NEVER TAKE A GUN TO AN ENTRENCHING TOOL FIGHT!!!!!!!!!!Must be the best in the world, they are trained to throw entrenching tools
Cheers S
NEVER TAKE A GUN TO AN ENTRENCHING TOOL FIGHT!!!!!!!!!!Must be the best in the world, they are trained to throw entrenching tools
Fanboy nonsense. Russian SpN are more shock troops then traditional special forces. Russia also has actual special forces. They did well in Syria but we have little info of their use in this war. They're definitely active, we can be sure of that. But we don't have good information on their use. For traditional SpN they're being used as elite infantry in important locations. Recent Russian pushes in the Kremennaya area were done by SpN. Russian ATGM teams hunting Ukrainian MBTs in Zaporozhye and IFVs were reportedly SpN. They're clearly a useful and important asset but I would ignore claims about them being the best in the world.Does anyone know how the Russian Elite Special Forces performed in this war? Are they on the battlefield? How did they do? I remember videos back in the day claiming that they had the best special forces in the world.
@Feanor
Video of the damage:There are reports of damage to the Kerch bridge ,I am not sure of the impact on logistics at this stage when they refer to spans coming down
Blasts reported on bridge between Russia and Crimea, authorities say two dead, child injured - ABC News
Crimea Bridge Explosion Photos and Videos Reveal Devastating Impact (newsweek.com)
Two dead after explosions reportedly hit Crimea’s Kerch Bridge | Ukraine | The Guardian
Allegedly unmanned boats. Russia is claiming they will have it repaired within a month. In the meantime truck traffic is re-routed through Kherson region where additional road paving efforts have been underway even before this incident. VMF BDKs are being used as ferries, and additional trains are being run on the railbridge portion.The damage is quite small and specific, with one of the concrete arm supports removed (about 10 second left in the movie). How UKR managed to get something into place to do that is beyond me.
It appears that the rail bridge is thinner and therefore would not "collect" as much of the upwards gas expansion. I suspect the rail bridge is also more structurally tough in order to carry more weigh from trains ?What I am trying to understand about the bridge attack is why the road bridge was struck rather than the rail bridge. The rail bridge would have had a much bigger impact on logistics. I can only speculate that either, the rail bridge was thought to be harder to damage, or the intent was to attack Putin's credibility which has already sustained damage recently.
Anders Puck Nielsen provides a good explanation of how difficult it is going to be for Putin to negotiate a peace deal with Ukraine. He's backed himself into a corner that's going to be a roadblock toward ending this war. You can see how given such an analysis just how important it may actually be to help publicly shake Putin's credibility within his domestic audience. Keeping in mind the recent Wagner mutiny and I can actually see why the road bridge may have been a preference.What I am trying to understand about the bridge attack is why the road bridge was struck rather than the rail bridge. The rail bridge would have had a much bigger impact on logistics. I can only speculate that either, the rail bridge was thought to be harder to damage, or the intent was to attack Putin's credibility which has already sustained damage recently.
I think this is incorrect. I suspect Russia will accept peace without recapturing Kherson and without taking Zaporozhye. I also suspect reparations are probably the easiest thing. I think Putin will not accept something called reparations. But if you couch it in some other terms, this is probably the easiest one. If in exchange he gets recognition of Russian annexation of Donetsk, Lugansk, and the current controlled areas of Zaporozhye and Kherson. There can probably be some back and forth about the current areas of Donetsk region since there is a big chunk outside of Russia's control. As for hoping that Putin leaving will open the door to piece, this is theoretically possible. There are economic interests within Russia that would prefer the war to end under almost any terms as long as sanctions are lifted. But as the Wagner mutiny showed, there is a real chance for something worse then Putin to end up in power. People throw the term fascism around pretty casually in this conflict, but consider the implications of a real fascist dictatorship, propped up by angry combat veterans, in a nuclear power.Anders Puck Nielsen provides a good explanation of how difficult it is going to be for Putin to negotiate a peace deal with Ukraine. He's backed himself into a corner that's going to be a roadblock toward ending this war. You can see how given such an analysis just how important it may actually be to help publicly shake Putin's credibility within his domestic audience. Keeping in mind the recent Wagner mutiny and I can actually see why the road bridge may have been a preference.
