The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

[Feanor]

It appears that the Russian advances in Kursk have slowed down significantly. Obukhovka is reported to be captured by Russians as of Sept 13. Snagost is not entirely captured (this is also partially confirmed by a couple of videos I saw of Russians dropping bombs at the Ukrainian positions in the village - of course, the videos can be a few days old, but reported as fresh by Ukrainians (Russians do the same)). This is according to Ukrainian sources.

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Source for the report: Russia's war on Ukraine. 13.09.24

According to the same report, Russians advanced in Kharkiv, Kupyansk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove

View attachment 51724

Pokrovsk looks really bad (though the Russian advances were, of course, stopped as per the “top men”). Took me a while to realize that there are two villages named Lisivka again, lol (even though i knew it before and Feanor mentioned it in his update the other day, but I forgot). Everything in the report above was consistent with other (pro-) Ukrainian sources/maps that I looked at, except some include certain locations as a grey zone vs captured and vice versa. Except for the Lisivka until I realized it is the one east of Ukrainsk, not the one north-west of Novohrodivka. Man, these names. Then there are Zhelanne, New Zhelanne, Other Zhelanne, First Zhelanne, and other Zhelannes. Go figure. Some are next to each other, others not so much. Anyway…

It is not a stretch to predict that Ukrainsk, including the terikon, is going to fall rather sooner than later. Today there were reports of Russians storming the Ukrainian positions at this location:

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This is from a post on X by a reliable (Ukrainian) source: x.com. I haven’t seen this to be reflected on any of the latest maps yet (some don’t even include it as the “grey zone” yet - case in point above), but it likely will in the next day or two depending on whether the current and future attacks are successful.

We recently discussed the Czech initiative and countries refusing to pay into it in spite of prior commitments. We can add Poland to the list of non-contributors:

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Original source in Polish: Wyborcza.pl

A short article at Reuters briefly discussing (some of the) potential responses from Russia to the Ukrainian strikes with western assets into Russia.

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putins-options-ukraine-missiles-response-includes-nuclear-test-experts-say-2024-09-13/

There are some interesting comments, especially by Sergey Makarov, who used to be an adviser to Putin and an analyst nowadays. I am not going to take up space pasting quotes since, I think, everyone can read it without paywalls or anything. I would add from myself that there will be a response, without a single little doubt in my mind. We just don’t know what it is. I already discussed it briefly a few weeks ago, so not going to repeat or add to it at the moment.

On this note, I was going to add more to my post on the subject of the Russian nuclear doctrine in the General Russia thread, but didn’t have the time. I will try to do so tomorrow.

Another little note. I listened to a couple of In Moscow’s Shadows podcasts today - I am behind - while doing “household duties” and want to mention something here that Mark very briefly talked about. This is the episode I am citing:

In Moscow's Shadows 162: Lavrov's (Living) Obituary - In Moscow's Shadows

Empty rumours of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov's death on the internet yesterday, got me thinking about his shrinking role, and the twilight of Russia's technocrats. Besides, he is already politically dead, so it’s in a way not too early ...

inmoscowsshadows.buzzsprout.com

He talks about the latest poll by the Levada Centre that strongly suggests that the support of continuing military action has increased since the Kursk invasion. This number went up from 34% in July to 41% after the incursion. The number of those who supported the idea of the peace talks, in contrast, has decreased from 58 to 50%. I just wanted to note this because there was some discussion recently of the subject and the idea that Russians will rally against Putin and whatnot. Like I argued then without any references at the time, this had the exact opposite effect. I would have to loook up the actual poll, which I am not willing to do at the moment, but I would propose that some regions’ numbers have changed much more significantly than that average Mark talks about. One can reasonably put parallels between this and the recruitment numbers as well.

That map showing Ukrainsk entirely under Ukrainian control isn't even in the neighborhood of credible. Russia has been contesting the town for many days now, and both suriyakmaps and Kalibrated show the town either mostly or entirely under Russian control with remaining Ukrainian forces gathered on and around the refuse mound. The last update from suriyakmaps actually suggests that Russia has begun enveloping the refuse mound.

In Kursk region we have a Russian flag raising in Snagost', so not sure what they're talking about. The sources I'm looking at show Russian forces considerably east of Snagost'. Maybe we will get something new in the next couple of days but it looks like Russia's counter-offensive is still going, and the new Ukrainian front will be on the Sverdlikovo-Novoivanovka line.

Lisovka makes things a bit confusing sure. Presumably there are a lot of foxes in the area. Russia holds the Lisovka east of Ukrainsk and has entered, contesting, the Lisovka west of Novogrodovka.

 

[Fredled]

It looks like Snagost as well as the link to the Golushkovo cauldron is partially under Russian control but is fiercly contested. It's not clear at this point if the Russians are able to supply their troop in the Golushkovo district via the Snagost route or north of Snagost. Note that there is still a small river in the way, and not all the roads visible on the map are paved. + these roads would still be under Ukrainian artillery fire.
Ukrainians are defending their positions there. It will take a few days before one of the two sides could claim a stable result.

According to Torsten Heinrich's War & History (You Tube chanel) who makes a summary of various pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian maps and blogs, Ukrainsk is entirely under Russian control. As well as unconfirmed Russian advances previousely reported. In several areas of the donbas front, Russians attempt to encircle Ukrainians, who probably retreat before that happens. However the Russian advance remains slow.

 

[Feanor]

It looks like Snagost as well as the link to the Golushkovo cauldron is partially under Russian control but is fiercly contested. It's not clear at this point if the Russians are able to supply their troop in the Golushkovo district via the Snagost route or north of Snagost. Note that there is still a small river in the way, and not all the roads visible on the map are paved. + these roads would still be under Ukrainian artillery fire.
Ukrainians are defending their positions there. It will take a few days before one of the two sides could claim a stable result.

