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[buffy9]

I think the ASBM question is also symptomatic of a broader intent on the part of the PRC to be able to attack USN vessels at ever greater distances from the Chinese mainland. While the PRC's requisite C4ISR apparatus strikes me as vulnerable for the time being, I expect that both it and their ASBM arsenal will grow over time, (allowing for ever larger salvos and the capacity to repeatedly subject CSG's to them, depleting available countermeasures) alongside LO ISR & ASuW aircraft and nuclear submarines. If the PRC reaches a point where it can attack USN CSGs while they are en route to (rather than merely "in") the West Pacific then I can see how a re-assessment of the current force structure would be called for.

To my mind, I imagine this might take the form of using smaller, cheaper carriers primarily for fleet defence/escort and investing more heavily in SSN/SSGN and heavily signature reduced surface vessels akin to the Zumwalt class design. With this said, it might be decades before such a transition could take place which may allow for other disruptive technologies to come to the fore in the meantime (EM railguns, HVPs, DEWs etc.). A nuclear powered CVN may yet be better placed to take advantage of said technologies than a smaller, cheaper, conventionally powered one.

China's military modernisation is not set to be fully complete until 2035 - another fifteen years in the making. In the mean time, both the US and China are investing substantially into R&D - preparation for any such conflict.

The risk of conflict remains seeningly low. Disputes over islands and island chains could lead to clashes, whereas Chinese efforts to reign in Taiwan may lead to a more serious confrontation on ideology/sovereignty grounds. Still, both sides are dependent economically on the other whereas conflict threatens a region filled with shipping. Even if conflict does occur and GPS/BeiDou is impacted, it only serves to massively reduce the precision of all assets in the battlespace - reducing effectiveness and placing shipping st far greater risk. I could go in depth, but this isn't the thread for it.

With regards to investing into major fleet units (Zumwalt-class specifically) there has been a trend pointing towards utilising more distributed, unmanned/autonomous platforms. In an age where information can spread far and wide easily, the images of drowning or dead sailors could be catastrophic on the human front.

Also at play in this regard (and arguably more important, as large casualties are a norm in major conflict) is the fact that investing in such large expensive assets takes time and money that can easily be lost or countered during the time it comes online. The Zumwalt-class, whilst having resistance to radar, is not immune to imagery which is becoming increasingly important both in space and in the air.

Investing in unmanned arsenal ships decreases the risk to personnel, limits much of the cost primarily to munitions and would not be overly reliant on organic sensors and other components. There are pros and cons, as discussed in the arsenal ship thread. Similar USV can also be employed in greater numbers also for ASW and ASuW, whereas the cost to build even such stealth coated/designed vessels would come at far reduced cost than a Zumwalt-class.

'Sea Hunter,' a Drone Ship With no Crew, Just Joined the U.S. Navy Fleet | Digital Trends

After two years of testing and evaluation by DARPA and the military, command of the "Sea Hunter," an unmanned autonomous warship, has been officially passed to the U.S. Navy.

www.digitaltrends.com

Submarines are certainly capable and a major advantage currently, though it remains to be seen how well they will perform in the region as ASW becomes increasingly important. Utilising major submarines (SSN and SSGN) as motherships/breakthrough ships is also a concept I quite like with large quantities of unmanned assets being utilised as supporters. I like the term "sneakthrough," implying the use of unmanned systems to find a route and lure enemy forces away.

The ability to use cheap sensor and shooter mass via unmanned platforms will become increasingly important, particularly when so much territory needs to be covered and the the cost of error (I.e. losing a major ship/group) becomes increasingly worse.

The problem with ASBM is that they are designed primarily to counter large expensive platforms, partially driving in my view the current shift towards the ideas noted above. Without such large expensive platforms, the use of ASBM becomes more limited. This being said, there are flaws with the above concepts (unmanned is not fit for everything, far from it) the range/sophistication of ASBM will only increase - potentially forcing USN assets further out, therefore increasing the kill chain/sensor chain with their own unmanned assets.

The FFG(X), has been noted previously as being a cheaper platform to produce than escort/ABM designed DDGs. Depending on how such ASBM proliferate, large numbers of "mid-tier" platforms operating as motherships and SAGs could be an economic counter to ASBMs - there cost not grand like CSG/ARG, but capable enough to defend themselves and support a shorter kill chain closer to the Chinese mainland.

Links forthcoming:

Mosaic Warfare | Air & Space Forces Magazine

Designing a new way of war to restore America’s military competitiveness.

www.airforcemag.com

 

[ngatimozart]

It's absolutely true that the PRC ASBM threat (if operational) is a major threat to US CSGs and their ability (as constituted now) to conduct strike and project power ashore.

