The Current Conflict In Syria

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Sounds like the IDF has continued strikes inside Syrian against both chemical stockpiles as well as Hezbollah positions in the Southern regions of the state. All of this as Russia has watched and made no comments about ongoing strikes against chemical stores


Are they really chemical weapon sites, or is that just a convenient reason to continue bombing targets in Syria? I'd like to see some evidence on the Israeli side, and given their repeated strikes against locations where the Iranians were delivering weapons or rumored to be setting up facilities, I strongly suspect Israeli strikes have far more to do with continuing to hit the Iranians and their proxies then with whatever remainder chemical arsenal Syria may still have. Just so we're clear, it's entirely possible Assad, or someone under him, has stashed away a portion of their chemical arsenal, with or without Russian knowledge and approval. But somehow I suspect that even if it was known for a fact that Syria had no remaining WMDs Israel would still be conducting strikes.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Update.

A real drama has unfolded around the M-4 highway in Idlib. While the Turks attempt to deliver on the promise of joint patrols along the M-4 highway, many of the rebel groups are resisting in various ways. Some are protesting or have even taken up arms, while others have destroyed sections of the road to prevent passage. Despite this some patrols have begun along one small segment. After the failure to live up to the Sochi accords, the Turks lost major ground in Syria and it seems they are eager to make sure this doesn't repeat itself. To this end it seems they have begun operations against some of the rebel groups, in some cases using riot control gear to clear the protesters. It appears that some of the protesters were killed, and there were attempted attacks against Turkish posts. In response the Turks carried out a UAV strike. However at this point the road remains blocked along many points, and only a small section is being patrolled.

Despite the ceasefire, small clashes continue, especially (allegedly) in places where al-Nusra is present.


An explosion has taken place in Afrin, Turkish-occupied Syrian Kurdistan. The Turks blame the PPK.


Encounters also continue between the US forces in Syria and Russian patrols, namely in the north-east. However it seems that the likelihood of hostilities has decreased.


A group of formerly US-backed fighters in At-Tanf have attempted to escape to Assad held territory. It appears that they were attacked either by US forces, or some other rebel fighters, but some managed to break out. There are also allegations that the group in question was involved in the drug trade and fled when they were discovered. The second link has photos of equipment taken from the group that escaped.


Some footage of a Russo-Turkish patrol in Hasakeh area. This is presumably the model of de-escalation that Russia and Turkey seek to implement in Idlib.


A Russian armored Ural allegedly belonging to PMCs hit an IED in Syria, and, also allegedly, everyone survived. I'm not convinced we would be told even if someone did die given the nature of these formations.


An interesting photo of a Kamaz Vystrel armored car, the type used by Russian PMCs in Syria, parked next to a guntruck normally used by Russian recon/SpN units in Syria.


A Russian artillery column driving Msta-B howitzers was seen again in Syria. In the past movements such as these signaled planned offensives, or major operations.


Bellingcat has uncovered evidence suggesting that Syrian generals personally observed a chemical attack against civilian facilities.


And another report from them, linking a chemical attack with a known Syrian military munition.


The SAA has set up mobile observation stations to deal with potential coronavirus cases. It's pretty obvious the shiny new equipment came from Russia.

 
Drums of War are beating again in Idlib. Both Turkey and Syria/Russia seem to be continuing to reinforce their Positions with the former apparently adding Atilgan Anti Aircraft missiles and Syria taking possession of new MIG-29's and more tanks.



However there are assertions that some or all of these Aircraft have actually been deployed in Libya;


Syria and Russia have apparently started bombing the Kabani area again.


Patrols of the M4 Highway have proved problematic to say the least and have led to clashes between Turkey and Militant Groups who are supposed to be allied with Turkey.


Russia has opened a second Air Base in NE Syria at the al-Qamishli airfield. This is close to where US Troops are based and both sides are continuing to deploy more and more troops and equipment in an apparent bid to control the area.



 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Update.

Collisions continue between Russian and American patrols in north-eastern Syria. Below is a large set of incidents that took place over the past ~3 months. In some cases Russian patrols blocked access to Syrian cities like Qamishli. In other cases US patrols attempted to block Russian movements. In one notable case, the deputy commander of the VDV was personally present.


Interestingly enough, a joint Russo-American patrol was conducted in northern Syria, after the killing of a Syrian by Turkish forces.


Syrian civilians throwing rocks at a US patrol. There have been multiple incidents of attacks on US patrols by some locals.


Some photos of Russian PMCs at a gas field near Palmyra.


A shot of an unusually large Russian troop column in Syria, including multiple Kamaz Tayfun MRAPs.


A large Russian troop column near Qamishly. Allegedly they were headed out to negotiate with the locals about setting up an observation post near Derik but failed to secure their cooperation. After this they set up an observation post in another village, Kasr Al-Dib. The observation post has an improvised landing area for helos, and multiple helos have been seen flying around in the area.

Following the deployment of the OP, Russian troops blocked a US patrol in the area, and Russian helos buzzed the stand-off repeatedly in a show of force. It's quite likely that this was a large part of the purpose in setting up the post.


Russia appears to be setting up a new base in Qamishly.


Russia has restored traffic along a highway from Aleppo to Hasakeh. This appears to be part of a plan to restore regular traffic between Syrian provinces. At appears that at least one US military checkpoint was passed during this movement.


A Russian Tigr-M armored car hit an IED near Kobani. Russia is reporting one service member with minor injuries.


