US Navy News and updates

[Terran]

True but I am not sure that’s a big problem. Yes it will be longer but the main issue is width and hight The Hangers generally have a bit more length than the helicopter is. UH1Y have been embarked on Burke class DDG in the past and the LCS and coming Constellation class FFG were spec’d around supporting larger V22 and NH90.
Bell’s Marketing team has produced art work of both parked in the hangers of Burke class DDG as well showing they seem convinced as well although Naval reco states that their pitch does short The Valor a “few inches”

SAS 2016: Bell unveils V-280 Valor naval variant

a Sea Air Space 2016 Online Show Daily - Bell Helicopter

www.navyrecognition.com

I admit I don’t know the length of the interior of the hangers yet I would lay good odds it’s got the space for a longer foot print.

 

[John Fedup]

The USN is getting rid of some relatively new patrol vessels. With a cruising range of 750 miles at 25 knots, perhaps these boats could make for good coastal yacht conservations assuming they can’t be flogged off to some foreign backwater.

The Navy Wants To Get Rid Of Its Nearly Brand New Patrol Boats

The Navy is looking to have all of its Mk VI patrol boats, the oldest of which it acquired just six years ago, decommissioned by the end of the year.

www.thedrive.com

 

[SolarWind]

The USN is getting rid of some relatively new patrol vessels. With a cruising range of 750 miles at 25 knots, perhaps these boats could make for good coastal yacht conservations assuming they can’t be flogged off to some foreign backwater.

The Navy Wants To Get Rid Of Its Nearly Brand New Patrol Boats

The Navy is looking to have all of its Mk VI patrol boats, the oldest of which it acquired just six years ago, decommissioned by the end of the year.

www.thedrive.com

If we are scaling down the war on terrorism and concentrating on containing China and Russia, then these boats are not very cost effective if not outright useless. Perhaps Saudi Arabia can purchase them to operate on their own. Instead, we have a large enough fleet of LCS, which offer more firepower and protection for crews.

 

[OldTex]

If we are scaling down the war on terrorism and concentrating on containing China and Russia, then these boats are not very cost effective if not outright useless. Perhaps Saudi Arabia can purchase them to operate on their own. Instead, we have a large enough fleet of LCS, which offer more firepower and protection for crews.

Naval News reported on 30 Jan that the US Navy were not planning to replace the Cyclone class Patrol Coastal boats.
Originally built to transport eight of the elite Naval Special Warfare U.S. Navy’s Sea-Air-Land (SEALs) special forces operators, the PCs were considered too large and too poorly armed for the clandestine stealthy transport role because the PCs’ size for transporting just eight SEALs didn’t seem effective, nor could the PCs stand up and survive against small enemy warships and warplanes outside of its effective gun range. The Navy’s attitude towards the PCs changed when they were stationed in the Middle East as the Navy found them very useful for patrolling against small and fast enemy Fast Attack Craft/Inshore Fast Attack Craft (FAC/IFAC) speedboats.
For purely speculative analytical purposes, the Naval News report touched on the prospect of using the Littoral Combat Ship (LCSs) or the US Coast Guard Fast Response Cutter (FRC) to replace the Patrol Coastal Boats.
Look at the draft and cost of a LCS compared to a U.S Navy’s Patrol Coastal, a MK VI PB, and a U.S. Coast Guard’s Fast Response Cutter (FRC):

• A LCS has a draft of 14.1 feet (4.3 meters) and cost around $430-$440 million each, costing even more with the planned installation of eight Naval Strike Missiles and other lethality upgrades.
• A Patrol Coastal boat has a draft of 7.5 feet (2.3m) and cost $20 million around the 1990s when they were built.
• A Mark VI Patrol Boat’s draft is 4 feet (1.2 m) with a cost around $15 million each.
• A Coast Guard Fast Response Cutter has a draft of 9.5 feet (2.5 m), a maximum speed of 28+ kts, and cost around $70 million each.

