Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates

[Wombat000]

With RAAF C-17s we could have another in theatre quite quickly anyway. As standard procedure the Fleet has been grounded awaiting an investigation. The RAN has operated 40 Seahawks since about 1990 and this is the first loss.

I do appreciate this. The RAN has an admirable record.
A long time ago I ventured at the apparent benefits of a Mk 13 launcher, at the time impressed that it had a relatively small footprint and a missile magazine to draw from.
I mention this because it was the consensus at the time essentially that it had a ‘single point of fail‘, so it was suboptimal to the unreloadable VLS.

A helicopter is a single point of fail.
A helicopter can fail from any one of a thousand parts, it’s efficiency of purpose does not make it more reliable.
Billions of dollars of HMAS Prestige is hanging on an ASW single point of fail, and will remain so until it’s replaced at some time of expedient convenience.
That exists today.

How many excuses do we really need to justify the lack of onboard ranged ASW love?

 

[Todjaeger]

IMO one of the reasons why theoretically acquiring VLA (ASROC) would make sense.

VL-ASROC would potentially extend the range of ship-launched LWT's from ~9 km out to ~22 km. A ship would still need to detect a potential sub contact out that far, which could certainly be problematic. As I understand it, the use of something like VL-ASROC would most likely involve firing upon a suspected sub detected by some other asset (like an ASW helicopter which had expended its own onboard ordnance) which was unable to engage. The other thing to keep in mind is that for every VLS cell occupied by a VL-ASROC, that is one less VLS cell available to be loaded with quad-packed ESSM, Standard SM-2/-6 missiles, or possibly even LACM.

With that in mind, I am rather ambivalent about the RAN adopting RUM-139 VL-ASROC. If there were more VLS cells fitted aboard RAN vessels, then having a few aboard each escort would provide an additional option. At present though, I suspect the opportunities for VL-ASROC to be used to only be in some specific scenarios which are not particularly likely in a conflict.

 

[ASSAIL]

I do appreciate this. The RAN has an admirable record.
A long time ago I ventured at the apparent benefits of a Mk 13 launcher, at the time impressed that it had a relatively small footprint and a missile magazine to draw from.
I mention this because it was the consensus at the time essentially that it had a ‘single point of fail‘, so it was suboptimal to the unreloadable VLS.

A helicopter is a single point of fail.
A helicopter can fail from any one of a thousand parts, it’s efficiency of purpose does not make it more reliable.
Billions of dollars of HMAS Prestige is hanging on an ASW single point of fail, and will remain so until it’s replaced at some time of expedient convenience.
That exists today.

How many excuses do we really need to justify the lack of onboard ranged ASW love?

ASW is a combined operation and the days of a single ship searching for submarines is gone.
Within the TF there will be a number of options, plenty of helos and a sprinkling of ASROC if the USN is involved.
If we are being hunted by submarines we are involved in a hot war (see RAN CONOPS) and we are part of a multi National TF So the scenario is not “a single point of failure” and even if we were engaged in an national ARG there will be back up.
In any case, the Hobarts will be involved as the primary AAW asset and as such they will be much closer to the HVU, other escorts including the Hunters will be further away in the ASW screen

 

[spoz]

Sounds like the aircraft may have lost tail rotor authority. but that is to some extent a guess, if a somewhat educated one.

 

[John Newman]

I do appreciate this. The RAN has an admirable record.
A long time ago I ventured at the apparent benefits of a Mk 13 launcher, at the time impressed that it had a relatively small footprint and a missile magazine to draw from.
I mention this because it was the consensus at the time essentially that it had a ‘single point of fail‘, so it was suboptimal to the unreloadable VLS.

A helicopter is a single point of fail.
A helicopter can fail from any one of a thousand parts, it’s efficiency of purpose does not make it more reliable.
Billions of dollars of HMAS Prestige is hanging on an ASW single point of fail, and will remain so until it’s replaced at some time of expedient convenience.
That exists today.

How many excuses do we really need to justify the lack of onboard ranged ASW love?

I can’t help but think you are over playing, or over emphasising, the loss of the MH-60R as a single point of failure.

Let’s not forget the ADF is operating at a peace time operating tempo, not wartime.

The loss of any ADF aviation asset would normally see a temporary pause in operations whilst being investigated, but if operating at a war time tempo there would be no pause.

We are simply not in a position to have ‘duplicates’ of a slightly different type for every ADF aviation asset, not practical or affordable.

As for VL-ASROC, it is a relatively short range ASW weapon, yes it is potentially another layer sitting between ship launched ASW torpedo and a helicopter launched ASW torpedo, but at what cost to the other VLS weapons?

