The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

rsemmes

Active Member
@seaspear, a fresh article on the subject of long-range FPV drones:
"A heavy wire-drone as launching platform high over the front-line so all the wire length of the second drone is on enemy territory?"
As I posted, a logical development.
 

swerve

Super Moderator
Ukrinform didn't report that because it was a failure. But not only an Ukrainian failure, also an American one. The American at least agreed and provided coordinates, if not actively participated in the preparation of the attack.
The bridge is a very large fixed construction. Why would the Ukrainians need coordinates? One sympathetic person on a ship sailing through the strait any time during or after building could have provided exact coordinates. Or a sympathetic person driving over the bridge after completion. Or they could just look at Google Earth.
 

Fredled

Active Member
Bob53 said:
on the other hand there are others that only post positive Ukrainian information and narrative.
I'm one of them. :)
KipPotapych said:
f you read the part of my post you quoted, I am arguing that the Americans must have known of the existence of the missiles, as opposed to “Surprise! We sank the biggest Russian ship all by ourselves with the missiles you had no idea we had!
Even better than that: The existence of the Neptune was of public notoriety long before the strike on the Moskva.
It was rather the inability of the Moskva to protect itself that surprised everyone. In fact it was a combined attack with drones and anti-ship missiles.
KipPotapych said:
The argument was that it is irrational to waste the equipment as they did (still do) because they fully, 100%, depend on the western supplies of that equipment.
It's irrational no matter is the case.

My counter argument is that for Ukrainians (and for Russians as well), it's not a waste. The equipment is delivered to be used to counter the Russian invasion. Not to stay in the rear to be preserved at any cost. Sometimes their decisions like invading Kursk may seems to you not logical, and then you think that what they lose there is a waste, but they have their own logic. And they don;t think that they have wasted anything. Of course Ukrainians can make mistakes. But it's difficult to judge from the outside. After all, equipment is destroyed by the enemy in the first place.

KipPotapych said:
Were they really needed though? It was the rocket-man who offered the troops, according to the Americans, Putin didn’t ask for them.
The key point is: though President Vladimir V. Putin quickly embraced it.
It still breached the barrier of the unthinkable.

KipPotapych said:
To hit a bridge with cluster munitions would be an even more asinine idea. Especially the bridge that is primarily used by civilians.
Cluster ammunition doesn't mean anti-personel ammunition, thought it's often the case. ATACMS cluster ammunitions are small bombs exploding on a wide area. We have seen several videos of them, one hitting an helicopter field. The explosion is able to dammage a bridge structure, thought several explosion are needed to collapse it.

"Primarily used by civilians": No such a thing in time of war. Every road or bridge are supposed to be used by the military, especially this one. Civilians can still use them at their own risk. The main crime is to fail to inform the public about the risk, for example by recommending not to travel neither by road or by boat to Crimea unless absolutely necessary. But the Russian media, instead, keep on saying that everything is all right as usual.

swerve said:
The bridge is a very large fixed construction. Why would the Ukrainians need coordinates?
Good point. But I mean, the American are able to deny the launch of the ATACMS if they disagree with the strike even when Ukrainians have the coordinates.

KipPotapych said:
That’s another “strange” part of the story. They say they knew it would not be successful, but let Ukraine proceed to prove the point.
I didn't say the Americans let the Ukrainians fail to prove the point. I said that the American also believed that it will be successful, IMO.

KipPotapych said:
In the Newsweek article, it is likely a typo - they probably meant to say “illegally”.
No: Newsweek quoted TASS Agency, whereas Kiyev Post quoted Ukrinform.

KipPotapych said:
Zaluzhny was fired in spite of him being against the direction chosen in 2023. He also was on record (quoted here by me) being against the Kursk offensive. Other officers have been dismissed (cited here by me) for their refusal to participate in or initiate the Kursk offensive. With my bias, which I fully accept, the article, combined with what I just wrote, makes it very clear that decisions are being made for political reasons and showtime.
The reason why he was dismissed is not clear. Certainly opposing the plan was one factor among others. Not the only one. I think that political ambitions was a more important factor, and at some point, the friction between the two men became unbearable. I think that Zaluhzny was also fed up.
The reason for dismissing other generals is not that they disagree with the Commander in Chief. But because they failed in their mission or because someone else is better for the job. The rest is speculation.

Zelensky or not Zelensky, a political leader who take utterly bad decisions in war time is not going to keep power. There is enough political opposition against Zelensky to rise the question of his legitimqcy if he would jeopardize the defence of Ukraine. Instead the opposition stands by Zelensky when his legitimacy is questioned by external leaders.