One issue in replacing the Patrol Coastals with the LCSs is, well, big and tall. The size and height differences between the LCS compared to the Patrol Coastals, Patrol Boats, and Fast Response Cutters is that the LCSs tower above the much smaller patrol boats. The LCS is so tall that its self-defense guns may not be able to depress low enough to fire at the FAC/IFAC boat swarms’ hulls if they get too close, then the LCS will have to rely on the guided RAM missiles and (if installed) Longbow Hellfire Surface Warfare Mission Package for a sure kill, or as a last resort, personal handheld weapons such as carbines, pistols, and portable machine guns. Thus, the low height of the Navy’s Patrol Coastals and MK VI Patrol Boats offer an advantage in close-quarters line-of-sight littoral combat that the LCSs higher-sitting weapons might not offer. This might be especially true against stealthy enemy semi-submersibles hidden in the waves that might be able to sneak up on a LCS where its radar sits so high up that the “radar dome’s coverage” might not be low enough to detect small close-in surface targets hidden in the waves (slipping underneath the LCS’s radar).
Both the Patrol Coastal boats and the MK VI patrol boats found new roles in asymmetric naval warfare (i.e the 'war on terrorism') but the shift to peer adversary operations does not mean that the asymmetric naval warfare roles will disappear. Rather the it will just mean a change in who is using the asymmetric tactics.

 

[SolarWind]

Anti-submarine warfare is not the job of patrol boats or patrol ships. The figurative bridge for use of LCS has been crossed many times as they are a current asset, upgradeable. It does not matter how much they cost when they were built as that decision cannot be unmade and they cannot be redesigned. If LCS need to be upgraded for their new role, then that is what needs to be done, and the upgrade cost is what their new cost is.

 

[OldTex]

Anti-submarine warfare is not the job of patrol boats or patrol ships. The figurative bridge for use of LCS has been crossed many times as they are a current asset, upgradeable. It does not matter how much they cost when they were built as that decision cannot be unmade and they cannot be redesigned. If LCS need to be upgraded for their new role, then that is what needs to be done, and the upgrade cost is what their new cost is.

At no point was it suggested that the Mk VI patrol boats or the Patrol Coastal (Cyclone class) boats were intended for use as anti-submarine warfare platforms. Your (and John Fedup's) assertion was that 'these boats are not very cost effective if not outright useless'. The Mk VI and the Patrol Coastal boats are littoral patrol craft intended to prosecute surface engagements with opponents FACs in shallow water as well as landing small special forces teams.

 

[SolarWind]

...Thus, the low height of the Navy’s Patrol Coastals and MK VI Patrol Boats offer an advantage in close-quarters line-of-sight littoral combat that the LCSs higher-sitting weapons might not offer. This might be especially true against stealthy enemy semi-submersibles hidden in the waves that might be able to sneak up on a LCS where its radar sits so high up that the “radar dome’s coverage” might not be low enough to detect small close-in surface targets hidden in the waves (slipping underneath the LCS’s radar).

Close-in combat with semi-submersibles that sneak up is an interesting capability. Why not take them out from the air?

Both the Patrol Coastal boats and the MK VI patrol boats found new roles in asymmetric naval warfare (i.e the 'war on terrorism') but the shift to peer adversary operations does not mean that the asymmetric naval warfare roles will disappear. Rather the it will just mean a change in who is using the asymmetric tactics.

I fully agree with this.

 

[alexsa]

This might be especially true against stealthy enemy semi-submersibles hidden in the waves that might be able to sneak up on a LCS where its radar sits so high up that the “radar dome’s coverage” might not be low enough to detect small close-in surface targets hidden in the waves (slipping underneath the LCS’s radar).

Ok, I will bite. Define radar dome coverage and your understanding of how semisubmersible may slip under it! By way of history; centimetric radar developed during WWII could detect a periscope head at close range. A stealthy 'semi-submersible' may be harder to detect (subject to how they are operated) but the software in modern radars allow for much better discrimination even when the target is close to the ship and within the ground clutter of raw radar displays.

The ground clutter is quite close to the ship (so I am not sure by what you are referring to as the radar dome) and to 'sneak under' the radar pulse coverage would mean you would need to be almost next to the ship. As an aside, which radar are you talking about, modern surface combatants have a range of systems set at different heights in the ship not to mention optical search systems as well.

Added to this sneaking under would likely rely on the LCS (or other vessel type ... noting your scenario could apply other vessels) stationary or going slow...... otherwise you semi-submersible is going to have to moving at a speed close in order to engage LCS unless they are directly ahead and then they are going to be very visible by eye and by radar as the wash will show up. Organic air is another capability that would allow such threats to be detected (and option not available to a coastal patrol boat).

