The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

[STURM]

You're now asking questions, but failing to address my actual arguments.timeline is erratic and without any guarantees of when nor if the next batch purchases is.

I actually have ''addressed'' the points you raised...... I was also not ''asking questions'' but stating facts.

My point is that for one army, the choice of laying down their weapons because of their fatigue, has a lot more dire consequences.

I well understood what your point was but as I previously said that wasn't what the discussion was centered on .....

I made the claim that Russian's are increasingly being sent into combat with older, less capable equipment. I never raised the issue of the Mosin Nagants.

Mosin Nagants are included in the ''antiquated'' weapons you brought up. Are there any other 'antiquated'' weapons apart from the Mosin Nagants? Rusty AKs don't count. As has been pointed out to you it's not as if whole Russian Corps or Fronts are being equipped with ''antiquated'' .
By right units should not be equipped with 'antiquated'' weapons but they are because of the state the Russians are in? It's no revelation.....

it would be disingenuous for anyone to argue that Russian armored ability isn't degraded every time they lose a modern / semi-modern T-80 variant or T-90 variant, and are forced to replace it with an older model T-72 or T-62

I say what I said previously : ''any MBT not protected properly and not deployed as part of combined arms formations will be ''death traps''. If the Russians can't get anything else then older, obsolete designs will have to do the job. Is it an ideal arrangement? No but it is what it is.

Again, simply put

''Again, simply put'' [Archer is a great gun] but is will not necessarily add more value to what is currently operated .... If the French say "sorry, we can't give you anymore right now" then yes maybe but from a logistical/support perspective the Ukrainians would be better off getting more of what they already operate. The Ukrainians have to be the ones who decide whether they want Archer.

That's a pretty easy argument to arrive at.

Was it an argument that was made or debated to begin with? BTW unless it had a APS or new gen ERA a decades old T-62 isn't more survivable than an 11 year old T-90.

It's a relevant point in that as the Ukrainian replacement troops are coming back from places like Britain, kitted out with modern western equipment, making them better equipped than many of their dead brethren that they're replacing, the Russians are having the opposite happen.

- Yes it's relevant but unless things have changed not all Ukrainian units are as well knitted out as the ones we see or the ones they want us to see.
- Is it holy writ or written in stone that in a few months Russian troops will still be badly equipped? I have no idea. Just like although the Ukrainians currently have the initiative and that things seem to be getting worse and worse for the Russians; I will not make any assumptions as to how this all ends.
-

 

[IIO2]

Damn you are bloodthirsty. The Ukrainians themselves aren't interested in maximizing kills. Their goal is regaining their land, and if that requires deaths, they are willing to pay the price, but overall they seem to be willing to let the actual Russian soldier leave. (Edit: excepting the ones commiting atrocities)

Keep in mind that many Ukrainians have relatives that are Russians. Some of them will be of mobilization age.

Ukrainian strategy seems to rely on destroying Russian supply lines. Destroy the ammo and fuel depots. Destroy the bridges and rail lines. See a supply convoy? Hit it. We have seen the results so far. They didn't need to kill all the Russians defending Kherson. Just make sure they won't have enough ammunition and fuel and the Russians retreat. Because a tank without fuel and ammo is just an extremely expensive hunk of steel and a soldier without bullets is just an extra mouth to feed.

What weapons can Ukraine use? The possibilities are myriad, but I believe something that can accurately strike a target as far away as 300 km away (and thus still be within the NPT) will be very useful. ATACMS is an example.

Other than that plenty of ammunition resupplies for the current equipment.

I am also watching the amount of money given to Ukraine. I understand that we tend to focus on weapon systems and grand strategies, but soldiers and civil servants have to be paid, fuel bought and distributed, homes and facilities rebuilt, refugees resettled, telecommunications restored, and so on. All this requires a lot of money.

Zelensky once said that Ukraine requires approximately $77 billion to make up for the budget shortfall. That's for about a year of this war. EU and US already promised some $30 billion, but I bet that while Ukraine would love ATACMS or F-16 or Leopard 2, Ukraine would rather have an extra $5 billion cash transferred every month.