Photos of US MRAPs near At-Tanf in the first link, and in Hasakeh province in the second link.


There is some progress in Idlib, where the Turks have now managed to set up patrols along a bigger chunk of the M-4 highway. However an IED went off near the patrol route during one of the patrols, and another went off when the Turks attempted to clear another portion of the highway to extend joint patrols. The Turks have suffered some casualties in the second incident. It's unclear whether they were the intended target.


Some footage of joint Russo-Turkish patrols, both along M-4 and in northern Syria.


During a joint patrol a Turkish MRAP got stuck and a Russian MRAP assisted.


Syrian MPs showing off a BTR-152.


Photos of Syrian MiG-29s, carrying among other things R-77s and Belorussian Talisman self-defense suites. There are unconfirmed reports of upgrades on the Syrian MiG-29 fleet.


An early Syrian T-72 model with additional armor.


Some imagery of S-300PMs in Syria.


Russia has been delivering humanitarian aid to parts of Syria.


A stockpile of weapons and munitions found by Syrian government forces in the south, and in Idlib, including the remains of a downed Turkish UAV.


Some footage of Hezollah Special Operations soldiers. Hezbollah played a pivotal role in the Syrian war, and this highlights that they're far closer to a regular military then many of the Syrian government forces.


Footage of joint Russo-Syrian exercises on naval security in Tartus.


A Turkish soldiers at a checkpoint in northern Syria.


The Syrian express continues, with a mass delivery of GAZ-66 trucks.


Putin has authorized the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense to negotiate with Syria the handover of additional real estate around Tartus.


A "second batch" of MiG-29s was handed over to the Syrians, allegedly. Su-24s are visible in the background. Given the recent appearance of "mysterious" jets in Libya, it's possible that Syria is being used as an intermediary.


The SDF has begun a major operation to hunt down roving ISIS bands near Deyr Ez Zor.

 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Update.

A Russo-Turkish patrol in Idlib was hit by an IED. 3 Russian service members were wounded, all appear to be ambulatory. A Turkish MRAP and a Russian BTR-82A were damaged. Up to this point joint Russo-Turkish patrols in Idlib were becoming common, and were penetrating deeper down the highway. Note, this is the second such incident recently (note the links marked with ***)

*** Подрыв БТР-82А ВС РФ в ходе совместного с Турцией патрулирования в сирийском Идлибе
*** https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/5952376.html
*** Момент взрыва СВУ около российского БТР-82А.. | Военный Осведомитель | VK

Footage of Russian special operations personnel operating a D-30 howitzer in Syria. It's really odd to see them operating the howitzer. It makes sense to have Russian artillerymen providing support fire to the Syrians, but why such a highly specialized team?


A Russian Tigr-M armored car was damaged in Syria under unknown circumstances.


An unknown UAV dropped a munition near a reconciliation center set up in northern Syria.

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There are reports of infighting inside Idlib between rebel groups.


A US MRAP flipped over in Syria, under unknown circumstances. Though knowing what kind of races they've been participating in suggests possibilities.


Some footage of encounters between US and Russian personnel in Syria.


Syrian personnel blocked a US troop column and forced them to turn around.


Kurds protest near a Russian outpost, in response to a recent Turkish airstrike in northern Syria.


Some photos of Russian MPs on the border of Latakia and Idlib provinces.


A photo of a Russian soldier carrying an RPK in Syria. The type remains in extremely limited service, in particular with the Marines.


Footage of a Syrian Su-22M4 flying at low altitude.


Syrian personnel got a hold of a US UAV, under unknown circumstances, possibly it was lost due to a technical malfunction.


Parliamentary elections took place in Syria. Unsurprisingly the Baath party won. Turnout is reported at 33%.


Based on data from the recent Russian constitutional referendum, Russia appears to have ~6.5 thousand personnel in Syria.


Some photos of weapons found by Syrian security personnel.


Footage of combat aircraft at Deyr-ez-Zor airbase; Su-24s, Su-22s, L-39s, and Mi-35s (maybe Mi-25s) and Mi-8s.

 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Updates.

Heavy artillery and air strikes took place along sections of the Idlib frontier, once again raising the possibility of a renewed Syrian offensive.


A Russo-Turkish patrol in Idlib hit an IED, again. One Russian and one Turkish vehicle were damaged. Russia suffered 3 wounded, fairly lightly from the looks of it. The Turks had an unspecified amount, possibly 3-5. This came right before Russia and Turkey ran the entire length of the M-4 highway for the first time. Despite the protests, and incidents, so far it appears that Turkey is making good on their promise, though much slower then expected.


Two Russian personnel were also wounded in Hasake province, by a mortar shell dropped from a UAV.


Russo-Turkish patrols in northern Syria, including Hasake province, continue.


Some images of Armenian EOD that deployed to Syria in support of Russian mine-clearing operations.


The low-key air war between Israel and Syria continues. Some footage of Syrian air defense firing over Damascus.


There are also reports of Syrians attempting to set up minefields on the Golan heights. The Israelies responded with an air strike.


There are reports of US F-15s intercepting an Iranian passenger jet over Syria near at-Tanf. It's possible that the plane got too close to the US positions there.


Photos of Russian PMCs in Syria.


A Syrian Kornet-E operator.


Some footage of Syrian Su-22M3s.


Some footage of Russian and Syrian personnel with a D-30. Interestingly enough there was recent footage where the Russian personnel were actually operating the howitzers.