However...

A) in a broader sense, I question the logic of focusing on power projection ashore as a viable strategy against the PRC
B) and relatedly, lots of ways to cut off SLOCs that don't involve getting inside of notional missile ranges.

That's the PRC's Achilles heel; it's dependency upon SLOC for energy, resources, and food. And they know it. That's why they want to build the canal in Thailand that cuts out the Straits of Malakka choke point, and they're building up their presence in the Indian Ocean. It's what the Silk Road policy is about, by trying to move as much stuff overland as possible, reducing its reliance on its SLOC.

 

[ngatimozart]

China's military modernisation is not set to be fully complete until 2035 - another fifteen years in the making. In the mean time, both the US and China are investing substantially into R&D - preparation for any such conflict.

The risk of conflict remains seeningly low. Disputes over islands and island chains could lead to clashes, whereas Chinese efforts to reign in Taiwan may lead to a more serious confrontation on ideology/sovereignty grounds. Still, both sides are dependent economically on the other whereas conflict threatens a region filled with shipping. Even if conflict does occur and GPS/BeiDou is impacted, it only serves to massively reduce the precision of all assets in the battlespace - reducing effectiveness and placing shipping st far greater risk. I could go in depth, but this isn't the thread for it.

With regards to investing into major fleet units (Zumwalt-class specifically) there has been a trend pointing towards utilising more distributed, unmanned/autonomous platforms. In an age where information can spread far and wide easily, the images of drowning or dead sailors could be catastrophic on the human front.

Also at play in this regard (and arguably more important, as large casualties are a norm in major conflict) is the fact that investing in such large expensive assets takes time and money that can easily be lost or countered during the time it comes online. The Zumwalt-class, whilst having resistance to radar, is not immune to imagery which is becoming increasingly important both in space and in the air.

Investing in unmanned arsenal ships decreases the risk to personnel, limits much of the cost primarily to munitions and would not be overly reliant on organic sensors and other components. There are pros and cons, as discussed in the arsenal ship thread. Similar USV can also be employed in greater numbers also for ASW and ASuW, whereas the cost to build even such stealth coated/designed vessels would come at far reduced cost than a Zumwalt-class.

'Sea Hunter,' a Drone Ship With no Crew, Just Joined the U.S. Navy Fleet | Digital Trends

After two years of testing and evaluation by DARPA and the military, command of the "Sea Hunter," an unmanned autonomous warship, has been officially passed to the U.S. Navy.

www.digitaltrends.com

Submarines are certainly capable and a major advantage currently, though it remains to be seen how well they will perform in the region as ASW becomes increasingly important. Utilising major submarines (SSN and SSGN) as motherships/breakthrough ships is also a concept I quite like with large quantities of unmanned assets being utilised as supporters. I like the term "sneakthrough," implying the use of unmanned systems to find a route and lure enemy forces away.

The ability to use cheap sensor and shooter mass via unmanned platforms will become increasingly important, particularly when so much territory needs to be covered and the the cost of error (I.e. losing a major ship/group) becomes increasingly worse.

The problem with ASBM is that they are designed primarily to counter large expensive platforms, partially driving in my view the current shift towards the ideas noted above. Without such large expensive platforms, the use of ASBM becomes more limited. This being said, there are flaws with the above concepts (unmanned is not fit for everything, far from it) the range/sophistication of ASBM will only increase - potentially forcing USN assets further out, therefore increasing the kill chain/sensor chain with their own unmanned assets.

The FFG(X), has been noted previously as being a cheaper platform to produce than escort/ABM designed DDGs. Depending on how such ASBM proliferate, large numbers of "mid-tier" platforms operating as motherships and SAGs could be an economic counter to ASBMs - there cost not grand like CSG/ARG, but capable enough to defend themselves and support a shorter kill chain closer to the Chinese mainland.

Links forthcoming:

Mosaic Warfare | Air & Space Forces Magazine

Designing a new way of war to restore America’s military competitiveness.

www.airforcemag.com

Hmm, are you sure about the time line for the PRC's military modernization? I would be somewhat careful about that to say the least, especially if it's a timeline that they have stated. We have plenty of recent evidence of their willingness to be open and transparent.

If you or others are thinking that the PRC are going to wait until 2035 before kicking off a major military confrontation with the US and others, I believe that you are mistaken. 10 years ago I would've agreed with you, but no longer, since Xi Jinping has been in charge. He's another Mao; in fact he's Maoist because he's taking the party and the country back to Maoism in all its aspects. I say that he's another Mao in that he appears to have an ego like Mao and I think that with his Xi Jinping thought now being party doctrine, he wants to be the 21st Century Mao, possibly even a greater emporer than Mao. If that's the case then that makes him doubly dangerous because of his ego and ambition.

