The Current Conflict In Syria

[Feanor]

I believe that the Derivatsiya is a better alternative to the Tunguska if used properly.
There is definitely place for a fully passive system in the age of stealth, and it can be vastly augmented by sharing a datalink with less survivable radar-operating systems.
The guns alone do not have a very long range, so an optical system aided by some automatic scanning makes a lot of sense. But with programmable fuzes they can be extremely lethal within their operating range.
Honestly I'd be far more worried if Russia started sending Derivatsiya systems to Syria than something like the Pantsir or a shiny new S-400.

Again I'm unsure what advantage it provides over a tracked Pantsyr. The Pantsyr can also be fully passive, and can definitely datalink with other systems. If the 57mm gun is such a must, why not produce a Land Forces Pantsyr-SV with a 57mm gun? Or merge the Derivatsiya with the Sosna if an all-IR system is that important?

Missiles already exist in many forms. I don't think there needs to be a missile between the Tor and Strela, considering the Tor is quite short ranged.
There is room for a fully passive gun system that can maximize the potential of the gun. A coupled missile could be nice, but it would be a MANPADS at best, which is not a better alternative.

There is one currently. It's being replaced by what to me seems like a less capable system. And remember, the Sosna is a MANPADS, essentially. There's no downside to putting the S and D on the same chassis, and replacing the Tunguska with a Pantsyr. Literally none. No capabilities would be lost, all would be retained, and new capabilities would be added.

We can look at other very high profile examples like the American strike on the Shayrat airbase in 2017, or the multinational strike against alleged CW facilities in 2018.

In 2017, the US launched in 1 strike a total of 59 Tomahawk missiles.
US claim: 58 missiles struck their targets, and an additional 1 malfunctioned. Approximately 20 aircraft were destroyed/damaged. The airbase lost its ability to refuel and rearm planes.

Russian claim: 23 missiles struck, 6 Syrian aircraft destroyed, flights resumed shortly after, and only extremely minimal damage.

Pro Assad media: 15 planes destroyed, plus several tankers caused blasts.

SOHR: A dozen hangars, a fuel depot, and an air defense unit.

Later on ISI published satellite images showing 44 targets were hit, including some that were struck multiple times, including a 5-element SA-6 battery.
Photos surfaced online showing more at least 10 distinct aircraft were destroyed.

It gets interesting. According to the summary you provided, the pro-Assad media agrees most closely with the ISI. But even the anti-Assad SOHR is missing the destroyed aircraft. This not so much highlights a pro-Assad bias in the media as much as it showcases the inherent unreliability of the reports in question. This has been my experience as well, which is why I prefer either photographic evidence, or confirmation from both sides, before definitively stating something.

In 2018, the US, UK, and France conducted a large scale strike involving naval ships and aircraft, against 3 distinct Syrian targets.

Coalition version: 105 missiles were fired. All targets were destroyed and none was intercepted. All missiles appeared to have been either conventional cruise missiles or stealth cruise missiles.
Syria launched 40 SAMs but only after the attack ended, resulting in no effect.

Syrian version: Most of the missiles were downed. A total of 13 near al Kiswah.

Russian version: 71 missiles out of 103 were downed.

SOHR: 65 missiles were downed but considerable damage was inflicted.

Although not spoken of, IIRC, the Barzah compound which was hit by approximately 70 missiles, may have had an underground bunker, which may explain that large amount of JASSM missiles with a penetrating warhead.

In this example, as in the last, the highly anti-Assad SOHR doesn't agree with the coalition version, and even cites large numbers of missile intercepts (though how they got that information is beyond me).

Overall, we can see that Syrian and Russian sources are very inconsistent with each other, and when faced with concrete visual evidence, are often found to be untrue.
So there is just no reason to believe them when they claim something, after low profile strikes that do not always generate visual representation of things.

Sure. I wouldn't take Russian claims at face value in the absence of evidence. You are correct (in my opinion), if that is your entire argument here.