Snagost' isn't the route to the Glushkovo area. Snagost' sits on a road from Korenevo to Gordeevka on the Ukrainian border. There is a dirt track road through Krasnooktyabr'skoe, and there is a rail line along which runs a road for most of it's length, but just north of Vishnevka there isn't for a small stretch, meaning you'd have to drive along the rail berm, and on the rail bridge, assuming that's doable. Snagost' protects these routes from the east. You're right in pointing out that these aren't great supply routes and there is a turnoff through Apanasovka, south of Snagost', but it's unlikely Russia can use that, since it's fairly close to the Ukrainian border.

In general I think the main issue is that Russia was able to launch the attack out of the Glushkovo area, suggesting they're able to keep the place supplied with pontoon bridges. Note, while some have credited Russian engineers for this, I think this is inaccurate. Even in the illfated Belogorovka crossing, the engineers did their job. It's Russian counter-battery efforts here that I think have made this possible.

According to Torsten Heinrich's War & History (You Tube chanel) who makes a summary of various pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian maps and blogs, Ukrainsk is entirely under Russian control. As well as unconfirmed Russian advances previousely reported. In several areas of the donbas front, Russians attempt to encircle Ukrainians, who probably retreat before that happens. However the Russian advance remains slow.

Also apparently Zhelannoe Pervoe, which probably means the end of the Nevel'skoe salient. With the Russian advance west of Krasnogorovka either taking or contesting Ostroe (sources differ but the village is mostly under Russian control), Ukrainian forces on the left short of the Volchya need to get out before Russia starts the fight for Gornyak. It's possible they've already withdraw and we just don't see it yet. If they wait too long we may have another Avdeevka-style disaster where infantry has to flee on foot across open fields under enemy artillery fires.

There are two bridges east of the large reservoire across the Volchya, and one is dangerously close to Russian lines.

 

[Capt. Ironpants]

I wrote this on Thursday evening, but was very tired from my busy day and did not post it. Events have overrun it now, but will go ahead and post as I am still left with questions:

I hope it's okay to ask my dumb civvie question from you military experts. I am rather perplexed about the current kerfuffle over authorizing Ukraine's use of "long range missiles". The American and British press are discussing it solely in terms of "US ATACMS and British Storm Shadow missiles."

Well, that may be the case at the moment (for public consumption, at any rate), but around Sept. 3 and 4, there were a number of articles in the press about the US considering supplying JASSMs to Ukraine. When carefully reading Putin's and Lavrov's statements, it seems to me that it is the JASSMs that are the real concern, although this is not explicitly spelled out.

I can see how allowing ATACMS and Storm Shadows to strike inside Russia would be rather bothersome to the Russians, but I can't see it changing the course of the war. Zelensky's stated aim of hitting Russian air bases does not hold water if we're talking ATACMs and Storm Shadows, but if we're talking JASSMs, it does.

As the the only aircraft in Ukraine capable of delivering JASSMs are those recently-delivered F-16s, of which they have only five left (three if the Russians really did destroy two of them on the ground in that attack on that airbase), and given they have very few competent pilots (and have already lost their most competent one), I wondered how much damage they could really achieve.

Then I found this (I think/hope Reuters is okay to cite):

US close to agreeing on long-range missiles for Ukraine; delivery to take months

One of the U.S. officials said there were efforts to make the missile operable with non-Western fighter jets in Ukraine's inventory, which has not been reported previously. Although the official did not provide further detail on which jets in Ukraine's inventory JASSM could be used with, they operate Soviet-era MiG-29, Su-24 and Su-27 jets.
...
Military analysts have suggested the introduction of JASSMs - which are stealthy and can strike further than most other missiles in Ukraine's current inventory - could push Russian staging areas and supply depots back by hundreds of miles.
...
This would severely complicate Russia's ability to sustain its offensive operations and potentially provide Ukraine with a strategic advantage.

From the article one gets the impression that the ability to make "the missile operable with non-Western fighter jets in Ukraine's inventory" is "months away". Whether this is true is anyone's guess. There are lots of legitimate reasons to obfuscate such matters. Leaking this put the Russians on notice to up the tempo and intensity of their offensives in the coming weeks before having to pull back air bases, etc., possibly causing them to overreach/over stretch, provided they believe it. If they are actually very close to achieving this (or already have), and can deliver the JASSMs quickly, then they win the element of surprise (again, provided the Russians believe this).

Some of the pros and cons of supplying JASSMs to Ukraine (I hope this source is okay -- if not, please let me know and I will edit to remove it), including the risk of Russia getting hold of some for reverse engineering:

Above All Else JASSM Would Give Ukraine A Steady Supply Of Cruise Missiles

Would JASSMs really make a difference? I am too ignorant to guess well. Even if supplied and authorized, how many aircraft (of whatever make) can the Ukrainians field to deliver them anyway?

It appears to me that the US authorizing use of ATACMs and Storm Shadows to strike "deep into Russian territory" would be an escalation, but not very effective In terms of materially damaging Russian military capability (unfavorable risk/benefit ratio for US/NATO). Supplying and authorizing JASSMs, on the other hand, would be a significant escalation (at least two rungs up the ladder in my humble estimation), but potentially effective. While they might (according to the sources cited) provide Ukraine with a tangible strategic advantage, I am not entirely convinced. Regardless, it seems to me the real issue is JASSMs, not ATACMs and Storm Shadows.