 

Sandhi Yudha

Well-Known Member
"Two Russian personnel were also wounded in Hasake province, by a mortar shell dropped from a UAV."

Thats something new for me.
Is this done by some ISIS-unit or anti-Syria rebels?
Quite advanced way of warfare. Not only they have an UAV modified and large enough to carry and release the mortar grenade, but they also are skillful enough to aim and release at the right moment.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
"Two Russian personnel were also wounded in Hasake province, by a mortar shell dropped from a UAV."

Thats something new for me.
Is this done by some ISIS-unit or anti-Syria rebels?
Quite advanced way of warfare. Not only they have an UAV modified and large enough to carry and release the mortar grenade, but they also are skillful enough to aim and release at the right moment.
Good question. The source in question blames the Turks but the evidence is flimsy at best. Also it may have been more then one UAV and more then one munition. The sources says "mines" (in Russian mortar = миномет "minethrower" and mortar shells are called mines) plural indicating that more then one was dropped. After the shells were dropped allegedly a "kamikaze" drone was used. Possibly a primitive loitering munition. So it does sound quite the attack to organize. On the other hand there have been UAV raids against Khmeimeem with over 20 drones involved. And in those cases Russia implied the US was to blame, because a US aircraft was in the area possible acting as a controller for the drones. That's not even evidence, just speculation. So I'm skeptical of the claims that the Turks are to blame until some solid evidence comes up. So far what they've got is that the mortar shells are Turkish, one of them failed to explode. And the remains of the drone resemble a Turkish Kargu loitering munition.
 

Boagrius

Well-Known Member
In my reading on this subject - and on IDF airstrikes conducted within Syria specifically - I have noticed that there seem to be two competing narratives emanating from both sides. On one hand, pro-Syrian (and often Russian) sources seem to claim that Syria's GBAD assets have effectively shut the IAF out of Syrian airspace, forcing them to employ wastefully large quantities of standoff PGMs to inflict very limited damage. On the other hand, I have heard it claimed that the IAF is largely operating in Syria with impunity and achieving its objectives at will.

I must confess I have struggled to find impartial information on this subject - wondering if anyone else has come across credible/impartial sources to shed light on the matter?
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
In my reading on this subject - and on IDF airstrikes conducted within Syria specifically - I have noticed that there seem to be two competing narratives emanating from both sides. On one hand, pro-Syrian (and often Russian) sources seem to claim that Syria's GBAD assets have effectively shut the IAF out of Syrian airspace, forcing them to employ wastefully large quantities of standoff PGMs to inflict very limited damage. On the other hand, I have heard it claimed that the IAF is largely operating in Syria with impunity and achieving its objectives at will.

I must confess I have struggled to find impartial information on this subject - wondering if anyone else has come across credible/impartial sources to shed light on the matter?
There's no contradiction. The Israelies can't effectively operate legacy aircraft in Syrian airspace with the total impunity they enjoyed in the past. And they're losing PGMs in every strike. On the other hand they appear to have both the standoff range and the munitions to achieve their objectives despite these limitations. The cost of their operations has been raised substantially, and the planning has become more difficult. But they appear to still operate effectively. Of course this isn't a binary. They likely would have been able to do considerably more damage without the improvement to Syrian airspace control and defense. Each side chooses to emphasize what they prefer to display. And it makes sense too. For manufacturesr of Russian air defense systems, and for the Russian government, its important to point out to potential (wealthy) clients what kinds of tangible benefits can come from paying Russia to upgrade their IADS. For the Israelies its important to assure both their domestic and foreign audiences that Israel is more then capable of handling threats (real or perceived) from Iran and Hezbollah on Syrian soil.
 

Beholder

Active Member
There's no contradiction. The Israelies can't effectively operate legacy aircraft in Syrian airspace with the total impunity they enjoyed in the past. And they're losing PGMs in every strike. On the other hand they appear to have both the standoff range and the munitions to achieve their objectives despite these limitations. The cost of their operations has been raised substantially, and the planning has become more difficult. But they appear to still operate effectively. Of course this isn't a binary. They likely would have been able to do considerably more damage without the improvement to Syrian airspace control and defense. Each side chooses to emphasize what they prefer to display. And it makes sense too. For manufacturesr of Russian air defense systems, and for the Russian government, its important to point out to potential (wealthy) clients what kinds of tangible benefits can come from paying Russia to upgrade their IADS. For the Israelies its important to assure both their domestic and foreign audiences that Israel is more then capable of handling threats (real or perceived) from Iran and Hezbollah on Syrian soil.
There is article with some stats, that support this assessment from israeli side:


According to military figures, from 2010 to 2013, two Syrian surface-to-air missiles were fired at Israeli aircraft, compared to the 844 that were launched at IAF jets from 2017 to 2020.

Over that period, from 2017 to 2020, the IDF also fired roughly 5,000 missiles at 955 targets in Syria, according to military estimates.

Over the past two years, the Israeli Air Force has destroyed a third of Syria’s advanced air defense systems, according to IAF assessments. However, much of those anti-aircraft weapons have already been replaced or even upgraded by more advanced models from either Russia or Iran
 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
@Boagrius There is no Syrian vs Israeli version. Syria has its own version. But Israel doesn't. Neither the military nor government officials comment on such strikes. Specific reference to such strikes is extremely rare, and even then it's really vague.
There is an Israeli sat company that provides frequent damage assessment footage, confirming the strikes and targets.