KipPotapych said:
But they also follow orders, which they don’t have to agree with.
A general would rather resign than following a devastatingly stupid order from a civilian. Several generals would also object to a bad order given to one of their colleague. And the order will not be fully obeyed.

KipPotapych said:
Trump can’t pledge anything. That’s not how things work in the US. Assuming he could, I don’t think be would. In my opinion, he is ready for Ukriane to drown and go away. I do not believe there will be some major help from the US going forward.
It depends on what Putin does. If Putin doesn't order a ceasefire, Trump will arm Ukraine to the teeth because he doesn't like to be contradicted.
However if Putin agrees to a ceasefire and his troops really stop firing, Ukrainians will be forced to stop fighting too. Then, in this case, Trump could drop economic, diplomatic and military aid to Ukraine, and renew good relations with his old friend Vladimir.
By all evidences, the friend Vladimir doesn't want to play this card.

I said:
But on the Russian side, the contrast is much more severe. A large part of new recruits are inapt to combat and sometimes to even carry a weapon.
You said:
This is rather funny because you are basically parroting the guy whose article I called “utter garbage” the other day.
This is confirmed by every single intervew of Ukrainian or foreign soldiers fighting in Ukraine. Also confirmed by indirect off-line informations from people on the front line.
I said:
So, IMO, the odds of seeing another counter offensive in 2025 is only 20%. But not zero.
You said:
Why not 15 or 25%?
Because I applied a very complex formula to reach this exact number. LOL :D :D

You said:
Today it is likely West + Ukraine - USA > Russia. An enormous change just like that.
West + Ukraine - USA is still several time Russia in militaro-imdustrial potential.
It's just that the European potential is not used.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
The bridge is a very large fixed construction. Why would the Ukrainians need coordinates? One sympathetic person on a ship sailing through the strait any time during or after building could have provided exact coordinates. Or a sympathetic person driving over the bridge after completion. Or they could just look at Google Earth.
Basically, because it is not that simple? One example from the NYT article posted a coupe of pages ago:

Ukrainian intelligence had detected a makeshift Russian barracks at a school in occupied Makiivka. “Trust us on this,” General Zabrodskyi told General Aguto. The American did, and the Ukrainian recalled, “We did the full targeting process absolutely independently.” Wiesbaden’s role would be limited to providing coordinates.

Why would they need the coordinates if they (reportedly) can do everything else themselves? They could have simply used Google Earth to get the coordinates of a building that has been there for decades, most likely.

One would think that in order to bring a bridge like that down, it would have to be a cumulative attack, striking in certain rather precise places, in certain sequence, etc. Another option, of course, would be to send a truck loaded with explosives and by some random, extremely unlikely chance, have it explode exactly when passing several tank cars filled with 100,000-150,000 litres of flammable material each. In that scenario, a section of a bridge may actually be displaced, as we had actually witnessed, leaving the bridge intact and operating otherwise, for the most part.


It was rather the inability of the Moskva to protect itself that surprised everyone. In fact it was a combined attack with drones and anti-ship missiles.
All analysis that I read indicates that they didn't even have their defences operating at the time of strike.

The attack was always reported as two Neptune missiles. Never otherwise. Not sure where you get the combined attack from. The fact that that happened in April-May (?) of 2022 doesn’t help your argument since there were no “combined missile and drone attacks” back then.

The equipment is delivered to be used to counter the Russian invasion. Not to stay in the rear to be preserved at any cost.
This is my last comment on the subject because it is getting silly. If virtually everywhere else your returns on the use of the same equipment provide 2.7 or whatever it is (on average) destroyed Russian pieces of armour for each one of yours, you better use that equipment there (ie, anywhere else). Especially because there you would be defending your territory that you will likely never see back otherwise; that would be instead of losing likely up to 1.5 of your scarce armour for every one of the Russian units, while trying to hold territory where the writing was on the wall from the very beginning. That was predicted here at that time, if you go back and read through the posts.

The key point is: though President Vladimir V. Putin quickly embraced it.
It still breached the barrier of the unthinkable.
What was the unthinkable?

"Primarily used by civilians": No such a thing in time of war. Every road or bridge are supposed to be used by the military, especially this one. Civilians can still use them at their own risk.
I would argue that striking a busy bridge that is primarily used by civilians with ATACMS M39 Block I would be the main crime. Those aren’t even anti-armour munitions. You should find and watch the videos where these things fall on a paved roadway and observe the damage.