Finally, if a capable warship with a myriad of systems cannot see a semi-submersible coming their way how is a patrol vessel going to pull this off.

I am a supporter to patrol craft and constabulary vessels for the roles they are designed for and they have a place inshore. The LCS idea is not confined to inshore waters and includes close offshore. No a huge fan of LCS but understand the concept and think you case in respect of semi-submersibles does not make sense,

 

[Toptob]

I don't know about doing ASW with those boats. But I do think that it's a waste to get rid of the MK VI boats so soon. I don't know if the USN has an aversion to operating small boats but they seem to just want to get rid of coastal and riverine forces as soon as they might be allowed to... Only to find out they need some riverine forces later anyway!

But anyway, it's a shame, because there's many ways these boats could still be used. Not in the least as a test platform which is what they where meant to be anyway. They could be used in USV development and training and the development of (anti) small craft tactics or many other things.

And I think they would even have value as frontline assets. They could be used to assist amphibious operations or simply dogfight with some of the many small combattants an enemies could operate. They could be mounted with heavy weapons like a mortar or maybe even ASM's or at least something like a hellfire. I'm not saying they can replace what a bigger ship brings to the table. But operating small boats is not a bad way to get hulls in the water and people to a place.

It looks to me that operating a squadron of small boats like the MK VI or CB90 from something like an LPD could be a powerful asset. Whether it's doing raids or patrols or even raiding inland in a riverine environment... Maybe they don't fit in with power projection or containing rivals in a power struggle, I don't know. But how sure are we that there won't be places and missions that something like the MK VI would be perfect for in the next war? In any case I was very impressed with the MK VI and I think it's a waste to let them go so soon. ---

 

[OldTex]

Ok, I will bite. Define radar dome coverage and your understanding of how semisubmersible may slip under it! By way of history; centimetric radar developed during WWII could detect a periscope head at close range. A stealthy 'semi-submersible' may be harder to detect (subject to how they are operated) but the software in modern radars allow for much better discrimination even when the target is close to the ship and within the ground clutter of raw radar displays.

The ground clutter is quite close to the ship (so I am not sure by what you are referring to as the radar dome) and to 'sneak under' the radar pulse coverage would mean you would need to be almost next to the ship. As an aside, which radar are you talking about, modern surface combatants have a range of systems set at different heights in the ship not to mention optical search systems as well.

Added to this sneaking under would likely rely on the LCS (or other vessel type ... noting your scenario could apply other vessels) stationary or going slow...... otherwise you semi-submersible is going to have to moving at a speed close in order to engage LCS unless they are directly ahead and then they are going to be very visible by eye and by radar as the wash will show up. Organic air is another capability that would allow such threats to be detected (and option not available to a coastal patrol boat).

Finally, if a capable warship with a myriad of systems cannot see a semi-submersible coming their way how is a patrol vessel going to pull this off.

I am a supporter to patrol craft and constabulary vessels for the roles they are designed for and they have a place inshore. The LCS idea is not confined to inshore waters and includes close offshore. No a huge fan of LCS but understand the concept and think you case in respect of semi-submersibles does not make sense,

The discussion of semi-submersibles approaching under the radar was contained in the article presented by Naval News. I would assume that even a mast top mounted radar would have 'wooded arcs' (just as the ship's SATCOM dishes would have) due to other structures and systems on the ship.

 

[CB90]

I don't know about doing ASW with those boats. But I do think that it's a waste to get rid of the MK VI boats so soon. I don't know if the USN has an aversion to operating small boats but they seem to just want to get rid of coastal and riverine forces as soon as they might be allowed to... Only to find out they need some riverine forces later anyway!

But anyway, it's a shame, because there's many ways these boats could still be used. Not in the least as a test platform which is what they where meant to be anyway. They could be used in USV development and training and the development of (anti) small craft tactics or many other things.

And I think they would even have value as frontline assets. They could be used to assist amphibious operations or simply dogfight with some of the many small combattants an enemies could operate. They could be mounted with heavy weapons like a mortar or maybe even ASM's or at least something like a hellfire. I'm not saying they can replace what a bigger ship brings to the table. But operating small boats is not a bad way to get hulls in the water and people to a place.