The Ukrainians are smart to be targeting the Russians in a surgical manner, because that's what you do when you're outgunned. They're taking "pot shots" at the Bear, in an attempt to being him to his knees. The Russian Army have already displayed horrendous logistics, the Ukrainians are simply compounding the problem, by surgically eliminating their access to supplies. Of course the Ukrainians are willing to let the Russians leave, the problem becomes whether or not the Russian government will let Russians leave.

I'm not bloodthirsty, I simply believe that only way you get meaningful change is from within. The only way Russia moves away from brutal autocracy is if the people in Russia rise up and depose their existing government, in hopes of getting a better one. Among the best opportunities the West will ever have to help influence that change, is to help the Ukrainians inflict enough damage (unfortunately, human life falls inside that category) that the Russian population becomes disheartened and sick of the war, similar to what happened with the American population in Vietnam. Wars are often lost due to faltering public support for the war effort.

Do you know what leads to Public support faltering? High death tolls. Corporations leaving countries and taking away people's jobs / benefits and pensions. Assets seized being liquidated and put to use in support of the defenders, etc.

Russians (at least some reasonable percentage of those in power) see this as an existential struggle between good and evil. They are actually think, or pretend to think, that their cause is righteous and that the collective West is a simply some decadent, evil entity, rather than a simple threat to their autocratic power. When phasing that type of fanaticism, there must be a willingness to perform the brutality required to break their spirit.

Think about WW2. It was a difficult, and terrible decision, but the acts such as the fire bombing of Dresden, in direct response to German brutality, was required to break the German spirit and help splinter the nationalist Nazi Pride. In a sense, the West had to showing it was willing to role its collective sleeves up and do the dirty work required to win. I take no joy in saying that tens of thousands more Russians have to be killed for the spirit to slowly start to be broke ln back at home, but I'm fully willing too see that be the outcome, if it helps ensure that Russia loses the war.

 

[IIO2]

Well you can say what you want, it is not your blood or anyone in here to be sure blood, that will be spill. It is Ukranian and Russian blood, and none of us in here can say for sure when they should stop the fight.

So what they are believe is what matter, not what we believe.

I've said all along, I'm willing to use as much as my tax money as is required to ensure a Ukrainian victory, but only if the Ukrainians actually have the will to fight. It's their blood being spilled. When they no longer have the desire to fight and are ready for peace talks, that's completely their business, as a sovereign nation, in control of their own destiny.

 

[Big_Zucchini]

Delusional Russian rally in Moscow. I don't speak Russian, but my understanding is that they want SARMAT missiles used on Washington, or something to that extent?

Front shots only - crowd you see is the crowd there is.
Multi-angle shots - more effort went into televised production than "demonstration" itself, i.e. target audience is TV, not people in the area.
Music video - politicians doubling as gangsta rappers because money is short.

All in all, this is not worthy of attention IMO. At most, it only reinforces the "Shaheed" vibe Russian TV has been promoting for the last couple months.

 

[IIO2]

I actually have ''addressed'' the points you raised...... I was also not ''asking questions'' but stating facts.



I well understood what your point was but as I previously said that wasn't what the discussion was centered on .....



Mosin Nagants are included in the ''antiquated'' weapons you brought up. Are there any other 'antiquated'' weapons apart from the Mosin Nagants? Rusty AKs don't count. As has been pointed out to you it's not as if whole Russian Corps or Fronts are being equipped with ''antiquated'' .
By right units should not be equipped with 'antiquated'' weapons but they are because of the state the Russians are in? It's no revelation.....



I say what I said previously : ''any MBT not protected properly and not deployed as part of combined arms formations will be ''death traps''. If the Russians can't get anything else then older, obsolete designs will have to do the job. Is it an ideal arrangement? No but it is what it is.