I didn't say the Americans let the Ukrainians fail to prove the point. I said that the American also believed that it will be successful, IMO.
I didn’t say you said. The article clearly says that the strike was allowed to prove the point:

The Ukrainians proposed attacking with ATACMS alone. Generals Cavoli and Aguto pushed back: ATACMS alone wouldn’t do the job; the Ukrainians should wait until the drones were ready or call off the strike.

In the end, the Americans stood down, and in mid-August, with Wiesbaden’s reluctant help, the Ukrainians fired a volley of ATACMS at the bridge. It did not come tumbling down; the strike left some “potholes,” which the Russians repaired, one American official grumbled, adding, “Sometimes they need to try and fail to see that we are right.”


That is not how things work in the real world - that is, you do not let Ukrainians use n number of missiles just to prove that the said missiles are ineffective for their purpose. I would think that this is crystal clear to everyone and why I said that this is another strange point of the article.

No: Newsweek quoted TASS Agency, whereas Kiyev Post quoted Ukrinform.
This is the original article that the Newsweek article quoted (RIA Novosti, not TASS, as clearly indicated in the article):


They call it “Crimean bridge” and “bridge over the Kerch Strait”. I have never seen it called otherwise in the Russian media space (and I never even read RIA or the like - gives you headache).

PS The other article was from Kiev Independent, not Kiev Post.

The reason for dismissing other generals is not that they disagree with the Commander in Chief. But because they failed in their mission or because someone else is better for the job. The rest is speculation.
They literally disagreed and said that Kursk invasion was a dumb idea that would result in great losses. They were replaced with others who didn’t say that. By the way, not all of them were generals.

There is enough political opposition against Zelensky to rise the question of his legitimqcy if he would jeopardize the defence of Ukraine.
Not true. Aside from Zaluzhny, there is no real opposition that has any significant weight within the Ukrainian society.

And the order will not be fully obeyed.
Which is why Ukrainian troops often withdraw from their position way before any order is given to do so (which often enough never comes at all).

It depends on what Putin does. If Putin doesn't order a ceasefire, Trump will arm Ukraine to the teeth because he doesn't like to be contradicted.
Trump alone cannot arm Ukraine. He can leave it with no arms, but he cannot provide any on a whim. That’s not how things work. Not sure what is so confusing about it.

Also, you talk like “he will do this and that” as if you have sources inside the administration or Trump’s head. Everything points to the fact that he wouldn’t do any of the things you think he would, even if he could.

This is confirmed by every single intervew of Ukrainian or foreign soldiers fighting in Ukraine.
This is not true because I personally previously posted evidence suggesting the exact opposite.

West + Ukraine - USA is still several time Russia in militaro-imdustrial potential.
It's just that the European potential is not used.
That’s right, over three years later the potential is not used. Half (and currently irreplaceable) the support was lost in days, really. There is no real indication that “the potential” is ever going to be used either. And so on. But one can keep betting on it, of course.

A couple of things on the subject:

IMG_9241.jpeg

IMG_9236.jpeg

IMG_9235.jpeg


I didn’t make the post I said I would. Maybe tomorrow.

Edit: also on the subject:

 
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KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
These constant miscalculations about the Russians basically cost them this war. Low morale, they won’t fight, Putin’s embarrassment that should lead to some irrational decisions, etc. We now have what we have. No war planning should ever be based on this. Especially when you had already clearly showed lack of understanding the first time. This “we know Russians, trust us” proposal is extremely dangerous. Which is rather funny because the Ukrainians follow the script to the tee quite often themselves.
To add to what I wrote ^, this is rather an excellent (with an exclamation mark!) take:

IMG_9296.jpeg

From: https://x.com/DrRadchenko/status/1908060055309598827
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member

Redshift

Active Member
I haven’t read the full transcript yet, but the briefs. One of which was Russia is expected to produce 1,500 tanks and 3,000 armoured vehicles this year. Along with 200 Iskander missiles. This latter part is definitely believable.

Not sure what the reasonings behind Russians are getting worse, while Ukrainians are getting better is. Seems like nonsense to me, but what do I know. This is the same logic applicable at much smaller scale:

View attachment 52604

View attachment 52605

From: https://x.com/wartranslated/status/1908122713815728168
"What do I know"

Well you unfailingly seem to "know" that Russia is always right and pretty much unbeatable and that Ukraine and the whole of Europe is always wrong and incapable of ever getting anything right.

Russia First?

