The few videos posted here that I saw of human vs drones, usually shows a bunch of unaware people being hit a few seconds before spotting the drones. Or even not noticing them. I am not sure I saw any video that fits your description of "split seconds" between detection and being hit. The worst case I remember seeing had a reasonable number of seconds for people to disperse before the first soldier could be hit.How exactly do they locate it in your hypothetical? We've seen drones quiet enough and fast enough for there to be split seconds between dispersed infantry identifying the drone and then getting hit, and that's in the open. How do you do it in terrain, trees or buildings?
I read the article (more of an introduction) and might read the future English translation, depending on its size.Haha. This is most definitely not the case. These two incompetent sides have been doing this for the last few years, going through the entire evolution of this type of warfare. Frankly, no one else has done or gone through anything like this. I am sure both sides are hiring volunteers (or “well paid” contractors) though that could give them tips and show them how this is done on the competent level. Maybe ask the Americans and other westerners fighting in the Chosen Company and the Foreign Legion (is that the name?) in Ukraine.
This perception of Russians and Ukrainians (though by way less people in the case of the latter) being just meat and fighting WW1 type of stuff is very unhealthy. I would wager a good amount of money that if you put your described battalion of any other military in the middle of it, without proper introduction and training, regardless whose side they fight for, they would likely get picked off rather quickly by the opposing side. Some would probably have more success than others, I am fairly certain they would all get wiped out in the end, for the most part, if they persist.
An article on the subject of revolution. It is in French though, so you would have to use the translate function. The article itself is a brief, there is a pdf link within for the full report (also in French).
But that's precisely the contrary of what I am suggesting here. No one under a reasonable risk of being attacked should be submitted to it without proper training. People should train against their own drone teams before going into any offensive operation.without proper introduction and training
No secret here, just basic logical thinking, that's clearly not being used by most involved.Also, imagine someone knows a secret and not telling Ukraine (or Russia, for that matter) how to do better, but letting them get slaughtered instead.
He might be right already. Often the issue isn't one of the event happening but one of OSINTers being able to confirm it. Suriyakmaps has, in my opinion, a fairly high standard which means sometimes he can't confirm advances as happening, and he defaults to either increasing the grey area, or leaving it unchanged until he can get it confirmed. It makes his map more valuable as a conservative estimate of what's going on, on the ground, and since there is a general trend of Russian advances and Ukrainian retreats, it gives us a good picture of what we know Russia has captured.I've got this...
![]()
Kalibrated Ukraine Map - Google My Maps
Kalibrated Maps is developed by (https://x.com/squatsons) ). It was created with the aim of providing a publicly available but accurate control map of Ukraine. The map is updated based on confirmed information but it is still under development and may have some mistakes.www.google.com
and this...
I guess that in a couple of days or so, Kalibrated will be right.
The thing is... Ukraine's a large country. So another piece of this is that Russian advances are still relatively small in the overall scale of things. This lets many decisions be made in a context that's mostly political, and the military reality can be ignored, or misrepresented as whatever someone wants it to be. Decisions will likely be made differently if Russia forces start taking cities like Kharkov, Sumy, or even Slavyansk and Kramatorsk. I suspect this war is heading for a decision fork that will come towards the end of the Russian campaign for the Donbas. Russia will likely face a Ukraine that isn't ready to give up, isn't willing to sign any peace that involves recognizing any loss of territory, and isn't fully defeated by any reasonable definition. Western support for Ukraine will be low compared to earlier parts of the war, but not negligible, and continuous. Capturing Zaporozhye or Kherson will still be very unlikely goals at that point in time. What does Russia do then? My suspicion is that they will push into Poltava, Dnepropetrovsk, Sumy, and Kharkov regions*. And they will likely declare some region or other to also be annexed or be targeted for annexation once enough territory is "liberated". The intent would be to force Ukraine to face increasingly worse prospects as the war continues.No Taurus for Kiev, from the horse's mouth.
