Question
Did the Captain of the Chinese ship make the decision to get that close or was it a directive from higher up?
We could speculate that answer but I would not be surprised if it happens again.
Safe sailing
Regards S
South China Sea thoughts?
- Thread starter SpartanSG
- Start date
Did the Captain of the Chinese ship make the decision to get that close or was it a directive from higher up?
We could speculate that answer but I would not be surprised if it happens again.
Safe sailing
Regards S
I would suggest that it came from well above his pay grade. Their system is very strong on the concept of central control and I think that they have political officers in all units too. If that is the case, I don't know how much control those political officers have over unit command chains. We know that Beijing are not happy with Trump and his pronouncements at the moment and we also know that Beijing doesn't like being told that they can't do something. Apparently at the latest Pacific Forum meeting in Nauru, the Chinese delegation leader spat the dummy, chucked all his toys out of his cot and stormed out when the Forum Chair put him in his place. The delegation were only there as observers, not participants and must have thought that they could prevent criticism of China or something, or tried to speak at the meetings when they weren't allowed to. Didn't work.
John Fedup
The Bunker Group
Good thing the Decatur had a competent watch crew at the time.
I really don't have motive, the truth is I've seen bias in both sino and foreign forum on ScS. as 2nd gen, American-chinese I try to educate my self on this topic, the more I read about it, the more detail and complicate it become. I do belief china want the ScS resource, island(man made or not), and more influence compare to US but not necessarily entire ScS as its territory, of course if US is not there, they might push for more. Same is true for ROC/PRC issue. The best ASEAN can do is play neutral in this and get deals from both. UNCLOS and such give rule of guidance, but not necessary the detail to solve individual case, and UN certainly wont get involved with territory dispute. china has no problem point to US wrong doing and say US didn't follow rules before and its non-signatory of UNCLOS etc.
I just read NYtime, International Court Orders U.S. to Ease Some Iran Sanctions. These kind things give china excuses not to follow the rules, where they consider Might is right. Also, other claim party such as Vietnam/ROC/malaysia etc etc, is not 100% right, you could argue their claim is more legit than China, but there is not solid evidence to indicate absolutely 100% legit. In the end China been more powerful, they will have the resource to push their agenda. From China perspective they don't see US as rule obey, keep the sea secure etc, they see US using its force to project its interest globally, and punish those who is not friendly with US, especially after Trump was elected.
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Playing devils advocate here, you're only reading the US side of the story, who is to say that it wasn't the US who was being the agressor, where is the independant source who can confirm who made the first move. Under the current US administration who knows what is truth and what is fake news.
John Fedup
The Bunker Group
I'm sure Donald knows.
Coming from a science background I read critically so am aware of most the pitfalls and biases. Given the current US administration I tend to treat some of their statements with extra caution, depending on who makes the statement. Generally I don't like the mainstream US media because I think that it is dumbed down, to be honest. I prefer the UK and European media and NZ media before it was owned by Murdoch and became US media clones and just as thick. I class Fox news about as reliable as RT or a cart load of pollies. I also treat the accuracy of the PRC media or official statements with quite a degree of caution, because in the past, like official Russian sources and media, they have been known to take large liberal liberties with the facts, and tend to inflict harm upon those of their citizens who question their versions of the story.
According to UNCLOS any reclaimed land are on shoals etc., are not legitimate territorial claims for 12 mile limits, EEZ or continental shelf claims. Also the PRC nine dashed line claims for the SCS are not accepted under the UNCLOS, which by the way the PRC has agreed to and ratified. So legally both ships were on the high seas in international waters. Secondly, IIRC the maritime rules of the road apply here and vessels must use all available means to determine the risk of a collision and undertake such actions necessary to avoid a collision. Now I don't doubt the USN upon this because usually they are a reliable source of information.
He may at that, but does it do us any good? I don't think so.I'm sure Donald knows.
True we don't know who instigated this close call of two large warships but if I was to guess I would suggest it was the PLAN.
Now are they the bad guys?
Well it's going to depend on who you ask; but the real concern for myself is the rapid military adjustment occurring in the region.
This brings uncertainty, and with it the potential for an incident like we are discussing rapidly escalating into something much uglier.
No doubt the respective ships captains have had instructions to Venture into or Guard the SCS ,depending on their respective governments wishes.
As to the future well I hope the CCP don't intend to test the waters to aggressively, but alas I feel we are at the start of a period of Chinese robust assertiveness, and that's not just against her smaller neighbours.
