US Navy News and updates

[Boagrius]

I do think that the ASBM and hypersonic missile discussions are relevant, though. It shows CSGs may be vulnerable, and they may need less investment compared to other chess pieces. Still, isn't that the most basic discussion of our national defence moment?

I'm not yet convinced that it does. After further reading, it seems that the most modern current and forthcoming SM3 Block II ought to be capable of destroying the Yaogan satellites upon which the Chinese ASBM seem to depend.

https://fas.org/pubs/pir/2011winter/2011Winter-Anti-Satellite.pdf
https://www.globalsecurity.org/space/world/china/yaogan-recsat.htm

When coupled to the requisite sensors (AMDR?) an effective means of severely degrading or nullifying these weapons may already exist.

 

[stevenyeadon]

I'm not yet convinced that it does. After further reading, it seems that the most modern current and forthcoming SM3 Block II ought to be capable of destroying the Yaogan satellites upon which the Chinese ASBM seem to depend.

https://fas.org/pubs/pir/2011winter/2011Winter-Anti-Satellite.pdf
https://www.globalsecurity.org/space/world/china/yaogan-recsat.htm

When coupled to the requisite sensors (AMDR?) an effective means of severely degrading or nullifying these weapons may already exist.

This could be very true when you combine the facts the CSGs will likely be 700+ nautical miles from the Spratly islands when projecting power. That, thanks to the new Stingray refuelers. CSGs will also have the cover of EABs created using friendly islands in the vicinity. Only the longest ranged assets the Chinese have such as satellites, their relatively noisy nuclear attack submarines, and potentially their OTH radars will be of use. I am at a loss to think of anything else they might use at such ranges.

Still, I worry about the Kessler Syndrome should we use ASATs to deny the Chinese ASBMs, especially since a retaliation by the Chinese could make things much, much worse. Potentially tens of billions of dollars in commercial and governmental assets could be wiped out with access to space getting even harder to do.

 

[Boagrius]

Still, I worry about the Kessler Syndrome should we use ASATs to deny the Chinese ASBMs, especially since a retaliation by the Chinese could make things much, much worse. Potentially tens of billions of dollars in commercial and governmental assets could be wiped out with access to space getting even harder to do.

True, but if we reach a point where the widespread survival of major USN surface combatants is at stake (including the incredibly expensive CSGs we have just talked about) I am not sure how much restraint either side would be showing to one another's space based assets. I dare say that all bets could be off on that one.

 

[Todjaeger]

Not to detail the conversation entirely, but what about a modern Chinese equivalent to the Tselina system? Russia is certainly going that route with the Liana. Could they get a large ballistic missile close enough for the missile's built in sensors to kick in and acquire the target independently at that point?

I have a more basic question. Is there a ballistic missile which has demonstrated the capability to hit a moving/maneuvering target?

If yes, then an answer about using an onboard sensor with a MTI would become a bit more relevant.

 

[ngatimozart]

We do know that the Chinese have fielded the DF21D, we don't know how good it is. We cannot presume that it's inadequate, because they are not stupid. With regard to targeting, they could use space based targeting with mid flight targeting data. Is the warhead manoeureable? We don't know. We have to assume that it is because they have worked on this for a long time and they know that it has to follow a moving target. There is a time lag in in signal time from space based sensors, but not long enough to affect targeting. They could have also fitted sensors in the warhead. We cannot discount any of the above. In 1941 the west said that the Japanese couldn't beat a European / US army, navy or air force, but they did all three in 1941 & 42. Very bad underestimation of an enemy based on mistaken preconceived ideas, and now is not the time to repeat thme same mistakes.

 

[Todjaeger]

We do know that the Chinese have fielded the DF21D, we don't know how good it is. We cannot presume that it's inadequate, because they are not stupid. With regard to targeting, they could use space based targeting with mid flight targeting data. Is the warhead manoeureable? We don't know. We have to assume that it is because they have worked on this for a long time and they know that it has to follow a moving target. There is a time lag in in signal time from space based sensors, but not long enough to affect targeting. They could have also fitted sensors in the warhead. We cannot discount any of the above. In 1941 the west said that the Japanese couldn't beat a European / US army, navy or air force, but they did all three in 1941 & 42. Very bad underestimation of an enemy based on mistaken preconceived ideas, and now is not the time to repeat thme same mistakes.

I agree that one should not assume that the system is inadequate. However, given that I know of no examples of similar systems successfully tested by other nations, some of whom have had advanced ballistic missile and sensor systems for a very long time, I am also concerned that the capabilities might also be getting overstated.