Make Russia Great Again?
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
An interesting observation. We talked earlier about why Russia repeatedly attacked across the Oskol instead of coming in across the border. But we recently had a very strange incidence. Between the Russian crossing near Topoli and the main Russian bridgehead around Dvurechnoe lies the small village of Kamyanka. Russian forces are north and south of it. But to attack the village they once again went across the river, entering the first houses from the river side. I don't have a good explanation for why, and this is no longer a question of attacking across the border into prepared defenses. Russian forces were already across the river, less than 1km away from Kamyanka from the north and not much farther away from the south, but they preferred to go across the river. For whatever reason this is appears to be the easier route for Russian forces.
 

crest

Member
An interesting observation. We talked earlier about why Russia repeatedly attacked across the Oskol instead of coming in across the border. But we recently had a very strange incidence. Between the Russian crossing near Topoli and the main Russian bridgehead around Dvurechnoe lies the small village of Kamyanka. Russian forces are north and south of it. But to attack the village they once again went across the river, entering the first houses from the river side. I don't have a good explanation for why, and this is no longer a question of attacking across the border into prepared defenses. Russian forces were already across the river, less than 1km away from Kamyanka from the north and not much farther away from the south, but they preferred to go across the river. For whatever reason this is appears to be the easier route for Russian forces.
Again I still think this has to do with treeline cover (I'm guessing around the rivers the trees are less bombed out). And a exploitation of lack of Ukrainian manpower. I can very easily see how the risk of crossing a river to some sort of reliable cover is preferable to crossing a Feild that is undoubtedly under drone surveillance. Especially if there is a chance of maned defence positions. I would chalk it up to good recon and flexibility showed by local Russian commanders. I mean is a 5 min boat ride really all that more dangerous then the whole operation on a atv? Also the advantage of outflanking or at least hitting prepared positions from unexpected directions
 

Fredled

Active Member
Feanor said:
An interesting observation. We talked earlier about why Russia repeatedly attacked across the Oskol instead of coming in across the border. But we recently had a very strange incidence. Between the Russian crossing near Topoli and the main Russian bridgehead around Dvurechnoe lies the small village of Kamyanka. Russian forces are north and south of it. But to attack the village they once again went across the river, entering the first houses from the river side. I don't have a good explanation for why, and this is no longer a question of attacking across the border into prepared defences. Russian forces were already across the river, less than 1km away from Kamyanka from the north and not much farther away from the south, but they preferred to go across the river. For whatever reason this is appears to be the easier route for Russian forces.
One of the reasons could be that the border is heavily mined, closed with dragon teeth and trenches on both sides. Making movement difficult.

Another reason could be that the Russians want to get rid of the natural barrier consisting in the river. If they can secure the west bank of the river, then they can move vehicles anywhere from north to south, complicating Ukrainian reactions.
__________________

Bob53 said:
Interested in the opinion of the commentators here of this sum up
KipPotapych said:
Not sure what the reasonings behind Russians are getting worse, while Ukrainians are getting better is. Seems like nonsense to me
It's a fact, yet it doesn't mean that the Ukrainian forces are stronger than Russian forces. Ukrainian forces are better but Russians forces are still stronger thanks to their numerical advantage and the strength of their air force.
This is another thing.

It's not clear if you and Bob53 are talking about the forces allocated to the defence of the European eastern border as a whole or only the Ukrainian part of it.
If we are talking about the European forces, they are getting better thanks to the shared experience from Ukraine. Russia also has gained experience so let's say, in this field Russians have the advantage of the direct experience while European have only indirect experience or feedback.
I'm not going to develop on the evolution of armed forces in countries bordering Russia as this is a topic for other threads.

About Ukraine, many of their new troops are trained in a NATO country, with NATO standards. We can assumed that they are trained professionaly. According to Ukrainian soldiers, this training is good but sometimes their own experience of the battle is completing the instruction.
They also receive NATO equipment. I don't think it's necessary to develop on this.

In Russia, there are two kinds of army: The professional one and the canon fodders. The cannon fodders have very basic training, when they have training, bad weapons, no infantry vehicles or only civilian ones, bad food, bad clothes, no medevac whatsoever...
Maybe you have posted the evidence of the contrary. The contrary is also true because there is also a professional army which has the best equipment Russia can provide and proper training. But they are only a fraction of the total forces.
Overall Russians ground forces are getting worse because they lose a lot of modern equipment and men. their naval forces is getting worse. However their drone units are getting better and their air force remains the same.

I said:
It was rather the inability of the Moskva to protect itself that surprised everyone. In fact it was a combined attack with drones and anti-ship missiles.
KipPotapych said:
All analysis that I read indicates that they didn't even have their defences operating at the time of strike.