By making the issue ostensibly about ATACMs/Storm Shadows the US can save face in saying "no" as we can say the Russians have already pulled back their air bases beyond range, and besides, the Russians have got pretty good at shooting these down. By making noises about being open to supplying JASSMs beforehand (and then being quiet about it), the US might think this would allow them to test the waters while at the same time perhaps pushing the Russians into a blunder at worst, or into looking nasty or hysterical at least.

Or maybe I am way off in the weeds. I hope you experts can set me straight.

Note: I very much appreciate the updates and analysis here, especially the detailed posts by the tireless and very patient @Feanor. Thanks so much, guys!

 

[KipPotapych]

That map showing Ukrainsk entirely under Ukrainian control isn't even in the neighborhood of credible. Russia has been contesting the town for many days now, and both suriyakmaps and Kalibrated show the town either mostly or entirely under Russian control with remaining Ukrainian forces gathered on and around the refuse mound. The last update from suriyakmaps actually suggests that Russia has begun enveloping the refuse mound.

In Kursk region we have a Russian flag raising in Snagost', so not sure what they're talking about. The sources I'm looking at show Russian forces considerably east of Snagost'. Maybe we will get something new in the next couple of days but it looks like Russia's counter-offensive is still going, and the new Ukrainian front will be on the Sverdlikovo-Novoivanovka line.

Lisovka makes things a bit confusing sure. Presumably there are a lot of foxes in the area. Russia holds the Lisovka east of Ukrainsk and has entered, contesting, the Lisovka west of Novogrodovka.

I don’t know what map he is using. I believe this is simply for illustration purpose of a particular geolocated Russian attack, not the general outline of the frontline. Today that spot was included either as grey zone or Russian control on the various (pro-) Ukrainian maps. Some suggest that Ukrainsk has already fallen, others speculate that it is about to. Here is the current Ukrainsk map from the source I mentioned yesterday.



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Here is another example. This is another Twitter account I discovered fairly recently and they seem to be doing a great job. Note that the maps look really busy at first, but once your eye gets a hang of it, they really are great and contain tonnes of info, including elevation, numerical change in area controlled for both sides, units involved, etc - hence, the business aspect of it. The mapper is French, so it may be beneficial to understand at least some of it, but really has very little effect in general.



Post on X: x.com

Of course, one needs to keep in mind that any map will lag behind by at least a day in most cases. Other limitations include the following fact: all these maps are created based on geolocated footage, likely compared to the reports by both sides from the frontline, verification of such info and comparing to other sources, etc. Many mappers have their own rules in regard to what qualifies for “control”, “grey zone”, etc. However, I lately see that regardless of the source for the map, few extremes aside, they all look the same, some lagging from others by a day or two, some trying to run ahead of the train, some are walking way behind, but those in the middle are more or less spot on and rarely need to do retractions/adjustments to previously mapped content. Something like that.

In Kursk, there have been reports and video evidence of Russians attacking and entering Lyubimovka, ways past Obukhovka. I believe this confirms that the latter is under firm Russian control. Snagost is recaptured by Russia as well. So their offensive is ongoing, though slower than it was a couple of days ago. Here is the Kursk map from the last X link I cited above:



Note the area marked as “to be verified” (waiting for additional info) that is likely based on the recent attack on Lyubimovka. Also note the area in the Glushkovo direction marked as “contested”, while many had already booked it as Ukrainian control, which of course it isn’t. The whole thing is so far based on a few poor quality videos showing a few vehicle speeding in a certain direction after the breach of fortifications. We shall see once the dust settles and fog clears.

In New York, Russians captured the phenol plant. I won’t be inserting another map due to the unreasonably limited space for attached images (4), but you can see one in the second link above. Deepstate (and others) reported the same.

✙DeepState✙

Мапу оновлено! ⚔️ Сили Оборони зайняли Вітряно, Дуровку та частину Журавлів. Ворог окупував Галицинівку та Снагость з навколишніми селами, а також просунувся в бік Любимівки, біля Піщаного, Григорівки, Гострого, Георгіївки, в Синьківці, Нью-Йорку та Українську. ✈️ Нагадуємо про наш збір для...

t.me

In other news, possibly in view of potential strikes deeper into Russia, it appears that they evacuated ships from Novorossiysk. There is a report on X citing satellite imagery. And here are a couple of snapshots I took form a gif showing the same (first is reportedly Sept 4 shot and the second is Sept 1):

The Ukrainian Wild Hornets reported that their drone has reached the speed of 325 km/h:

Thread By @wilendhornets - Highspeed FPV drone from Wild Hornets ac..

Highspeed FPV drone from Wild Hornets accelerated to 325 kmh We broke our previous speed record We continue to develop this project A little more and

unrollnow.com

That gets us into the territory of Russian helicopters being chased after by these things. It remains to be seen if it can retain these velocity for any extended period of time (few minutes?), but the capability itself is already quite amazing. Provided it is true to begin with, of course.

Russians are continuing building fortifications in Kursk, although reportedly at a slower pace now (there is a video of the progress imbedded):

Thread By @bradyafr - Russian forces continue expanding defens..

Russian forces continue expanding defenses in Kursk but the pace of their construction has become less rapid in recent days Here is a look at how thes

unrollnow.com

A brief discussion of the situation at Vuhledar and Ukrainsk directions and potential developments.

Thread By @M0nstas - Map Donbas There are layers of forces an..

Map Donbas There are layers of forces and fortifications on top of topography but Zerg grinding machine under command of Chaos Undivided doesnt care a

unrollnow.com

Note Vitaly also noticed the frequency of Russian exploitation of the stretched Ukrainian defense and the resulted encirclements.

