result, no one in ASEAN takes the words of dummest ASEAN diplomat seriously. It is wrong of Locsin to use swear words over a EEZ dispute (see next post on Sabah too).

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(a) During his talk to the nation, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte said “China remains to be our benefactor” and “if I may just add something to the narrative, just because we have a conflict with China doesn't mean to say that we have to be rude and disrespectful... As a matter of fact, we have so many things to thank China for – the help in the past and itong mga tulong nila ngayon.”​

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(b) The Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte has been thanking China for donating one million doses of COVID-19 vaccine developed by Sinovac Biotech Ltd. to the Philippines. Presidential Spokesman Harry Roque also said, “The President’s message to the members of his Cabinet is only the President can use swear words. Nobody can do the same.” J Carpio’s columns in the Inquirer deserves to be shared in full below, as a counter point to the nonsense spewed by President Rodrigo Duterte and his henchmen.​

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https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1390276994596687874

(c) What is worse than using profanities, as a diplomat? Locsin did something far worse — he backed down from using those swear words over a EEZ dispute. By now you can start to understand why Beijing doesn't take the clown show and current PRRD admin seriously where it comes to South China Sea issues.​

4. Vietnam’s Nguyễn Phú Trọng in contrast, prepares for ASEAN meetings to put his country’s best foot forward. By acting logically, Vietnam’s capable Foreign Minister, Bùi Thanh Sơn is able advance his country’s national interest at international meetings. At a staff level at ADMM, the Vietnamese have a reputation for doing good work with their counterparts. They are serious minded and low key in their work in support of the ASEAN Chairman’s agenda and to further confidence building led by ASEAN defence ministers.

5. In the 2014-2017 cycle, the areas of ASEAN cooperation in defence were expanded, to include the Expert Working Group (EWG) on Humanitarian Mine Action. This cycle saw the conduct of three joint full troop exercises (FTXs), namely:

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(i) ADMM-Plus Maritime Security / Counter Terrorism Exercise;​

(ii) ADMM-Plus Military Medicine / HADR Exercise (AMHex); and​

(iii) ADMM-Plus Humanitarian Mine Action / PKO FTX (Exercise Force 18). The Standard Operating Procedures on Multinational Coordination Centre, adopted by the 11th ADMM in 2017 was developed during this cycle.​

6. On 10 Dec 2020 at the 10th Anniversary of the Founding of ADMM-Plus, Vietnam’s General Ngo Xuan Lich affirmed that as an active, proactive, and responsible member of ASEAN as well as ADMM-Plus, Vietnam will continue to make its greatest efforts, together with ASEAN and ASEAN’s friends, to make contributions to peace, stability, cooperation and development of the region. In the 2017-2020 cycle, the areas of ASEAN cooperation in defence were further expanded, with another EWG established in the area of cyber security. This cycle saw the conduct of five FTXs, namely:

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(i) ADMM-Plus Maritime Security FTX;​

(ii) ADMM-Plus Military Medicine FTX (Medex 2019);​

(iii) ADMM-Plus Counter Terrorism FTX;​

(iv) ADMM-Plus PKO FTX; and​

(v) ADMM-Plus Humanitarian Mine Action FTX.​

7. In addition, the EWG on HADR staged a staff exercise / communications exercise, while the EWG on Cyber Security organised a table-top exercise.

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(a) Other major deliverables of the cycle are the launching of the Handbook on Military Medicine and the establishment of the ADMM-Plus EWG on Cyber Security portal.​

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(b) During Vietnam’s 2020 ASEAN Chairmanship, they successfully organized numerous ADMM events through-out the year; which cumulated the 10th Anniversary celebrations of the Founding of ADMM-Plus (on 10 Dec 2020). At the Anniversary Vietnam’s General Ngo Xuan Lich affirmed that as an active, proactive, and responsible member of ASEAN as well as ADMM-Plus, Vietnam will continue to make its greatest efforts, together with ASEAN and ASEAN’s friends, to make contributions to peace, stability, cooperation and development of the region.​