''Again, simply put'' [Archer is a great gun] but is will not necessarily add more value to what is currently operated .... If the French say "sorry, we can't give you anymore right now" then yes maybe but from a logistical/support perspective the Ukrainians would be better off getting more of what they already operate. The Ukrainians have to be the ones who decide whether they want Archer.



Was it an argument that was made or debated to begin with? BTW unless it had a APS or new gen ERA a decades old T-62 isn't more survivable than an 11 year old T-90.



- Yes it's relevant but unless things have changed not all Ukrainian units are as well knitted out as the ones we see or the ones they want us to see.
- Is it holy writ or written in stone that in a few months Russian troops will still be badly equipped? I have no idea. Just like although the Ukrainians currently have the initiative and that things seem to be getting worse and worse for the Russians; I will not make any assumptions as to how this all ends.
-

I'm well aware, as are you, that not all Ukrainian units have top notch kit. In fact, some of their legacy units are still largely supplied with Soviet era equipment, not better than what the Russians are using. I'm simply referencing the new forces that will be entering war zone on each side. Right now, I think the Ukrainians being trained vy the thousands in Britain and Poland, are being sent back well equipped, while I'm currently not seeing that from the Russian side... Could that change down the road? Quite possibly, but I'll believe it and I'll be happy to point it out, when I see it.

 

[Big_Zucchini]

The Ukrainians are smart to be targeting the Russians in a surgical manner, because that's what you do when you're outgunned. They're taking "pot shots" at the Bear, in an attempt to being him to his knees. The Russian Army have already displayed horrendous logistics, the Ukrainians are simply compounding the problem, by surgically eliminating their access to supplies. Of course the Ukrainians are willing to let the Russians leave, the problem becomes whether or not the Russian government will let Russians leave.

Surgical strikes are just more logical, whether or not outgunned. Russia is trying its best to conduct similar strikes as well.
Targeting retreating soldiers is always a dilemma because on one hand you're preventing many enemy soldiers from fighting you in the future, but on the other hand you're showing them retreat is a less preferable option to staying and fighting to death, as death will come either way.

 

[IIO2]

Front shots only - crowd you see is the crowd there is.
Multi-angle shots - more effort went into televised production than "demonstration" itself, i.e. target audience is TV, not people in the area.
Music video - politicians doubling as gangsta rappers because money is short.

All in all, this is not worthy of attention IMO. At most, it only reinforces the "Shaheed" vibe Russian TV has been promoting for the last couple months.

I certainly don't think it's some overwhelming narrative, but I think it's important to see what level extremism (even if it's limited in quantity) that we're (the collective West) is up against. This is in line with many of their media programs who toss around the use of nuclear weapons on Western cities, as if that's simply acceptable, normative conversation.

It's important to see your enemy for they really are and what they really believe.

 

[STURM]

The Ukrainians are smart to be targeting the Russians in a surgical manner, because that's what you do when you're outgunned.

''That's what you do'' whenever you can irrespective of whether ''outgunned'' or not.

Think about WW2. It was a difficult, and terrible decision, but the acts such as the fire bombing of Dresden, in direct response to German brutality

It was because Dresden was a transport hub and because the Soviet offensive in East Prussia; Pomerania and Silesia was meeting tough resistance and the Soviets wanted some relief. As it stands the fire bombing of Dresden actually had little bearing on the German effort at that stage of the war.

was required to break the German spirit and help splinter the nationalist Nazi Pride.

At an early stage of the war it was the only way the RAF could strike back but as it turns out despite all the bombing the German population largely withstood it until the very end. You will also note that despite all the bombing German production actually peaked in 1944.

Amazon.com

 

[IIO2]

Surgical strikes are just more logical, whether or not outgunned. Russia is trying its best to conduct similar strikes as well.
Targeting retreating soldiers is always a dilemma because on one hand you're preventing many enemy soldiers from fighting you in the future, but on the other hand you're showing them retreat is a less preferable option to staying and fighting to death, as death will come either way.

