Russia - General Discussion.

Well you are not the first time that saying anyone critical to Western data and believe is anti west bias.
Did I say or imply that? No - I didn’t. Attributing things to me I never said or implied doesn’t help your case, and it makes it hard to take the rest seriously - especially when pushback leads straight to emotional and ad hominem responses.

I’ll put you on ignore now. This isn’t a sound or sober exchange.
 
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Ananda

The Bunker Group
said it was from the Central Propaganda Department of the CCP. That’s just their name, don’t blame me.
So, it is still an article on what they are trading and what they are trading coming from real trade data. It is better then Bank of Finland data, that not have real first hand data on Russia Economy. Especially what Russia now trading with their trade partners.

I also put you on ingnore list, the second one on my history in this forum. Clearly bias western superiority complex person like the first one.
 
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Russia is increasingly capable of producing key military components domestically, according to The Economist.

The Economist said:
There are still constraints on Russian industry. Last year the country relied on North Korea to provide a significant proportion of artillery ammunition used in Ukraine; those stocks are not limitless. Key inputs to the artillery supply chain—chromite for barrels and cotton cellulose for propellant—still have to be imported, according to research by the Open Source Centre and the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in London. But Russia is now able to produce some important components at home.

“In principle, there would seem to be no reason why this mobilised defence effort cannot be maintained for quite a long period of time,” writes Mr Cooper, in a recent study for the RUSI Journal which surveys many of the facilities discussed above. “It is not without irony,” concludes Mr Cooper, “that advanced Western economies may now find the need to look closely at Russia to understand how to adapt.”
 
The fact that Russia's GDP could be falling is even more significant when you consider that most of its post-invasion GDP growth has come from war-related sectors, according to the Bank of Finland.
CSIS making similar claims:
CSIS said:
This results in dislocated growth—production of everything defense-related is rising, while the rest of the economy is nearly stagnating.

Higher productivity could have partly resolved the workforce problem. However, that would have required a technological breakthrough, which has been thwarted by the continued and tightening restrictions on technological exports to Russia.
https://www.csis.org/analysis/down-not-out-russian-economy-under-western-sanctions
 

Ananda

The Bunker Group

Matter of commodities export is the main factor on Russia Economy growth slow down. The war expenditure still growing and clearly the slow down of Russia Economy is not due to MIC production factor.

Russia Economy growth still dominate by their energy industry growth. Slow down in export market due to global trade war matter more. MIC Defense production is big factor, but not the biggest one. Something that being put by Western think tank and sources as missleading bias assessment.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Simple Googling can shown IMF data (which IMF taken from all Russian trade) indicating they are growing not from War Production as some in Western claim.
Do you mind sharing this data and providing some explanation of how this conclusion is derived from the data? I'll be honest, my economic knowledge is limited, so it would be interesting to see the connection. On a side note, does World Bank data show a similar picture?
 

Ananda

The Bunker Group
you mind sharing this data and providing some explanation of how this conclusion is derived from the data?
Let me give public data link from this site, as it is quite user friendly.


They are using mostly data from World Bank, but if go to IMF public data base it will shown around the same. Some statistical differences mostly due to data round up.

The GDP by sectors shown mining (commodities), manufacturing, constructions (infrastructure), public administration (Goverment Spending) and agriculture as main GDP sectors. Defense related are coming from public administration. You can click each sector and shown the trend. The War already increase significantly the government spending related to defense.

The detail trade data (at least on open source) ussualy bit laging. The overall can shown 2024, but details trend usually lag a year.


.

The GDP and trade data shown commodities still the main factor of growth. They are the main export that provide forex sources to Russia.


The consumer data shown after decline in early years of war (22) it is rebounding as big part of overall economies. See the amount of consumer spending and compare it to total GDP. Basically they make around 50% of GDP.

Thus the commodities, consumer spending and war/defense rated spending shown (as I mention before) are three main factors that Drive Russia GDP. War spending but also consumer spending increase manufacturing and trade import data (especially from China) shown capital goods import that can be use both for defense manufacturing but also consumption especially as import substitution manufacturing.

Still the commodities that provide the fuel for financing the import and Investment. Thus those three sectors are main sectors responsible for Russian GDP growth. Assesment that only put war related sector as the main growth engine really give missleading one. Thus in my book that kind of conclusion especially after see who make it, clearly political bias in nature.
 