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(c) Beyond ADMM initiatives, the Ministry of Defense of Singapore provided ISR support for the Battle of Marawi and also recently donated 50,000 Covid-19 test kits to the Philippines Department of National Defense (DND). "The test kits which were delivered at the Veterans Memorial Medical Center (VMMC) will be issued to the VMMC and the Armed Forces of the Philippines Medical Center (AFPMC)," DND spokesperson Arsenio Andolong said.​

 

[StingrayOZ]

It’s not only the Americans that can’t stand this type of entitled Pinoy behaviour. The rest of ASEAN can’t stand Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte — who misses select ASEAN meetings to smoke pot in his hotel room — I wish I was kidding but it’s sadly true that the Philippines does not take ASEAN seriously.

Its hard to see who can take him seriously.

Australia has been working on Duterte, but efforts had declined in recent years. Everytime we did something for him, he would burn Australia. He made some horrid comments against a murdered Australian nurse. More recently we get dragged into his human rights abuses. (Australia helped draft Philippine law dubbed ‘a human rights disaster’)

The Indonesians also seem to have gone colder. Who knows how long the Skoreans can deal. Unfortunately the problem is deeper than Duterte, I suspect it will take a wholely new administration significant time to turn things around, if that is even possible. Working with Duterte has massive baggage. The more you deal, the deeper you get.

 

[OPSSG]

The Philippines and Vietnam Discussed — Part 2

Unfortunately the problem is deeper than Duterte, I suspect it will take a wholely new administration significant time to turn things around, if that is even possible.

8. ASEAN has enough real problems to manage when talking to external powers like China, US or the EU by virtue of its structure. It does not need the Pinoys to manufacture a fake one, like Sabah, for their domestic audience.

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(a) If you ask me, the ASEAN Chairman (Brunei) is busy enough with the Feb 2021 Coup in Myanmar, the Sultan of Brunei does not need more current PRRD admin Bullsh!t. After the ASEAN Summit, as a follow up, ASEAN is also considering a proposal to send a humanitarian aid mission to Myanmar as a potential first step in a long-term plan to bring the Tatmadaw (aka the Myanmar Army), back to their barracks instead of shooting people in the streets.​

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(b) The ASEAN Chairmanship will pass next to Cambodia and it will be hosting of the 16th ADMM and 9th ADMM-Plus at the end of 2021. It looks like 2022 will be a lost year, as China pulls the strings of its puppet again.​

The Indonesians also seem to have gone colder.

9. After the Philippine Navy's LPD Acquisition Project 2nd rebidding became a failed bid, Indonesian interest in working with the Pinoy Navy has become zero. Word is, the LPD Acquisition Project requirements is being improved to exclude a bid by Indonesia’s PT PAL shipyard to provide a repeat order. Spain’s Navantia and Turkey’s ASFAT shipyards said to have made new offers several months ago.

Its hard to see who can take him seriously...

...Working with Duterte has massive baggage. The more you deal, the deeper you get.

10. Lack of respect for fellow ASEAN member states by the current Pinoy leadership of Rodrigo Duterte and Teodoro Locsin Jr earns them contempt (from the rest of ASEAN); and this is especially the case for Malaysia.

(a) The festering wound of unmet and unreasonable Pinoy claims to Sabah was reopened in July 2020 when a Twitter note from the US Embassy in Manila mentioned “Sabah, Malaysia.” The furious reaction from Philippine Foreign Secretary Teodoro Locsin Jr was to deny that Sabah was in Malaysia.​

(b) Notes Verbale were filed by Malaysia and the Philippines at the UN over Malaysia’s extension of its continental shelf claim from Sabah’s coast facing the South China Sea. I note that Malaysia’s filing was consistent with UNCLOS, yet it drew an unpleasant response from the Philippines, which continues to entertain an archaic and illegal claim to Sabah territory.​