Targetting Soldiers, retreating or not, is difficult. It's not as if they often clustered in huge groups that are easy to dispatch. Pretty much the only time you're going to see mass casualty type events are during failed / deeply hindered offensive operations.

The Ukrainians have been claiming to kill between 600-1000 Russians per day for the last little while. I, personally, believe that number is inflated for propaganda sake... Let's say it's actually half of that (300-600 dead Russian per day). That number likely needs to increase, at least some, if you hope to outpace their rate of mobilization.

 

[seaspear]

I certainly don't think it's some overwhelming narrative, but I think it's important to see what level extremism (even if it's limited in quantity) that we're (the collective West) is up against. This is in line with many of their media programs who toss around the use of nuclear weapons on Western cities, as if that's simply acceptable, normative conversation.

It's important to see your enemy for they really are and what they really believe.

So you can demonstrate for war but not against it, would be interesting how they got permission for their rallying march
Over 1,700 Russians detained during anti-war demonstrations (axios.com)


Moscow Warns Legal Consequences For Russians Joining Anti-War Protests (ndtv.com)

 

[Ananda]

I'm willing to use as much as my tax money as is required to ensure a Ukrainian victory, but only if the Ukrainians actually have the will to fight.

My comment is to answer your comment on 'Russia can believe what they want'. Again it is Ukranian and Russian believes that matters. Much more importance than what your believe (as collective west public), or mine (as non collective west public) or anyone else in global communities. It is their blood that are going to spill, not everyone else (so far). Unless you want to join western voluenters in Ukraine line.

Yes number of casualties can shift public opinions, and including in Ukraine and Russia. Despite what many Western media feeding, Both portion of Ukranian and Russian have believe on their own cause in this war. Western media always shown how much Russian avoiding drafts, but not how much Ukranian avoiding drafts. Low morale and drafts avoidence happens in both sides. Both sides draftees has similar chances become cannon fodder.

After they are pulling back from Kharkiv, Russian and Luhantsk Militia defensive line in the Kharkiv-Luhantsk border still hold. Thus Big Potential after pulling back from West Bank, Russian lines in East Bank can also hold.

That's why I stated before this war has showm tendencies going to be long protected conflicts.

 

[STURM]

Few (if any) of said experts projected the reasonably quick defeat of Saddam's forces, nor did they project NATO forces staying in Afghanistan longer than the Soviets did.

On Saddam in 1991; opinions were mixed. I still have issues of Air Forces Monthly, Newsweek and Times from that period. Some analysts/experts predicted that Saddam would be defeated fairly quickly because the coalition wasn't Iran. Others predicted it would take weeks. It was often heard that Iraqi troops were ''battle hardened'' from the 8 year war with Iraq; problem is it was a different type of war.

So at the start of 2022, there was plenty of information about Ukraine's shortcomings, with not so much concrete information about whether Russia was actually able to take the country.

Very true; we heard more about Ukrainian limitations than Russian ones and this is partly because we assumed that they would perform like they did in the Donbas campaign [effective use of EW and information warfare and the creation of highly effective strike/recce complexes comprising UASs, arty and MLRSs].

But I was sceptical that Russia's military conflicts of the last few decades - beating on weak countries like Georgia, 2014 Ukraine and Syrian rebels - was a sign it was going to crush Ukraine.

I factored in the possibility that things might not go as smoothly as the Russians planned and I assumed - like many others - that the Russians were prepared and equipped for the task at hand. It never occurred to me that the Russians were actually prepared for a different kind of war; that units were so understrength; that the Russian air force was not trained for a strategic air campaign and didn't see overall air superiority as a prerequisite and that Putin would be under the gagaland illusion that he was with regards to Ukrainian resistance.

But I was sceptical that Russia's military conflicts of the last few decades - beating on weak countries like Georgia, 2014 Ukraine and Syrian rebels

Understood and agreed. Just like how I'm sceptical when people assume that the U.S. or NATO will do well if faced with similar operational challenges.
On paper they would but in reality? For the past few decades U.S. experience has been against Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran [not a full blown war no doubt], Libya, Panama and Grenada.