Since 2012 he's increased the rate of PLA modernization across the board and purged any opposition, as well as any incompetents. He's pushed the SCS & ECS aggressions and that speaks to what his aims are. It is now my view that we are looking at possibly the war kicking off in 10 years or less. Xi will want to be alive to savor his victory and wallow in the glory.

 

[stevenyeadon]

It's absolutely true that the PRC ASBM threat (if operational) is a major threat to US CSGs and their ability (as constituted now) to conduct strike and project power ashore.

However...

A) in a broader sense, I question the logic of focusing on power projection ashore as a viable strategy against the PRC
B) and relatedly, lots of ways to cut off SLOCs that don't involve getting inside of notional missile ranges.

As to point A.

I think something often missing from discussions about war with China is the very real risk of escalation with China should joint Fires be used against Chinese territory against military targets. China won't act as if it has less dignity than the US in terms of an attack on its soil. Due to a risk of escalation it seems power projection should take a back seat to sea control and sea denial. Rob the Chinese of effective aggression in the Western Pacific.

Of course, the limited wars of the 20th and 21st centuries have been notoriously difficult to declare victory over. However, the alternative is to risk a crisis not seen since the Cold War.

To me, the South China Sea seems the place to see a flare up first. Given the state of the PLAN Marine Corps, which doesn't seem capable of easily winning a war for Taiwan with the quality of its ground forces. This given the Latest DIA China Military Power report.

IMO, with 20 or so installations in the Paracel Islands and regular patrols around Scarborough Shoal, the Chinese best option seems to be a massive build up of installations in the Spratly Islands. It would force other powers to actively confront them before they all but annex the SCS, allowing Chinese propaganda to label other powers aggressors. How does the USN and partners defeat China in terms of naval capabilities, installations, and information warfare from a position of increasing advantage in the SCS? Will the Chinese escalate to conducting strikes from within their borders, knowing these forces are now military targets to cautious strategists? Will they need to escalate in such a way, given the Spratlys can be supported by forces in the Paracels.

I'm sorry, but I tend to generate more questions than answers.

 

[stevenyeadon]

Hmm, are you sure about the time line for the PRC's military modernization? I would be somewhat careful about that to say the least, especially if it's a timeline that they have stated. We have plenty of recent evidence of their willingness to be open and transparent.

If you or others are thinking that the PRC are going to wait until 2035 before kicking off a major military confrontation with the US and others, I believe that you are mistaken. 10 years ago I would've agreed with you, but no longer, since Xi Jinping has been in charge. He's another Mao; in fact he's Maoist because he's taking the party and the country back to Maoism in all its aspects. I say that he's another Mao in that he appears to have an ego like Mao and I think that with his Xi Jinping thought now being party doctrine, he wants to be the 21st Century Mao, possibly even a greater emporer than Mao. If that's the case then that makes him doubly dangerous because of his ego and ambition.

Since 2012 he's increased the rate of PLA modernization across the board and purged any opposition, as well as any incompetents. He's pushed the SCS & ECS aggressions and that speaks to what his aims are. It is now my view that we are looking at possibly the war kicking off in 10 years or less. Xi will want to be alive to savor his victory and wallow in the glory.

The treatment of minority groups within China is a foreboding sign of where we are going as a global community. Uighur concentration camps and a five year plan to eliminate official sanction of religious groups by the Communist Party. If how you treat your own is any guide to how you treat the Other, then the US and its allies are heading towards terrible, possibly global, conflict with Xi Jinping's China.

 

[ngatimozart]

As to point A.

I think something often missing from discussions about war with China is the very real risk of escalation with China should joint Fires be used against Chinese territory against military targets. China won't act as if it has less dignity than the US in terms of an attack on its soil. Due to a risk of escalation it seems power projection should take a back seat to sea control and sea denial. Rob the Chinese of effective aggression in the Western Pacific.

If / when it got to the point of direct fire against targets on mainland China, the situation would have escalated anyway. IMHO that action is fraught with danger because it means the possibility that the Chinese government may escalate the war to a thermonuclear war. Like the US, they regard their homeland as sacred soil and regard any attack on it as the ultimate insult that can be only avenged in blood, by the annihilation of the perpetrators.