(c) Malaysia considers the Philippine claims over Sabah a “non-issue” as Sabah in 1963 along with Sarawak, and Singapore was part and parcel of the founding states of the Federation of Malaysia, which accordingly was an act of “self-determination.”​

(d) The lack of realism by Locsin sums up the whole illogical Philippine narrative centred on its anachronistic and illegal claim to Sabah. Philippine pundits may oppose or reject Sabah’s inclusion in Malaysia since 1963, but denying the fact of Sabah being a part of Malaysia amounts to abandoning reality. It is of no help to the Philippines itself or to its relations with Malaysia.​

 

[oldsig127]

9. After the Philippine Navy's LPD Acquisition Project 2nd rebidding became a failed bid, Indonesian interest in working with the Pinoy Navy has become zero. Word is, the LPD Acquisition Project requirements is being improved to exclude a bid by Indonesia’s PT PAL shipyard to provide a repeat order. Italy’s Navantia and Turkey’s ASFAT shipyards said to have made new offers several months ago.

Can you clarify the underlined? Is it Navantia (Spain) or an Italian bid

oldsig

(Yes, it's a single line)

 

[OPSSG]

Can you clarify the underlined? Is it Navantia (Spain) or an Italian bid

oldsig

(Yes, it's a single line)

Sorry, brain dead. It should be Spain. Appreciate the correction.

Original post edited.

 

[OPSSG]

Brunei’s 2021 defense white paper — Part 1

1. As ASEAN Chairman in 2021 and the smallest country by population, the country is concerned about its role in ADMM Plus, and even feels cornered by middle powers (when the regional environment has been indulgent to Brunei for its turn to a stricter form of Islam for its citizens and armed forces) — their new Defence White Paper 2021, at pages 25, 28, 33 and 35, states:

"8. In the last decade, there also have been continued pressures placed on security in the maritime domain in the South East Asia region. Tensions over overlapping claims, over- and illegal fishing, and the security of sea lines of communication (SLOC) from those who seek to exploit internationally recognised laws, all have placed continued and growing demands on Brunei Darussalam’s security forces to secure and police its sovereign maritime borders and territory).

9. Similar incursions and exploitation in the land domain have also increased by those who seek to gain from various activities, financially or otherwise. As Brunei Darussalam strives to preserve its natural habitat in a world that is experiencing climate change and the threats posed by those who seek to exploit the unlawful extraction of resources have placed increasing pressure on Brunei Darussalam’s security agencies, often in the most remote areas of the nation.

10. In the next 15 years, the South East Asia region is likely to face five specific challenges which will, in turn, drive and shape the nature of the strategic security and defence environment for Brunei Darussalam:

10.1. The influence of major power dynamics in the region.​

10.2. The impact of regional and global instability and the requirement for Brunei Darussalam to maintain its international obligations.​

10.3. The continuous and increasing threats of terrorism, violent extremism, and transnational crimes in Brunei Darussalam or at its near borders.​

10.4. The impact of technological development, especially in the cyber domain, and how these may be exploited by others for gain.​

10.5. The impact from the increasing frequency and intensity of natural disasters and the way in which Brunei Darussalam can shape its ability to respond both at home and overseas.​

…

16. This shift to multipolarity has also permitted smaller nations to hold positions of relative influence, as Major or Middle Powers seek to engage with these nations. As the Major and Middle Powers further compete in the future, smaller nations will find it increasingly difficult to adopt a friends-to-all approach, where they will need to choose, and often in a binary manner in relation to their partnerships with Major or Middle Powers.

17. From a Defence and Security perspective, an approach where a small nation is able to offer utility in supporting wider regional and global stability is likely to mitigate the natural pressure faced from respective Major and Middle Powers as they seek to exert influence in the political and economic spheres. For small nations, this is likely to be a challenging balancing act and will require carefully considered and enduring defence diplomacy plans that are integrated with wider national security strategies.