Sadly Stampede
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
In addition, the arbitration ruling from the UN's Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague determined in favour of the Philippines on the competing SCS EEZ claims between the Philippines and China (PRC), with the ruling also outlining what is required to have a valid EEZ claim under UNCLOS. I had previously posted about the ruling in this very thread back in May here. Again, the ruling specifically stated it was not making a determination on whether China (PRC) had any valid territorial claims to rocks and/or shoals in the SCS, as those features do not grant EEZ claims, which is what the whole arbitration case was about.
Further, the issue the US (and other countries it seems) has with the PRC claims in the SCS is that they are not 'just' EEZ claims, but that the PRC is also claiming control/sovereignty over the SCS. With Freedom of Navigation, vessels are able to be in/transit through international waters freely which is everywhere further than the 12 n mile limit from the land/coastline of a nation, excepting for areas where there are agreed reductions because more than one nation is within 12 n miles of an area or sea lane. The Straits of Dover is a classic example, as that strait is only ~21 n miles across between the UK and France. What has been getting reported in a number of the news sources I use from different nations, is that the PRC has been insisting that the US (and presumably other nations' navies) get permission before having a USN warship enter or transit the SCS.
It is of course right that a nation request permission before entering the territorial waters (12 n mile limit) of another nation, and when making a port of call. To insist requesting permission for areas outside of the agreed upon 12 n mile limit, is to attempt to have others recognize claims of sovereignty, since if one has to request permission to sail in a given area, then one can also be denied permission to do so. So far, nothing I have come across has suggested that the PRC is 'only' claiming sovereignty or areas that are within 12 n miles of the various rocks and shoals they have claimed and modified/constructed on.
An article that original appeared in a USNI Proceedings journal / magazine, that has been reposted by the ANI.
Wheat’s role in Russian naval power
The article by Friedman discusses the impact that WW1 had on Russia and how it pertains to the SCS. Prior to the start of WW1 Russia was the worlds largest exporter of wheat, with most of this wheat being bulk shipped from Black Sea ports through the Bosphorus Straits and eventually into the Aegean Sea and beyond. When the Ottoman Empire entered the war on the Central Powers side, this immediately closed the Bosphorus Straits to the Russian wheat bulk shipping, which Friedman argues turned WW1 into a maritime war, rather than what is commonly believed, a land war. Because Russia had the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires to it's west and south west preventing land access as well as the Ottoman Empire strangling it's sea access to it's wheat markets, Russia was beginning to run out of money and was forced to borrow off Britain, who in turn had to borrow off the US, which soured relations between the US & the UK. So the idea of forcing a way through the Dardanelles to reopen the Russian southern SLOC was attempted with disastrous results for the western allies and Russia.
I have a great uncle buried somewhere on Chunuk Bair, Gallipoli Peninsula, Turkey; just one of 600 Auckland Mounted Rifles killed in 3 days and who lie in unknown graves. Many families across the world have lost relatives in that war, so we all tend to focus on the land side of it. Until I read Friedman's article, I had always thought of the Great War as a land war fought in the mud of the trenches with any naval action as basically a sideshow compared to what happened in the trenches. However when I read Friedman's article it did cause me to think and I do suspect that he is right. You hear me banging on about Kiwis being seablind and I think this illustrates what maritime war really is. Like Friedman says, it's not about fleets banging away at each other - which is important, but denying the enemy the ability to move their trade, especially bulk products which cannot easily or efficiently be moved by land, across the sea as exports or as imports. Ipso facto it's all about about SLOC - pure and simple.
So the Russian loss of its SLOC eventually cost it the war, by forcing massive social upheaval in the motherland and it ended up suing for peace with Germany. Friedman suggests that the British thought it less dangerous to mount the Dardanelles campaign than put the price of bread up in the UK. The German use of U boats caused serious losses to British shipping and had the potential to blockade the British Isle. In WW2 the Kreigsmarine U boat fleet very nearly won the Battle of the Atlantic and cut off the British Isles from North America. If it wasn't for Ultra and Doenitz's insistence on sighting and daily reports, the U boats may have won that battle. In the Pacific after a shaky start (dud torpedoes) the USN submarine fleet decimated the Japanese merchant fleet. So in the end whilst the British and allies won the Battle of the Atlantic, it was a close run thing. By 1945 the Japanese were receiving very little supplies from their conquered territories, especially oil, because their SLOC were strangled.
If you look at the SCS, there are a nice set of choke points, and with Beijing highly dependent upon the SCS for both its burgeoning export trade and especially imported energy, it's SLOC through the SCS are extremely important to it. IMHO, Friedman's article asks the question are the PRC actions in the SCS about the resources there? Or does Beijing see securing it's SLOC through the SCS as being the far higher priority and the resource issue is a nice smokescreen? So IMHO the SCS controversy is not about resources but about securing SLOC above all else. Whether the PRC will be successful in this is another story.