A bit of perspective on Ukrainsk from Def Mon:



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In contrast, here is the insanity reported by the Ukrainian propaganda outlets:

Frontline report: Russian forces finally sacrifice Pokrovsk offensive to defend Kursk - Euromaidan Press

Ukraine has managed to alter battlefield dynamics with its Kursk incursion in just six weeks: Russia redeploys forces from crucial Pokrovsk offensive

euromaidanpress.com

Today there are a lot of important updates from the Kursk direction. Here, in a critical turning point, Ukrainian forces finally managed to escalate the pressure in the Kursk Oblast to such an extent that the Russians were forced to sacrifice their Pokrovsk offensive and redeploy their most critical reserves to the north. By disrupting the biggest Russian offensive operation, on which Russians staked everything, the Ukrainian Kursk offensive proved to be a strategic success.

In the Koronevo area, Ukrainian forces significantly outnumbered the Russian defenders of the town and its surroundings. As the Russians lost substantial territory on the northern and southern flanks, Koronevo faced an imminent threat of encirclement.[…]

The Russians would not be able to sustain such counterattacks without a substantial increase in available troops in the Oblast. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that the Russians redeployed up to 30,000 troops from unspecified directions to Kursk.

Meanwhile, President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that there are up to 60,000 Russian troops across the northeastern border from Bryansk to Kharkiv, including Kursk. Syrskyi also noted that the number of troops, initially at 30,000, is expected to rise as the Russians plan further counteroffensive efforts in the Kursk Oblast.

And so on.

 

[Fredled]

The last Torsten Heinrich's video shows this map of the Kursk/Snagost area. The Russian have definitely opened the cauldron, between Tolpino and Snagost. It's a difficult terrain for supply vehicles to cross, but at least, they can bypass the Seym river on tracked or other off-road vehicles. There are two small rivers to cross. This progression shows that Russians are actively repelling Ukrainians in this area.
It also pushes Ukrainian artillery further from the pontoon bridges. And that's may be more important.

However Ukrainians have entered the Glushkovo district from the south (the grey zone on the left of the map). What Ukrainians have taken there is not well defined. They are still moving. It's not a very important force: one or two dozen of armoured vehicles.
Ukrainians even had the luxury to make a minor advance in the north of the occupied area, in the direction of Sheptukova.
They don't progress anymore in the east and south east.

It's possible they've already withdraw and we just don't see it yet. If they wait too long we may have another Avdeevka-style disaster where infantry has to flee on foot across open fields under enemy artillery fires.

Yes. And such figure is repeating in several areas. Russian advance in the north and in the south of an Ukrainian position, then close the grip and fill the gap. Ukrainians have no choice but to withdraw or be trapped. Of course that's only possible where Russians have the numerical advantage.
That being said, the number of soldiers involved are relatively small. It's often platoon size. So, there is no panic if a dozen, at most one hundred, soldiers have to escape an encirclement.

 

[Fredled]

Would JASSMs really make a difference? I am too ignorant to guess well. Even if supplied and authorized, how many aircraft (of whatever make) can the Ukrainians field to deliver them anyway?

It appears to me that the US authorizing use of ATACMs and Storm Shadows to strike "deep into Russian territory" would be an escalation, but not very effective In terms of materially damaging Russian military capability (unfavorable risk/benefit ratio for US/NATO).

I'm no better specialist than you. But I understand that the JASSM is the US equivalent to the Storm Shadow/Scalp. Not the same model, but more or less the same range and payload.
The only big difference is with quantity. UK and French inventories for their cruise missiles and (other high end hardware) is very limited. In the single digit per month. Numbers are not released, but we can see that the number of attacks is very small. The US can afford to give them by the dozen and still see no significant change in their own inventory. If they are talking end-of life missiles, then the US stocks are almost unlimited.
The only problem is, as you said, the number of planes able to launch them. Between 3 and 5 F16's at the moment. Ukrainians are not going to use F16's to attack ground targets before they get more F16's and the Mirage 2000's. That means not before mid 2025.

In the immediate time frame, it's clear that only ATACMS and Storm Shadow/Scalp's are available. Their range is 300km. That means that, for safety reason, they can hit targets at best 200 km inside Russia + the south of the Kursk Region they occupy. So there is no way they can hit important Russian air bases like Engel's, where the Tupolev's are based.
The goal of these strikes "deep" inside Russia would be to hit the logistic centers and railways. This alone could impede significantly the Russian operations.

I don't see the risk of an escalation with that. It's more posturing by the Russian Foreign Ministery. But Russians know very well that they are the agressors and that they deserve what they get. Despite Lavrov telling journalists the opposite of reality without feeling any shame.

More important is the air-to-air missiles that will enable the F16's to strike Russian Mig's. The US has promised AMRAAM's, and they also have them in large supply. That's what Russians should worry about right now.

In contrast, here is the insanity reported by the Ukrainian propaganda outlets:

Ukrainian forces finally managed to escalate the pressure in the Kursk Oblast to such an extent that the Russians were forced to sacrifice their Pokrovsk offensive and redeploy their most critical reserves to the north.

I don't understand why this is insanity. The Russians have not "sacrified" their Pokrovsk offensive, this is an overstatement, but it's not that far from reality. The facts show that Russians won't be able to repel Ukrainians from the Kursk Region by picking up 100 men here and there. They have to move forces from Ukraine proper. They certainly have less forces at their disposal in Pokrovsk than they would have, had Ukrainians stayed iddle in the Summy Region. And certainly less forces that they would like.

Russians are making every efforts to make it as if there were no change. That's why they are moving small units, picked here and there, along the front line as well as from Russia. It's working psychologically as Russians are still able to progress in the Donbass, and in the media sphere where they are able to claim that the diversion have failed, but at the same time, taking small units, and sometimes soldiers individually, decrease the effectiveness and coordination on the Kursk battlefield. It also delays the Russian counter offensive, allowing Ukrainian to prepare for it. That's why they had no result whatsoever for ome month.