…

26. Maritime. Despite efforts to maintain stability through collective measures and activity, security in the maritime domain continues to be placed at increasing risk. Tensions arise from a combination of threats… The maintenance of essential SLOC for all nations in the South East Asia region is fundamental to the security and prosperity of each state… Tensions related to overlapping maritime claims in the South China Sea have increased, as nations seek to dominate and influence in the region. Militarisation of maritime features will continue to be of grave concern as the reach of nations expand well beyond their own mainland shorelines and recognised Economic Exclusive Zones (EEZs). This risk of miscalculation and the ensuing spiralling of regional instability is potentially the most significant threat in the maritime domain. Left unchecked, the situation will only worsen… Beyond this, it will be necessary for nations to build more effective and integrated maritime security capabilities, blended with those of all other operating domains, to ensure the integrity of the oceans and seas. Additionally, efforts should be enhanced to ensure full and effective implementation of the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) in its entirety, as well as, ensuring substantive progress is made in the negotiations towards an early conclusion of an effective and substantive Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC) consistent with international law, including the 1982 UNCLOS.

…

31. South East Asia specifically has experienced a significant increase in terror related activities during the last decade. Within a South East Asian context, in the aftermath of the events in Marawi, terrorism has demonstrated that it does not respect traditional sovereign borders. The fight to liberate Marawi City sieged by large scale organised terrorism in the last quarter of 2017 serves as a reminder of the region’s vulnerability posed by similar threats and has raised concerns terrorist proliferation, radicalisation, and the possible expansion of terrorism specifically within South East Asia.

32. However, while the terror-related situation in the Philippines continues to pose significant challenges, acts of terrorism are not occurring in isolation, with most other South East Asian nations also facing considerable and continuing threats. Activities are increasingly becoming more diverse and more connected, particularly with the return of South East Asian foreign terrorist fighters who have fled the Middle East to the region in order to create and strengthen terrorist networks in South East Asia. Based on recent events, it remains concerning that these returning foreign terrorist fighters continue to bring with them a radicalised narrative, the means to indoctrinate others, and the skills to harm the public and foster crisis. The potential emergence of new terrorist groups will continue to pose enormous challenges to the region in the future. In this past decade, the region has experienced multiple terrorist threats, manifested in many different forms both traditional and novel, but all invoking fear."

 

[OPSSG]

Brunei’s 2021 defense white paper — Part 2

2. In summary, Brunei is naked and afraid of geat power competition, while concurrently concerned about:

(a) it’s SLOCs in view of the disputed claims in the South China Sea;​

(b) its stature within ADMM (to be seen as useful and contributing member of ASEAN);​

(c) the threat of returning ISIS fighters from the Middle East (as manifested in the Philippines) — especially since it’s army has only 1 brigade;​

(d) the threat presented in the cyber domain and the concurrent need to consider space as a domain; and​

(e) the environment (and need to have the ability to conduct HADR missions under ADMM auspices or with a partner nation).​

3. Brunei’s latest defense white paper was released on 31 May 2021 and it shows a country that is increasingly uncomfortable with China’s behavior but does not call out the country by name. We are starting to see the increasing finlandization of both Malaysia and the Philippines; where bending over backwards by small ASEAN member countries, like Brunei, is no longer enough. ASEAN’s core challenge right now is to not only deter a range of China’s behaviors but also avoid catastrophic conflict—while still advancing economic interests of its member states.

4. On 15 Jun 2021, during the 15th ADMM, the ADMM Bandar Seri Begawan Declaration in Commemoration of the 15th Anniversary of the ADMM towards a Future-Ready, Peaceful and Prosperous ASEAN was adopted. The Declaration reaffirmed ASEAN's commitment to tackle prevailing and emerging transboundary security threats in our region, particularly in the maritime security, counter-terrorism, Chemical, Biological and Radiological, cybersecurity and information domains.