 

[Feanor]

Probably nothing special.
In 2017 we've heard this:

It's Official, Russia and Syria Have Linked Their Air Defense Networks

The formal arrangement adds more complexity for the United States and its allies in the already complicated conflict.

www.thedrive.com

Then, a year after saying Russia integrated its air defenses with those of Syria, a Syrian S-200 battery shot down a Russian Il-20 plane.

The exact statement quoted is this:

"Today, a unified integrated air defense system has been set up in Syria,” Meshcheryakov said. “We have ensured the information and technical interlinkage of the Russian and Syrian air reconnaissance systems. All information on the situation in the air comes from Syrian radar stations to the control points of the Russian force grouping.”

Not exactly detailed or specific. Information from Syrian radars is somehow transmitted to Russian control points. In real time? In what format? It certainly raises some questions. And it not so much implies upgrades to the Syrian network as much as it implies Russian access to Syrian air defense command and control. Which honestly I took for granted since the start of Russian involvement. Current Russian C4I centers even take data from an S-125 or an S-200? I suspect not without some serious work. But your point is well taken, Russian upgrades or "upgrades" to Syrian air defenses may be essentially insignificant for all practical purposes.

No. You ALWAYS need redundancy. The IAF always sends more planes than the bare minimum needed, as a contingency plan.
But that is also not equivalent to launching double the munitions. A single munition costs more than getting a few more planes up in the air.

Yes but the level of expected resistance increases the amount of redundancy needed. We're arguing about whether the employment of Pantsyrs and Buk-M2Es is enough to cause a complication in mission planning and strike execution or not, with or without Russian involvement and/or assistance in the form of early warning.

Yes. All Syrian air defense systems are constantly tracked, among many other types of assets.
There are several ways to track them consistently, but if you bring a new system from another theater entirely, bring it in disassembled, and assemble it below radar, then you can disguise it for a prolonged period of time quite effectively.
What it would have over Syrian AD is that Israelis weren't supposed to know about its existence at all.
But it did know, because of some classified factors I'm not at liberty to talk about.

The technical aspect by which Iran COULD attempt to use the system to fulfill its purpose, was already explained, and will be further expanded on below.

It still doesn't answer to the objection I provided. It's not impossible that Iran tried to smuggle in one of their more sophisticated pieces of SHORAD and use it to down an Israeli jet, but it hardly seems like the likeliest scenario, and the complete lack of evidence outside an Israeli claim makes me dubious. Again, it would make far more sense to purchase more Pantsyrs. I don't see how it would be easier for Iran to disguise the delivery of a brand new type of system, never before seen in Syrian hands, vs Russia delivering upgraded versions of a system Syria already operates.

Because they would again be highly visible to Israeli intelligence.

What makes a Russian delivery of Pantsyrs more visible then an Iranian delivery of Tors?

Technically, these systems have unknown anti-EW, and so the effect of Israeli EW on them is unknown. But we do know several such units were already destroyed.
It is possible Russia built them "light", having no anti-EW capabilities other than computerized ones, but keeping them effective in an EW-heavy environment by linking them with higher tier air defenses and dedicated EW systems which Syria doesn't have.

The SM variant isn't in service yet, it's completing trials now. So it definitely hasn't been destroyed. As for the S2 variant, I'm unsure. Some may have been destroyed but I think all the UAE variants seen in Libya are S1s. And quite a few were destroyed while hiding in hangars, not while actively operating. Either way a top of the line current system must be better then a top of the line system from nearly 3 decades ago (iirc the Tor-M1 entered service in the early 90s). I'm sure the Israeli air force can defeat any quantity of Pantsyrs or Tors that Russia or Iran can reasonably deliver, especially given the lack of other assets for them to work with. But it doesn't change the basic argument. It makes little sense for Iran to even opt for the Tor under these circumstances.

Iran does not have Pantsirs in large quantities to spare. The Tor however does fulfill a niche that local air defenses can already fulfill, and is strategically less important to Iran as it invests in more modern, longer range systems. Depending on one's doctrine, a Pantsir could be a Tor replacement.
Anyway, think of this as a 2nd F-117 shootdown.
You deploy your system under cover, not tracked (or so they might think) by Israeli intelligence because it's not Syrian, in a site Israel might use in the following months, dig in and try to avoid detection at all times. And only when the unit gets a visual ID, start up the system and fire.
Plenty of places to conceal it.