Ukrainsk: I wonder how the Russians are going to rename this village: Russiansk?

 

[Feanor]

I don't understand why this is insanity. The Russians have not "sacrified" their Pokrovsk offensive, this is an overstatement, but it's not that far from reality. The facts show that Russians won't be able to repel Ukrainians from the Kursk Region by picking up 100 men here and there. They have to move forces from Ukraine proper. They certainly have less forces at their disposal in Pokrovsk than they would have, had Ukrainians stayed iddle in the Summy Region. And certainly less forces that they would like.

You've said this above, but do you have any sources? So far it's just a claim. I'm not sold Russia needs to repel Ukraine in Kursk region at all. Another positional front, isolated from the rest, draining Ukrainian resources, isn't really a problem. It was a problem when there was a credible threat of further substantial advances. But that seems to be done with.

Russians are making every efforts to make it as if there were no change. That's why they are moving small units, picked here and there, along the front line as well as from Russia. It's working psychologically as Russians are still able to progress in the Donbass, and in the media sphere where they are able to claim that the diversion have failed, but at the same time, taking small units, and sometimes soldiers individually, decrease the effectiveness and coordination on the Kursk battlefield. It also delays the Russian counter offensive, allowing Ukrainian to prepare for it. That's why they had no result whatsoever for ome month.

It's not true that they've had no result whatsoever for a month. Russian forces have slowed their advance not when Ukraine entered Kursk region but when they reached the built up areas west of Doentsk. Instead of villages they have a series of small towns to go through. There's Novogrodovka, Selidovo, Ukrainsk and Gornyak, before they get to Mirnograd and then Pokrovsk. You'll note that while many, myself included, assumed the main goal of the offensive was Pokrovsk because, well, that was the direction, the offensive has actually swung south and forces a Ukrainian withdrawal not only from the northern outskirts of Krasnogorovka but almost the entire area between the line Pervomayskoe-Karlovka in the north, and the Krasnogorovka suburbs in the south. Ukraine still has some positions east of the Volchya in this area, but if the push southward continues, those will have to get out too. In fact I suspect they're already pulling back if the information about Zhelannoe Pervoe falling is accurate. Those aren't "no results". Rememeber Russia took Novogrodovka in ~3 days of light fighting, and went into Selidovo immediately afterwards, but the arrival of Ukrainian reinforcements slowed down the situation in Selidovo, and Russia then spent ~1 week securing Novogrodovka. Taking tiny villages is one thing but even small towns with the built-up Soviet-style apartment housing is a whole other. They're much more defendable, and even just clearing them takes time.

It's not clear that any substantial forces have been moved from the Pokrovsk axis to Kursk region. If you have evidence, please present it.

By the way in this war often it's not the forces Russia sends to an area that determine the pace of advance, but other factors. Russian forces are still fairly uneven with quality of performance varying. The terrain and geograpy of an area have a pretty substantial effect, and the quality of Ukrainian forces there matters a lot too. There's a reason Russia has had so little success in the woods west of Kremennaya and has been mostly stalled at Chasov Yar after taking the canal neighborhood. On the other hand they've been advancing steadily into Toretsk. Look at Ugledar. Russia spent ridiculous resources and efforts trying to take it by assault and failed over and over again. Now it's flanked from the north, and could very well fall without a fight.

Ukrainsk

: I wonder how the Russians are going to rename this village: Russiansk?

The renaming is done because Russia passed law (iirc) renaming all towns and villages in the newly annexed territories to the pre-1991 names. Ironically this law doesn't apply to the territory of pre-war Russia itself, and isn't being applied consistently. Ukrainsk got it's name ironically not from the soviet republic of Ukraine but from the mine there called Ukraine (which did get its name from the soviet republic). So it would not get renamed.

 

[Capt. Ironpants]

I'm no better specialist than you. But I understand that the JASSM is the US equivalent to the Storm Shadow/Scalp. Not the same model, but more or less the same range and payload.

Thank you for your kind reply.

From what I have read, while the payload is very similar, the JASSMs do have longer range than the British Storm Shadow (while the US ATACM has a similar range). How much longer, of course, depends on the variant:

The 2,400-pound JASSM (Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile) is armed with a 1,000-pound warhead and has a range of more than 230 miles, though the improved AGM-158B JASSM-ER has a range of 575 miles. [630 miles according to another source cited later in this post]

Link: JASSM missiles for Ukraine’s new F-16s?

The Storm Shadow has a range of up to 155 miles (250km), and the ATACM a range of between 100 miles and 190 miles, depending on the version. So, the older JASSM would not be all that significant a change in range, while the new and improved one most certainly would be. The JASSM is also reportedly more stealthy.

In the immediate time frame, it's clear that only ATACMS and Storm Shadow/Scalp's are available. Their range is 300km. That means that, for safety reason, they can hit targets at best 200 km inside Russia + the south of the Kursk Region they occupy. So there is no way they can hit important Russian air bases like Engel's, where the Tupolev's are based.
The goal of these strikes "deep" inside Russia would be to hit the logistic centers and railways. This alone could impede significantly the Russian operations.

Zelensky is the one citing "the ability to strike air bases" deep inside Russia as a major reason we should authorize long-range missile strikes, and has done so on several occasions. Unless he is woefully misinformed or a total idiot, he knows that Storm Shadow and ATACM missiles cannot accomplish this (but the newer JASSM could).

To prevent the attacks, Zelenskyy pushed for permission from the U.S. to use long-range weapons to target airfields hundreds of miles inside Russia.