Power projection takes many forms, however you must always stand up to a bully and when you back down it just encourages them. The PRC must understand that it, like all other nations, must live within boundaries and that it cannot help itself to anything it wants, just because it can. It's a signatory to the UN Charter and to the UN Convention of the Law Of the Sea (UNCLOS). It's actions in the SCS & ECS illustrates that any agreements and treaties that it signs aren't worth the paper they're printed on. Yes the US, UK, France etc., are angels either, but they are far better than the PRC.

Of course, the limited wars of the 20th and 21st centuries have been notoriously difficult to declare victory over. However, the alternative is to risk a crisis not seen since the Cold War.

That's very debatable. If you are talking about the wars the US was involved in, then most if not all are the US's own fault, and it's nothing to do with the forces fighting on the ground, but with the civilian leadership in Washington. Some wars they should never have been involved in and others, the pollies just had to micromanage everything and interfere.

The UK and France got a bloody nose in Suez in 1956, a mess of their own making. France was evicted from Vietnam. The UK won the Falklands War in 1982. The USSR was humiliated in Afghanistan.

To me, the South China Sea seems the place to see a flare up first. Given the state of the PLAN Marine Corps, which doesn't seem capable of easily winning a war for Taiwan with the quality of its ground forces. This given the Latest DIA China Military Power report.

IMO, with 20 or so installations in the Paracel Islands and regular patrols around Scarborough Shoal, the Chinese best option seems to be a massive build up of installations in the Spratly Islands. It would force other powers to actively confront them before they all but annex the SCS, allowing Chinese propaganda to label other powers aggressors. How does the USN and partners defeat China in terms of naval capabilities, installations, and information warfare from a position of increasing advantage in the SCS? Will the Chinese escalate to conducting strikes from within their borders, knowing these forces are now military targets to cautious strategists? Will they need to escalate in such a way, given the Spratlys can be supported by forces in the Paracels.

I'm sorry, but I tend to generate more questions than answers.

There are a lot of things that we don't know with certainty about the PLA and its various services. Even the DIA analysis isn't aware of everything because western intelligence will not have significantly infiltrated the PLA and CCP. You also must remember that the PLA belongs to and swears allegiance to the CCP, not the people or head of state.

However it would be remiss of us to presume that they are not as good as us and I would question the assertion that the PLAN marines are lax. The PRC attacking and overrunning Taiwan is never going to be an easy proposition, and anyone who asserts that doesn't know what they are talking about. The PRC will win, but they will pay a heavy price for it, unless they manage to sabotage and significantly disable Taiwanese resistance from within by the use of special forces and Taiwanese traitors.

 

[buffy9]

Hmm, are you sure about the time line for the PRC's military modernization? I would be somewhat careful about that to say the least, especially if it's a timeline that they have stated. We have plenty of recent evidence of their willingness to be open and transparent.

If you or others are thinking that the PRC are going to wait until 2035 before kicking off a major military confrontation with the US and others, I believe that you are mistaken. 10 years ago I would've agreed with you, but no longer, since Xi Jinping has been in charge. He's another Mao; in fact he's Maoist because he's taking the party and the country back to Maoism in all its aspects. I say that he's another Mao in that he appears to have an ego like Mao and I think that with his Xi Jinping thought now being party doctrine, he wants to be the 21st Century Mao, possibly even a greater emporer than Mao. If that's the case then that makes him doubly dangerous because of his ego and ambition.

Since 2012 he's increased the rate of PLA modernization across the board and purged any opposition, as well as any incompetents. He's pushed the SCS & ECS aggressions and that speaks to what his aims are. It is now my view that we are looking at possibly the war kicking off in 10 years or less. Xi will want to be alive to savor his victory and wallow in the glory.

It was stated by Xi himself (link forthcoming, might be a bit) that full modernization had been brought forward from 2050 to 2035. It is assumed that this includes the full "world leading" military that the CCP wanted originally by 2050, which will need to include enormous institutional change and build up. At China's pace this will maybe occur earlier, though for the moment I'm inclined to believe otherwise.

(Can no longer find initial link relating to Xi, will keep looking and update when able. If nothing here, link below relating to wider Chinese ambitions from 2016).

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/23340460.2016.1210240

The BRI has not yet diverted attention away from the Malacca Strait and in the mean time the risk to Chinese shipping remains high. This is in addition to the potential to exploit separatism by foreign actors and questionable reforms to training, doctrine and corruption. This will all take time, which raises the question of whether China believes it has that time and whether the US wishes to give them that time.

Prior to COVID tensions may have continued and competition would have persisted, though a lot of things are up in the air at the moment. Economic depression, as I see it, will be a major source of concern for planners looking over the next decade.