You can either believe Syria, whose track record does not include reliability.
Or you can just form your own opinion based on reports.

@Feanor There's no real evidence that the IAF is either facing a more challenging environment in terms of air defense, or losing PGMs.
There are several arguments here:
1)When I get notified about rocket sirens in Israel, it's usually followed by reports of interception and then footage of both the interception and the destroyed projectile.
Destroyed projectiles are not discarded, instead they are transferred to special police warehouses. There's also footage containing sound of explosions when there are interceptions, but not of landing projectiles.
Syrian media does not provide footage of the allegedly intercepted projectiles in any way.

2)Every report of an airstrike is followed by proof of damage.

3)Syrian claims are always "90% interception rate" but somehow all targets are destroyed and 0 footage of destroyed missiles.
You gotta clear out the debris, you know. It's highly hazardous.

4)Footage of alleged interceptions shows Syrian missiles either flying in a ballistic trajectory, or erratically maneuvering between invisible targets with no interception, usually at very short range.

5)Syrian SAMs, even its newest ones, are well known to Israel and the west. That means countermeasures existed for a very long time. Most of Syria's SAMs are versions of any of the 19 SAM batteries destroyed in 1982 in the Bekaa Valley. In those 40 years the IAF has evolved far more than Syria's air defenses.

On the conceptual level, making SAMs useless is very easy when they're operating in a vacuum, which is what Syria currently does, simply because SAMs were never meant to operate in a vacuum. They were designed around many support elements that Syria no longer has.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
@Feanor There's no real evidence that the IAF is either facing a more challenging environment in terms of air defense, or losing PGMs.
There are several arguments here:
1)When I get notified about rocket sirens in Israel, it's usually followed by reports of interception and then footage of both the interception and the destroyed projectile.
Destroyed projectiles are not discarded, instead they are transferred to special police warehouses. There's also footage containing sound of explosions when there are interceptions, but not of landing projectiles.
Syrian media does not provide footage of the allegedly intercepted projectiles in any way.

2)Every report of an airstrike is followed by proof of damage.

3)Syrian claims are always "90% interception rate" but somehow all targets are destroyed and 0 footage of destroyed missiles.
You gotta clear out the debris, you know. It's highly hazardous.

4)Footage of alleged interceptions shows Syrian missiles either flying in a ballistic trajectory, or erratically maneuvering between invisible targets with no interception, usually at very short range.

5)Syrian SAMs, even its newest ones, are well known to Israel and the west. That means countermeasures existed for a very long time. Most of Syria's SAMs are versions of any of the 19 SAM batteries destroyed in 1982 in the Bekaa Valley. In those 40 years the IAF has evolved far more than Syria's air defenses.

On the conceptual level, making SAMs useless is very easy when they're operating in a vacuum, which is what Syria currently does, simply because SAMs were never meant to operate in a vacuum. They were designed around many support elements that Syria no longer has.
The most obvious evidence is that the Syrians shot down an F-16, after which point Israel stopped operating inside Syrian airspace, at least as far as I can tell, and has instead chosen to launch stand-off munitions from Israeli or Lebanese airspace. As for evidence of downed PGMs, it's a good question. Syria is a very closed off country so it's possible that they're simply not displaying them. It's also possible that there aren't many to display. I would have to do some more digging to see what I can find. I would be very surprised if literally 0 PGMs had been shot down in this entire time. I wouldn't be at all surprised if the interception rate is well below what is claimed, and even below 50%. I'm not sure how we would verify exact interception rates unless the Syrians consistently showed the remains of whatever they intercepted, and they clearly don't.
 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
The most obvious evidence is that the Syrians shot down an F-16, after which point Israel stopped operating inside Syrian airspace, at least as far as I can tell, and has instead chosen to launch stand-off munitions from Israeli or Lebanese airspace. As for evidence of downed PGMs, it's a good question. Syria is a very closed off country so it's possible that they're simply not displaying them. It's also possible that there aren't many to display. I would have to do some more digging to see what I can find. I would be very surprised if literally 0 PGMs had been shot down in this entire time. I wouldn't be at all surprised if the interception rate is well below what is claimed, and even below 50%. I'm not sure how we would verify exact interception rates unless the Syrians consistently showed the remains of whatever they intercepted, and they clearly don't.
The shootdown of an F-16 is a very simple case.
An S-200 is easily fooled, but just like every electronic system, if you don't make it not work, it will just work.
The F-16 was outside formation, turned off his sensor and defensive aids, and so was a very easy target. An investigation showed it was a simple human error. The pilot and navigator waere disciplined but I don't remember their current status.

The matter of munitions launch point is unsubstantiated. There is no evidence to show what attack path Israeli planes take.
For a fact, the very attack in which an Israeli F-16 was downed, started with a munitions launched from Israel's Galilee region into the T4 airbase in Syria about 300km away.
But such detailing of an attack path is extremely rare, and may have been revealed only due to the high profile of the attack.

So even before a plane was downed, the IAF was launching standoff munitions.
And it's not really surprising - if you can fire from standoff, you do it. Absolutely no point in doing otherwise, especially if the target is static and under satellite surveillance.

Also, more than a year AFTER the incident, there were reports of Israeli airstrikes well inside Iraq, which required flying over most of Syria.