“We can protect our cities from Russian guided bombs if American leadership makes a step forward and allows us to destroy Russian military aircraft on their bases," he said.

Link: At NATO summit, Zelensky presses for US greenlight to hit Russian bases

I don't see the risk of an escalation with that. It's more posturing by the Russian Foreign Ministery. But Russians know very well that they are the agressors and that they deserve what they get. Despite Lavrov telling journalists the opposite of reality without feeling any shame.

I'm sorry, but French is like my sixth language and I've mostly forgot what little I once knew (although I can still manage to read it somewhat) so this video from Afrique Media News is mostly incomprehensible to me, especially as the French translator's voice completely drowns out Lavrov's. I assume it's a video of Lavrov speaking at this event, his remarks translated into English here:

Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's remarks at the ambassadorial roundtable discussion of Ukraine crisis settlement, Moscow, September 12, 2024

If my assumption is incorrect, could you kindly supply a link in English, German, Spanish or Russian (in my order of preference)?

I'm not sure what part of his remarks you have in mind. Leaving aside political polemics and propaganda, of which there is plenty to be found surrounding this war (I'm just interested in facts regarding this issue, these missiles, their range, how they work, etc. -- in other words, the things themselves) -- he is correct in pointing out how the ATACM and Storm Shadow missiles are programmed and guided.

You will not like the slant in this article, but again, I have no interest in slant and cant, just the facts, ma'am, about how these things work. This article lays it out in an understandable way re satellite guidance, and as it relates to the question at hand:

Deep Strikes Into Russia: M-Code Satellite Guidance That Navigates ATACMS, Storm Shadow Missiles Makes U.S. Complicit

The JASSM, at least the newer version, is a little trickier, but would still require direct American involvement to program, whichever version we're looking at:

Lockheed Martin ramps-up building JASSM and LRASM air-to-surface missiles with semi-autonomous guidance

More important is the air-to-air missiles that will enable the F16's to strike Russian Mig's. The US has promised AMRAAM's, and they also have them in large supply. That's what Russians should worry about right now.

I respectfully disagree. Where is Ukraine going to get F-16 pilots capable of shooting down Russian MiGs "right now"? I know Lindsey Graham appealed to retired NATO F-16 pilots to volunteer to fly for Ukraine "until they can get their pilots trained":

Video of Graham here:

Whether any have volunteered so far, I don't know. I have not seen any announcement of such. I can't envision any doing so, but then maybe that's because I'm a big chicken or because I have no wish to die for somebody else's country.

It takes between two and a half to three and a half years to fully train a US F-16 pilot to be fully combat ready. While the Ukrainian pilots undergoing training already have experience in their own Soviet style aircraft, they also have to master English, and it appears training has not gone as smoothly as hoped. I simply can't see the F-16s making a big difference in the near future, let alone changing the course of the war.

Edited to add: No change in policy was announced following the meeting between Biden and Starmer. Kirby's remarks just prior to the meeting indicated there was no change in policy:

MR. KIRBY: I would not expect there to be any announcements on this coming out of the meeting today. There’s been no change to our policy, Lara, with respect to the long-range strike capability inside Russia, and I’d leave it at that.

Link: On-the-Record Press Gaggle by White House National Security Communications Advisor John Kirby

So this whole discussion may be moot, at least for the time being. But the subject won't go away. Zelensky again called for permission yesterday. I guess the future will tell ...

 

[KipPotapych]

I don't understand why this is insanity. The Russians have not "sacrified" their Pokrovsk offensive, this is an overstatement, but it's not that far from reality.

It is far enough from reality that I believe it is safe to call it insanity, as I did. Pretty sure I had already talked about why this is the case. And I, frankly, believe that Pokrovsk is the second thing Ukraine should worry about at this time, which I also talked about already.

Russians are making every efforts to make it as if there were no change. That's why they are moving small units, picked here and there, along the front line as well as from Russia. It's working psychologically as Russians are still able to progress in the Donbass, and in the media sphere where they are able to claim that the diversion have failed, but at the same time, taking small units, and sometimes soldiers individually, decrease the effectiveness and coordination on the Kursk battlefield. It also delays the Russian counter offensive, allowing Ukrainian to prepare for it. That's why they had no result whatsoever for ome month.

Fredled, I really do wonder where you get your information from. I am not kidding at all. You say no result whatsoever for one month. Here is something to ponder about then: the following indicates the territory exchanged in the last week alone (week 37 of 2024) and you should be able to read it in French, I am assuming (pertes is losses, for those who do not understand French - mine is really bad too beyond the very basics and some vocabulary, fyi).



Post on X: x.com. While I think it is obvious and likely shouldn’t even be mentioned, but I will say it anyway: it’s not accurate to a square metre, but the situation otherwise is pretty clear. Last week, Ukraine lost over 20% of the territory they captured in Kursk and the situation is still unraveling. Note that I am going with the numbers cited above and the area captured as measured by the Americans (I cited that number a few posts ago) rather than Syrsky’s numbers (over ~15% otherwise?).

Here is another one to ponder:



Post on X: x.com. To note, last month set a record in terms of Russian monthly advances in more than two years. We are exactly half month in so far. It should also be noted that the area captured does not necessarily illustrate success or failure. See the Ukrainian Kursk offensive (though not exactly the same thing) that they say “proved to be a strategic success”. However, in another man’s words:



From the thread referenced below.

Another one:



Post on X: x.com

Here is Def Mon’s response to the article in question (highly recommended):

Thread By @DefMon3 - I'm just gonna look at the data here and..