Reagan's Star Wars/SDI programme comes to mind in a somewhat similar manner.

 

[stevenyeadon]

I figured I would post some information on what the COCOMs want the USN to look like given actual demand. This is what the actual demand for classes looks like.

The U.S. Navy desired by the COCOMs:

Ballistic Missile Submarines	12
Aircraft Carriers	15
Amphibious Warfare Ships	~54
Attack Submarines	~87
Large Surface Combatants	Unknown, but it would have to be over 104 ships
Combat Logistics Force	Unknown, but it would have to be over 32 ships
Total	Unknown, but over 395 ships at base

Navy Wants 355 Ships; New Assessment Adds Destroyers, Attack Subs

Amphib USS Wasp Will Deploy With Surface Action Group in 2017

WASHINGTON, D.C. — When amphibious warship USS Wasp (LHD-1) deploys the first time from its new homeport in Japan in late 2017, it’ll ship out with some extras: a squadron of Marine F-35B Lighting II Joint Strike Fighters, three guided-missile destroyers, a Marine general and a Navy admiral. The...

news.usni.org

 

[Feanor]

I have a more basic question. Is there a ballistic missile which has demonstrated the capability to hit a moving/maneuvering target?

If yes, then an answer about using an onboard sensor with a MTI would become a bit more relevant.

I guess it becomes a question of whether this is something the Chinese would in fact demonstrate, or prefer to keep to themselves... and if we want to assume credibility given the resources spent on deploying the system, or assume lack of capability until definitely proven. I suspect this conversation is academic, but I was more curious as to your reply if we assume that they can hit a moving warship at least some of the time. Would the satellite+onboard sensors combination suffice in principle?

 

[Todjaeger]

I guess it becomes a question of whether this is something the Chinese would in fact demonstrate, or prefer to keep to themselves... and if we want to assume credibility given the resources spent on deploying the system, or assume lack of capability until definitely proven. I suspect this conversation is academic, but I was more curious as to your reply if we assume that they can hit a moving warship at least some of the time. Would the satellite+onboard sensors combination suffice in principle?

The basic question I asked was actually even broader than about Chinese capabilities. Has anyone been able to get a ballistic missile warhead to hit a maneuvering target?

If no one has demonstrated such a capability, then there could be designs which are theoretically capable of doing so, but are also unproven. This then also means that such designs might be incapable of actually scoring hits vs. a maneuvering target except for a lucky hit, or the ASBM version of the Golden BB.

A similar sort of question exists for having a seeker head installed in a ballistic missile warhead, has anyone designed one and then tested it to see if it actually worked as intended? Given the speeds that a ballistic missile can travel at (Mach 10+) that could cause a number of problems with the function of an onboard seeker, not unlike some of the problems which have been occurring with guidance on hypersonics. The seeker portion of the warhead would need to be rugged enough to deal with the both the G forces and heat associated with passing through air at Mach 10, yet still permit what would most likely have to be RF/microwave radiation through (out and then back in) if using ARH. This also leaves open the potential for an ARH seeker to be spoofed or jammed. This is also all assuming that whatever systems and datalinks being used in the first place can guide the inbound manuevering warhead to within sensor range so that the ARH can search a kill box, find the target, and the maneuver to effect either a direct hit, or strike close enough to damage the target. Keep in mind that the CEP for a number of PRC ballistic missiles is 10m+ when targeting stationary targets.

When I went to go back and re-read about ASBM's, much of the information I came across dates from around 2009, and at least at the time, there was concern about the possible development, and that at the time there was "no defense against it" if it worked as theorized. That concern about it, if it worked as theorized, to me was and is rather noteworthy. IMO the PRC would want to know whether or not such a system would work properly if called upon to engage the USN in a conflict in the SCS or ECS. That would NOT be the time for the PRC to initiate a ballistic missile launch, or especially multiple ballistic missile launches, and then have things go awry. Secondly, IMO the PRC would likely not want to keep such a capability really a secret, especially if they wanted to keep USN vessels and task forces out of areas of interest to the PRC like the ECS and SCS. If the PRC had an actual, demonstrated ASBM capability capable of achieving mission kills (or worse) against US warships, they could use knowledge of such a capability to great effect as the USN would be wary about letting too many warships get within possible targeting range. In effect, getting the USN to have a smaller, less active presence in those areas of interest to China, all without even needing to actually fire the missiles.