5. The ADMM approved the establishment of a Cybersecurity and Information Centre of Excellence (COE) in Singapore, which will complement the ASEAN Cyber Defence Network in promoting regional exchanges, interactions and cooperation on cybersecurity matters. The COE will enable information sharing and capacity building among ASEAN defence establishments against cyberattacks, disinformation and misinformation. The ADMM also approved Singapore's proposal to host an ADMM-Plus conference on countering Chemical, Biological and Radiological threats in 2022.

6. For Brunei, even if the Biden administration adopts a less overtly confrontational approach toward China than Trump’s, the risks of conflict in the South China Sea are real.

 

[OPSSG]

TNI AL demonstrates ability to operate unilaterally and on a bilateral basis, in disputed waters during Exercise Eagle Indopura

1. Jan 2020 began with a standoff in the Natuna Islands on the far southern end of the South China Sea, a territory claimed by China and Indonesia. In a weeks-long standoff, a Chinese coast guard vessel and accompanying fishing boats entered the northern Natuna Sea, and started to operate inside Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Eventually, Indonesia deployed F-16 fighters and naval ships to the islands and President Joko Widodo personally flew to the area, in an unusual show of force from the country inside it’s EEZ.

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(a) China has not claimed the Natuna islands themselves, but says it has nearby fishing rights within a self-proclaimed Nine-Dash Line that includes most of the energy rich South China Sea - a claim disputed by some Southeast Asian countries and not recognized internationally.​

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https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1440264548519350274

(b) In early Sep 2021, the USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70) was sailing in the Natuna Sea off Indonesia, near where the Chinese survey vessel Haiyang Dizhi 10 has been operating since late Aug 2021. Unusually, the U.S. super carrier also broadcasted its location, a move that analysts say would be intended to show that it is operating freely in international waters. China claims most of the South China Sea for itself. Correspondingly, it was also reported that Indonesia's navy has increased patrols around its Natuna islands in the South China Sea after Chinese and US vessels were detected nearby in international waters, last week.​

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https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1439303209353236483

(c) China operates four large outposts with 10,000-foot runways in disputed areas of the South China Sea: Woody Island, Fiery Cross Reef, Mischief Reef, and Subi Reef from which the PLA has greatly expanded its ability to project power in these waters. At the end of 2020, the size of China’s navy — or its “battle force ships” — was approximately 360, compared to the United States’ 297, according to the US Office of Naval Intelligence. It also projected that China’s navy will increase to 400 ships in 2025 and 425 in 2030. These PLA naval capabilities deployed are fundamentally linked, and how China’s aircraft carriers can take advantage of them to comfortably conduct operations at greater distances. To make matters more acute from a balance of power perspective, in Apr 2021, the TNI AL lost 1 of its 5 submarines — KRI Nanggala (402) — when taking part in a torpedo-firing drill off Bali. Singapore’s MV Swift Rescue was able to provide visual confirmation of the loss sub, for the TNI AL.​

2. Indonesia has tried to avoid letting South China Sea dominate their relationship with China, but with Beijing marking its territory in the region, the days of quiet diplomacy might not last forever. Indonesia stated its position on the matter in a note verbale addressed to UN Secretary General António Guterres on 26 May 2020, where it opposed a series of circular notes filed by Being in relation to Malaysia’s application to define the limits of its extended continent shelf. In particular, Indonesia cited China’s notes protesting Malaysia’s application itself, and later on, rejecting the Philippines’ and Vietnam’s positions on the matter.

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(a) When Donald Trump was president, Japanese, Korean and ASEAN leaders often had concerns about American reliability. Likewise, European allies have expressed something close to contempt for the US over the conduct of the withdrawal from Afghanistan. I have reason to suspect that Japanese, Korean and ASEAN leaders have similar concerns. These concerns about American reliability relate to broad issues of national cohesion and political will, more than the personality of any particular president.​