It looks to me that operating a squadron of small boats like the MK VI or CB90 from something like an LPD could be a powerful asset. Whether it's doing raids or patrols or even raiding inland in a riverine environment... Maybe they don't fit in with power projection or containing rivals in a power struggle, I don't know. But how sure are we that there won't be places and missions that something like the MK VI would be perfect for in the next war? In any case I was very impressed with the MK VI and I think it's a waste to let them go so soon. ---

Letting go of MK VI early is a waste of money...but buying it in the first place when literally nobody had an actual requirement for it was an even bigger waste of money.

The entire program was mismanaged and I have absolute disdain for how the USN has managed the small boat communities in recent years. It is a classic example of something worth doing worth doing well...or don’t do it at all.

That isn’t to say they don’t have some potential value, they do, even though I also believe the design is also an overstuffed pig. But the USN has had absolutely no comprehensive sense of how to man train operate or equip these things properly - bottom line give them to a community that will make better use of them whether it’s the USCG or USMC. Or just sell them FMS and get some money back and goodwill.

 

[John Fedup]

...still like the yacht conversion disposal solution

 

[ngatimozart]

Interesting article on how the US can turn the tables on the PRC in the command of the sea competition for the North Pacific. Don't challenge, withdraw to the US bases and fort up, support the allies in creating their defensive bubbles, and leave the maritime commons an open area. The PRC has far more to lose and let them expend a huge amount of resources defending their SLOC against the US and its allies. Does make sense, but will US pride let it consider such an approach?

Don’t Knock Yourself Out: How America Can Turn the Tables on China by Giving Up the Fight for Command of the Seas - War on the Rocks

Editors note: This essay is the second in a series of eight articles, “Maritime Strategy on the Rocks,” that examines different aspects and implications

warontherocks.com

 

[Boagrius]

Part of me wonders whether the US will have no choice but to adopt this approach if China's capabilities continue to grow long term. I suspect there may be something to be said for turning A2/AD in the other direction...

 

[SolarWind]

The island defense ideas are already taking shape.

Marines Testing Regiment at Heart of Emerging Island-Hopping Future - USNI News

The Marine Corps is starting to form and experiment with the littoral regiment at the heart of its modern-day island-hopping strategy, the head of Marine Corps combat development told USNI News. The stand-up of this first Marine Littoral Regiment is among the first and most visible steps being...

news.usni.org

In my opinion, submarines armed with LRASM and UAVs would be able to implement a surface denial strategy against a larger fleet of surface ships. This might be more effective than building and supporting hundreds of surface ships.

Some thoughts that building an oversize surface fleet would face serious challenges:

Navy’s Plans to Counter China May Be Doomed by Shipbuilding Disasters

The Defense Department has bold ambitions to build a 546-ship fleet over the next 30 years to counter a rising China. Based on the Navy’s track record of failed shipbuilding programs over the past 20 years, it is impossible to see how such a goal is possible.

www.pogo.org

Personally, I feel the last article is overly negative. The LCS and Zumwalt were built at a time when the US world power was unchallenged and experimentation was justified to some extent. Going forward, goals for the Navy are clearer.

 

[John Fedup]

Let’s not forget that POGO is a platform for whiners like Winslow Wheeler.

That being said, these USN builds are to some extent self inflicted disasters. The LCS should have killed years ago. Modules didn’t arrive, propulsion in the Freedom class is a disaster and they need more crew than planned. Serious deficiencies in armaments had to be addressed. A sink hole program.

Zumwalt was a failed mission concept, shore bombardment from 100 miles out in the missile age, how was that ever going to work? The 155 mm automated gun was ok had more ships been built but with only 3 ships, $800k shells were just too expensive. Nevertheless the ship has potential with a next generation version. Great IEP for energy directed weapons and the size to accommodate new bigger missiles and more of them.

The Ford class, too much new tech but hopefully the program gets sorted soon. There is still a place for the big CVNs.