Depending how hard China is hit by the virus (it is difficult to note how much exactly) and much it is affected, there could be a significant push by the CCP to increase nationalism/party support - and potentially to divert away from other issues of concern within the population. To maintain unity, there could be a greater push to reunify Taiwan - with other nations and island chains potentially brought in. This is admittedly without an absolutely clear and in depth understanding of Chinese politics, nor would I seek to go in depth into such a topic at this time.

I'll avoid judging Xi or coming to conclusions as a result, though maintaining leadership over such a large population will be a clear agenda for Chinese leadership over the coming depression - and the means to do that may be significant for more than just China.

From a US perspective, it depends on a lot of things. The next US President will be enormously influential in what many view as a major shift in global politics and the two contenders are different individuals in terms of policy and outlook. How well either will handle it remains to be seen, as they are ultimately the director of grand strategy. Specifically their policy on China and Taiwan will be of particular note.

I don't want to derail the thread into geopolitics and strategy, nor do I want to be an armchair general. What is clear to me is that the decade ahead has the potential to be very significant and it comes down to how major world leaders manage their circumstances.

I'll leave it at that.

 

[ngatimozart]

The treatment of minority groups within China is a foreboding sign of where we are going as a global community. Uighur concentration camps and a five year plan to eliminate official sanction of religious groups by the Communist Party. If how you treat your own is any guide to how you treat the Other, then the US and its allies are heading towards terrible, possibly global, conflict with Xi Jinping's China.

We're all very aware of that, it's not relevant to this thread, and you didn't answer my question.

 

[OPSSG]

Post 1 of 2

Power projection takes many forms, however you must always stand up to a bully and when you back down it just encourages them. The PRC must understand that it, like all other nations, must live within boundaries and that it cannot help itself to anything it wants, just because it can. It's a signatory to the UN Charter and to the UN Convention of the Law Of the Sea (UNCLOS). It's actions in the SCS & ECS illustrates that any agreements and treaties that it signs aren't worth the paper they're printed on...

There are a lot of things that we don't know with certainty about the PLA and its various services. Even the DIA analysis isn't aware of everything because western intelligence will not have significantly infiltrated the PLA and CCP...

..The PRC attacking and overrunning Taiwan is never going to be an easy proposition, and anyone who asserts that doesn't know what they are talking about. The PRC will win, but they will pay a heavy price for it, unless they manage to sabotage and significantly disable Taiwanese resistance from within by the use of special forces and Taiwanese traitors.

1. Taking a stand is important but done in different ways by the littoral states in the SCS & ECS.

2. IMO, China is playing a geo-political chess game, where they want the option to shoot by 2027 to 2031 (round 4) — by which time the PLA(N) would have acquired a 3rd carrier. But if the Chinese do shoot, they lose the chess game. Not only has China built military facilities in the South China Sea; it also deploys offensive capabilities, conducts exercises and actively prevents other vessels and aircraft (be they reconnaissance, civilian fishery or commercial resource exploitation) from conducting their activities. Operations in the South China Sea have developed into ‘grey zone’ warfare, employing a mixture of military coercion, economic inducement, information warfare, and even historical narratives.

3. To add flavour to ngatimozart’s analysis — What the PLA seeks is more options for escalation in round 4: 2027 to 2031 (continuing from our 2016 post in relation to the current disputes and developments in the South China Sea). US Pacific Fleet commander Adm. John Aquilino said in a statement the US is “committed to a rules-based order in the South China Sea, adding, “the Chinese Communist Party must end its pattern of bullying Southeast Asians out of offshore oil, gas, and fisheries. Millions of people in the region depend on those resources for their livelihood.”

4. The West Capella, an exploration vessel, operated by Petronas in the South China Sea (SCS) has been drawing attention from Chinese fishing vessels and Coast Guard ships from Mar to May 2020. On 18 Apr 2020, Reuters reported that the Haiyang Dizhi 8, a Chinese government survey ship, was "tagging" West Capella. They “continued to harass the rig and its supply vessels. In response, Malaysian navy and law enforcement ships have been regularly patrolling the area,” according to the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. Competition in the SCS is an endurance game — it requires stamina and benefits from the “indirect approach.” Presence is more important than firepower. The USS America amphibious ready group was a show of strength, but such fleeting muscular demonstrations are largely ineffective at countering China’s strategy in the SCS. See also: U.S. Naval Standoff With China Fails to Reassure Regional Allies