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(b) Humiliation in Afghanistan – and the shared defeat inflicted by Washington on its allies – also raises concerns about the efficacy of US deterrence against China, in relation to Taiwan and disputes in the South China Sea. This combination – an emboldened, aggressive China and a weakened, humiliated America – would leave Taiwan and ASEAN without options. Important powers like Japan and India, with significant Indo-Pacific interests, would be at risk as well. Japan and India – both Quad members who see China as a serious threat – are equally important. Leaders in India, in particular, were dismayed by Washington’s surrender to the Taliban, and it will be extremely important for Team Biden to reassure them and the other ASEAN partners.​

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3. The interplay between politics, economics and security is a reality for all countries that border the South China Sea, as well as for those whose economies depend on its shipping channels—leading them to remain engaged at a military level. Concurrently, in Aug 2021 more than 4,500 military personnel from both US and Indonesia took part in a military drill — the largest joint military exercise between the two states in history. Gen. Andika Perkasa, Indonesian army’s chief of staff, said the drill, which is called Garuda Shield, aims to strengthen friendly relations between Jakarta and Washington.

4. CO RSS Tenacious, Lieutenant Colonel Tung Wanling highlighted the importance of the long-standing bilateral exercise in enhancing understanding between both the Singapore and Indonesian navies. She said:

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"The exercise allowed us to deepen our shared knowledge, and bolster strong and enduring defence relations. It provided an opportunity for us to work and learn from one another, to enhance our cooperation and strengthen the understanding between our sailors."​

Held since 1974, Exercise Eagle Indopura is the SAF’s longest-running bilateral exercise with a foreign military. The RSN, as ASEAN’s most capable navy and TNI AL, as ASEAN’s largest navy (by personnel strength), conduct regular professional exchanges, exercises and port calls, and also collaborate through the multilateral Malacca Straits Patrol and other activities including socio-civic programmes.

5. These regular interactions have enhanced the close ties and mutual understanding between the personnel of both navies. Glad to see the Indonesian and Singaporean navies training together at Exercise Eagle Indopura — this 26th edition includes a live-fire exercise held at Natuna Sea — the exercise was modelled after real-time maritime security operations, the participating ships were also tasked by their respective operation centres to track the movement of simulated vessels of interest cued by alerts from the RSN's Information Fusion Centre. The exercise concluded with a sail-past of the participating vessels. Vessels and aircraft involved from the 2 countries include:

• KRI Diponegoro (365)
• KRI Malahayati (362)
• CASA MPA
• RSS Tenacious (71)
• RSS Justice (18)
• Fokker 50 MPA

 

[Ananda]

The RSN, as ASEAN’s most capable navy and TNI AL, as ASEAN’s largest navy (by personnel strength),

Actually TNI-AL is also the largest in ASEAN in term of # hulls. However it's mostly outdated with many already loosing capabilities. This kind of exercise with RSN, RAN and USN hopefully will also open the public perception, how much TNI-AL need to be upgraded.

Not only TNI-AL, but BAKAMLA (Coast Guard) also need Investment. The Coast Guard Chief recently talk in Parliament that they can not covering Chinese CG in North Natuna Sea all the time, due to lack of sufficient #hulls and don't have enough budget for high operational tempo. Something that need to be think, as Politicians in here more interested to get flashy new procurement Project, rather thinking on providing enough budget for high operational tempo patrolling duties.

 

[OPSSG]

The Progressive Pakistanisation / Finlandization of Malaysia

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1440853769353265157

1. On 12 Sep 2019, State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi held talks with Foreign Minister Saifuddin Abdullah of Malaysia in Beijing and this was followed-up up with a number of calls and virtual meetings in 2020 and 2021, where Saifuddin expressed “sincere condolences to China” on the novel Coronavirus epidemic, and stressed that Malaysia “will stand firmly with the Chinese people” at this difficult time.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1441206597095591936

2. Acting as a dis-reputable foreign proxy for the CCP, Koh King Kee (Koh), President of the Centre for New Inclusive Asia in Malaysia, shared his opinions on these issues with Global Times reporter, Xu Yelu:

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“Global Times: Southeast Asian countries, including Malaysia and Indonesia, have recently expressed their concerns over AUKUS. Malaysia's defense chief said on Wednesday that he will seek Beijing's views on it. In your opinion, how much impact does Australia's acquisition of nuclear submarines and technology have on Malaysia?​

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Koh: US President Joe Biden has said that one of the justifications for US withdrawal from Afghanistan is to focus America's resources to compete against China. The timing of the formation of AUKUS immediately after US's withdrawal from Afghanistan is thus no coincidence.​

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AUKUS is an America-led united front and an additional component of its Indo-Pacific Strategy to contain China, as ASEAN is the main theatre of US-China competition. It will be a likely cause to destabilize the regional peace and security of ASEAN and thus affecting the investment climate in the region.​

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China is Malaysia's largest trading partner for 12 consecutive years. And Malaysia, being the second largest trading partner of China among ASEAN countries, naturally feels uneasy over the formation of AUKUS, especially at a time when the country needs to attract foreign investments, particularly from China, to recover the economy from COVID-19 pandemic.​

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Global Times: The three countries in the AUKUS seek to contain China with this small "NATO" in the Indo-Pacific region. What might happen to neighboring countries like Malaysia? Will countries in the region be forced to take sides?​

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Koh: The geographical distance of the three AUKUS members from ASEAN/China would render AUKUS an ineffective "NATO" against China.​

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ASEAN nations have always preached maintaining Southeast Asia as a "zone of peace, freedom and neutrality" (ZOPFAN), free from interference by any outside powers. Maintaining ASEAN centrality vis-a-vis China-US rivalry is the consensus of ASEAN members.​

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No ASEAN country is likely to join a US-led "Asian NATO" in view of the close trade ties between China and ASEAN, unlike EU countries and Soviet Russia during the Cold War.”​

3. Malaysia is proud to call their boss in China, for an appropriate response — because they believe there are no consequences to the Pakistanisation / Finlandization of Malaysia (with a hard tilt to China) and their decision to engage in direct betrayal of FDPA partners and affected ASEAN members (like, Brunei, the Philippines, Indonesia and Vietnam) but there are consequences to making these decisions. Of course ASEAN existence means there is no alliance like NATO but ASEAN centrality also means standing with other affected ASEAN members instead of betrayal.

4. In July 2021, the Philippines reversed course and fully restored the Visiting Forces Agreement that allows US forces to operate from the Philippines. Once upheld as "poster boy" of behaving like a vassal state to preserve Sino-Philippines ties, Rodrigo Duterte's Philippines must have thrown Beijing hawks off the chair with the recent vocal support for AUKUS and Australia's nuclear sub deal.

 

[swerve]

Perhaps it even got throught Duterte's thick skull that the Chinese response to kow-towing is to kick you in the teeth & demand even more subservience.

 

[STURM]

Malaysia is proud to call their boss in China, for an appropriate response — because they believe there are no consequences to the Pakistanisation / Finlandization of Malaysia (with a hard tilt to China) and their decision to engage in direct betrayal of FDPA partners and affected ASEAN members (like, Brunei, the Philippines, Indonesia and Vietnam) but there are consequences to making these decisions. Of course ASEAN existence means there is no alliance like NATO but ASEAN centrality also means standing with other affected ASEAN members instead of betrayal.

To me saying that Malaysia is "proud to call their boss" is pushing things a bit too far. Malaysia has a tough balancing act to maintain, it has to maintain good ties with China whilst simultaneously doing the same with others in order to safeguard its key interests. If the Malaysian Foreign Minister had flown to Canberra, London or Washington to seek clarification or views on something which can have an impact on Malaysia in the long term, would it have been news?