The articles from a decade ago also mentioned issues which would require resolution in order for an ASBM system to be effective, namely target detection, tracking, and datalinking. To my knowledge, and I freely admit to not being an expert in current PRC combat systems, but as I understand it, China is still testing both datalink and broad area surveillance systems, as well as surveillance satellites. That could mean that the issue of locating targets for an ASBM could still be problem.

 

[ngatimozart]

I figured I would post some information on what the COCOMs want the USN to look like given actual demand. This is what the actual demand for classes looks like.

The U.S. Navy desired by the COCOMs:

Ballistic Missile Submarines	12
Aircraft Carriers	15
Amphibious Warfare Ships	~54
Attack Submarines	~87
Large Surface Combatants	Unknown, but it would have to be over 104 ships
Combat Logistics Force	Unknown, but it would have to be over 32 ships
Total	Unknown, but over 395 ships at base

Navy Wants 355 Ships; New Assessment Adds Destroyers, Attack Subs

Amphib USS Wasp Will Deploy With Surface Action Group in 2017

WASHINGTON, D.C. — When amphibious warship USS Wasp (LHD-1) deploys the first time from its new homeport in Japan in late 2017, it’ll ship out with some extras: a squadron of Marine F-35B Lighting II Joint Strike Fighters, three guided-missile destroyers, a Marine general and a Navy admiral. The...

news.usni.org

YOU ARE BASICALLY REPOSTING THE SAME MATERIAL AND REPEATING THE SAME ARGUMENTS . WE DON'T REALLY UNDERSTAND THE REASONING OF YOUR ARGUMENTS BECAUSE THEY ARE INCOHERENT.

EACH COUNTRY DOES ITS FUNDING SUMS DIFFERENTLY AND THE US IS NOT UNUSUAL IN THAT. HOWEVER WHEN LOOKING AT DEFENCE COSTINGS THEY CANNOT BE TAKEN AT FACE VALUE BECAUSE YOU HAVE TO KNOW HOW THEY ARE CALCULATED AND WHAT THEY ACTUALLY INCLUDE BEFORE YOU CAN REACH ANY INFORMED CONCLUSIONS. THEREFORE I STRONGLY SUGGEST THAT YOU REAPPRAISE WHAT YOU ARE ACTUALLY DISCUSSING.

 

[Boagrius]

I take ngati's point in that it would be safer to assume that the Chinese ASBM capability functions as intended. With that assumption in mind, we are left considering what countermeasures the USN has at Its disposal.

From the available information it appears that the DF21D may use a combination of OTH radar and ISR satellites for cueing, with the latter providing tracking updates prior to activation of onboard sensors in terminal phase.

AFAIK, China's existing OTH radar capability provides significant coverage into the West Pacific, making it well suited as a compliment to DF21D. That said, it is comprised of large static arrays so the US could realistically target them at the outset of hostilities via LACM (perhaps submarine delivered) or the future LRHW.

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www.janes.com

The next component in the ASBM kill chain appears to be the Yaogan ISR satellite constellation. As stated previously, all of these appear to fit comfortably in the engagement envelope of SM3 Blk II, which may provide the USN with an extraordinary ASAT capability thanks to the mobility afforded by ship based launchers.

https://fas.org/pubs/pir/2011winter/2011Winter-Anti-Satellite.pdf

There is certainly a discussion to be had about the unprecedented ramifications of destroying the LEO satellites of a major power en masse like this, but the capability seems to be there, and was successfully tested in Operation Burnt Frost.

The final step would be to defeat the incoming missile itself. Without knowing what method the RV uses for terminal guidance, it is difficult to say what soft kill countermeasures may work against it. Given the immense heat generated by a weapon travelling at such high speed, my guess is that an active RF based seeker is more likely than a passive IR/EO one. AFAIK existing USN EW systems like SEWIP are not geared to dealing with a weapon of this kind. With that said, I do understand that AESA radars are regularly credited with the ability to perform electronic attack, so I wonder if an immensely powerful radar like SPY6 might be able to perform EA on the inbound RV.

As stated before, the only kinetic response the USN might be able to use would be SM6, preferably in its reportedly hypersonic Blk IB iteration. How reliable this would be is hard to say, but no other weapon in the USN arsenal appears to have the kinematic qualities needed to intercept such a high and fast target in terminal phase.

So looking at the above it does seem as though the US has some credible options available to break the PRC ASBM kill chain in multiple places. I suspect it is going to be difficult to ascertain just how effective each would be based exclusively on OSINT.

