The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
I am reading, at the same time...
"Volodymyr Zelensky is prepared to cede the territory as part of a peace deal set in motion by the US president and Vladimir Putin’s meeting in Alaska this week, The Daily Telegraph has reported."
and
"Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky says his country “will not give land to the occupier.” CNN

Confusing? Yes, but no one is negotiating yet.
Could be “ceasefire without security guarantees is unacceptable” and once realization settles, no guarantees are going to be provided and Putin will not accept unconditional ceasefire, “we demand unconditional ceasefire” and “ball is Putin’s court”. In other words, “We will accept a land swap that Russia will find unacceptable.

This is also interesting:

IMG_1825.jpeg

Confusing, lol. I find it extremely hard to believe. It makes zero sense. We shall see.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Could be “ceasefire without security guarantees is unacceptable” and once realization settles, no guarantees are going to be provided and Putin will not accept unconditional ceasefire, “we demand unconditional ceasefire” and “ball is Putin’s court”. In other words, “We will accept a land swap that Russia will find unacceptable.

This is also interesting:

View attachment 53309

Confusing, lol. I find it extremely hard to believe. It makes zero sense. We shall see.
It appears this is someone's interpretation of some of Trump's statements. It may or may not be a correct interpretation. My read of his discussion of land swaps was that he would ask for Russia to return Kharkov, Dnepropetrovsk, and Sumy region areas. Another version of this interpretation is in the link below. To throw into the pile of "educated guesses", here's another version, this one mine; Russia gains all of Donetsk and Lugansk with official recognition, but the conflict is frozen is Kherson and Zaporozhye, with Ukraine "retaining sovereignty" and Russia having a "right to access Crimea", but on the ground the reality remains a frozen conflict along the line of contact.


On a side note, here are another couple of takes on the current situation with the Russian breakthrough north of Pokrovsk area from alternate map makers. I think the situation is still murky, and there are reports of Ukrainian reserves on the move, so it remains to be seen how things stabilize, when they do. Also the fog of war remains strong, so even though we have first reports of Russian infantry on the outskirts of Dobropol'ye, out of the line of towns Rodinskoe-Biletskoe-Dobropol'ye-Belozerskoe, none have fallen yet, with Russian troops inside Rodinskoe but the town still contested. I think Rodinskoe will fall soon, and the door will start to close on the Pokrovsk area, Biletskoe may or may not fall soon, depending on just how bad the situation is in that area.

 

Ananda

The Bunker Group
FB_IMG_1755038931797.jpg

Ukraine M1A1 from US stocks that already covered with ERA and anti drones net and cages. In the end Ukrainian make Western Tanks like how they covered their own T-80.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
It appears this is someone's interpretation of some of Trump's statements. It may or may not be a correct interpretation. My read of his discussion of land swaps was that he would ask for Russia to return Kharkov, Dnepropetrovsk, and Sumy region areas. Another version of this interpretation is in the link below. To throw into the pile of "educated guesses", here's another version, this one mine; Russia gains all of Donetsk and Lugansk with official recognition, but the conflict is frozen is Kherson and Zaporozhye, with Ukraine "retaining sovereignty" and Russia having a "right to access Crimea", but on the ground the reality remains a frozen conflict along the line of contact.

Possibilities mentioned in the article:









Just by looking at the maps, we can see right away that options 3 and 4 make no sense whatsoever. I highly doubt Ukraine will give up the remaining Donbas. Russia would have to take it by force if it wants and if it can (with “reasonable” resources, time, etc). Do people residing in the remaining Donbas want to live in Russia? The answer is probably not. Zelensky said today (via Google translate from Ukrainian):

"We will not leave Donbas. We can't do that. Donbas for the Russians is a springboard for the future new offensive. For several years, Putin will have an open path to both Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk regions. And not only that. Also to Kharkiv. Now they want to give them about 9 thousand square kilometers, which is about 30% of the entire Donetsk region (the size of the unoccupied territory - ed.), and this is a springboard for new aggression," the president says.[…]

"I'm not going to surrender my country because I don't have the right to do so. And the question is not that I hide behind the Constitution. Is the state private property? 30% of the Donetsk region is my private property? The exchange of territories is a very complex issue that cannot be separated from the security guarantees for Ukraine," he said.