5. The US Navy is built and deployed with that high-end mission in mind. But at the other end, the great powers are competing day-to-day for global influence. This requires a subtler battle over partners and messages. To win this day-to-day competition, the US Navy will need a dispersed force of smaller, less expensive vessels, like the FFG(X) and the LCS (under its 52 small surface combatant (SSC) 30 year shipbuilding plan):

(i) The 10 new FFG(X) frigates, awarded 30 Apr 2020 will partially help when they arrive.​

​

(ii) The USN plan to forward station LCS ships for periods of 24 months, at three locations will help with forward presence. The forward presence locations for the LCS fleet are as follows:​

​

(a) 3 LCS at Singapore;​

​

(b) 3 LCS at another Western Pacific location, such as Sasebo, Japan, and​

​

(c) 7 LCS at Bahrain.​

​

All forward presence LCS will be operated by dual crews (i.e., Blue and Gold crews), like the Navy’s ballistic missile submarines; and the crews for the ships will be permanently fused with their associated mission package crews—the distinction between core crew and mission package crew will be eliminated.​

The actual motivating force for the US Navy is great power conflict. But the Americans also need a US Navy that is not just ready to win wars, but also a SSC fleet structure that is prepared to win the competition for peace and influence taking place every day. At the end of FY2018, the Navy’s force of SSCs totaled 27 ships, including 0 frigates, 16 LCSs, and 11 mine warfare ships. Under the Navy’s FY2020 30-year (FY2020-FY2049) shipbuilding plan, the SSC force is to grow to 52 ships (34 LCSs and 18 FFG[X]s) in FY2034. As per Sun Tzu - ‘The biggest victory is the one that requires no battle’. So shooting is something China does not intend on doing. They don't need to in this 2020 round (round 2).

A) in a broader sense, I question the logic of focusing on power projection ashore as a viable strategy against the PRC

6. Agreed. It seems that the issue is really to create uncertainty for the PLA second artillery via the conduct of Expeditionary Advance Base Operations (EABO) within the island chains. EABOs take targeting pressure off the US bases in Japan and in Guam. Is that correct?

 

[OPSSG]

Post 2 of 2

7. EABOs will also take pressure off Taiwanese air bases that are presumed attacked (and kept suppressed by part renewal of rocket attacks) —irregardless of the aspirational aspects of the plan (meeting budget reality), the US naval services gain a systems level benefit of giving the enemy too many targets to seek in the island chains.

8. With respect to the cross strait missile arms race, Taiwan’s National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST) is said to have fired some medium-range missiles in Apr 2020 at Jiupeng. The tests are believed to have included the Yun Feng missile, a supersonic land-attack cruise missile that has a range of 1,500 kilometers. The missile, fitted with a ramjet engine, can carry a semi-armor piercing high explosive and fragmentation warhead. The surface-to-surface missile could be deployed to weaken China’s combat capability. The weapon is believed to be able to attack strategic targets including airports, harbors, and command bases located in central China. Land-based missile systems including Yun Feng and other cruise missiles are a vital asset of Taiwan’s arsenal when engaging in asymmetric warfare against China. As the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) poses the greatest threat to Taiwan in the event of a military conflict, the island country would be able to better defend itself if it could launch attacks on China’s air bases.

B) and relatedly, lots of ways to cut off SLOCs that don't involve getting inside of notional missile ranges.

9. Agreed. The conduct of an Indian Ocean or such other potential future blockade elsewhere, is a form of American CATOBAR carrier battlegroup’s escalation dominance, viz-a-viz, the STOBAR equipped carriers (namely, CV16 Liaoning and CV17 Shandong) of the PLA(N). But given the technological advances the PLA(N) has made, China can no longer be regarded as a green-water navy.

10. The launch and subsequent operational deployment of CV16 Liaoning signalled Beijing’s aspirations to become a naval power and to match the USN in the Indian-Pacific region. The 26 April 2017 launch of CV17 Shandong and the 12 Jan 2020 commissioning of the first of 8 Type 055Ds to form the nucleus of future PLA(N) SAGs are further evidence of this intention. The CATOBAR Type 003 carrier to follow after Shandong will mark a change in naval aviation capability.

Q: Would you agree to the above or is there more flavour to add in this geopolitical chess game?

 

[Ananda]

New video graphics from Naval News on FFG (X) capabilities. Nothing new than what has been reviewed before. However the graphics quite interesting on showing potential of FFG (X) being used more independently (and not just as escort) on fighting/opposed to multiple threats scenario, including of missile swarms. Kind of that potentially can be faced in 'say' SCS (especially the munitions capabilities of Mk110 57mm gun).