This also favors a Pantsyr over a Tor, as it can operate without radar. Complete passive mode.

The Times of Israel is a very reliable source. It's politically non-aligned and is also very professional. Unlike JPost for example, which often shoves opinions into factual reporting, creating a mess.
But the best reports on the incident came from TheWarZone.
First report on day 1:

Russian IL-20 Surveillance Plane Went Down Off Syrian Coast During Israeli Missile Barrage (Updated)

The Il-20 disappeared as Syrian air defenses responded to an Israeli strike. Russia has insinuated that a French frigate may have been involved.

www.thedrive.com

Sorry, but how is this a version of events from Russia? At best it's a preliminary statement, in which Russia says

"The connection with the crew of the Russian Il-20 aircraft was lost over the Mediterranean Sea when the plane was returning to the airbase of Khmeimim, 35 kilometers from the coast of Syria," a Russian Ministry of Defense official said, according to state-run media outlet TASS. The "Il-20 ... disappeared during the attack of four Israeli F-16 aircraft on Syrian targets in the province of Latakia."

"Russian radars fixed missile launches from the French frigate Auvergne, which was in that area," according to TASS.

Hardly a definitive claim, more of a preliminary statement based on limited information available. It was amended, in that very article, mere hours later, with:

Russia now says that a Syrian SA-5 (S-200) surface-to-air missile did indeed accidentally take down its Il-20 Coot electronic intelligence gathering plane, but that the Israeli Air Force is also to blame for the friendly fire incident that claimed 14 lives. According to Russian officials, only a one minute warning was given by Israel of the impending attack, leaving Russian forces nowhere near enough time to make sure their personnel and materiel would be safe from the onslaught.

Second, better formed report:

Russia's Claim That Israeli F-16s Used Their Doomed Il-20 Spy Plane As Cover Doesn't Add Up

It's not clear how the Kremlin might respond after the embarrassing incident in which Syrian forces accidentally shot down the Russian aircraft.

www.thedrive.com

The first Russian version was that a French frigate fired the missile that downed the Il-20 plane.

No. The first Russian statement was that an Il-20 went down, in the area where a French frigate and the IAF were operating, during an IAF strike. And missile launches from the French frigate were spotted on radar. That's the entirety of it. The report was update, rapidly, mere hours later, with more details.

The second version, appearing in the picture posted on TWZ, showed a route taken by the IAF of arrival, missile drop, and immediate departure, taking place between 22:00 and 22:10. Russia mentioned specifically GBU-39 bombs.

The final version tells Israeli planes dropped their munitions at 21:40 and proceeded to patrol.
At 21:51 Syrian AD started firing.
At 22:03 the Il-20 was hit.
At 22:40 Israeli planes left the area.

Just so I understand correctly, the difference between vers. 2 and 3 here consists of a discrepancy in the departure time after the downing? Where and under what circumstances were the two differing versions presented? I also notice that 2240 and 2140 hours are awfully similar numbers. Is it possible that we're dealing with a transcription error somewhere along the chain of press statements? Who even made the differing statements? The briefing I provided doesn't show what time Israeli aircraft left the area, but it does have screenshots from the S-400 radar post showing an Israeli F-16 near the Il-20 at the moment of downing, with the Il-20 being between the F-16 and the S-200 missile.

 

[Feanor]

A few notes:
1)GBU-39, alleged by Russia to be used, have no man in the loop capability, so aircraft don't need to patrol unless they want BDA. To do BDA, they have to fly close to the target, not 100km away, especially during night time.
Sats do BDA if needed.
2)Even at maximum range, 10 minutes to glide 100km is about as much as it can possibly take. Waiting 11 minutes to start firing S-200 missiles at something that should have already hit by then, would be ineffective.
3)12 minutes between starting of Syrian AD firing and an impact on an Il-20 shows Syria fired a large number of munitions.
4)If the Il-20 was a decoy, Israeli planes should have left immediately after it was hit, not more than half an hour.