According to Zelensky, the Ukrainian position remains unchanged: first a ceasefire, then negotiations on the remaining issues. At the same time, territorial issues cannot be discussed without Ukraine's participation.



The first option, freezing at the line of contact, is the most logical one and looks good on the map. I have no doubt, personally, Russia would agree to this provided all the “pockets” and “salients” along the line of contact are closed in their favour, and whatever else makes sense, for which they will trade the territories of Sumy and Kharkiv detached from other territories of Ukraine they control. At the end of the day, what matters is not the territory because it was never about the territory. It is what other concessions they will get. Offering a ceasefire in exchange for withdrawal of the Ukrainian forces from Donbas is basically saying “we will continue the war”. I find it hard to see any other way. Which is why I still find it hard to believe the meeting will take place on August 15. There is certainly more situational awareness than is disclosed to the public intentionally or via “leaks”, but it appears that Trump’s admin is trying to manage expectations by lowering them dramatically (though I doubt many are expecting any significant breakthroughs and agreements, maybe aside from the MAGA cultists). Rubio:



White House:



While I don’t disagree with your interpretation, I highly doubt there will be any official recognition.

Regardless, too little we know and too much speculate on. Could be that Trump is planning to “swap” what Russia doesn’t control, but officially annexed, in Kherson and Zaporozhye for what Russia doesn’t control in Donetsk. Maybe Putin will “give up” Donetsk that Russia doesn’t control for other concessions and this is his bargaining chip - though very specific, he gives up the “chase” after the officially annexed but not controlled territories in the south to show his willingness to negotiate and earns the meeting with Trump, leaving Donetsk as the main bargaining chip (ie I will continue the war unless). He will tell Trump that Ukrainian front is collapsing (see, for reference, thousands of UA troops surrounded in Kursk that Trump was proclaiming after his talk with Putin) and that Russia will take the entire Donetsk, then Zaporozhye, Kharkiv and Dnipro, and so on; but he is a great lad and out of his respect for his friend Donald, he is willing to freeze the front where it is, provided the closure of the pockets that I mentioned earlier in exchange for the detached or all Kharkiv and Sumy territories (or not and keep them as a hedge for further negotiations), and give up, even though it is of great importance to him and people of Russia, his pursuit of capturing the entire Donetsk region in exchange for guaranteed UA neutrality, limits on its military, sanction relief, protection of Russian language/culture/religion, etc. He will also offer to start/resume talks on various arm control treaties, etc. Trump will be very happy to hear that. Euros will find it hard to reject because they had already committed themselves to the “starting point should be the line of contact”, but nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine, of course, so there will be a tremendous pressure on Zelensky and other decision makers, the whole country, really, to accept the deal. Euros won’t just accept it right away either, while thanking their Daddy, but there will be a lot of loud proclamations, etc. If the process takes too long and the front actually does start collapsing for Ukraine, which isn’t necessarily a remote possibility in its own time, Putin will say that the time is up and a little too late and will continue his endeavours of conquering Ukraine. Since no one wants this to happen, the process shouldn’t extend too long.

Note the nonsense of 60,000 Russians killed in July alone that Rubio mentioned (I think UA MoD had it at just over 30,000, including killed and wounded). This probably indicates that they are preparing Trump for the UA front collapsing argument more than anything else. As if they don’t know that he only (maybe?) believes it until Putin tells him otherwise (and he won’t be wrong calling bullshit). This is probably where the 120,000 dead Russians vs 8,000 or whatever it was Ukrainians since the beginning of the year is coming from too. This sets the mood for “Russia is not winning”, which Trump so far had repeated a few times.

Last thing, while on the subject. Zelensky announced some casualty numbers today as well:



Convenient.
 

Redshift

Active Member
You probably noticed that Ukraine has no money and no weapons, Ukraine cannot decide.
Your taxes, and not only yours, are keeping Russia busy. Some companies are making huge profits (maybe that reminds you of somewhere else), isn't that enough?
I think that you will find that Russian people's taxes are funding things to an even more catastrophic level and keeping Russia busy, maybe that will remind them of something too, like healthy care and life expectancy, perhaps, one day, that will be enough.
 