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Somewhat related: Meduza claims (citing CMASF) there has been no industrial, non-military growth since 2023, and that private-sector investment is nearing stagnation. I can’t verify the primary source myself, as my Russian is rudimentary, but I’ll attach it as well.

meduza said:
At the same time, Russia’s civilian industries have not seen comparable growth. The picture is far less rosy when excluding the sectors with a “significant military-industrial presence” from Rosstat’s data. Analysts at the government-affiliated Center for Macroeconomic Analysis and Short-Term Forecasting concluded that non-military industrial production has stagnated since mid-2023. The center also found that private-sector investment activity is “close to stagnation.”

 
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So I dug a bit deeper into the report, because I think it's interesting to see how the economy is evaluated from inside Russia. ЦМАКП, while maybe not independent in the Western sense, is as far as I can tell considered reputable within Russia for macroeconomic analysis.

They state that: while headline indicators like GDP and unemployment look good, the underlying economy - particularly the civilian and private sectors - is stagnating, with growing structural risks.

Quick summary:
- GDP growth is driven by base effects and non-productive sectors.
- Industrial production outside defense is stagnant.
- Private investment and consumption are stalling.
- Inflation hits the poor hardest.
- High interest rates and a credit crunch are choking investment.
- Risk of widespread corporate bankruptcies is rising.
- Some positives remain: record-low unemployment and modest wage growth in high-demand sectors.

Relevant quotes:
I used automatic translation for most of this, so if any Russian speaker here can check whether the translations are fair, I'd really appreciate it.

Real productive growth has nearly stopped, despite reported GDP growth:
"Прирост ВВП оценивается в 3.8–4.0% [...] Однако, формально, высокие темпы роста ВВП затеняют тот факт, что по сути реальная производственная активность в экономике увеличиваться почти перестала."
→ "GDP growth is estimated at 3.8–4.0% [...] However, high headline growth rates obscure the fact that real productive activity in the economy has nearly stopped increasing."
Industrial growth is concentrated in defense-related sectors - civilian output has stagnated:
"Если же рассмотреть объем промышленного производства без учета секторов с ощутимым присутствием ОПК, следует констатировать, что стагнация наблюдается с середины 2023 г."
→ "Excluding sectors with significant military-industrial presence, stagnation has been observed since mid-2023."
Private sector investment is weak and close to stagnation:
"Текущая инвестиционная активность частного бизнеса, судя по косвенным признакам, близка к стагнационной."
→ "Current investment activity of private business, judging by indirect signs, is close to stagnation."
Inflation is structurally regressive, hitting the poor hardest:
"Рост цен по корзине «для бедных» существенно выше общего уровня инфляции."
→ "Price increases for the 'basket for the poor' are significantly higher than the overall inflation rate."
A wave of corporate bankruptcies is likely due to high debt costs:
"Российская экономика стоит перед угрозой масштабного скачка корпоративных банкротств."
→ "The Russian economy faces the threat of a large-scale surge in corporate bankruptcies."
The credit market is seizing up, limiting business investment:
"Произошло т.н. «кредитное сжатие» [...] выдачи новых банковских кредитов по наиболее значимым сегментам упали на 30–50%."
→ "A so-called ‘credit crunch’ occurred [...] loan issuance in key segments fell by 30–50%."
Unemployment is at a record low:
"Уровень безработицы в октябре-ноябре снизился до рекордно низких 2.3%."
→ "The unemployment rate in October–November declined to a record-low 2.3%."
There is still some wage growth in sectors with labor shortages:
"Сохраняется медленный рост реальной заработной платы [...] Основным фактором роста выступает сохраняющийся дефицит (квалифицированного) труда."
→ "A slow increase in real wages continues [...] The main factor behind this growth is the ongoing shortage of (qualified) labor."
Monetary supply growth isn't fueling inflation (yet):
"Его динамика де-факто не создает инфляционного давления."
→ "Its dynamics do not create inflationary pressure in practice."
Non-food consumer price inflation is moderate:
"Рост цен на непродовольственные товары [...] существенно ниже (+0.81% за декабрь, +6.12% в годовом выражении)."
→ "Price growth for non-food products was significantly lower (+0.81% in December, +6.12% year-on-year)."
 
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