It's also worth mentioning that the Delilah is the go-to weapon in Syria, right after the Spice and SDB glide bombs.
What's unique about the Delilah is that it started its life as an air launched decoy with a very potent EW kit. Only after a while it was converted to serve as a cruise missile. Its warhead is exceptionally small. Only about 20kg. It's therefore presumed that the cruise missile version retains the EW kit or parts of it, eliminating the need for escorting aircraft.


Whenever Israeli munitions fell as duds, Syrian media rushed to show them as trophies. It's very unreasonable to think they wouldn't show downed Delilahs or Spice bombs.
 

Boagrius

Well-Known Member
Thanks @Feanor and @Big_Zucchini for your input. The main GBAD assets that got me thinking about this were the Buk M2 and Pantsir systems that Syria now seems to operate in decent quantities. There is also their S300s (eg. in Masyaf) but it is my understanding that these are currently Russian operated and controlled, and have not been used against the IAF as yet.
 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
Even if the S-300 were used, their version is not exactly the peak of Russia's technological might. They've made a long line of improvements to their own systems since then.
IIRC it was the PMU-2 version, which should be known to the west, if we are to assume a reasonable scope of espionage.

There's nothing Syria has that can really threaten the IAF. Not even a much denser network of top of the line S-400, Buk-M3, and Pantsirs, because they simply do not have the air force, EW assets, decoys, inter-connectivity, and operational flexibility to make this work.
It's like building a damn fine sports car without the wheels.

We cannot expect Syria to use the S-300 any time soon unless some major diplomatic incident occurs. I believe Russia made a huge mistake selling this system, because regardless of its usage policy, it's taken a major marketing hit.
Widely regarded as a failure, that is, simply because it cannot be used.
Doesn't matter if what's holding you back is mere politics - if you have such an advanced system but missiles are still landing in your territory, it doesn't look good.
Not that it makes much of a difference since most orders for Russian weaponry are more politically-driven than technologically driven (not that I'm saying there's any substantial technological issue in Russia's MIC).
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
The shootdown of an F-16 is a very simple case.
An S-200 is easily fooled, but just like every electronic system, if you don't make it not work, it will just work.
The F-16 was outside formation, turned off his sensor and defensive aids, and so was a very easy target. An investigation showed it was a simple human error. The pilot and navigator waere disciplined but I don't remember their current status.

The matter of munitions launch point is unsubstantiated. There is no evidence to show what attack path Israeli planes take.
For a fact, the very attack in which an Israeli F-16 was downed, started with a munitions launched from Israel's Galilee region into the T4 airbase in Syria about 300km away.
But such detailing of an attack path is extremely rare, and may have been revealed only due to the high profile of the attack.

So even before a plane was downed, the IAF was launching standoff munitions.
And it's not really surprising - if you can fire from standoff, you do it. Absolutely no point in doing otherwise, especially if the target is static and under satellite surveillance.

Also, more than a year AFTER the incident, there were reports of Israeli airstrikes well inside Iraq, which required flying over most of Syria.

It's also worth mentioning that the Delilah is the go-to weapon in Syria, right after the Spice and SDB glide bombs.
What's unique about the Delilah is that it started its life as an air launched decoy with a very potent EW kit. Only after a while it was converted to serve as a cruise missile. Its warhead is exceptionally small. Only about 20kg. It's therefore presumed that the cruise missile version retains the EW kit or parts of it, eliminating the need for escorting aircraft.


Whenever Israeli munitions fell as duds, Syrian media rushed to show them as trophies. It's very unreasonable to think they wouldn't show downed Delilahs or Spice bombs.
I have a few questions for you if you don't mind.

1) Do you think Syria has shot down literally 0 PGMs?

2) If no, have they shown any fragments?

3) If the Syrian IADS is such a total failure why has neither Russia or Iran delivered more capable systems? Russia might have some agreements with Israel about this but Iran certainly doesn't. And they're the ones getting hit.

4) Is there any evidence of Israeli strikes from inside Syrian airspace post shoot down?

On a side note, Syria isn't the only route to Iraq. During the strike on Osirak iirc didn't Israel go through Saudi airspace? Given the recent warming up between Saudi Arabia and Israel (especially their cooperation vis-a-vis Yemen) isn't it possible, or even likely, that the Saudis would be willing to allow Israeli warplanes through?

Even if the S-300 were used, their version is not exactly the peak of Russia's technological might. They've made a long line of improvements to their own systems since then.
IIRC it was the PMU-2 version, which should be known to the west, if we are to assume a reasonable scope of espionage.

There's nothing Syria has that can really threaten the IAF. Not even a much denser network of top of the line S-400, Buk-M3, and Pantsirs, because they simply do not have the air force, EW assets, decoys, inter-connectivity, and operational flexibility to make this work.
It's like building a damn fine sports car without the wheels.

We cannot expect Syria to use the S-300 any time soon unless some major diplomatic incident occurs. I believe Russia made a huge mistake selling this system, because regardless of its usage policy, it's taken a major marketing hit.
Widely regarded as a failure, that is, simply because it cannot be used.
Doesn't matter if what's holding you back is mere politics - if you have such an advanced system but missiles are still landing in your territory, it doesn't look good.
Not that it makes much of a difference since most orders for Russian weaponry are more politically-driven than technologically driven (not that I'm saying there's any substantial technological issue in Russia's MIC).
I'm not convinced that Russia sold Syria the systems. They're S-300PM systems, a variant not ever exported because it's a domestic variant specifically. It's likely closest export variant is the PMU1. They're operating Russian IFFs, they came straight from a Russian SAM regiment that was re-armed with S-400s, and they're reportedly operating under Russian command. They also haven't participated in the current scuffles at all as far as I can tell. I suspect they provide extra launch tubes for the Russian IADS along the Syrian coast, with some Syrian staff on site. Given just how few TELs the S-400s at Khmeimeem have, this would make sense.