Wheat’s role in Russian naval power
The article by Friedman discusses the impact that WW1 had on Russia and how it pertains to the SCS. Prior to the start of WW1 Russia was the worlds largest exporter of wheat, with most of this wheat being bulk shipped from Black Sea ports through the Bosphorus Straits and eventually into the Aegean Sea and beyond. When the Ottoman Empire entered the war on the Central Powers side, this immediately closed the Bosphorus Straits to the Russian wheat bulk shipping, which Friedman argues turned WW1 into a maritime war, rather than what is commonly believed, a land war. Because Russia had the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires to it's west and south west preventing land access as well as the Ottoman Empire strangling it's sea access to it's wheat markets, Russia was beginning to run out of money and was forced to borrow off Britain, who in turn had to borrow off the US, which soured relations between the US & the UK. So the idea of forcing a way through the Dardanelles to reopen the Russian southern SLOC was attempted with disastrous results for the western allies and Russia.
I have a great uncle buried somewhere on Chunuk Bair, Gallipoli Peninsula, Turkey; just one of 600 Auckland Mounted Rifles killed in 3 days and who lie in unknown graves. Many families across the world have lost relatives in that war, so we all tend to focus on the land side of it. Until I read Friedman's article, I had always thought of the Great War as a land war fought in the mud of the trenches with any naval action as basically a sideshow compared to what happened in the trenches. However when I read Friedman's article it did cause me to think and I do suspect that he is right. You hear me banging on about Kiwis being seablind and I think this illustrates what maritime war really is. Like Friedman says, it's not about fleets banging away at each other - which is important, but denying the enemy the ability to move their trade, especially bulk products which cannot easily or efficiently be moved by land, across the sea as exports or as imports. Ipso facto it's all about about SLOC - pure and simple.
So the Russian loss of its SLOC eventually cost it the war, by forcing massive social upheaval in the motherland and it ended up suing for peace with Germany. Friedman suggests that the British thought it less dangerous to mount the Dardanelles campaign than put the price of bread up in the UK. The German use of U boats caused serious losses to British shipping and had the potential to blockade the British Isle. In WW2 the Kreigsmarine U boat fleet very nearly won the Battle of the Atlantic and cut off the British Isles from North America. If it wasn't for Ultra and Doenitz's insistence on sighting and daily reports, the U boats may have won that battle. In the Pacific after a shaky start (dud torpedoes) the USN submarine fleet decimated the Japanese merchant fleet. So in the end whilst the British and allies won the Battle of the Atlantic, it was a close run thing. By 1945 the Japanese were receiving very little supplies from their conquered territories, especially oil, because their SLOC were strangled.
If you look at the SCS, there are a nice set of choke points, and with Beijing highly dependent upon the SCS for both its burgeoning export trade and especially imported energy, it's SLOC through the SCS are extremely important to it. IMHO, Friedman's article asks the question are the PRC actions in the SCS about the resources there? Or does Beijing see securing it's SLOC through the SCS as being the far higher priority and the resource issue is a nice smokescreen? So IMHO the SCS controversy is not about resources but about securing SLOC above all else. Whether the PRC will be successful in this is another story.
Ananda
The Bunker Group
As you compared SCS with Black Sea..here's some thought of mine on that..
If we go back to USSR time..The Sovyet perhaps has controlled most of the shores in black sea through it's own territory and Warsaw Pact countries shores.
Thus by conventional thinking terms, the Soviet control the Black Sea..
However in reality is not that simple since the only country with shores on Black Sea but not under USSR or Warsaw Pact...is also the one that control the entrences to Black Sea..
As NATO members, Turkey with NATO can choke black sea that can make the Soviet ability to exploited their dominance on Black Sea near to meaningless on term of trade route or as supply route to USSR friendly states in Middle East or North Africa.
SCS geographic is not that similar than Black Sea, but one thing in similarism is that even if China can dominate SCS through to it's artificial bases..the entry to SCS is not under China's control..
For once, The Natuna Islands basically sit in the entrences of China Sea..and with it's possition..if significant forces operate there as opposite of China..it can close the gateway to SCS.
Natuna islands for SCS standard is not small..Natuna main island is the largest natural island in SCS, and it's larger in land area compared to Singapore. Thus if needed, significant military bases can be put there.