The attack was always reported as two Neptune missiles. Never otherwise. Not sure where you get the combined attack from.
This is what I remember having read back then. Now, it could be UAV, not "drone" in the sens we understand today. Wikipedia talks of Byraktars.
Wikipedia said:
The operation to sink Moskva may have been assisted by the use of at least one Bayraktar TB2 drone (UCAV), which seems to have observed the event and may have played other roles in the ship's sinking.[44][45] The Telegram post by the Wagner Group[27][26] and a Ukrainian official said the drone "diverted" or "distracted" the crew, but David Hambling, a technology journalist writing in Forbes, considered this unlikely, since the ship's anti-drone and anti-missile defenses were provided by two different systems: the long-range SA-N-6 Grumble (S-300F) missiles against the drone and the multibarreled AK-630 cannons against the Neptune missiles.[44]

Several reports were consistent with Bayraktar drones being in the same area as the ship. Arda Mevlutoglu, a defense industry analyst, stated that a Bayraktar TB2 ground-control station was seen in Odesa on 10 April.[45] A video released by the Russian military on 12 April showed a missile being launched from the Russian frigate Admiral Essen and stated it destroyed a Bayraktar drone near the Crimean coast.[46][44][47] A Ukrainian video "shot from the air with a night vision scope,"[44] claimed to show Moskva burning in the distance,[48] and could have been made by a Bayraktar drone flying in the area.[44]

Analysts stated the Bayraktar drone may have also provided targeting information.[45] Can Kasapoglu, the director of security and defense studies at the Turkish think tank Center for the Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM), said: "Reports that Turkish TB2 drones were involved in the attack either as a distraction for Moskva or as location spotter of Moskva are both quite possible."[45] Mevlutoglu mentioned that Rear Admiral Oleksiy Neizhpapa, commander of the Ukrainian naval forces, had in the past suggested that TB2 drones would be used with Neptune launchers for target reconnaissance.[45] Mevlutoglu also said the main radar system on Moskva was out of date, designed to detect aircraft and cruise missiles. The TB2, with a lower radar cross-section and flight speed, may have been missed by the ship's radar.[45]

The aviation journalist Valius Venckunas reported: "According to Arkady Babchenko, a Russian military journalist and an outspoken critic of Vladimir Putin, a Ukrainian Bayraktar disabled Moskva’s radar station, rendering it unable to detect and intercept incoming missiles. However, Babchenko has not provided the source of such information."[49]
link

KipPotapych said:
What was the unthinkable?
The deployment of North Korean troops in the war on Ukraine.

KipPotapych said:
They literally disagreed and said that Kursk invasion was a dumb idea that would result in great losses. They were replaced with others who didn’t say that. By the way, not all of them were generals.
Who are these generals and what are your sources? It's only speculation, IMO, to discredit the Ukrainians and try to prove that the Kursk offensive was a failure.

KipPotapych said:
Trump alone cannot arm Ukraine.
Trump can increase or keep the same pace of delivery, which would be considered as a base minimum. Ageing equipment in US military stocks which need to be replaced are more than enough to double or triple the current aid. Sending new, cutting edge weapon is also possible.
Trump has said, before the elections, that he will arm Ukraine if Russia doesn't agree with a ceasefire. And that's what he is doing.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
One of the reasons could be that the border is heavily mined, closed with dragon teeth and trenches on both sides. Making movement difficult.

Another reason could be that the Russians want to get rid of the natural barrier consisting in the river. If they can secure the west bank of the river, then they can move vehicles anywhere from north to south, complicating Ukrainian reactions.
You successfully missed the point entirely. Here's the crossing, for clarity;

 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
"What do I know"

Well you unfailingly seem to "know" that Russia is always right and pretty much unbeatable and that Ukraine and the whole of Europe is always wrong and incapable of ever getting anything right.

Russia First?

Make Russia Great Again?


PS I have never said “Russia is always right” or unbeatable. That is nonsense. Neither did I say any such thing about Ukraine and “the whole of Europe”. That’s also nonsense.
PPS If you have something of substance to contradict my posts with, you can do so and we can discuss it, no? I actually like constructive dialogue and debate and varying opinions, as unbelievable as it may sound! Granted, I do prefer when the said debates and opinions are based on the reality, backed by evidence or something that resembles logical deduction.


