KipPotapych said:
Except as was previously discussed here the damage they cause “hitting Russia’s revenue” is smaller than the margin of error (something like 0.5% or less as was outlined), so there is no credible demonstrated capability to meaningfully impact the revenue that Russia receives from hydrocarbon exports.
As was previously discussed you count cost of material damage without including loss of revenues. That Putin asked an "energy ceasefire" and that it was the only thing he agreed with, indicates that it was more than 0.5%. Even the US, under Biden, feared for an increase of oil products prices on international markets This was far fetched, IMO. But we don't have any number on losses or damage assessment from Russian oil enterprises that we are able to check.
You said:
The fact that Ukraine uses it as some kind of “we accepted it but Russia didn’t” angle to say that it is Russia that doesn’t want to end it is extremely weird.
I said:
Ukraine would have more legitimacy to attack Russians there and to attempt to retake these territories.
clearly indicates that “the plan”, as you understand it, should include Ukraine resuming war when they find it convenient/possible, which contradicts your own statements
Yes because as long as the territory remains Ukrainian, Ukrainians will have the right to retake it. The goal of the peace agreement is that Russia stops attacking Ukraine. Not that Ukraine never ever try to recover stolen land and restore justice. When an agreement sets the limit between Ukrainian occupied and Russian occupied zones on a certain line, it means that Russian troops are not allowed to cross it. And Russian troop are still an illegal force of occupation which in normal circumstance should withdraw.
Of course it won't be reasonable for Ukraine to resume the war as long as the Russians are able to defend the conquered land. It could be reasonable in the event of a collapse of the Russian armed forces (rebellion, logistic failure etc).
More realistically, it leaves the door open to a voluntary withdrawal in the context of a friendly settlement and the emergence of a pro-west government in Russia. If the territories are officially recognised as Russian, even this will be impossible (or extremely unlikely).
You said:
“Sharing pie” with Putin is also an assessment that misses the mark entirely.
When Putin offers "rare earths" to Trump, and Trump suggests that the US takes over the Zaporizhia Nuclear Plant, it looks like sharing the pie IMO.
You said:
The loss of the US aid cannot be compensated with other sources.
Yes it can, with few exceptions. Intel can be replaced, albeit not with the same accuracy and timing. Patriots can be replaced. The problem is the quantity. But it became a problem with patriot missiles too.
HIMARS ans ATAMCS can't be replaced, but air born alternative can be used.
Europe is boosting defence spending and production increase is visible.
link
But, as I said, it doesn't mean that it will be enough.
You said:
Any referendum would result in what had become. There is no reasonable way to argue otherwise. The real referendum, is of course, nearly impossible under the Ukrainian constitution. This also goes together with the fact that Crimean people had voted overwhelmingly (over 90 percent, I don’t recall exactly) to not be part of Ukraine in the early nineties.
And maybe they would vote again to be part of Russia today. But Russia doesn't want to allow Ukraine to organise a referendum there. I don;t think that the Ukrainian constitution doesn't allow for a referendum. But it's irrelevant as long as Russian occupation forces don't allow for a valid and recognised referendum to happen.
Same in the Donbass.
Ukraine has also the right not to organise a referendum. In this case, Ukraine has the right to retake Crimea by force and not to ask inhabitants their opinion if they deem reasonable that the population won't rise against them.
You said:
Presence of the Russian troops in Crimea, be it ground troops or the Black Sea fleet, is the reality, it’s not a “provocation”. I mean really? Even with the way the discussion has been lately, I am still surprised this is a point of debate.
It both the reality and a provocation and an act of agression.
The other reality is that the Russian Navy is unable to sail west of the Crimean peninsula thanks to sea drones. As long as Ukrainian national water boundaries are maintained, Ukrainians have the right to defend these waters against intruders. If it becomes Russian waters, they lose this right. More over, Russia can threaten Odessa and the south-west of Ukraine directly from Crimea. If Russian manage to invade Odessa and the land south-west of it, then Molodova, Romania and Bulgaria are directly threatened. That's why Europeans have to prevent that by offering adequate defence to Ukraine and broker a peace deal in this respect. The second reason is the Grain Corridor.
I don't think that the peace deal will recognise the Russian occupation of Crimean waters while Russians don't currently control it. It will only recognise land occupation.
I said:
Ukraine accepted a total ceasefire 40 days ago. Russia has persistently rejected it.
You said:
This is irrelevant. Of course, you also say
Ukraine is not willing to negotiate a deal that doesn't make sens for them.
You said:
Doesn’t the train of thought transfer to the Russian position here?
No because a ceasefire is not a peace deal. Ukraine agrees to a cease fire. Not yet to a peace deal. A ceasefire, in this case, is unconditional. Both sides stop firing the time they negotiate a peace deal. If no peace deal is reached, the cease fire can be prolonged or cancelled.
You said:
They need to rump up their production to deter China alone in the current environment.
That's Trump's logic. But it's wrong logic. The US doesn't have to ramp up production to support Taiwan and other countries from China. China is not a direct military threat as Russia is currently in Europe. China hasn't engage its military since the end of the Vietnam War and is unlikely to do so.
It's funny that Trump thinks that he has to cut aid to Ukraine because there is more pressing needs in the Indo-Pacific while Australis, NZ, South Korea and Japan are increasing it...
You said:
What if the US imposes a ban on export of the “American stuff” (includes components, of course) to Ukraine? This is not a far-fetched scenario at all -> see Trump refusing to sell Patriots to Ukraine as one example.
What if Trump orders to bomb Ukrainian positions to pressure Zelensky to accept peace as Clinton did with Milosevič? He would get his peace deal within two days.
More seriously, Trump will understand that it's not smart to be seen as "
unreliable".
If he bans export of american components to Europe (banning only to Ukraine makes no sens), it will be the last nail on the US arm export coffin.
In fact even cutting military aid to Ukraine, in the sens that it would give Putin a victory and an incentive to continue the war, would put him in a very complicated position with his international partners and at home. He can't cut aid without being seen as openly pro Putin. He can't ignore the consequences. That's the problem.
You said:
The point that everyone is missing, or so it seems, Ukraine was never prevented from joining the EU.
I have talked about it already a few weeks or months ago. And yes, it was surprising that Putin was ready to agree that Ukraine joined the EU because the 2013 uprising was precisely about that.
Then I said that it's because Putin despises the EU so much that he doesn't deem them capable of defending Ukraine military or even themselves without the US. So an "article 5" equivalent without the US is, for him, acceptable, because, in his mind, it's meaningless. This is even more true after the Brexit. It's not only without the US but also without the UK.
In this case, security guarantees would involve the UK, so it's potentially stronger than strictly EU.
Putin is also against any deployment of foreign troops in Ukraine (other than Russian). This would prevent any practical application of a mutual defence assistance with European nations. If European troops can't be based and acclimated in Ukraine in advance, they won't be able to counter a Russian attack. European, and preferably US forces should be based in eastern Ukraine to make such defence agreement effective. There should be at least an air force. this is currently the case in the Baltic states and Poland.
You said:
Would continuation of hostilities provide better results than real negotiations?
Depends on the negotiations. It doesn't depends whether Russians are still advancing or not.
If the peace agreement will allow Russia to invade the rest of Ukraine in a few years, or worse, to invade another European country, then it's better to continue to fight. Ukrainians and European are not going to sign a suicidal agreement.
A peace agreement is only possible now because the Russian advance is very slow. Should it accelerate Russian would absolutely not negotiate.