 

[Feanor]

The basic question I asked was actually even broader than about Chinese capabilities. Has anyone been able to get a ballistic missile warhead to hit a maneuvering target?

If no one has demonstrated such a capability, then there could be designs which are theoretically capable of doing so, but are also unproven. This then also means that such designs might be incapable of actually scoring hits vs. a maneuvering target except for a lucky hit, or the ASBM version of the Golden BB.

A similar sort of question exists for having a seeker head installed in a ballistic missile warhead, has anyone designed one and then tested it to see if it actually worked as intended? Given the speeds that a ballistic missile can travel at (Mach 10+) that could cause a number of problems with the function of an onboard seeker, not unlike some of the problems which have been occurring with guidance on hypersonics. The seeker portion of the warhead would need to be rugged enough to deal with the both the G forces and heat associated with passing through air at Mach 10, yet still permit what would most likely have to be RF/microwave radiation through (out and then back in) if using ARH. This also leaves open the potential for an ARH seeker to be spoofed or jammed. This is also all assuming that whatever systems and datalinks being used in the first place can guide the inbound manuevering warhead to within sensor range so that the ARH can search a kill box, find the target, and the maneuver to effect either a direct hit, or strike close enough to damage the target. Keep in mind that the CEP for a number of PRC ballistic missiles is 10m+ when targeting stationary targets.

When I went to go back and re-read about ASBM's, much of the information I came across dates from around 2009, and at least at the time, there was concern about the possible development, and that at the time there was "no defense against it" if it worked as theorized. That concern about it, if it worked as theorized, to me was and is rather noteworthy. IMO the PRC would want to know whether or not such a system would work properly if called upon to engage the USN in a conflict in the SCS or ECS. That would NOT be the time for the PRC to initiate a ballistic missile launch, or especially multiple ballistic missile launches, and then have things go awry. Secondly, IMO the PRC would likely not want to keep such a capability really a secret, especially if they wanted to keep USN vessels and task forces out of areas of interest to the PRC like the ECS and SCS. If the PRC had an actual, demonstrated ASBM capability capable of achieving mission kills (or worse) against US warships, they could use knowledge of such a capability to great effect as the USN would be wary about letting too many warships get within possible targeting range. In effect, getting the USN to have a smaller, less active presence in those areas of interest to China, all without even needing to actually fire the missiles.

The articles from a decade ago also mentioned issues which would require resolution in order for an ASBM system to be effective, namely target detection, tracking, and datalinking. To my knowledge, and I freely admit to not being an expert in current PRC combat systems, but as I understand it, China is still testing both datalink and broad area surveillance systems, as well as surveillance satellites. That could mean that the issue of locating targets for an ASBM could still be problem.

This helps, thank you. I suspect the problem must be soluble at least in principle, since Russia presumably uses some sort of seeker on both the air-launched BM RS-74 Kinzhal, and the Avangard combat block for ICBMs. However the Avangard is quite large, and carries a nuclear warhead, while the RS-74 is, to the best of my knowledge, not formally accepted for service which leaves questions open as to the effectiveness of its seeker and it's ability to hit a maneuvering target at sea (and it's not launched from a giant distance away based on nothing more then satellite data). I know the comparison is imperfect, but the Iskander-M (from whom the Kinzhal is derived) is a BM and a PGM, though again the range is not nearly as great.

EDIT: This almost slipped my mind, but the PRC is also working on an air-launched BM carried by the H-6 bomber. I wonder how much of the experience and solutions developed can carry over between these programs.

 

[stevenyeadon]

YOU ARE BASICALLY REPOSTING THE SAME MATERIAL AND REPEATING THE SAME ARGUMENTS . WE DON'T REALLY UNDERSTAND THE REASONING OF YOUR ARGUMENTS BECAUSE THEY ARE INCOHERENT.

EACH COUNTRY DOES ITS FUNDING SUMS DIFFERENTLY AND THE US IS NOT UNUSUAL IN THAT. HOWEVER WHEN LOOKING AT DEFENCE COSTINGS THEY CANNOT BE TAKEN AT FACE VALUE BECAUSE YOU HAVE TO KNOW HOW THEY ARE CALCULATED AND WHAT THEY ACTUALLY INCLUDE BEFORE YOU CAN REACH ANY INFORMED CONCLUSIONS. THEREFORE I STRONGLY SUGGEST THAT YOU REAPPRAISE WHAT YOU ARE ACTUALLY DISCUSSING.