As for the "Pakistanisation/Finlandisation" characterisation, it sounds dramatic but is not an accurate description or comparison given the circumstances Finland faced and the current position of Pakistan. If and when it can accurately be applied it will be when Malaysia stops being critical of Chinese actions in the SCS, stops issuing diplomatic protests, downgrades its defence ties with the U S. and Australia (Malaysia has deeper and more extensive defence ties with both countries than with any other) and does the same with the FPDA (Malaysia plays host to the only pernanent base the ADF has on foreign territory and has maintained its commitnents to the FPDA - if indeed Malaysia was becoming Finland as it was prior to WW2 or Pakistan as it is now, Makaysia will eventually downgrade ties with the FPDA to appease its 'boss'). It might also downgrade its claims in the Spratlys and totally refrain from openly being critical of China - that would be "betrayal" in the "truest' sense of the word, as well as being a "hard tilt" towards China.

I hardly see how this recent meeting (which BTW I feel was pointless) or any other actions Makaysia has taken to safeguard its interests was a "betrayal" of Malaysia's FPDA and ASEAN partners. Does it indeed mean that it is not "standing by" its partners? When it resorts to the UN in response to Chinese actions, loudy proclaims it doesnt recognise China's claims, intercepts regular Chinese intrusions in its EEZ, as well as reporting the presence of a formation of Chinese aircraft which came close to Malaysian airspace and was intercepted, what does that mean? A "betrayal" will come when or if Malaysia totally reverses its course with regards to common policies and agreements long reached with FPDA and ASEAN partners.

If indeed Malaysia wanted to please China and adopt a foreign policy in line with this, RMN ships would not have participated in a PASSEX with the Queen Ekizebeth carrier group. Malaysia would not have participated in RIMPAC and Pitch Black, MAF people would be attending courses in China rather than in various Western countries and the level of exchanges (such as the annual Airman talks with thr USAF and the Submarine talks with the USN and RAN ) would be in decline. Note also that the first partcipation of the F-22 in a regional bilateral exercise was in Malaysia.

I seriously doubt that policy makers are unaware (as you suggested) of the consequences of giving in too much to China as Makaysia has a long history of dealing with China (it was the first of the original ASEAN nembers to establish ties) and has experienced first hand how what China says and actually does can differ.

As I've pointed out in a previous post, in private Malaysian officials in probably welcome this new alliance/pact although they will not say it openly. A lot is not mentioned openly and a lot takes place via discreet back door diplomacy. Like other smaller non aligned countries Malaysia does have legitimate concerns, as any long time observer will know, even before the rise of China, unlike some of its neighbours Malaysia has traditionally downplayed the extent of its military ties with certain countries.

As the cliche goes however "it's not what is said but done" which is telling. To get an objective and accurate asessment of Malaysian policy and overall direction, one has to view things in totality rather than in isolation - not only how Malaysia deals with China, but also with various other players must be taken into account and context.

Note that deep distrust of China due to its previous moral support of the Communist Party of Malaya (a protracted insurgency campaign was waged both in Peninsular and East Malaysia), as well as a strong aversion to communism is still deeply ingrained in the Malaysian pysche, irrespective of the lenghts taken to mantain good ties with China for economic and security reasons.

 

[STURM]

On Duterte, I doubt that Chinese hawks were really suprised. They from the onset fully grasped that a lot of what he previously said was driven by internal politics, plus the need to obtain certain things from both the U.S. and China. Despite his flaws (there are many), Durterte fully realises the need to mantain the status quo with the U. S.

 

[tonnyc]

Despite his flaws (there are many), Durterte fully realises the need to mantain the status quo with the U. S.

I don't think this sentence is true. I don't think he realizes it. Rather, the people in Armed Forces of the Philippines have had to figuratively beat it into his head over and over again.

Duterte is like Trump. He is worse than Trump in some respect. He will bullshit everything. Both China and the US of A know this, and this is fundamentally why neither bothered giving anything substantial to the Philippines so far. Because at the heart of it he doesn't keep his word.

 

[STURM]

China's aim was to attempt to weaken the level of influence the U.S. has with the Philippines and to push things as far as they could go but ultimately China was under no illusion that a major break would occur, Philippines/U S.- ties are too deep rooted.