As far as I can tell, after initial confusion and vague statements, Russia presented a single version of events, whose primary points lie in the following;

1) Israel carried out strikes with only ~2 (sometimes 1) minute of warning (it's possible it was like 1.5 or 1.75 minutes) thus violating some unnamed agreement with Russia
2) IAF aircraft were in the area near a Russian Il-20 at the time of downing, and maneuvered in such a way as to place the Il-20 between them and the S-200 missiles

Nothing you provided materially refutes these claims. Nor has Israel explicitly denied any of these specific points, at least as far as I can tell. Instead Israel has made vague accusations against Syrian air defense (accusations that likely have some merit given their habitual ineptitude and the fundamentally irresponsible act of firing S-200s into airspace near the Il-20 without the ability to discriminate presicely between targets). It's possible that due to an error somewhere in the information chain, the departure time was mis-identified in one or another public statement. I don't see what bearing this has on the specifics of the downing. At the end of the day it doesn't matter how long Israeli aircraft spent in the area after the fact.

As for the delay in firing air defenses by the Syrians, if they are firing haphazardly after the fact, as you say, this perfectly explains the delay. 10 minutes for the bombs to hit, another 1-2 minutes for the air defense batteries to start firing.

 

[Big_Zucchini]

Again I'm unsure what advantage it provides over a tracked Pantsyr. The Pantsyr can also be fully passive, and can definitely datalink with other systems. If the 57mm gun is such a must, why not produce a Land Forces Pantsyr-SV with a 57mm gun? Or merge the Derivatsiya with the Sosna if an all-IR system is that important?

In an ideal world, we'd have the known and tested digital architecture and components of the Pantsir utilized for a fully passive system to serve as a low tier tactical ADS.
But a lot of Russia's current acquisition policies are not exactly logic-driven. At least in the ground forces where you naturally have more main contractors.

It gets interesting. According to the summary you provided, the pro-Assad media agrees most closely with the ISI. But even the anti-Assad SOHR is missing the destroyed aircraft. This not so much highlights a pro-Assad bias in the media as much as it showcases the inherent unreliability of the reports in question. This has been my experience as well, which is why I prefer either photographic evidence, or confirmation from both sides, before definitively stating something.

And the only ones willing to provide photographic evidence for anything, are ISI, an Israeli company.

In this example, as in the last, the highly anti-Assad SOHR doesn't agree with the coalition version, and even cites large numbers of missile interce

I'm not going to give SOHR any shred of reliability. Their info collection is purely OSINT. I only added them for the extra perspective.
Before I proceed, ISI is a civilian satellite company that provides advanced solutions to different sectors like agriculture where analysis of long term aerial photographic data is useful.
As Israel doesn't admit it conducts strikes, it needs a 3rd party to provide footage that gives the psychological effect to these strikes, an important factor in the age of information. So back to where I was.

My point was that often Russia and Syria make seemingly arbitary claims independently, which explains why they're sometimes so different.
The only ones that provide visual evidence are Israel and occasionally the US when it conducts strikes.
Of course, a lot of the actions between all these state actors are the dynamics between states, who feel no need to convince the public of anything. Sometimes even intentionally keep things below radar.
But occasionally there comes a point where all sides make a claim, and one side happens to show a visual proof, and in those cases we see that the Russian and Syrian versions are just wrong.
And from many years of watching Russian news at home (yeah I'm Russian), I can tell BS when I hear it.
I don't even know why Russia feels compelled to back up Assad in his media's claims. It's a soft stance at a time when Russia needs to show strength, particularly against Iran that tries to snatch contracts from Russia.
My suspicion during the Il-20 downing was that behind the scenes Putin was furious at Assad.

Which brings me to my next point. Perhaps what we've seen is not a change in the Israeli pattern of strikes in Syria, but a turn in the Putin-Assad relationship. Until the Assad had free reign, but not anymore.
I think Russian air defense crews would be competent enough to avoid such incidents with ease, while SAA crews could not despite many years of combat.

Current Russian C4I centers even take data from an S-125 or an S-200? I suspect not without some serious work. But your point is well taken, Russian upgrades or "upgrades" to Syrian air defenses may be essentially insignificant for all practical purposes.