 

[Boagrius]

Yes the 57mm makes a little more sense in light of the above. It seems to be taking over much of the CIWS role once occupied by Phalanx at the expense of NGFS. I can see the logic given the additional range and hitting power of guided 57mm rounds. In the context of threat ASMs, it would definitely be desirable to put the inbound weapons in the water at extended range, rather than risk hitting them late only to scatter supersonic pieces around your own ship.

 

[OPSSG]

Ford Commences Second Round of Carrier Qualifications

USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78), the only carrier qualification (CQ) asset regularly available on the East Coast this year, commenced its second round ...

www.navy.mil

In the above story, USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) seems to have worked out its issues with the electromagnetic aircraft launch system, the advanced arresting gear, the advanced weapons elevators and so on.

During post-delivery test and trials, the US Navy is certifying fuel systems, conducting aircraft compatibility testing, exercising the flight deck and testing the on-board combat systems, William Couch, a spokesperson for Naval Sea Systems Command said. The US Navy have announced the certification of a fifth Advanced Weapons Elevator aboard USS Gerald R. Ford. “Certifying Lower Stage Weapons Elevator 5 [LSWE 5] is extraordinarily significant, in that we now have the capability to move ordnance from the aft magazine complex deep in the ship through the carrier to the flight deck...” said Rear Adm. James P. Downey, program executive officer for Aircraft Carriers.

Combat system ship qualification trials are scheduled for 2021 and additional developmental and operational evaluations will continue over the next 12 months.

In the meantime, CVN 78 is functioning as the only carrier qualification (CQ) asset regularly available on the East Coast this year, commenced its second round of CQs for Fleet Replacement Squadron pilots in May 2020 with a healthy and mission-focused crew.

...the graphics quite interesting on showing potential of FFG (X) being used more independently (and not just as escort) on fighting/opposed to multiple threats scenario, including of missile swarms. Kind of that potentially can be faced in 'say' SCS (especially the munitions capabilities of Mk110 57mm gun).

Agreed.

The contract for the FFG(X), valued at US$5.6 billion, is for up to ten ships rather than 20. At 7,400 tonnes full-load displacement, the winning design is several hundred tonnes heavier and about seven metres longer than the standard Italian FREMM, to comply with the US Navy’s requirements for survivability and growth potential. At 7,400 tonnes full-load displacement, the winning design is several hundred tonnes heavier and about seven metres longer than the standard Italian FREMM, to comply with the US Navy’s requirements for survivability and growth potential. In US Navy terms, the FFG(X) is a small surface combatant, but the design will result in one of the world’s largest modern frigates. Under the US Navy’s FY2020 30-year (FY2020-FY2049) shipbuilding plan, the Small Surface Combatant (SSC) force is projected to grow to 52 ships (34 LCSs and 18 FFG(X)s) in FY2034.

SSCs with the integration of the Naval Strike Missile (NSM) and the MQ-8C Fire Scout, can perform missile picket and scouting/screening function for a US fleet as it approaches littoral waters. The US Navy has also commenced flight testing of the newest unmanned helicopter, Northrop Grumman MQ-8C Fire Scout, equipped with the Leonardo AN/ZPY-8 advanced search radar.

To date, the US Navy has received 32 of 38 MQ-8Cs says Northrop. All will be retrofitted with the AN/ZPY-8. It adds that the type obtained initial operational capability in June 2019 and is scheduled for its first deployment in 2021.

 

[OPSSG]

The Tritons with Unmanned Patrol Squadron 19 – the US Navy’s first unmanned aircraft squadron – arrived in Guam in late Jan 2020 to support CTF-72, which oversees the patrol, reconnaissance and surveillance force in the U.S. 7th Fleet region. “It’s been a long road to get to 7th Fleet, but it’s an exciting time to show off what our sophisticated sensor suite can do,” Naval Aircrewman (Operator) 1st Class Ryan Gray, VUP-19’s operations lead petty officer, said in the CTF-72 story.

Almost three months after arriving in Guam, a pair of MQ-4C Triton autonomous, unmanned aircraft have integrated into fleet operations and training flights and stretched the US Navy’s maritime domain awareness across the Indo-Pacific, according to the US Navy.

The US Navy is counting on the Triton, which can operate at greater than 50,000-foot altitudes and at the 2,000-mile-plus range, to provide an unmanned platform for persistent, maritime intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities and work alongside its manned fleet of reconnaissance and surveillance patrol aircraft.

“While developing the concept of operations, the MQ-4C Triton is actively conducting missions that are complementing the P-8A Poseidon,” said Cmdr. Kim DaCosta-Azar, commanding officer of VUP-19, in an email response to Seapower. “This complement brings increased persistence, capability and capacity through its multisensor mission payload.”