 

[Exonian]

Now that the situation on the west bank of the Dneiper seem to have been resolved where does it leave future operations?

I assume that the units of both sides that have been involved in serious fighting will, in the short term, need some time to re-fit and be brought back up to strength. Once that is completed both Russia and Ukraine will be able to move units elsewhere.

On the Russian side possibly some of the better equipped units might be deployed where Russia is still making minimal gains. Other units will be used to stabilise the front elsewhere. I do not see any major new Russian offensives starting until the spring when more the recently mobilised troops will have had more training.

From the Ukraine perspective I would think that they will want to create an air defence umbrella over Kherson, and also provide an artillery screen along the west bank of the Dneiper. Apart from a modest 'garrison' force in Kherson most of the armour and mechanised Ukraine units should in the medium term be available for offensive operations, and I think Ukraine needs at least one more significant advance before the spring. A push to pass Svatove to the north would threaten to isolate the town, and also cut the rail line south through Starobilsk which would further hamper the Russian logistics. Is a push south from the Vasylivka area a realistic proposition? The ISW maps show partisan activity all around Melitopol which would surely help an advance in that area, with the possibility of then isolating Russian forces to the west, and forcing them to rely on supplies through Crimea,

 

[vikingatespam]

Is Ukraine now also not send to greet Russian Meat Grinders ? Is Ukraine conscript also not become cannon fodders ? Like it or not more likely at this moment Ukranian soldiers are killed outnumbered then Russian ones, simply as they are more numerous in the ground. Their numbers fall under Russian barrage is more. However their numbers due matter to push back Russian in Kharkiv and now in West Bank of Dniper in Kherson.

If average Russian convinces they are fighting for their Russian brethen in Southeast Ukraine, if they are convince those Southest Ukraine is Russian land (as it is part of Russia before USSR administrative division), then they will fight even with more costs.

This war will bleed more Ukranian and Russian blood, and no end in sight yet.

If the training of UKR solider on the whole is better (some fraction in the west, some in quiet sectors), and the RU artillery arm cannot throw nearly as many shells as in the summer; then I would think the UKR loss rates will be lower. By and large RU is the one attacking and getting nowhere. I suspect but cannot prove now that the UKR losses are fairly lower than the RU.

 

[vikingatespam]

As it is stand now, despite all their set backs, they are still controlling much of those four oblasts. If average Russian believe southeast Ukraine is their land, it is reside by mostly their brethren, again they will fight.

...or they will not, as evidenced by the 700,000 or so who chose to flee RU recently. I have a difficult time believing that the majority of RU citizens somehow feel threatened by UKR. I suspect more are just apathetic. If this apathy extends to the RU soldiers on the battlefield, then that doesnt speak well to future RU performance.

 

[vikingatespam]

My comment is to answer your comment on 'Russia can believe what they want'. Again it is Ukranian and Russian believes that matters. Much more importance than what your believe (as collective west public), or mine (as non collective west public) or anyone else in global communities. It is their blood that are going to spill, not everyone else (so far). Unless you want to join western voluenters in Ukraine line.

Yes number of casualties can shift public opinions, and including in Ukraine and Russia. Despite what many Western media feeding, Both portion of Ukranian and Russian have believe on their own cause in this war. Western media always shown how much Russian avoiding drafts, but not how much Ukranian avoiding drafts. Low morale and drafts avoidence happens in both sides. Both sides draftees has similar chances become cannon fodder.

After they are pulling back from Kharkiv, Russian and Luhantsk Militia defensive line in the Kharkiv-Luhantsk border still hold. Thus Big Potential after pulling back from West Bank, Russian lines in East Bank can also hold.

That's why I stated before this war has showm tendencies going to be long protected conflicts.