You're right. The comm protocols are entirely different, not to mention the raw data.
The claim was dubious and shrouded in PR. But in the end it turned out they shot themselves in the foot.

Yes but the level of expected resistance increases the amount of redundancy needed. We're arguing about whether the employment of Pantsyrs and Buk-M2Es is enough to cause a complication in mission planning and strike execution or not, with or without Russian involvement and/or assistance in the form of early warning.

With substantial jamming of the systems? Unlikely.
A typical sortie consists of a strike team that can defeat the given target, resist an air engagement, defeat local SAMs, with a few extras. If a significant amount of the deployed munitions is intercepted, a 2nd wave can be sent. But I've only heard of multiple waves when there's a significant amount of targets in a short time window.

This also favors a Pantsyr over a Tor, as it can operate without radar. Complete passive mode.

Yeah but Iran doesn't have many Pantsirs to spare. They're also more valuable to them than Tors. Any buy of Pantsirs would take time and would be visible to Israeli intelligence.

Just so I understand correctly, the difference between vers. 2 and 3 here consists of a discrepancy in the departure time after the downing?

Not only. Version 2 shows a route of arrival, drop, and retreat. Version 3 shows a route of circling, for about an hour. There's a difference in timing as well.
Particularly weird to make such serious errors yet pinpoint the identity of the munitions as something very low RCS as an SDB.

Where and under what circumstances were the two differing versions presented

I do not remember. I only remember seeing both versions presented factually on Russian TV.

I also notice that 2240 and 2140 hours are awfully similar numbers. Is it possible that we're dealing with a transcription error somewhere along the chain of press statements?

Hardly. That one was presented as is by Shoigu. Even if there was a typo, someone would be quick to correct it.

Nothing you provided materially refutes these claims. Nor has Israel explicitly denied any of these specific points, at least as far as I can tell.

In the article on TheWarZone that I linked, there's a restoration of the IDF's full chain of tweets where they deny Russia's accusations.

At the end of the day it doesn't matter how long Israeli aircraft spent in the area after the fact.

I think it does matter. Israel's version is that its aircraft have long left the area before Syrian air defenses started firing. That means they could not have been near the Il-20.

 

[Feanor]

It appears that Turkey is gearing up for an offensive in Syria, against the Kurdish town of Ayn-Issa. The town was previously covered by the presence of a SAA force, but that force has since withdrawn. Overtures were made by the Syrian government to the Kurds to hand the town over to full SAA control. When they failed to reach such an agreement, the SAA withdrew, and now the Kurds are left to face the Turks by themselves. This is a delayed continuation of the Russo-Syrian strategy of putting the Kurds between the Syrians and the Turks. It's important to note that Russian LP/OPs are still in the area. This may prevent a full offensive, but it's not clear. In the reverse scenario the SAA was able to push the rebels back while ignoring Turkish LP/OPs in Idlib area.

To me this entire strategy is aimed at separating the Kurds from their US backers and forcing them to make deeper and more meaningful deals with the Assad government. However so far it has been unsuccessful as the Kurds have chosen over and over again to lose ground and lives, rather then make this deal. It seems strange to me, given the high cost and non-existent pay off of their current course, but perhaps there's something I'm missing. Either way, if they continue like this, the Turks will continue to gain ground (and eventually lose ground to the Syrians as they did dramatically in Idlib). And I suspect Russia even prefers the Turkish backed rebels as neighbors over US-backed Kurds.

Бои под Айн-Исса. 18.12.2020

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colonelcassad.livejournal.com

Айн Исса. Накануне больших событий

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colonelcassad.livejournal.com

 

[swerve]

Perhaps they distrust Assad too much. Or maybe it's Assad who's making sure that the terms are unacceptable to the Kurds, to set them up for being beaten up.

 

[Feanor]

Perhaps they distrust Assad too much. Or maybe it's Assad who's making sure that the terms are unacceptable to the Kurds, to set them up for being beaten up.

I'm sure both of those are factors but I'm having a hard time imagining what kind of terms are worse then getting overrun by the Turks and their proxies. And I'm also not sure what the point of making terms is in the first place if the only goal Russia or Assad have is to feed the Kurds to the Turks.