Redshift

Active Member
I guess this is why I find "rather amusing" those who don't read a History book or "don't know" and/or "don't care".

"Though the Declaration of Paris of 1856 had officially abolished privateering among civilized nations, the United States had declined to sign the protocol because it had relied so heavily on privateering in its wars against Britain. In 1861, with the shoe on the other foot, Secretary Seward approached the British Minister, Lord Lyons, to ask if the United States could change its mind and adhere to the agreement after all. Lyons found the request "rather amusing" and replied that while the United States was certainly welcome to accept the Declaration of Paris, its terms could not be applied ex post facto to the current war."
...
"The international court that adjudicated the dispute (that British support for the Confederacy had prolonged the war and encouraged southerners to hold out to the very end) in 1872 rejected this last claim, but it did rule that Britain should pay for the damage done by the Florida and the Alabama . In the Treaty of Washington (1871), the British agreed to pay the United States the sum of $15 million."

That being about the ACW, the on topic is what court will adjudicate those who support Ukraine to prolong the war and hold out to the very end and what protocol(s) we want to apply today that we didn't apply yesterday and we will not apply tomorrow?
Utterly irrelevant to this topic and this thread.
 
The first option, freezing at the line of contact, is the most logical one and looks good on the map. I have no doubt, personally, Russia would agree to this provided all the “pockets” and “salients” along the line of contact are closed in their favour, and whatever else makes sense, for which they will trade the territories of Sumy and Kharkiv detached from other territories of Ukraine they control.
If Russia is truly interested in an end to the war, I'm not sure how it would be acceptable to leave Slavyansk/Kramatorsk in Ukrainian hands. Even if the war is not primarily about territory, territorial claims have become a central part of popular Russian motivation and I do think Putin is somewhat beholden to that. And it seems extremely unlikely that Ukraine would give up further territory as part of negotiations down the line. I would guess that full control of the Donbas is the minimum Putin would accept, territorially. Otherwise a ceasefire gives massive advantage to Ukraine to reorganize and rebuild in the case that hostilities restart.

At the end of the day, what matters is not the territory because it was never about the territory. It is what other concessions they will get.
This is somewhat true. But I view this war primarily as an utter repudiation of the Minsk process. Meaning Putin will not engage in diplomacy until he is sure he will get what he wants. He will not risk this becoming Minsk 3. The only way to guarantee that is to a) continue the fighting while negotiating or b) get such concessions in exchange for a ceasefire that he can be certain Ukraine will not be in a position to stonewall his negotiations and return to fighting. To freeze the contact line in exchange for a ceasefire and negotiations to solve the "real" issues is basically just a return to Minsk. And even though the war has not gone as he would have liked, Russia is still in a very advantageous position compared to Ukraine. Not sure why he would give that up unless he gets big concessions like the Donbas.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
If Russia is truly interested in an end to the war, I'm not sure how it would be acceptable to leave Slavyansk/Kramatorsk in Ukrainian hands. Even if the war is not primarily about territory, territorial claims have become a central part of popular Russian motivation and I do think Putin is somewhat beholden to that. And it seems extremely unlikely that Ukraine would give up further territory as part of negotiations down the line. I would guess that full control of the Donbas is the minimum Putin would accept, territorially. Otherwise a ceasefire gives massive advantage to Ukraine to reorganize and rebuild in the case that hostilities restart.
Yes, I agree, and talked about it previously as well. However, it would greatly depend on what concessions they would be able to get in return. For example, if the conditions are such that Ukraine simply cannot reconstitute its force, and this is the likely outcome, in my opinion, I don’t see a reason for them not to agree to leave the rest of Donbas. If significant concessions are not made, on the other hand, Russia doesn’t have enough reasons to stop. Here is the thing: there will be no actual peace agreement for many years/decades to come, but a (hopefully) permanent ceasefire that will be agreed and Russia will not stop until the terms are acceptable because they fully understand this reality (first ceasefire and then talks is an idiotic take/ask and every rational person realizes it, likely including those asking). They can also resume the hostilities at any time, though, possibly, from a worse position than they are in now if the agreement is not holding. The position, however, could also be stronger, which is everyone’s bet. As of right now, Ukraine has already lost the war and their current desire to continue the fighting is pretty ludicrous from my perspective because they will only lose more and the end result will be worse, possibly eventual full capitulation. But that is their prerogative. Here is an interview with Konrad Muzyka (translated from Polish) which outlines why the war is lost and why there is no reversal (I would say this is a must read, personally):