![]()
En direct, guerre en Ukraine : l’Allemagne n’envisage toujours pas de livrer des missiles Taurus à l’Ukraine
Le ministre de la défense allemand, en visite à Kiev, a annoncé le prochain déblocage d’une enveloppe d’aide militaire supplémentaire de 1,9 milliard d’euros. Mais Berlin ne compte pas livrer ces missiles de longue portée réclamés depuis un certain temps par Kiev.www.lemonde.fr
This is one little inconvenience of living on promises. (What does Zelenski have?, What can he do?)
Yes, it is about to surpass German production of missiles (and US production too?).Ukraine is also developing its own missiles so perhaps not so reliant on the German Taurus
![]()
“Bigger Than ATACMS”: Ukraine’s Cutting-Edge Ballistic Missile Reportedly Enters Combat Use
Developed since May 2022, Ukraine's latest missile boasts advanced precision and power, marking a significant advancement in its defense capabilities.united24media.com
![]()
New Ukrainian Ballistic Missile Threatens Russian Rear and Reduces Kyiv’s Reliance on Western Arms
New Ukrainian Ballistic Missile Threatens Russian Rear and Reduces Kyiv’s Reliance on Western Armsarmyrecognition.com
I think this is a great insight. Russia is seeking to negotiate to achieve it's political objectives, but has 0 interest in a ceasefire for the exactly same reason that Ukraine, and some of their foreign backers, want a ceasefire. The ceasefire helps Ukraine. It's also the reason why Ukraine won't negotiate with Russia. They have nothing to negotiate with, no objectives they can realistically achieve by negotiations, other then accept a diplomatic settlement to what amounts to a defeat.The result, then is, that Moscow and Kiev are approaching the question of negotiations with incompatible paradigms. Kiev, ideally, would like a ceasefire without any negotiated obligations; Moscow wants negotiations without a ceasefire. Russia has demonstrated that it is perfectly comfortable negotiating while military operations are ongoing. If the discussion collapses, it can always be resumed later, and in any case the Russian Army can continue advancing. This flexibility comes from Russian confidence that it will achieve the same strategic objectives in either case. For Ukraine, on the other hand, negotiating against a backdrop of ongoing combat is bad math, because it is the AFU that is steadily being rolled back and seeing its strategic position weaken.
Taking this to its paradigmatic conclusion, Russia and Ukraine have fundamentally different views of the relationship between military operations and negotiation. Ukraine seeks to negotiate to improve its military position: using performative diplomacy to leverage additional support from its western backers, and seeking a ceasefire to reconstitute its forces. Russia, on the other hand, uses military operations to improve its position in negotiations. The particular war aims and demands of the two parties are almost inconsequential, as the two sides do not even agree on what negotiations are for.
Commentators even here on defencetalk have expressed surprise that Russian morale recovered after '22, and that Russia clearly thinks they can win the war. This is a neat summary of why. The push on Artemovsk/Bakhmut was a messy one, but since ~June '23 this war has been one of steady if somewhat costly victories for Russia. At best it can be said that the victories aren't large enough to move the needle, and they're certainly not large enough to get Ukraine to surrender. But the trend line viewed over the last ~2 years is fairly clear. Ukraine's ability to fight is winding down, Russia's is ramping up. I suspect the second half of '25 will only confirm this trend.Commentators in the west rarely try to view the conflict from Russia’s perspective, but if they could they would quickly see why Russian confidence remains high. As Russia sees it, they have absorbed and defeated Ukraine’s two best punches on the ground (the 2023 counteroffensive and the Kursk operation), and they have weathered a long and steady infusion of western combat power without the trajectory of either the ground campaign or the strike war fundamentally shifting. Meanwhile, Russia has essentially scratched off the entire southern Donbas, pushing the front across the border into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and they are poised to wrap up the central sector of front as the advance around Pokrovsk and Kostyantynivka blooms.