EDIT: Consider that in Russian S-400 regiment, often they don't replace the TELs when they re-arm. I.e. the TELs are completely (or nearly so) interoperable between the S-300P and the S-400.
 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
I have a few questions for you if you don't mind.

1) Do you think Syria has shot down literally 0 PGMs?

2) If no, have they shown any fragments?

3) If the Syrian IADS is such a total failure why has neither Russia or Iran delivered more capable systems? Russia might have some agreements with Israel about this but Iran certainly doesn't. And they're the ones getting hit.

4) Is there any evidence of Israeli strikes from inside Syrian airspace post shoot down?

On a side note, Syria isn't the only route to Iraq. During the strike on Osirak iirc didn't Israel go through Saudi airspace? Given the recent warming up between Saudi Arabia and Israel (especially their cooperation vis-a-vis Yemen) isn't it possible, or even likely, that the Saudis would be willing to allow Israeli warplanes through?



I'm not convinced that Russia sold Syria the systems. They're S-300PM systems, a variant not ever exported because it's a domestic variant specifically. It's likely closest export variant is the PMU1. They're operating Russian IFFs, they came straight from a Russian SAM regiment that was re-armed with S-400s, and they're reportedly operating under Russian command. They also haven't participated in the current scuffles at all as far as I can tell. I suspect they provide extra launch tubes for the Russian IADS along the Syrian coast, with some Syrian staff on site. Given just how few TELs the S-400s at Khmeimeem have, this would make sense.

EDIT: Consider that in Russian S-400 regiment, often they don't replace the TELs when they re-arm. I.e. the TELs are completely (or nearly so) interoperable between the S-300P and the S-400.
1)Statistically, with several thousand munitions dropped on Syria, it would be illogical to think 0 munitions were shot down. However, typical Israeli munitions are low RCS, especially the SPICE and SDB bombs, and even the Delilah.
Syrian air defenses are geared towards very high RCS targets like manned fighters and large aircraft.
Only few in-service systems are capable, like the Pantsir. Which leads me to the next point.

2)Exactly - they haven't shown any fragments from allegedly downed missiles. Pantsirs are confirmed beyond doubt to have been operationally used. However, not a single fragment of a downed Israeli missile was shown to the public. And as we know, the Syrian media is thrilled to show such fragments every chance they get.
Israeli artillery uses semi-reusable catapult launched drones. They're cheap, somewhat dispensable, and take some beating every time they land for reuse. So the IDF loses them at a fairly high rate, even outside combat. Occasionally they malfunction over enemy territory and land in Syria or Lebanon or even Gaza.
Syrian media gladly showcased these every time they found one.

3)Russia - likely not because of agreements, but because they understand that Syria does not have the physical means or expertise to use them properly, so their systems would get destroyed at a disproportionately high rate.
For example, the only reason why in 1973 Egypt inflicted so many losses to the IAF with SAMs was because Egypt had an effective air force.
Letting only SAMs engage with aircraft is like ordering catapult operators to face a cavalry charge.
Iran - they tried, but there were reports of Israeli strikes against components of Iranian systems. They cannot transport them whole, lest they'll be spotted.
But regardless, Israel's intelligence grip on Iran is ridiculously tight. They also have their own financial troubles. Losing highly expensive equipment every other week is taking a toll on Iran's resources and morale alike. After operation House of Cards in 2019, remaining Iranian forces have largely withdrawn from southern Syria.

4)Direct evidence? No. But we do know SDB or SPICE bombs (both glide bombs with similar characteristics) are the go-to weapon for the IAF in Syria.
To think Israel would always be firing from within Israeli territory, it would require Israeli aircraft to fly at an altitude of 5km in circles, for 17 minutes for a Delilah missile to hit at max range. That is by all means a terrible strategy, especially considering it allows Syrian S-200 to threaten Israeli aircraft within Israeli airspace.
SDBs and SPICE have approximately 100km range from high altitude (can fly low then make a short climb and release, then descend and return).
Considering that much of the footage of Israeli strikes in Syria shows exceptionally large explosions, we can assume the longest range weapon known in its arsenal, the 20kg warhead Delilah, is not so frequently used as thought.

Googling "ISI Syria" will show plenty of results of large craters or large destroyed targets very deep inside Syria.

There is simply no SAM in Syrian inventory that can threaten Israeli aircraft on their way to a destination. Only point defenses that can show some capability on the destination itself, where they'll be dealing with low RCS munitions only.

The Osirak reactor is not the best example. Neither Jordan nor Saudi Arabia were friendly with Israel. That was 13 years before Jordan accepted a peace treaty with Israel.
Even today, Saudi Arabia does not allow Israeli planes to fly over its territory. And with the use of advanced radars, Israel cannot really conceal such a flight route, and would rather not risk the diplomatic incident especially when such strikes are routine.

Even then, the targets were very deep in Iraq as well, and the need for concealment likely dictated short range munitions to be used.