Russia here gets to pick and choose, regardless of what many think. Ukraine is ruined. Far from the case for Russia. If what is offered now is worthy of consideration and provides sufficient benefits (including sanctions relief), I think they will take the deal I outlined. Aside from what I said just above, another reason is uncertainty vs certainty. Certain outcome with known benefits. If they continue fighting, they will eventually crush Ukraine (and it could happen sooner than we think?), but there will be new sanctions, more death, more confrontation, expiration of the START treaty early next year with unlikely new talks, and so on. While the effectiveness of new potential sanctions is questionable at best, the existing sanctions will undoubtedly, or very likely, remain long after Ukraine falls and Russia experiencing growing economic (and internal) problems. It is also worth mentioning that Russians know full well that China is their competitor, in spite of the eternal partnership, or whatever the way they put it. Weighing everything out, it just seems to me that there is quite a bit of sense in ending it with the right offer on the table at this point.

This is somewhat true. But I view this war primarily as an utter repudiation of the Minsk process. Meaning Putin will not engage in diplomacy until he is sure he will get what he wants. He will not risk this becoming Minsk 3. The only way to guarantee that is to a) continue the fighting while negotiating or b) get such concessions in exchange for a ceasefire that he can be certain Ukraine will not be in a position to stonewall his negotiations and return to fighting. To freeze the contact line in exchange for a ceasefire and negotiations to solve the "real" issues is basically just a return to Minsk. And even though the war has not gone as he would have liked, Russia is still in a very advantageous position compared to Ukraine. Not sure why he would give that up unless he gets big concessions like the Donbas.
Again, I think you are right. I just don’t think there will be much further immediate negotiating in regard to Ukraine per se, but general security architecture in Europe and arms control. So, I guess what I am saying is more or less the same thing you are because I believe we are at the point, or close to it, where Putin will be getting most of what he wants, so he doesn’t need the rest of Donbas. And this is a great negotiating position to be where everyone should theoretically agree, an equilibrium of the game, because no one will be better off if this continues much longer. No doubt the war will continue if that point is not yet here. I guess we will have more clarity tomorrow. What House press secretary said there will be a joint press conference after the meeting. That should be interesting.

Like I said in my previous post, all we do is speculate and I could be completely off here. Given what we know or think we know, I believe this is the most reasonable approach to take by all parties. The problem is, however, Zelensky is delusional and Euros don’t want to accept a defeat, are paranoid, and seem to be OK with more Ukrainians dying and the country getting more wrecked. I am not sure what their calculus is here if they actually care about Ukraine.


A few more interesting reads:

A very good thread by Clement Molin examining Russian airstrikes and advances:


A good short article by Brady Africk showing the drone launch sites Russia built to specifically attack Ukraine:


A thread by Rob Lee in regards to the recent Russian breakthrough:


Mike Kofman on the same subject:


Pasi Paroinen on the same subject:


Playfra from X on the same subject:

 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
I said in my previous post that Ukraine had lost this war. I want to add this thread by Pasi Paroinen dated March 4 of this year. If my memory serves me right, it was about the time when the Kursk “salient” started to collapse. I had it in my bookmarks since and was planning to share it way back when, but never did, I don’t think. The thread is Finnish, so I am going to attach a whole bunch of AI translated screenshots below showing the entire thread. I have quite a bit to comment on, but I don’t have the time at the moment for another essay, but I don’t exactly agree with him on everything. For example, he (and many others, actually) puts a lot of blame on slow and limited delivery of weapons by the allies at the beginning of the war. He says that the rationale behind it was the fear of Russia disintegrating, nuclear war and the like. With all due respect to Pasi (and many other people), I believe this is rubbish. While I agree that Ukraine had its best chance to push the Russians back further in 2022 and early 2023, you couldn’t just dump a whole bunch of various weapons, that were (continuously) provided later, at the Ukrainian army in 2022. First of all, most of these weapons were required to get the operators trained. Ukraine had zero need for MBTs and armoured vehicles as they had plenty of their own, for example (Soviet made tanks are still the main battle tank for both sides 3.5 years later). On the other hand, long-range missiles and fighter jets was clearly out of the question due to the very training needed to operate them, and so on. But beyond that, and, in my opinion, most importantly, I am going to (perhaps annoyingly?) mention for the n-th time the commitment concept. The argument, for example, that the nuclear escalation wouldn’t have happened regardless of arms deliveries just because it didn’t happen is not an argument at all, its a fallacy. An argument would be that it didn’t happen because there was no sudden influx of various “advanced” weapon systems, but the rate of delivery allowed for the Russian management and commitment not to respond the way they potentially could (nuclear is only one real option). Furthermore, I think I already said this a while ago, Russians could have mobilized much earlier if things were evolving differently and that could change the outcome completely. Consider them throwing additional 300,000 troops back when the armour was still readily available and drones weren’t really a thing. We could definitely debate the outcome if that were to happen. There is no clarity here at all and to assume that the events would unroll in favour of Ukraine and significantly so if we provided more weapons in the beginning simply doesn’t have a nearly sufficient base under it. I am going to stop here, even though I have a lot more to say, because I have other commitments.

I think this is a very good thread to read through and provides a realistic perspective to think about.



















Edit: from a quick overview, it appears that I managed to attach all these images in the right order without any going missing; if that is not the case, let me know and I will try to fix it.
 

rsemmes

Active Member
The US-RUSSIA meeting in Alaska is one of the biggest farces in recent history.
Clowns playing with world's security.
Dignity is a concept that has no meaning for these administrations and Presidents.
Yes, a lot of farces, maybe you would like to give us a list of all of them.

I don't think Ukrainians should care how big the farce is, as long as it brings peace.
Should you care?
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Yes, a lot of farces, maybe you would like to give us a list of all of them.

I don't think Ukrainians should care how big the farce is, as long as it brings peace.
Should you care?
But when it seems unlikely that it will, this simply adds insult to injury.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Whatever the situation is, I would think there will be developments on the front elsewhere as a result.
There already appear to be. Some reports indicate that Russian forces took Predtechino, threatening a link-up with advancing forces near Belaya Gora because Ukraine pulled units from there to the new breakthrough. Now we have Ukraine pulling out of their salient on the east bank of the Oskol. With Kupyansk and Kupyansk-Uzlovoy straddling the river, it remains to be seen whether they're going to withdraw across the Oskol, or just contract their perimeter somewhat. I suspect also that Russian gains in the Seversk area are not due to some sudden improvement in Russian approaches to advancing there but due to Ukraine running short on resources.
 

SolarisKenzo

Well-Known Member
As predicted, the summit was a good meeting between a cruel dictator and a wannabe one.
No details have been released. Trump will now refer to Zelensky and the Europeans.
The feeling is that he hasn't convinced the Tsar to abandon the "russian puppet government" in Kiev, but has accepted the current situation on the ground in principle.
Zelensky faces a difficult internal challenge, under pressure from Zalunzny, Poroshenko, and, above all, Azov, sent to plug the gap north of Pokrovsk. Putin hasn't given up on the idea of subjugating all of Ukraine, but he lacks the strength and risks being unable to sustain it.
The Europeans, excluded from the summit and deeply disgusted by the words of both Trump and Putin, will do everything they can to derail any agreement without their direct involvement.

The final press conference, when both Putin and Trump basically talked about their vision of the world (largely alligned) was something horrible.
When Trump said "Putin told me the 2020 election was rigged by Biden" was the confirmation that this whole summit was a circus between two dangerous individuals.
 

Hoover

New Member
What did you expect? Putin is far more intelligent than Trump and his loyal, but unable gouvernment. Trump pulled Putin back onto the diplomatic carpet, and Trump will also trying to end all sanctions. There is a lot of nice, big business at the horizon.

On Monday Zelenskij will meet Trump. I hope not for receiving the terms of surrender of the UA, backed by the US.
 
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