Putin is a serial treaty-breaker. He can't be trusted to keep any promise. Russia was formally committed to not only recognising the pre-2014 borders of Ukraine, but protecting them. Putin broke that agreement, because he could. Any treaty which rewards Putin for invading Ukraine merely stores up trouble for the future.I cannot provide a link because I don't know if they were facts or an interpretation, but I read that during the Ankara negotiations Russia was willing to give back the land corridor for a Crimea/Donbas/no-NATO peace agreement; Boris told Zelensky no.
Russia should be interested in peace, Ukraine should be interested in peace. I wonder if someone is telling Zelensky that he can get "victory" instead, I also wonder what that "victory" will look like and at what price.
This goes both ways. The west committed to NATO non-expansion. We now know that was a lie. Minsk Accords 1 and 2 were lies. The grain deal that Russia just ended was also a lie. The real issue is that the gap in the positions of the sides is such that no real negotiations are possible.Putin is a serial treaty-breaker. He can't be trusted to keep any promise. Russia was formally committed to not only recognising the pre-2014 borders of Ukraine, but protecting them. Putin broke that agreement, because he could. Any treaty which rewards Putin for invading Ukraine merely stores up trouble for the future.
"Russia should be interested in peace" - I think you've forgotten who invaded who. Putin doesn't want peace: he wants victory, or at least something he can present as victory, so he can keep power, & prepare for next time. He's proved that by his behaviour. If he wanted peace he wouldn't have started the war.
When did "The west" commit to NATO non-expansion? The claim is that there was an oral promise, but that's not supported by any government statement, or any written agreement, or written promise. Hans-Dietrich Genscher said the west should make such a commitment: he didn't say it had. He didn't have the authority to commit even Germany to it, & his boss didn't agree. James Baker agreed with Genscher, but again, his head of government didn't commit to it.This goes both ways. The west committed to NATO non-expansion. We now know that was a lie. Minsk Accords 1 and 2 were lies. The grain deal that Russia just ended was also a lie. The real issue is that the gap in the positions of the sides is such that no real negotiations are possible.
There were more statements then just that, but I don't think it matters. Whether the west cleverly tricked Soviet leadership by implying this without actually promising, and then simply turned around and ignored all that, or whether there was in fact an agreement, it creates a problem of trust. Whether you're technically correct or just lied doesn't make the other side any more willing to trust you or play by your rules.When did "The west" commit to NATO non-expansion? The claim is that there was an oral promise, but that's not supported by any government statement, or any written agreement, or written promise. Hans-Dietrich Genscher said the west should make such a commitment: he didn't say it had. He didn't have the authority to commit even Germany to it, & his boss didn't agree. James Baker agreed with Genscher, but again, his head of government didn't commit to it.
What we're talking about is the foreign ministers of two NATO countries saying things in speeches during but outside the process of discussions on the unification of Germany, while the USSR was still in existence. No formal commitment by heads of government, or by any other countries, or by NATO . . . .
At the end of the day the Minsk Accords happened because Ukraine signed them. If Ukraine had no intention of following them and signed them anyway then Ukraine negotiated in bad faith. France and Germany signed them. Did they also negotiate in bad faith? The answer appears to be yes. Putin's signature isn't worth anything. Ok sure. But what's the signature of western heads of state worth? At the end of the day the current war is a product of that same original break of promise by Russia. So following your logic the west and Ukraine are justified in signing any treaty, then arbitrarily breaking it when they feel like it. From where I sit it doesn't work like that. If you want to negotiate, you are accountable for the documents you signed. Germany, France, and Ukraine, lied and negotiated in bad faith when they signed the Minsk Accords. Their signature is worth as little as Putin's. Which again brings us back to the question, how can any new deal be trusted? What are any new promises worth? From where I sit, nothing. And the grain deal is a perfect example of that. No negotiations are possible because the word of Ukraine or its western backers is worthless.Personally, I think the Minsk agreements are meaningless. They happened because Russia had broken its written promises.