Furthermore, Israel and Syria were warring parties in 1981 but they maintained a ceasefire. Israel would not risk breaking that ceasefire, especially considering Syria had an extremely potent air defense force, air force, and surveillance capabilities back then that could jeopardize the entire operation.
Today, Israel and Syria no longer have a ceasefire agreement in effect (frozen indefinitely), so the diplomatic obstacle to using Syrian territory is lifted.


What would be the obstacle for Russia to just get more launchers into Khmeimim or a remote storage facility? Surely any arrangement would be better than the PR disaster the S-300 system suffered due to the sale to Syria.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
1)Statistically, with several thousand munitions dropped on Syria, it would be illogical to think 0 munitions were shot down. However, typical Israeli munitions are low RCS, especially the SPICE and SDB bombs, and even the Delilah.
Syrian air defenses are geared towards very high RCS targets like manned fighters and large aircraft.
Only few in-service systems are capable, like the Pantsir. Which leads me to the next point.
I notice you haven't answered the question. I agree, it's illogical. Do you think 0 munitions were shot down? If yes, you are, by your own admission, illogical. If no, then where are the fragments?

2)Exactly - they haven't shown any fragments from allegedly downed missiles. Pantsirs are confirmed beyond doubt to have been operationally used. However, not a single fragment of a downed Israeli missile was shown to the public. And as we know, the Syrian media is thrilled to show such fragments every chance they get.
This hasn't been my experience in following this conflict, though admittedly I've spent relatively little time on Syrian media resources. I suspect it would take considerable media analysis to show that this is the case. Emphasis mine.

Israeli artillery uses semi-reusable catapult launched drones. They're cheap, somewhat dispensable, and take some beating every time they land for reuse. So the IDF loses them at a fairly high rate, even outside combat. Occasionally they malfunction over enemy territory and land in Syria or Lebanon or even Gaza.
Syrian media gladly showcased these every time they found one.
To know that this is the case every or even most of the times they found one, we would need to compare malfunction statistics to numbers displayed by the Syrian media, again some major media analysis. I haven't done it, and in what I have seen of this conflict, relatively few Israeli downed UAVs or munitions have cropped up in the media. If you have some indications that the Syrians are very eager to display these sort of things, that would be interesting. I suspect that finding a downed UAV, especially by civilians or non-military agencies, in the country side as such, would generate considerably more public attention. Cleaning up the results of an Israel missile strike on a military facility, especially one where Iranian proxies or advisers are based, would be kept out of the public eye as much as possible, and that might include remains of downed munitions. It's also possible that the damage of intercept is such that the distinction between a munition that exploded on target and a munition that exploded in mid air due to interception by something like a Buk-M2 missile (for example) would be negligible, significant reducing the propaganda value of such a display.

3)Russia - likely not because of agreements, but because they understand that Syria does not have the physical means or expertise to use them properly, so their systems would get destroyed at a disproportionately high rate.
For example, the only reason why in 1973 Egypt inflicted so many losses to the IAF with SAMs was because Egypt had an effective air force.
That hasn't been my impression. My take away has been that the Egyptian air force was lackluster at best, and outright incompetent at worst. In the War of Attrition that directly preceded the Yom Kippur war they took horrendous losses, despite having considerable Soviet air (going so far as to have some Soviet pilots flying their aircraft, and an entire Soviet PVO division deployed around Cairo). Even in that war the Israelis lost far fewer aircraft then the Syrians and Egyptians, and only a few of those in air to air combat, the overwhelming majority were downed by GBAD. Take a look here: https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/JEMEAA/Journals/Volume-02_Issue-1/Tovy.pdf Israels problem was that it's tiny and the IAFs available resources were dwarfed by the volume of Soviet military aid to the Arabs.

Letting only SAMs engage with aircraft is like ordering catapult operators to face a cavalry charge.
Iran - they tried, but there were reports of Israeli strikes against components of Iranian systems. They cannot transport them whole, lest they'll be spotted.
Specifically against advanced Iranian SAMs? I didn't see any. If you have, do you mind sharing?

But regardless, Israel's intelligence grip on Iran is ridiculously tight. They also have their own financial troubles. Losing highly expensive equipment every other week is taking a toll on Iran's resources and morale alike. After operation House of Cards in 2019, remaining Iranian forces have largely withdrawn from southern Syria.
Certain agreements were made between Israel and Russia about who would be allowed in southern Syria (specifically Deraa and near the Israeli border) with Russian MPs deployed to enforce those agreements. Are we sure it's an issue of Iranian resources and not of political arrangements? I'm far from convinced.

4)Direct evidence? No. But we do know SDB or SPICE bombs (both glide bombs with similar characteristics) are the go-to weapon for the IAF in Syria.
To think Israel would always be firing from within Israeli territory, it would require Israeli aircraft to fly at an altitude of 5km in circles, for 17 minutes for a Delilah missile to hit at max range. That is by all means a terrible strategy, especially considering it allows Syrian S-200 to threaten Israeli aircraft within Israeli airspace.
I don't follow. Why would the aircraft need to keep flying in circles?

SDBs and SPICE have approximately 100km range from high altitude (can fly low then make a short climb and release, then descend and return).
Considering that much of the footage of Israeli strikes in Syria shows exceptionally large explosions, we can assume the longest range weapon known in its arsenal, the 20kg warhead Delilah, is not so frequently used as thought.
Do you mind sharing?

Googling "ISI Syria" will show plenty of results of large craters or large destroyed targets very deep inside Syria.
Maybe I'm totally lost, but googling that came up with buckets of results about ISIS. Maybe I'm missing your point. Could you elaborate?