The MQ-4C’s mission payload includes a Northrop Grumman-built ZPY-3 Multifunction Active Sensor, an X-band radar with modes that include maritime surface search, spot synthetic aperture radar (SAR), strip SAR, inverse SAR snapshot and inverse SAR high-resolution. The radar’s 360-degree scan enables the Triton to cover 2.7 million square miles during a mission.

The Triton’s suite also includes a Sierra Nevada-built ZLQ-1 electronic surveillance measures sensor equipped with specific emitter identification and with an automatic identification system. A Raytheon-built MTS-B multispectral electro/optical/infrared sensor with a laser designator/pointer/range-finder capability also is installed.

The Guam deployment, originally planned for late 2018, was delayed after a Triton crashed during operational testing in California in September 2018. The US Navy received the first delivery of the MQ-4C in 2017.

 

[Ananda]

New video from Xavier on his latest sightseeing in Norfolk Naval Base. Quite entertaining at least for me. Last year I went to East coast with family, got an offer for Norfolk Package Tour, but got outvoted by the rest of family that prefer take DC package . Well at least for me this video can remedy a bit..

 

[StobieWan]

Yes the 57mm makes a little more sense in light of the above. It seems to be taking over much of the CIWS role once occupied by Phalanx at the expense of NGFS. I can see the logic given the additional range and hitting power of guided 57mm rounds. In the context of threat ASMs, it would definitely be desirable to put the inbound weapons in the water at extended range, rather than risk hitting them late only to scatter supersonic pieces around your own ship.

The 57 mm is a very sensible choice for the Frigate - I see the same reasoning in the selection of that calibre for the Type 31 - they're just great for plinking boghammers etc.

It's a nice dual purpose mount and in the case of the USN, the weapon is already in service so not a great logistic stretch.

I'll be interested in seeing what the growth margins look like as while I know the hull is longer and there's a gain in displacement, they also stuck in another 300 tons of scantlings etc to meet USN requirements.

I'm encouraged by all of this and it's a shame this isn't what the USN specified in the first place, rather than the detours along the way with LCS.

 

[John Fedup]

This article discusses the merits of semi-submersible unmanned vessels for ISR. These vessels ideally would be optionally manned and of varying size. They share features found in narco boats. As the article points out, the large commercial fibreglass boat industry in the US can produce superior boats at lower prices.

Taking Notes from Narcos: Semisubmersible Unmanned Ships for Great Power Competition | Center for International Maritime Security

cimsec.org

 

[StobieWan]

Apologies if this has been already posted earlier in the thread but on the 57 mm round, I tripped over references to Alamo:

Advanced Low-Cost Munitions Ordnance (ALaMO) Guided Projectile

The ALaMO (Advanced Low-cost Munitions Ordnance) HE-4G is a low-cost 57mm guided smart munition being developed for the U.S. Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship, new Fast Frigate, and the U.S. Coast Guard’s National Security and Offshore Patrol Cutters. ALaMO will allow the Navy to hit moving targets at...

www.l3t.com

Now that, that could get nasty for an opponent in a small ship or FAC.

 

[76mmGuns]

Apologies if this has been already posted earlier in the thread but on the 57 mm round, I tripped over references to Alamo:

Advanced Low-Cost Munitions Ordnance (ALaMO) Guided Projectile

The ALaMO (Advanced Low-cost Munitions Ordnance) HE-4G is a low-cost 57mm guided smart munition being developed for the U.S. Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship, new Fast Frigate, and the U.S. Coast Guard’s National Security and Offshore Patrol Cutters. ALaMO will allow the Navy to hit moving targets at...

www.l3t.com

Now that, that could get nasty for an opponent in a small ship or FAC.

Currently the LCS 57mm gun is aimed optically ( sorry no source) from what I've read on other forums. Will such shells be like a fire and forget or still need guidance?

Also, given what Takao wrote in the RAN thread page.... 1412? about running out of high tech missiles and shells, will they become available in sufficient quantities in time?

 

[oldsig127]

Currently the LCS 57mm gun is aimed optically ( sorry no source) from what I've read on other forums. Will such shells be like a fire and forget or still need guidance?

Operated remotely via the FCS, with the capacity to be operated instead by local control using a video sight and joystick. It's been using smart ammo since about 2000. At least one more recent type has semi active homing

BAE Systems Unveils the ORKA One Shot One Kill Round for 57mm Gun at S

a Sea-Air-Space 2015 - BAE Systems ORKA round

www.navyrecognition.com

oldsig