That's what Jakarta's understand..and that's why Indonesian begin to upgrade bases in Natuna. It will not be as fast or as massive in scales of China building it's artificial islands bases or in Hainan..
However even at this point Natuna AB already able to operate one squadron of Fighter there. Indonesian AF also regularly already put one flight of Fighters operating on that AB.
Again it's not in the scale of China can do in their artificial bases 'yet'..still just like Turkey was not in the par of military as USSR..but they can get NATO reinforce them.
Indonesia now is neutral party..but I think China knows that if they push Indonesia on the SCS gate way (Natuna Islands), potential Indonesia get assistance from third parties is there.
And China is far from dominating much of SCS as USSR did on Black Sea.
My point is, as in the end USSR has to make compromise with Turkey thus NATO on Black Sea..due to the strategic entrences is not in their control. China will also seek in my opinion compromise on SCS in the end..cause for one thing..they don't control the entrences to SCS.
If we go back to USSR time..The Sovyet perhaps has controlled most of the shores in black sea through it's own territory and Warsaw Pact countries shores.
Thus by conventional thinking terms, the Soviet control the Black Sea..
However in reality is not that simple since the only country with shores on Black Sea but not under USSR or Warsaw Pact...is also the one that control the entrences to Black Sea..
As NATO members, Turkey with NATO can choke black sea that can make the Soviet ability to exploited their dominance on Black Sea near to meaningless on term of trade route or as supply route to USSR friendly states in Middle East or North Africa.
SCS geographic is not that similar than Black Sea, but one thing in similarism is that even if China can dominate SCS through to it's artificial bases..the entry to SCS is not under China's control..
For once, The Natuna Islands basically sit in the entrences of China Sea..and with it's possition..if significant forces operate there as opposite of China..it can close the gateway to SCS.
Natuna islands for SCS standard is not small..Natuna main island is the largest natural island in SCS, and it's larger in land area compared to Singapore. Thus if needed, significant military bases can be put there.
That's what Jakarta's understand..and that's why Indonesian begin to upgrade bases in Natuna. It will not be as fast or as massive in scales of China building it's artificial islands bases or in Hainan..
However even at this point Natuna AB already able to operate one squadron of Fighter there. Indonesian AF also regularly already put one flight of Fighters operating on that AB.
Again it's not in the scale of China can do in their artificial bases 'yet'..still just like Turkey was not in the par of military as USSR..but they can get NATO reinforce them.
Indonesia now is neutral party..but I think China knows that if they push Indonesia on the SCS gate way (Natuna Islands), potential Indonesia get assistance from third parties is there.
And China is far from dominating much of SCS as USSR did on Black Sea.
My point is, as in the end USSR has to make compromise with Turkey thus NATO on Black Sea..due to the strategic entrences is not in their control. China will also seek in my opinion compromise on SCS in the end..cause for one thing..they don't control the entrences to SCS.
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John Fedup
The Bunker Group
Turkey's control of the Dardanelles is critical but whether it is in support of NATO or Russia is an open question with Erdogan in charge. Even if he was sympathetic with NATO in opposing potential Russian aggression against one of the Baltic states, I don't think Turkey would be the only member worried about invoking Article 5.
Ananda
The Bunker Group
Well I put the comparison of Black Sea condition on cold war era..with SCS on present.
Erdogan is not in Turkey calculation in Cold War era..
Point I'm taking..even in Cold War era..with USSR dominance on most of Black Sea..they still have to make compromise due to the Black Sea entrences is not in their control.
Similar thing on SCS..China in the end will have to make compromise..as the entrences is not under their control..and China presently in SCS in comparison to USSR on Black Sea in cold war..is not in control of much of SCS yet..
This whole thing in my opinion is part of preliminary game on how to jockying for compromise term in the end.
Erdogan is not in Turkey calculation in Cold War era..
Point I'm taking..even in Cold War era..with USSR dominance on most of Black Sea..they still have to make compromise due to the Black Sea entrences is not in their control.
Similar thing on SCS..China in the end will have to make compromise..as the entrences is not under their control..and China presently in SCS in comparison to USSR on Black Sea in cold war..is not in control of much of SCS yet..
This whole thing in my opinion is part of preliminary game on how to jockying for compromise term in the end.
John Fedup
The Bunker Group
Fair enough. Hopefully there are no mis-steps by any of the players in the SCS.
I don't think that's a particularly realistic scenario, given the complete lack of significant Russian buildup across from the Baltics. The most they've done is strengthened their enclave in Kaliningrad, and that only makes sense, given how vulnerable it is. Realistically their forces there are still rather weak compared to say, neighboring Poland. And while Turkey has its problems with the US and the EU, I strongly doubt they would ever seriously back Russia against them in an open military confrontation. It would just be too hopeless.