There is simply no SAM in Syrian inventory that can threaten Israeli aircraft on their way to a destination. Only point defenses that can show some capability on the destination itself, where they'll be dealing with low RCS munitions only.
Any old SAM can threaten them. It's a question of using countermeasures including EW to deal with those SAMs. If an antique S-200 can down an F-16 it's pretty obvious that so can many other things, including more modern assets like Buk-M2s, and Pantsyrs. I don't see why Russian AEW, or various other radars (ship-bourne, GBAD, fighter jet) couldn't be used to give Syria a heads up about inbound Israeli strikes, with Pantsyr and Buk-M2 pickets positioned in ambushes along various likely approach vectors. This wouldn't provide guaranteed positive control of airspace, in fact it would positively preclude it, but it would allow mobile and more modern though shorter range systems to ambush Israeli aircraft, and cause potential losses. If you have to fly low to avoid the older big SAMs, you become more vulnerable to something like a Pantsyr. Given how frequently Israel flies into Syrian territory, losing aircraft to a tactic of this type is a question of when not if, in my opinion.

I would add another important component to this equation. After losing an F-16 the Israelis proceeded to retaliate quite severely, until a phone conversation between Putin and Netanyahu. After which the retaliations stopped and the Israelis appear to have switched their approach to hitting targets in Syria. Is it possible that something along the lines of the above was threatened or implied?

The Osirak reactor is not the best example. Neither Jordan nor Saudi Arabia were friendly with Israel. That was 13 years before Jordan accepted a peace treaty with Israel.
Even today, Saudi Arabia does not allow Israeli planes to fly over its territory. And with the use of advanced radars, Israel cannot really conceal such a flight route, and would rather not risk the diplomatic incident especially when such strikes are routine.

Even then, the targets were very deep in Iraq as well, and the need for concealment likely dictated short range munitions to be used.
This is all speculation and supposition. I don't think you can positively rule out that an alternate flight route was used, either through an unofficial agreement with the Saudis or by exploiting traditional Saudi incompetence. The Osirak reactor is a good example of a real scenario where the Israelis chose to operate a certain way under certain circumstances, proving a capability. It's also important to note that apparently at least one of the "mystery" strikes was done by UAVs. Are we suggesting that Israel flew UAVs through the entirety of Syria? I suspect there's more going on here that we don't know.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Furthermore, Israel and Syria were warring parties in 1981 but they maintained a ceasefire. Israel would not risk breaking that ceasefire, especially considering Syria had an extremely potent air defense force, air force, and surveillance capabilities back then that could jeopardize the entire operation.
Today, Israel and Syria no longer have a ceasefire agreement in effect (frozen indefinitely), so the diplomatic obstacle to using Syrian territory is lifted.
Are you suggesting that in 1981 the Israelis could carry out a strike like this with complete impunity through Syrian airspace? I'm genuinely curious. In 1982 the Israelies certainly did a number on Syrian air defense at Bekaa. But 1981 was prior to that point, and it took considerable resources and planning to execute that blow. A completely different situation from sneaking by the Saudis.

What would be the obstacle for Russia to just get more launchers into Khmeimim or a remote storage facility? Surely any arrangement would be better than the PR disaster the S-300 system suffered due to the sale to Syria.
First off, I don't see the PR disaster. At all. I'm genuinely unsure what you are referring to.

Second off, you seem to be ignoring the circumstances that surrounded the situation. Israel had carried out a strike in an area, operating very close to a Russian Il-20. Consequently Syrian SAM fire (the same venerable S-200) struck the Il-20 and downed it killing Russian service members, allegedly (according to Russia) because Israeli jets were maneuvering in a way that placed the Il-20 bewteen them and the missile. Russia subsequently alleged that Israel violated some sort of agreement regarding warnings about strikes (to get Russian assets out of the way, but of course to also warn the Syrians). The Israelies responded by stating that warnings had been provided. Russia fired back with a statement that the warning was insufficient (iirc they mentioned a 2 minute warning) to get the Il-20 out of the way. Russia blamed Israel squarely for the incident, and appeared to at least have some merit. The delivery of the S-300PM with Russian IFFs was a direct response to this, and it's location (overlooking the area where this incident took place) clearly indicate that it's meant to be used in a similar situation. Given the presence of Russian service members, the type of system (a domestic PM variant with Russian IFFs) it's my opinion that the systems are likely plugged into the Russian air defense grid on the Syrian coast and are for all practical purposes part of the Russian air defense grid, but a part of that grid that can ostensibly be claimed as "Syrian" if Israeli operations threaten Russian service members in the future. The TELs are interoperable with S-400 missiles, and can easily be connected to other Russian assets in the area. Getting more launchers into Khmeimeem wouldn't provide this sort of grey area escalation capability. And a storage facility wouldn't accomplish anything at all.

In my opinion Russia deployed the systems to be able to fire at Israeli aircraft, if they threaten Russian personnel, and be able to avoid an open confrontation. It seems to me that at the political level Russia and Israel are not interested in a conflict or even a clash. However things can happen in a complex tactical environment, and this gives Russia a flexible response with plausible deniability. If anything it will be the Syrians celebrating a shoot down. This explains the placement of the systems at Masyaf, the fact that the S-300 has been notoriously silent during recent Israeli strikes, and the fact that Russia was willing to trust Syria with Russian IFFs.
 
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