 

[Toptob]

Well, @John Fedup and @SolarWind I think you're both right to some extent. But I do think both the navy and their political overlords have let Industry get away with too many shenanigans for too long. And it doesn't look like there's very much motivation to do any better in the future. The biggest problem I think is that the US (and most European) defense organizations are overpaying way to much and receiving way to little!

Yeah I know, a totally unqualified claim. But let us look at the LCS program, why are there two classes? Why didn't they make a choice? Right because they needed to spread the pork! So they ended up with two parallel build programs neither of which worked out very well and as John mentioned above should have been terminated a long time ago. The problem for me is that industry made big promises and then proceeded to fail again and again and the navy and politics let it go on.

Yeah the article @SolarWind posted may be a bit uncharitable about the USN's recent procurement practices. But there's little to be positive about, especially with these three programs. But what's more worrying is the inefficiency of the US defense industry. Programs are often overpriced and over budget and while they still produce some premium equipment... Over the last decades there has been less innovation than I would like, with the most successful products being improvements of existing designs. And especially in the naval industry a worrying degradation of capacity.

In the US and Europe development and build speed are too slow and capacity is lacking. And don't get me wrong, it's not just industry that's at fault, these nations have been poor customers as well. In Europe we've been spending to little and that's made it difficult for industry to survive, and any order is very precious. And the US have been consistently expecting to little from industry, letting them get away with poor performance. But in any case many Western shipbuilding programs are overpriced and take far too long.

Even if they could build a 500 or so ship navy they wouldn't have the capacity to maintain it.

 

[John Fedup]

@Toptob ...some good points about industry contractors and the customers themselves. The consolidation of vendors via mergers is part of the problem as is pork barrel politics. The LSC is a standout example. Without discussing the merits of or lack of cutting back the F-35, when a program is spread out over almost all US states, it is very difficult.

As for customers, many nations treat defence as economic work programs rather than as vital needs for national sovereignty. Australia and Canada both have governments that have to address regional pork barrel demands although not quite as severe as the US. All nations have different defence requirements and modifying existing designs to suite these needs along with local content further complicates things. Regardless of good intentions, defence procurement now is going to be very difficult with most Western nations facing huge economic problems due to years of incompetence and COVID.

 

[ngatimozart]

The USNI has a link to the unclassified 1978 three-volume history, Sea-Based Airborne Antisubmarine Warfare 1940-1977 that was declassified in 1990.

The History of Sea-Based Airborne Antisubmarine Warfare: 1940-1977 - USNI News

The following is the unclassified 1978 three-volume history, Sea-Based Airborne Antisubmarine Warfare 1940-1977. The so-called Cross report was declassified in 1990. A partial version of this report was published by USNI News last month as part of the rolling release of documents related to the...

news.usni.org

The USN has also ordered 4 more CVM-22B Osprey. However I have never heard of a the C-2A Greyhound helicopter so that must have been some super secret USN fling wing design masquerading as a fixed wing design.

Navy orders four more CMV-22B variant aircraft in $309.5M deal - UPI.com

The Bell-Boeing Joint Project Office received a$309.5 million Navy contract to deliver four CMV-22B Osprey helicopters, the Defense Department said last week.

www.upi.com

 

[Terran]

The USNI has a link to the unclassified 1978 three-volume history, Sea-Based Airborne Antisubmarine Warfare 1940-1977 that was declassified in 1990.

The History of Sea-Based Airborne Antisubmarine Warfare: 1940-1977 - USNI News

The following is the unclassified 1978 three-volume history, Sea-Based Airborne Antisubmarine Warfare 1940-1977. The so-called Cross report was declassified in 1990. A partial version of this report was published by USNI News last month as part of the rolling release of documents related to the...

news.usni.org

The USN has also ordered 4 more CVM-22B Osprey. However I have never heard of a the C-2A Greyhound helicopter so that must have been some super secret USN fling wing design masquerading as a fixed wing design.

Navy orders four more CMV-22B variant aircraft in $309.5M deal - UPI.com

The Bell-Boeing Joint Project Office received a$309.5 million Navy contract to deliver four CMV-22B Osprey helicopters, the Defense Department said last week.

www.upi.com

I have to say the CMV22B buy is one of the most sensible buys. I know some people have been up in arms about it but when you consider issues of range, ability to land on just about any ship and right from the factory In flight refueling. The latter never offered on C2.