The direct evidence for poor RU morale or belief in this cause cannot directly be understood, but we can indirectly acertain it by actions that are not in doubt:

- RU has dramatically raised the enlistment bonuses for new recruits
- 700,000 Russians (primarily military age men) fled the country
- RU is recruiting from prisons

Sure, millions of UKR fled the country at the start of the invasion - 90% non-combatants.

 

[vikingatespam]

Now that the situation on the west bank of the Dneiper seem to have been resolved where does it leave future operations?

I assume that the units of both sides that have been involved in serious fighting will, in the short term, need some time to re-fit and be brought back up to strength. Once that is completed both Russia and Ukraine will be able to move units elsewhere.

On the Russian side possibly some of the better equipped units might be deployed where Russia is still making minimal gains. Other units will be used to stabilise the front elsewhere. I do not see any major new Russian offensives starting until the spring when more the recently mobilised troops will have had more training.

From the Ukraine perspective I would think that they will want to create an air defence umbrella over Kherson, and also provide an artillery screen along the west bank of the Dneiper. Apart from a modest 'garrison' force in Kherson most of the armour and mechanised Ukraine units should in the medium term be available for offensive operations, and I think Ukraine needs at least one more significant advance before the spring. A push to pass Svatove to the north would threaten to isolate the town, and also cut the rail line south through Starobilsk which would further hamper the Russian logistics. Is a push south from the Vasylivka area a realistic proposition? The ISW maps show partisan activity all around Melitopol which would surely help an advance in that area, with the possibility of then isolating Russian forces to the west, and forcing them to rely on supplies through Crimea,

Given the surprises the UKR have sprung, its hard to see whats coming. IMO:

- neither side can force the Dnepr
- due to poor logistics and a new burden of conscripts, RU will suffer high attrition in the winter
- the front lines have narrowed somewhat
- I doubt RU will launch an attack from Belarus or Sumy
- the logistical situation on the RU side of the Kherson sector is still thin - being supplied over 1 main rail line and the Crimean route is narrow
- RU is vigorously defending the DPR and LPR areas

(shakes magic 8 ball)

UKR will launch at attack from the Zapor. area, driving south, to Berdiansk in January after a solid freeze. Cut the RU field in 2, making the logistics for the RU forces in the Kherson area even harder and hopefully forcing them to retreat into Crimea. This is all without a serious terrain analysis. There doesnt appear to be any large rivers in the way and there is the Tokmak-Berdiansk highway that could be used.

 

[seaspear]

Later in winter the Dnieper can freeze over this may allow some traversing of forces

 

[Leftyhunter]

Of course this war will bleed A LOT of Ukrainian blood, but they have no other choice but to bleed. If they surrender and capitulate, they cease to exist as a nation and are forced to exist as a puppet, under Russian tyranny. Russian's, on the other hand, can leave tomorrow. There is no existential threat to Russian sovereignty. Nobody is invading Russia and trying to end their existence as a nation.

These types of conflicts have a long history of the defender, ultimately persevering, as long as they're willing to bleed to do it. In most instances, see Germany's march into the Soviet Union, The American debacle in Vietnam, the Korean War, hell, even Afghanistan for both the Russians and Americans to a certain extent. Eventually, it become fruitless to invade a country that does not want to be conquered. It goes without saying that Ukrainians can, reasonably field 2-3 million soldiers over the coming 2-3 years, should they be required to, as long as Western support does not stop. Needless to say, Russia has a choice to make. They either field an army capable of destroying not only what Ukraine is fielding now, but what they are capable of fielding should they get desperate, or they turn around, go home and cut their losses. What they're doing right now, is not effective. They're months behind the Ukrainians in terms of mobilization. They're starting to show real signs of their soldiers being less and less equipped as they leave for combat, while Ukrainian soldiers are training in places like Britain, Poland, and soon, other Western countries, being sent back to the battlefield with modern, Western kit. I'm curious to see what happens as winter hits. Something tells me that Russians that currently exist at the front are going to be hard pressed to get re-supplied with appropriate winter clothing. Meanwhile, we've already seen massive, public commitments from countries like the Canada, USA, Britain and Sweden, to ensure the Ukrainian army is as kitted out for the winter as can be expected considering the live nature of the conflict. Russian logistics have been hot garbage in all other areas of this war, I don't imagine it will be much better when it comes to providing appropriate winter clothing, especially to front line troops.