About Ukraine, many of their new troops are trained in a NATO country, with NATO standards. We can assumed that they are trained professionaly. According to Ukrainian soldiers, this training is good but sometimes their own experience of the battle is completing the instruction.
They also receive NATO equipment. I don't think it's necessary to develop on this.
That does not mean they are better than they were though. I still didn't read the transcript and don’t know what the man talked about.

The transcript, for those interested, by the way:


In Russia, there are two kinds of army: The professional one and the canon fodders. The cannon fodders have very basic training,
There is no such thing Ukraine? Evidence had been posted here previously that suggests there is.

when they have training, bad weapons, no infantry vehicles or only civilian ones, bad food, bad clothes, no medevac whatsoever...
You are repeating propaganda again.

Maybe you have posted the evidence of the contrary.
Yes, I did.

This is what I remember having read back then. Now, it could be UAV, not "drone" in the sens we understand today. Wikipedia talks of Byraktars.
link
So in other words, it was not a UAV/missile combined strike.

Who are these generals and what are your sources? It's only speculation, IMO, to discredit the Ukrainians and try to prove that the Kursk offensive was a failure.
Very short memory. One example from Spetember:

Zelensky was advised by some of the Ukrainian top brass not to invade Kursk. Some were dismissed as a result. Zaluzhny's advice was apparently the same.


Interestingly, Zaluzhny, according to the article, asked the exact same thing I did here over a month ago
That’s unlike some of Ukraine’s top army commanders, including the former armed forces commander Gen. Valery Zaluzhny, now Ukraine’s ambassador in London, when Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy first broached the offensive earlier this year and pushed for it.

Others who opposed the offensive included the highly respected Emil Ishkulov, commander of Ukraine's 80th Air Assault Brigade. He was dismissed in July amid protests from high-ranking officers who called for him to be kept in post. “We don't understand why commanders who have unquestioned authority among the personnel, who have a victorious combat record and experience of a big war, are out of favor to the top leadership of the armed forces,” the commanders said in a protest video posted on social media sites.

Local media reported at the time that the reason for Ishkulov's dismissal was that he “opposed a task that didn't correspond to the brigade's strength.” According to two high-ranking Ukrainian military officials who were granted anonymity to speak with POLITICO, Ishkulov objected to the Kursk operation, fearing his brigade could eventually be too exposed inside Russia and that the casualty toll could rise precipitously.

Zaluzhny’s objection to the incursion, meanwhile, was that there was no clear second step after the border had been successfully breached by elite Ukrainian units drawn from four brigades, according to these officials. Zaluzhny queried: once you have the bridgehead, what then? “He never got a clear answer from Zelenskyy,” said one of the officials. “He felt it was a gamble,” he said


Trump can increase or keep the same pace of delivery
Again, Trump cannot issue new aid. Period.

And that's what he is doing.
What is it that he is doing?
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
There must be two different versions of Gen Cavoli’s speech out in the wild. I read the transcript and saw no such thing as outlined in Bob’s post (I had my doubts, as already expressed).

[…]Furthermore, Russia's ongoing effort to develop a massive military larger than its pre-war force, combined with its propensity to absorb military, political, and economic costs to achieve its strategic goals, indicate that Russia poses an enduring threat to the United States, our NATO Allies, and global security. This threat is intensified by Russia's strengthened relationships with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), and the Republic of Iran (Iran). Together, this group of adversaries seeks to undermine U.S. and Allied advantages and challenge our vital interests at home and abroad.

Russia continues to pursue strategic objectives that undermine the United States. While the war in Ukraine has been Russia's focus and the most visible sign of Moscow's great power ambitions, Russia's strategic objectives are centered on attaining unencumbered influence in its near-abroad and greater international power while diminishing the leadership and influence of the United States. The Kremlin openly communicates its desire for an alternative to NATO as the European security architecture, to expand Russia's military, and to increase force presence in key locations along NATO borders. Following the old Soviet playbook, Russia is engaging in a calculated destabilization campaign through cyberattacks on infrastructure, public sabotage, targeted violence, weaponized migration, election interference, and information operations. These activities have serious consequences for the freedoms and prosperity we enjoy in the United States. Taken together, they confirm the chronic threat that Russia poses to U.S. interests.

Within this broader context, the war in Ukraine is fundamentally about creating opportunities for Russia to gain geopolitical advantages and denying them to NATO. The scale of violence on the battlefields in Kursk, Donetsk, and Bakhmut demonstrates Russia's willingness to employ brutal means in pursuit of its goals. Now entangled in an extended, large-scale war, the Russian regime has refashioned its military, economic, and social structures to sustain what it describes as a long-term confrontation with the West-systemic changes that illustrate Russia's intention to confront us into the foreseeable future.