My mistake, the information I posted does not add to the discussion. This discussion has already gotten to an in depth analysis of the ASBM threat from China. I have nothing to add then. The debate has singled out the biggest issue to the aircraft carrier and both sides of the debate have made good points.

 

[ngatimozart]

This helps, thank you. I suspect the problem must be soluble at least in principle, since Russia presumably uses some sort of seeker on both the air-launched BM RS-74 Kinzhal, and the Avangard combat block for ICBMs. However the Avangard is quite large, and carries a nuclear warhead, while the RS-74 is, to the best of my knowledge, not formally accepted for service which leaves questions open as to the effectiveness of its seeker and it's ability to hit a maneuvering target at sea (and it's not launched from a giant distance away based on nothing more then satellite data). I know the comparison is imperfect, but the Iskander-M (from whom the Kinzhal is derived) is a BM and a PGM, though again the range is not nearly as great.

EDIT: This almost slipped my mind, but the PRC is also working on an air-launched BM carried by the H-6 bomber. I wonder how much of the experience and solutions developed can carry over between these programs.

I also read that the PRC are working on an air launched BM from the H-6. I thought it was the DF21D that they were working on, which would make a lot of sense. That definitely would push the USN CBG further. Can't remember where I read it though.

 

[Boagrius]

I also read that the PRC are working on an air launched BM from the H-6. I thought it was the DF21D that they were working on, which would make a lot of sense. That definitely would push the USN CBG further. Can't remember where I read it though.

Yes, that is the CH-AS-X-13 I referred to earlier. A decent write up on these developments below

 

[Boagrius]

Another interesting piece on the DF21D specifically:

On January 8, 2011 while en route to Beijing, then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates took questions on Chinese military modernization. Responding to a question about the ASBM, Gates said “We’ve been watching these developments all along. I’ve been concerned about the development of the anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles ever since I took this job [in 2007]...They clearly have the potential to put some of our capabilities at risk and we have to pay attention to them, we have to respond appropriately with our own programs.” In fact, he elaborated, “some of [DOD’s] higher priority areas for investment are focused on some of these anti-access programs.”...

...In a series of interviews in spring 2011, then-U.S. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Gary Roughead downplayed the impact of China’s ASBM. Admiral Roughead explained “You have to look at the total employment of the weapon. You have to look at the nature of being able to first locate, then target, and then engage a moving seaborne target at range...I really do think it is not the game-changer people have played it up to be.” As he elaborated, the goal of the U.S. Navy is “to not be denied ocean areas [where we] can operate, or not be restricted in our ability to operate.” Most importantly, Roughead stated unequivocally “we have systems that can counter weapons like [the DF21D]...

...“Countering China’s projected ASBMs could involve employing a combination of active (i.e. ‘hard-kill’) measures, such as shooting down ASBMs with interceptor missiles, and passive (i.e. ‘soft-kill’) measures, such as those for masking the exact location of Navy ships or confusing ASBM reentry vehicles. Employing a combination of active and passive measures would attack various points in the ASBM ‘kill chain’—the sequence of events that needs to be completed to carry out a successful ASBM attack. This sequence includes detection, identification, and localization of the target ship, transmission of that data to the ASBM launcher, firing the ASBM, and having the ASBM reentry vehicle find the target ship. “Attacking various points in an opponent’s kill chain is an established method for countering an opponent’s military capability. A September 30, 2011, press report, for example, quotes Lieutenant General Herbert Carlisle, the Air Force’s deputy chief of staff for operations, plans, and requirements, as stating in regard to Air Force planning that ‘We’ve taken [China’s] kill chains apart to the “nth” degree.’ In an interview published on January 14, 2013, Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert, the Chief of Naval Operations, stated: ‘In order for one to conduct any kind of attack, whether it is a ballistic missile or cruise missile, you have got to find somebody. Then, you have got to make sure it is somebody you want to shoot. Then, you’ve got to track it, you’ve got to hold that track. Then, you deliver the missile. We often talk about what I would call hard kill—knocking it down, a bullet on a bullet—or soft kill; there is jamming, spoofing, confusing; and we look at that whole spectrum of operations. And frankly, it is cheaper in the left-hand side of that spectrum. “To attack the ASBM kill chain, Navy surface ships, for example, could operate in ways (such as controlling electromagnetic emissions or using deception emitters) that make it more difficult for China to detect, identify, and track those ships. The Navy could acquire weapons and systems for disabling or jamming China’s long-range.

http://www.andrewerickson.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Chinese-Anti-Ship-Ballistic-Missile-Development_Book_Jamestown_2013.pdf

Now, bearing in mind this article is now 7 years old, there seems to have been both a focus on defeating this type of weapon for some time, and considerable confidence in the USN's ability to do so. How well placed that confidence is I don't know, but I am inclined to agree that disrupting the missile's ability to acquire a target rather than kill it with an interceptor seems like a more practical solution. With the advancements China has made in hypersonics, it may be a matter of time before a future ASBM appears with a maneuvering hypersonic glider rather than a ballistic RV, or with a MIRV payload, making the task of direct interception even more difficult.

