Thanks guys. All great points. I have to disagree with you on a few of them.
After nearly two years living in a compound with diplomats from all over the world, I’ve been amazed at how behind the scenes each nation strives to enact their own foreign policy on the ground despite their publicised alliances or enmities, and how industrial and corporate interests that are nationless in origin are often at odds with the narratives that states publicly espouse. The reality is far more complicated than any simplified USA/China/Russia trinary of allegiance. That is especially noticeable here in the ASEAN security context, where any ‘strategic alliance’ is always trumped by contemporary tactical needs.
As far as FMS goes, didn’t we go our own way with the P3K2 upgrades for the very reason that our needs differed? It’s a shame they didn’t let us on-sell that capability, especially given how much we invested in that process.
The ex-Nimrod pilot I met at the Singapore Airshow told me that there was a lot of anger in the UK over the P8 purchase, when is was discovered they would not be able to incorporate their own technology in the platform. They had been expecting a similar deal that the Indians got with the P8I, but that was a once off to get the first export customer over the line, and was not repeated. They were all behind the P-1 which would have seen a partnership between Kawasaki, Toshiba, BAE and Leonardo.
After more discussion, apparently the 1980’s revamp of the FMS system under Reagan was done to ensure that the customer nations through-life costs were spent via the OEM, rather than invested back into the customers economy through local industry. It also stripped away the clauses that originally formed the exigence for the whole process: ie: preventing regional arms races in developing nations, and preventing them from military spending at the cost of their own development. The original 1961 version of the DSCA Act states: “If the United States finds that any economically less developed country is diverting development assistance to military expenditures, or is diverting its own resources to unnecessary military expenditures, to a degree which materially interferes with its development, such country shall be immediately ineligible for further sales and guarantees until the United States is assured that such diversion will no longer take place.”
This was obviously not compatible with the new wave of neoliberalism, and the US is most certainly now happy to sell weaponry to nations that shouldn’t be buying it. In many ways this is to pushback against Chinese influence, but the Chinese have aced it with their ‘Belt and Road’ initiative, which even NZ has signed up to.
The US is happy to enact FMS deals with nations that are as far away from the ideology of ‘our’ western-generic ‘liberal and libertarian’ standards as you can get... Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, Philippines, Afghanistan, the usual African and Asian array of despots and gangsters, many of whom are highly likely to use it against their own population, so there can be no credence that it exists to stop weaponry falling into ‘the wrong hands’, unless your measurement of success is supporting corporate freedom of action over personal freedom from their action, which has been the mainstay of US foreign policy since the 80’s. Remember the Afghan commander who openly had a young underage boy chained to his bed as a sex slave? He was firmly on our Christmas card list as they trained and armed his personal garrison. When a US soldier refused to work with him he was booted out of the service in short order. You know, the whole pan-Central Asian ‘girls are for babies, boys are for fun’ concept... This is where the ‘foreign policy for domestic consumption’ comes into play. The standard forms of Bernaysian PR technique are used to shift the narrative to define who the ‘good and bad’ guys are in order to manufacture consent for action on behalf of those who lobby the politicians. The story is spun to support the sale of whoever they have the chance to sell to. If things had gone slightly different, and the Taliban were a ‘legitimate’ govt in Afghanistan, yet still behaved as they do now, the US would be selling them weapons if it strategically suited them to do so, and we wouldn’t be sending the SAS, we would be sending Fonterra salesmen. ‘Behaviour compatible with our public’s world view’ is currently not a factor in whether someone is ‘our’ enemy or ally... and hence our need for sovereign control over our defence force, it’s assets, and how they are deployed and for whose benefit, which is an issue that’s becoming harder and harder to suppress in the public narrative.
I wonder at what point does the advantages of a platforms physical characteristics out-way the need to buy the same platform as our contemporary allies, when interoperability comes through systems and communications as opposed the airframe itself? All of Saab’s systems are NATO compatible, including link-16/link-22 tactical datalinks and SATCOM. Saab’s AREXIS EW/EA and Sirius ELINT/COMINT systems are world-class and could be integrated into he platform on our own terms and operational rhythm as opposed to that of other nations. We need our MPA to fullfill the whole ISR spectrum immediately, not ten years after they reach FOC. Our defence partners have other airframes for that capability. We don’t have that luxury.
Anyway, kind of went off-track there... It’s great how articulate in your arguments some of you guys are. I love reading these posts, they always make me think, and remind me how complicated the world is.
Sorry for the rant