Getting hot food to Russian soldiers with relatively few trucks along a one thousand plus mile front will be quite a logistical challenge.
Leftyhunter

 

[Leftyhunter]

An ugly conversation, of course, but now that the war seemingly will be focused in a 400'ish KM stretch between Zaporizhzhia and Svatove, the question becomes the following...

What can the West provide Ukraine to maximize Russian casualties after their recent round of mobilization and how can they help inflict as much death as possible in an attempt to draw the ire amongst the Russian population towards their government. Like it, or not, tens of thousands more Russian sons, husbands and fathers have to be killed in Ukraine, before the population has simply had enough or the government throwing the men into the meat grinder.

Here are the easiest CONVENTIONAL methods for the West to help the Ukrainians inflict mass casualties, IMO.

- M109 Howitzers. Italy is sending 20-30 more that they're taking out of storage. The United States has more than 1000 of them, many of which will not be upgraded to M109A7 standard, but are still plenty new and capable enough to counter the Russians. Undoubtedly, the Russians have been achieving greater success in recent months of locating and destroying Ukrainian artillery. The U.S. can easily spare 100 M109's. They don't need to all be sent at once. Rather, if send approximately 18 (3 batteries worth) per month, for the next 5 months, that gives you time to train additional crews in places like Poland and Germany, before sending them.

- Krab Howitzers. Ukraine ordered 48 Krabs, over an above what Poland donated to Ukraine. Every attempt should be made by the West to have Poland send many of their existing Krabs to Ukraine in the coming months, backfilling their own with the new ones Ukraine ordered, as they role off the assembly line.

- Panzerhaubtize 2000's. Quite frankly, between Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, I'd like to see them send a few more each, maybe a total of 18 (3 batteries) between the 3 nations. Again, the idea would be to backfill their own armies, as the ones Ukraine ordered from Germany roll off the assembly line. Ukraine needs them now. These other countries can afford to get new ones starting a year from now.

- Archer. The Swedes are, apparently, considering sending it, and it would be a great if they did. Obviously, they won't be sending large quantities, but even 6-12 could make a big difference in helping increase Ukrainian artillery effectiveness. With France unlikely to send more than the 24 CAESARS they've already sent, adding Archers into the mix, at the right time, would be a nice influx of new Western technology.

- Airburst munitions, GPS guided munitions (Excalibur), SMart munitions, etc... These expensive, but highly effective 155mm rounds are already being sent to Ukraine, but digging deeper into existing quantities, while simultaneously ramping up production, will be key. These types of rounds particularly disheartening for Russian infantry and armor, because they are deadly accurate and effective. While costly, they're exceptional killing weapons and their use needs to be maximized vs quality targets, as much as possible.

- Drones, Drones and more Drones. The Ukrainians have had success retrofitting drones to drop grenades and mortar rounds. Western drone countries across Europe and North America ought to be retrofitting their commercial drones for sale to the Ukrainian military. You can severely damage Russian morale and maximize casualties over the winter months, when ill-equipped Russians are freezing in the winter weather and they're constantly terrified about death from above. Russia, to their credit, has upped their drone game substantially over the last couple months. Between the success they're having with their Lancet drones and their ability to deeply the Shahed drones they got from Iran, they're doing a good job in that space. It's time for the Ukrainians (via their backers) to step their game up and develop an overwhelming fleet of retrofitted drones, increasingly more capable of raining down death on mobilized Russians.

The Israeli Spike ATGM Extended Range version with a 27km range would be a good addition for Ukraine. Not sure if the newly elected PM would agree to do so as he has given mixed signals. A few Israeli MRAPs have been spoted in Ukranian service. Israel makes long range drones and loitering munitions but the again back to complex politics.
Leftyhunter