With all this said, I do believe that the US will need to develop effective countermeasures to the ASBM threat regardless of how it designs its future fleet. Even if the CSGs were disbanded entirely (for argument's sake), Chinese ASBM capable of reliably completing the kill chain would still represent a serious threat to USN surface ships of all types, ranging from future Frigates, to Arleigh Burke, Ticonderoga and any of its support and amphibious vessels. In short, restructuring the USN to reduce emphasis on carriers and redistribute resources elsewhere may do little to address the problem or provide the USN with superior strategic options(?).
...

 

[Blackshoe]

It's absolutely true that the PRC ASBM threat (if operational) is a major threat to US CSGs and their ability (as constituted now) to conduct strike and project power ashore.

However...

A) in a broader sense, I question the logic of focusing on power projection ashore as a viable strategy against the PRC
B) and relatedly, lots of ways to cut off SLOCs that don't involve getting inside of notional missile ranges.

 

[Blackshoe]

I figured I would post some information on what the COCOMs want the USN to look like given actual demand. This is what the actual demand for classes looks like.

At the risk of re-opening this conversastion:
1. "COCOM demands do not match budgetary submission" is right up there "General Francisco Franco remains dead" in terms of news-worthiness
2. "Actual demand"=/= "an actual demand"

 

[buffy9]

Still, I worry about the Kessler Syndrome should we use ASATs to deny the Chinese ASBMs, especially since a retaliation by the Chinese could make things much, much worse. Potentially tens of billions of dollars in commercial and governmental assets could be wiped out with access to space getting even harder to do.

Late reply I know, but there is a greater focus on utilising non-kinetic means to take down satellites - including reversible means which do not have a permanent impact on the satellite or the constellation. The Kessler Syndrome is bad, but it is not a critical issue until masses of satellites are destroyed/impacted.

In terms of other capabilities besides satellites and OTHR, they do exist in some capacity - the below link being perhaps the most notable as an A2AD penetrating asset.

China's High-Speed Drone Is Rocket-Powered And All About Doing What Satellites Can't

The aircraft is designed to rapidly gather intel in contested areas by surprise and especially when key satellites are no longer operational.

www.thedrive.com

I'm in agreement with Tod however. Such a lengthy kill chain would show vulnerabilities that would be (and are) being exploited by USN planners. Personally, I'd argue such systems may be place holders until the PLAN has been built up, the PLASSF has developed continuous and robust constellations and the PLARF is equipped with hypersonics. The US has already shown to China an intention to counter ballistic missiles (PAC-3, THAAD, SM-3, etc) and considering China's tendancy to look long-term, it would conceivably make sense that the DF-21 and DF-26 could be modified to carry HGW.

It remains to be seen. A show of force by the DF-21D or any other ASBM in the seas surrounding may come at a time when the CCP deems it necessary to deter particular action - potentially a US intervention in Taiwan.

 

[Boagrius]

I think the ASBM question is also symptomatic of a broader intent on the part of the PRC to be able to attack USN vessels at ever greater distances from the Chinese mainland. While the PRC's requisite C4ISR apparatus strikes me as vulnerable for the time being, I expect that both it and their ASBM arsenal will grow over time, (allowing for ever larger salvos and the capacity to repeatedly subject CSG's to them, depleting available countermeasures) alongside LO ISR & ASuW aircraft and nuclear submarines. If the PRC reaches a point where it can attack USN CSGs while they are en route to (rather than merely "in") the West Pacific then I can see how a re-assessment of the current force structure would be called for.

To my mind, I imagine this might take the form of using smaller, cheaper carriers primarily for fleet defence/escort and investing more heavily in SSN/SSGN and heavily signature reduced surface vessels akin to the Zumwalt class design. With this said, it might be decades before such a transition could take place which may allow for other disruptive technologies to come to the fore in the meantime (EM railguns, HVPs, DEWs etc.). A nuclear powered CVN may yet be better placed to take advantage of said technologies than a smaller, cheaper, conventionally powered one.