 

[swerve]

Image. Not wanting to be seen to openly feed them to the Turks. Assad is certainly that duplicitous, though often clumsily.

 

[2007yellow430]

As a citizen without a lot of military tech, I’m astounded that we’d abandon allied troops like this. At a minimum we should have evacuated them. This will not end well, I suspect.

Art

 

[Big_Zucchini]

As a citizen without a lot of military tech, I’m astounded that we’d abandon allied troops like this. At a minimum we should have evacuated them. This will not end well, I suspect.

Art

The Kurds have been an ally to the US, but the Turks are a league higher in that regard. As sad as it is to abandon people whom the US supported on more moral grounds (but definitely political first), going against Turkey would be a bad idea and I'll explain why.

At the moment, Turkey is a semi hostile ally within NATO. But this hostility is political. The west may try to be pantient until a leadership changes in Turkey, which may turn things back to where they were.
To allow this, the conflict between Turkey and the US needs to be a political one only, and remain relatively simple.
If the US backs the Kurds, it may alienate any anti-Erdogan, pro-west people in Turkish politics.

 

[swerve]

As a citizen without a lot of military tech, I’m astounded that we’d abandon allied troops like this. At a minimum we should have evacuated them. This will not end well, I suspect.

Art

They're not just an army. They're a people. There are a couple of million of them in Syria, & a lot more in Iraq, Iran & Turkey.

 

[ngatimozart]

They're not just an army. They're a people. There are a couple of million of them in Syria, & a lot more in Iraq, Iran & Turkey.

Yes and it serves Syrian, Iraqi, Iranian, and Turkish national interests that their Kurdish populations political interests be kept in check and subjugated. They all don't want a Kurdish Free State to form because that will create agitation from their own Kurdish subjects for independence.

 

[Feanor]

Image. Not wanting to be seen to openly feed them to the Turks. Assad is certainly that duplicitous, though often clumsily.

It's possible but I still have a sneaking suspicion there's more then that to it. It has to be a better deal to have the Kurds recognize Assad's sovereignty over them, then to have the Turks take over the area. And in a post-ISIS Syria the Turks remain a major threat, meaning that having Kurdish allies or vassals if you will, opens up additional options for both pushing back against the Turks and having motivated forces of your own to fight against the Turks and their proxies. To me it seems quite logical to offer the Kurds a decent deal to rejoin Syria. If rebel fighter who actively fought against Assad can be reintegrated, doing the same for the Kurds has to be doable.

 

[ngatimozart]

About 6 months ago, the Italians confiscated 84,000 tablets of Captagon, a methamphetamine used by jihadists to give themselves "courage". The bust is valued at €1 billion, which is a huge hit on any drug operation. I think some people will have paid with their lives for this.

Italian police seize record amount of amphetamines shipped from Syria

Italian police said on Wednesday they had seized about 14 tonnes of amphetamine pills worth around 1 billion euros ($1 billion) arriving from Syria, in what they described as the world's single largest operation of its kind.

mobile.reuters.com

At the time media claims were that it was Daesh making it and selling it, however it is now suggested that Assad is the drug king. He will not take this failure very well, because it's desperately needed foreign currency.

Captagon: Destroying the frontline drug

The BBC gains access to an operation to destroy millions of pills of an amphetamine made in Syria.

www.bbc.com

 

[swerve]

Yes and it serves Syrian, Iraqi, Iranian, and Turkish national interests that their Kurdish populations political interests be kept in check and subjugated. They all don't want a Kurdish Free State to form because that will create agitation from their own Kurdish subjects for independence.

True, but I was addressing the proposition that they should have been evacuated. As well as apparently being based on the false premise of the Kurds in Syria being just an army, it would serve the purposes of their enemies to evacuate them. The fewer Kurds in the region the better, as far as the governments of Syria, Turkey, Iraq & Iran are concerned. Though industrialisation & urbanisation are already moving Kurds out of their homeland en masse, e.g. to Istanbul, which I think has more Kurds than any city in Kurdistan - or than all of Syria.