Despite extensive battlefield losses in Ukraine, the Russian military is reconstituting and growing at a faster rate than most analysts had anticipated. In fact, the Russian army, which has borne the brunt of combat, is today larger than it was at the beginning of the war-despite suffering an estimated 790,000 casualties. In December 2024, Moscow ordered the military to increase its strength to 1.5 million active service members and is recruiting approximately 30,000 troops per month. Russian forces on the frontlines of Ukraine are now at over 600,000, the highest level over the course of the war and almost double the size of the initial invasion force.

Russia is not just reconstituting service members but is also replacing combat vehicles and munitions at an unprecedented pace. Russian ground forces in Ukraine have lost an estimated 3,000 tanks, 9,000 armored vehicles, 13,000 artillery systems, and over 400 air defense systems in the past year—-but is on pace to replace them all. Russia has expanded its industrial production, opened new manufacturing facilities, and converted commercial production lines for military purposes. As a result, the Russian defense industrial base is expected to roll out 1,500 tanks, 3,000 armored vehicles, and 200 Iskander ballistic and cruise missiles this year. (Comparatively, the United States only produces about 135 tanks per year and no longer produces new Bradley Fighting Vehicles.) Additionally, we anticipate Russia to produce 250,000 artillery shells per month, which puts it on track to build a stockpile three times greater than the United States and Europe combined.

Not all of Russia's military capability has been degraded by the war. Russia continues to hold the largest nuclear weapons stockpile in the world. Russia's nuclear arsenal is composed of an estimated 2,500-3,500 high- and low-yield warheads, which can be tailored for use on the battlefield or employed strategically. Recently, the Kremlin updated its nuclear policy, which is

intended to communicate a lower nuclear threshold and outlines the range of contingencies that could justify the use of nuclear weapons. Russia also maintains robust chemical and biological weapons programs and has repeatedly used the chemical weapon chloropicrin and riot control agents as a method of warfare across the frontlines of Ukraine, in violation of its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention. Within its air and maritime capabilities, Russia has sustained only minor losses in Ukraine. The Russian Aerospace Force currently retains over 1,100 combat-capable aircraft that include Su-57 stealth fighters and Tu-95 and Tu-160 strategic bombers. Aside from some losses in its Black Sea Fleet, the Russian Navy remains intact, with over 60 submarines and 42 surface vessels capable of launching nuclear-tipped Kalibr cruise missiles.

Russian commanders still emphasize quantity and mass over skill and operational acumen. However, the poorly resourced and disorganized Russian forces we saw during the initial invasion have improved significantly. Russian formations are gaining combat experience. The military has demonstrated its ability to learn from the battlefield, disseminate new concepts across organizations, and counter Ukrainian tactical and technical advantages. It has implemented rapid cycles of adaptation and is developing new capabilities to accelerate force modernization. In November 2024, the Russian military conducted its first strike on a Ukrainian military facility with the new Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile. Russian officials have stated this missile could be equipped with a nuclear warhead. We have seen Russian forces employ new, domestically produced electronic countermeasures against Ukrainian jamming technology to improve strike efficacy. Additionally, Russian ground forces are integrating reconnaissance and one-way attack drones into their offensives on the battlefield. Russia is also expanding its undersea capabilities through the addition of Severodvinsk-ll class nuclear-powered cruise missile attack submarines, Dolgorukiy Il-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, and other undersea reconnaissance capabilities both in the European and Indo-Pacific theaters. These new capabilities show that the Russian military is intent on gaining tactical and operational advantage for the future battlefield.

To support Russia's growing military apparatus, the Kremlin has established economic policies to restructure its financial institutions and defense industry. In September 2024, Russia announced a 25% increase in defense spending, which represents 6.3% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP)[…]


There is no talk about the Ukrainian forces getting better or worse. I wonder what he is basing his Russian tanks and IFVs production numbers. Like I said above, the Iskander number seems very believable, but the armour… Not so sure, to say the least.

In regards to the claims of Russians using chemical weapons:

Both the Russian Federation and Ukraine have accused one another and reported allegations of use of chemical weapons to the Organisation.

A compendium of all official correspondence by States Parties on such allegations and accusations has been made available on the OPCW public website and is regularly updated.

The information provided to the Organisation so far by both sides, together with the information available to the Secretariat, is insufficiently substantiated.



That’s the statement after the accusation Cavoli is talking about, made public by the United States in May of last year.