I'm just gonna look at the data here and conclude that Trent have no idea what he is talking about There's also no indication the Russians moved any s

unrollnow.com

Thread on X: x.com

Basically take your pick. To be stressed here, all of the above are pro- and Ukrainian sources. Most are “pro-Ukrainian” to the highest degree possible, reasonably speaking. On the subject, I am personally getting tired myself of having to label the sources as “pro-Ukrainian” or “pro-Russian”. This is a big part of the problem, in my opinion, in this whole thing. In reality, there are sources are reasonable and reliable and those that are not. What side they are supposedly “cheering” for, if any, has little relevance whatsoever. Most of the most “pro-“ anything are the worst you can rely on. And this is becoming more snd more visible on any social media. I actually came to talk about that very topic, but it will have to wait for tomorrow (maybe).

Fredled, I also want to note that what you are saying in your post, in other words, is that Russia currently views Kursk as a secondary objective (if not tertiary and further down the line).

Ukrainsk: I wonder how the Russians are going to rename this village: Russiansk?

I don’t think they will rename it. But I also think it doesn’t matter. At this time, it isn’t exactly clear whether there will ever be a village again.

 

[Fredled]

@Feanor. I think the ISW has documented in details where Russian reinforcements came from. (Forcibly, I know it form somewhere).

 

[Feanor]

@Feanor. I think the ISW has documented in details where Russian reinforcements came from. (Forcibly, I know it form somewhere).

Do you have a link to the material in question? I'm wondering how they found it out.

 

[Hone C]

Do you have a link to the material in question? I'm wondering how they found it out.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian forces continued counterattacking throughout the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on September 12 but made only marginal gains, likely due to continued Ukrainian offensive operations and defensive counterattacks in the area. Geolocated footage

www.understandingwar.org

"Footage published on September 11 purportedly shows elements of the Russian 137th VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) participating in assaults northwest of Snagost. ISW observed reports that elements of the 137th VDV Regiment were operating in the Siversk direction as of late August 2024. Elements of the 106th VDV Division's 51st VDV Regiment are also reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast. Russian authorities have largely relied on poorly trained and equipped conscripts and small elements of Russian regular and irregular forces to address the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast thus far and will likely require additional manpower and more combat experienced units to fully push Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast."

The above is ISW's Sept 12 assessment, pulled from various sources and caveated. In the footnotes they often reference their own previous reports, but not much in the way of primary sources.

 

[Feanor]

Institute for the Study of War

Russian forces continued counterattacking throughout the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on September 12 but made only marginal gains, likely due to continued Ukrainian offensive operations and defensive counterattacks in the area. Geolocated footage

www.understandingwar.org

"Footage published on September 11 purportedly shows elements of the Russian 137th VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) participating in assaults northwest of Snagost. ISW observed reports that elements of the 137th VDV Regiment were operating in the Siversk direction as of late August 2024. Elements of the 106th VDV Division's 51st VDV Regiment are also reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast. Russian authorities have largely relied on poorly trained and equipped conscripts and small elements of Russian regular and irregular forces to address the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast thus far and will likely require additional manpower and more combat experienced units to fully push Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast."

The above is ISW's Sept 12 assessment, pulled from various sources and caveated. In the footnotes they often reference their own previous reports, but not much in the way of primary sources.

Well this makes sense but doesn't really support what he said above. Elements of a VDV regiment from a tertiary area like the Seversk salient don't really have any impact on the primary offensive in the Pokrovsk-Kurakhovo area. I do recall seeing Russian sources mention those units involved in the Kursk area but it also opens many other questions. With the ballooning of the size of the Russian military many units don't really look like they're supposed to. The best example is the 810th MarBde. At the start of the war it was a light mechanized formations with no tanks, towed guns, and BTR-82As for transports. It sported 3 infantry btlns, a recon btln, and iirc two artillery btlns (one rocket-arty Grads, one towed Msta-B). Now it's a formation of ~12 000 personnel operating tanks, SP howitzers, towed guns of multiple types, and it's completely unclear what the ORBAT looks like for the infantry formations. Presumably it now either contains an entire flock of newly minted btlns, or it's now composed of regiments. So... the 810th MarBde could be engaged in (hypothetically) the Zaporozhye area. And there could be multiple btlns in play, leading a reasonably intelligent observer to believe the "brigade" is there. But then several btlns of it show up in Kursk region. So Russia pulled them out from Zaporozhye? Maybe. Or maybe several btlns of this brigade were in reserve because the brigade is actually a division. The 51st Rgt is a good example of a mystery unit. It was relocated to Crimea pre-war and was supposed to be converted into a full brigade. Yet it keeps coming up in reports as a regiment. Did the conversion never happen? Did it balloon like the 810th MarBde? Is it still a relatively normal-sized regiment?

All of this makes it hard to just assume that if you saw a piece of say the 155th MarBde near Ugledar in August, and the 155th MarBde engaged in Kursk in September, that means it moved from U to K. If there are persistent reports that Russia is pulling pieces of units out, where are those reports coming from? How do we know these are pieces from Ukraine being pulled to Kursk and not pieces of the same unit from somewhere else?

EDIT: My memory is playing tricks on me. The 56th Rgt is the one that was supposed to turn into a brigade, in Crimea. But the general point stands. The ISW report doesn't support the idea that Russia is pulling forces away from the Pokrovsk or Kurakhovo axis. It explicitly lists a less significant area. And even there if the entire report is elements of the same unit showing up, I'm skeptical. This might indicate forces from the Seversk salient are in Kursk region. It doesn't indicate anything about the Pokrovsk-Kurakhovo area.

EDIT2: Speak of the devil, the 56th Regiment is also active in Kursk region, and it's still called a regiment, raising the exact issue above.