If you're right, it means that China is both vulnerable and highly motivated to seize control, and opposing them in this becomes very dangerous. In fact, all things considered, unless one is intentionally hoping for US hegemony over China, it might be better for strategic balance globally if China had safe shipping routes that it could protect independently.
Todjaeger
Potstirrer
Part of the issue as I see it, is that the strategic efforts the PRC is engaged with in the SCS is not just about providing safe SLOC between the PRC and the Mideast/Africa/Europe. I say this for a few reasons.
The first is that those same SLOC can be cut prior to entering the SCS when shipping has to pass through the various channels between the islands of Malaysia and Indonesia. Short of the PRC seizing control of land within either Malaysia or Indonesia, the PRC lacks a way to ensure that their SLOC into the SCS remain open.
The second is that of the countries which are bordered by and have EEZ claims within the SCS, none of them individually could realistically threaten PRC power or shipping within the SCS. I also suspect that even if the nations worked together, they would be unequal to the task of defeating the PLAN should it deploy to the SCS en masse, and that is assuming the nations would and could cooperate...
Rather, I see the PRC efforts within the SCS basin as attempting to accomplish four overall goals. The first is to protect the PRCS SLOC, at least within just the SCS area. The second is to secure what additional EEZ resources can be exploited for use by the PRC. The third is to enable the PRC to influence and/or close the SLOC which pass through the SCS between other nations, especially potential competitors for trade and resources like S. Korea and Japan. The fourth effort I see as a form of nationalistic or perhaps cultural imperialism which seeks to re-impose Chinese suzerainty over the region.
Some good thoughts.
I would come down on the side of China securing its SLOC in the SCS as one of two main ambitions.The other is a show of military posturing to add political sway to her near maritime neighbours. ( The umbrella of influence,fear,and maybe reward ).
The SCS resources will be in the mix, but I would not assume they are the main priority.
Just my opinion
Regards S
During President Jokowi’s visit to Natuna Islands he restated that in 1996 China recognised Natuna’s waters as Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Since China has declared to refusal to accept the ruling of the Permanent Court Arbitration, Indonesia is looking at further legal and policy frameworks to implementing its sovereign rights over its EEZ in Natuna Islands, which include the base upgrade.
In the event that these countries decide to unite in order to meet a common threat; it would only be because the U.S. has fully entered the picture and has promised full support. Without U.S. support; these countries would never band together to conduct military ops. Yes no doubt, the combined efforts of Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines would not deter the Chinese, nor would they be able to defeat the Chinese but there is also the question of how much hardware the Chinese would be willing to pour in the area given that they'll also need reserves in case of possible U.S. involvement and will also be on standby in case of any moves made by Japan further north.
Hanging over everything is just how far the U.S. is willing to go? A conflict in the South China Sea would probably see the U.S. prevail but at what cost and what comes after that? As the old cliche says : 'history always repeats itself'. A few decades ago the U.S. was very undecided as to how to deal with China over the Korean issue and with the communist victory on the mainland. It's priority was Europe and its worry was being dragged into a full scale war with China over Korea. The Europeans were very worried as they saw the U.S. being distracted in Asia. Following Chinese intervention in Korea, there were some in the Truman administration who were even willing to abandon Korea. Another worry was that events in Taiwan [by the Nationalists who were determined on retaking the mainland] would drag the U.S. into a war with China; the Soviets having no choice but to join in. At the same period the U.S. was also supporting Tibetan resistance groups in the form a training and dropping them into Tibet. Fast forward several decades later, the U.S. and China are still at odds.
To the Chinese; what they're doing it only to be expected given its new status as a world power. The see it as their right. They're only doing now what in the past they were unable to do. To them, outside powers which object are only being hypocritical given their past track record and that as outside powers, they have no business interfering in issues China has with other countries; in an area the Chinese consider their backyard. over matter concerning Chinese ''sovereignty''.
The priority no doubt is securing its SLOC to and from the Middle East. A major nightmare from a Chinese perspective is how vulnerable its SLOCs are; not only from interdiction by the U.S. but also from other countries. The presence of oil/gas fields in the Spratlys also plays a major part. China has great need for a new oil/gas source. It's action in the Spratlys are also intended to send the message that China is a power not to be trifled with and also intended to drive a wedge between the U.S. and the various South East Asian countries; as well as Japan which the Chinese view as an obedient ally/lackey of the U.S. which would be acting differently were it not due to U.S. backing.
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