Sorry for the copy-paste above. I didn’t feel like summarizing. I might summarize a few other points later, maybe.
 

seaspear

Well-Known Member
This article goes into some depth the Russian military industry base resources and perhaps production capabilities worth a read
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
^ Good read. Thanks.

It is only now it (randomly) hit me that Gen. Cavoli stated, according to the transcript and as quoted above, that Russia lost 3,000 tanks, 9,000 armoured vehicles, 13,000 artillery systems, and over 400 AD systems in the past year!

Russia definitely didn’t lose all that in the last year. Oryx totals for the duration of an entire war, up until April 1, 2025:

IMG_9314.jpeg

So there is something off there either with the wording or numbers themselves. The same may apply to the production capacity he mentioned. However, Iskander numbers actually appear to be quite low now that I shuffle through memory. I clearly remember the production numbers for Iskander-M claimed to be about 100 per month by the Ukrainian intelligence. I will have to look that up I know it was discussed here perviously).

There is a lot of “weirdness” about the numbers in his report.

Edit: Didn’t take long. This is from an article dating March 1, 2025:

A key issue addressed in the report is Russia’s production of long-range ammunition, a crucial factor in sustaining its military operations. RUSI cites plans from the Russian Ministry of Defence, indicating that in 2025, Russia intends to produce 750 9M723 Iskander tactical ballistic missiles and 560 Kh-101 air-launched cruise missiles.

Ukrainian intelligence has also published its own estimates regarding Russia’s missile production capacity. According to its assessment, Russia is currently capable of producing 40 to 50 Iskander ballistic missiles, 30 to 50 Kalibr cruise missiles, and approximately 50 Kh-101 missiles per month.



This is from an article dated November 21, 2024 (discussed here, I remember):

Russia has significantly ramped up the production of Iskander ballistic missiles compared to other types. As of Nov.20, it has stockpiled 350 Iskander-M missiles, with plans to produce an additional 70 units by the end of the month, according to the report.


Those numbers do not include Iskander-K, while Cavoli refers to both, -M and -K missiles.

Edit 2: This took a little longer, but I found it. A pretty reliable man and this is from a recent discussion I saw:

IMG_9315.jpeg

And his next post (in that ^ string):

IMG_9316.jpeg

The thread (in Polish):

 
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Redshift

Active Member


PS I have never said “Russia is always right” or unbeatable. That is nonsense. Neither did I say any such thing about Ukraine and “the whole of Europe”. That’s also nonsense.
PPS If you have something of substance to contradict my posts with, you can do so and we can discuss it, no? I actually like constructive dialogue and debate and varying opinions, as unbelievable as it may sound! Granted, I do prefer when the said debates and opinions are based on the reality, backed by evidence or something that resembles logical deduction.



That does not mean they are better than they were though. I still didn't read the transcript and don’t know what the man talked about.

The transcript, for those interested, by the way:



There is no such thing Ukraine? Evidence had been posted here previously that suggests there is.


You are repeating propaganda again.


Yes, I did.


So in other words, it was not a UAV/missile combined strike.


Very short memory. One example from Spetember:



That’s unlike some of Ukraine’s top army commanders, including the former armed forces commander Gen. Valery Zaluzhny, now Ukraine’s ambassador in London, when Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy first broached the offensive earlier this year and pushed for it.

Others who opposed the offensive included the highly respected Emil Ishkulov, commander of Ukraine's 80th Air Assault Brigade. He was dismissed in July amid protests from high-ranking officers who called for him to be kept in post. “We don't understand why commanders who have unquestioned authority among the personnel, who have a victorious combat record and experience of a big war, are out of favor to the top leadership of the armed forces,” the commanders said in a protest video posted on social media sites.

Local media reported at the time that the reason for Ishkulov's dismissal was that he “opposed a task that didn't correspond to the brigade's strength.” According to two high-ranking Ukrainian military officials who were granted anonymity to speak with POLITICO, Ishkulov objected to the Kursk operation, fearing his brigade could eventually be too exposed inside Russia and that the casualty toll could rise precipitously.

Zaluzhny’s objection to the incursion, meanwhile, was that there was no clear second step after the border had been successfully breached by elite Ukrainian units drawn from four brigades, according to these officials. Zaluzhny queried: once you have the bridgehead, what then? “He never got a clear answer from Zelenskyy,” said one of the officials. “He felt it was a gamble,” he said



Again, Trump cannot issue new aid. Period.


What is it that he is doing?
And there you go again.

It's all propaganda, except when Russia says it.

Entirely critical of the country that was invaded and entirely non critical of Russia.
 
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