Операция Z: Военкоры Русской Весны

‼️Боевики ВСУ целыми подразделениями сдаются в плен в Курской области ▪️Крымский 56 полк ВДВ продолжает контрнаступление, выбивая врага с новых опорников, уничтожая и захватывая в плен. ▪️Эти оккупанты на видео взяты в районе Коренево. ▪️Ранее бойцы 56 полка освободили Комаровку, Вишневку и 10-я...

t.me

 

[Feanor]

I'll try for another update today, things are moving in a few areas. Ukraine is continuing attacks on the Glushkovo part of Kursk region, with Leopards showing up, and it feels reminiscent of Ukraine's summer offensive. On the flip side Russia seems to have reached the heights that overlook the road that runs along the Oskol on the left shore. This means they've practically accomplished the purpose of the push out of Peschanoe. Lastly Ukrainsk has fallen, and we will see if the next effort will be on Gornyak or Selidovo. The former would indicate a continuation of the advance on Kurakhovo, something that's supported by Russia's west-ward drive out of Krasnogorovka. The latter would indicate they are preparing for an attack on Mirnograd-Pokrovsk.

 

[Fredled]

Elements of a VDV regiment from a tertiary area like the Seversk salient don't really have any impact on the primary offensive in the Pokrovsk-Kurakhovo area.

The impact on Pokrovsk and where Russian forces in Kursk come from were two separate comments.
My last comment pointed on the inability for the Russians to repel Ukrainians from the Kursk Region with only small units picked up in a way that it won't make a difference on the Pokrovsk axis and in the Donbass front in general.
Then I explained that during the first month of the Kursk Incursion, there were no visible change in the continued progression in the Donbass, as the Russians wished, but that they failed to expel Ukrainians during all this time.
That's why now, I believe that if they want to expel Ukrainians within a reasonable time frame, they will have to move more troops from the Donbass or Zaporizhia.

There were unconfirmed or half-confirmed reports of troops moving from Zaporizhia, from the Karkiv region, and elsewhere in the Donbas to a lesser extent.
Sometimes I'm talking about what I learned a few days before or one or two weeks before and I don't have the link on hand. I often think others to have read the same informations by their own and I'm surprised when they disagree. I'm sorry that I can't always illustrate all my comments with internet links.

A few days earlier, I related a french language video telling that Ukrainian soldiers at the Pokrovsk front felt a positive difference since the Kursk Incursion. Noting that this video is not a proof in itself, but an information which could be infirmed or confirmed by facts at a later time.

This was refuted yesterday by you and KipPotapych that Russians slowed down because a change of terrain, then by the need to reorganise their logistic.
This is not convincing because, even in open terrain, with little or no building, their advance have been slow. When they create a salient 1 km forward in one day, it's big. Usually their advances are counted in hundreds of meters a day. An armoured column can roll through the open field at 40 km per hour if they are not stopped. But they do, at best 1 km in one day. And this only where they do advance. It's not the whole front that move by a few hundred meters per day, but some localisations. There were one or two cases when they did more, I admit. But it didn't compensate much.

I don't think that their pace of advance created a logistic problem to the point that they had to slow down. Nor that it was particalry fast thanks to lack of building areas.

_______________________________________

Zelensky is the one citing "the ability to strike air bases" deep inside Russia as a major reason we should authorize long-range missile strikes, and has done so on several occasions. Unless he is woefully misinformed or a total idiot, he knows that Storm Shadow and ATACM missiles cannot accomplish this (but the newer JASSM could).

Don't expect Zelensky to enter technical details accurately. What he means is that Ukraine needs the ability to strike Russian air bases deeper inside Russia. Whether it's with Storm Shadow or JASSM is not important to him. If he gets the authorisation to strike beyond the Storm Shadow range, it's assumed that missiles able to do that will be attached with it.

Yes, F16's are still too few to make a difference or to even take the risk to engage in real combat operations. And the problem is the number of pilots. Over one year ago, it was believed that around 20 pilots with Mig flying experience were undertaking F16 courses. Today it appeared that only 6 pilots had finished them.
That means that anything that require a F16 will be used only in 6 months, at the very least. Ans this affect JASSM (air to ground)as well as AMRAAM (air to air).

The fact that the weapons are launched from Ukraine is immaterial. It would make Ukraine complicit, but it would not make Ukraine the attacker. Ukraine has to be viewed just as another of the over 800 overseas military bases from which the US can mount attacks on its adversaries.

I disagree with this interpretation. It's the one who take the decision who is the attacker, no matter who owns the technology. It's Ukraine who take the decision. The US provide the technology. The US is complicit, Ukraine is the attacker.

The missiles doesn't have to be guided by an operator who must have the US nationality. It only gets encrypted GPS signals automatically.
The GPS signal is also not the main source of informations or instructions for the missiles. Instead, it was observed that Russians can jam this signal quiet effectively. Other source of information involve stellite imagery and drone reconnaissance. So this article is not exact when they say that providing GPS signal makes the US a belligerent.

Of course, the line between materially enabling a strike and actively being engaging in the conflict is very slim and depends on interpretation. That was the famous debate about the Taurus missiles. If Germans encode the missile route to strike a specific target but the Ukrainians take the decision to launch the missile, do that make German the attackers? The amswer can be yes or no.
It's clear that any country helping Ukraine militarily could be considered a legitimate target for a Russian strike.

In the case an American pilot would fly an Ukrainian F16, I think that this would cross the line because it won;t be possible to make the difference between a regular pilot in a US plane and foreign pilot engaged in the Ukrainian air force in an Ukrainian plane. Materially, there would be no difference and the Russians would not buy it.

If my assumption is incorrect, could you kindly supply a link in English, German, Spanish or Russian (in my order of preference)?

My apologize. Sometimes I don't realise that the video I just listened to was not in english. (Maybe because it was a translation.)