On the question of the Mk 13 missile launcher, I think that falls into a different category, it truely is a potential single point of failure.

If the launcher did have a significant failure, that couldn’t be fixed at sea, then the ship has no option but to return to home base for repairs, if a helicopter is lost, it can be far easier to replace.

 

[oldsig127]

Firstly, Thankfully everyone is safe.
wishing the best outcomes for everyone involved, strength to them all !

I feel it now highlights an issue tho, and that is the ships ASW.
I appreciate the helo is the optimal ASW asset to reach out, seek out and touch.
But as is now, the ship has no optimal ASW asset (that I know of), LWT restricted by range.

The presumption that a helo, with seemingly a billion moving parts, will always be available is demonstrated to be flawed.

One helicopter loss in how many thousands of hours of operation? Not on the face of it a very convincing reason to overturn the logic behind the current mode of ASW ops.

oldsig

 

[icelord]

Managed 6 months in MEAO with the Seahawk only operating for 2 mths as the part needed was not available and so we waitied. No new Helo was sent out, we just operated without it on counter piracy. I recall someone made video of themselves spinning on the flight deck and crew disembarking in gear...not sure why FlyCo wasnt laughing.

Birdies did spend alot of time watching movies and acing guitar hero

As mentioned they suspended flights which would be all non mission critical. Once debrief and black box are recovered should be alright.

 

[Redlands18]

Managed 6 months in MEAO with the Seahawk only operating for 2 mths as the part needed was not available and so we waitied. No new Helo was sent out, we just operated without it on counter piracy. I recall someone made video of themselves spinning on the flight deck and crew disembarking in gear...not sure why FlyCo wasnt laughing.

Birdies did spend alot of time watching movies and acing guitar hero

As mentioned they suspended flights which would be all non mission critical. Once debrief and black box are recovered should be alright.

Was that when we only had the 16 S-70 Seahawks?

 

[Wombat000]

Just simply to clarify, because sometimes I’ve found written comments can be misinterpreted.

I’m not trying to question using helos on ASW ops.
I acknowledge undeniable excellent service history of RAN helo ops.
My concern was re meaningful ship mounted capability, when forced to play Plan B.

I only originally referenced the Mk13, from previous discussion a long time ago, cos I interpreted a comparison of a capability linked so heavily to a single system, in missile launch thru the Mk13 and ASW so heavily reliant on availability of an extremely complex helicopter. A failure of each (Mk 13 now retired) had a disproportionate impact on capability.

I accept the comments in reply to my original.
I accept that we are currently not in warlike conditions, so we have some flexibility in ops and can conveniently facilitate resupply, but the capability is still (I presume) effected until that resupply occurs.
As mentioned, a TG can afford the temporary loss, especially with the availability of other airframes to cover longer arcs.

I also understand that my understanding is by very nature incomplete, and should remain so.

Thankfully professionalism, providence has prevailed, and strength always for that to continue.
Thanks to all.

 

[ADMk2]

I do appreciate this. The RAN has an admirable record.
A long time ago I ventured at the apparent benefits of a Mk 13 launcher, at the time impressed that it had a relatively small footprint and a missile magazine to draw from.
I mention this because it was the consensus at the time essentially that it had a ‘single point of fail‘, so it was suboptimal to the unreloadable VLS.

A helicopter is a single point of fail.
A helicopter can fail from any one of a thousand parts, it’s efficiency of purpose does not make it more reliable.
Billions of dollars of HMAS Prestige is hanging on an ASW single point of fail, and will remain so until it’s replaced at some time of expedient convenience.
That exists today.

How many excuses do we really need to justify the lack of onboard ranged ASW love?

If you are considering a single ship, you’d be correct. However RAN tends to operate in taskgroups does it not? The loss of one helicopter is not going to lead to the complete loss of ASW capability, not even for that ship, given our warships have bow mounted and towed sonars, LWT with a significant range and depth increase coming via Mk.54 Mod 2 torpdeo development program we have joined and so on. Other helicopters will still be available for the role in the ASW role within the taskgroup.

I’m not against VL-ASROC per se, but few navies operate such for some reason, surely not just cost, and as mentioned above, every VL-ASROC you carry, imposes limits on other missile capabilities…

 

[ngatimozart]

Sounds like the aircraft may have lost tail rotor authority. but that is to some extent a guess, if a somewhat educated one.

That's a bit of a reach even for a denizen of the wardroom. It could've been anything from the jesus nut to a main rotor gearbox failure. The point is that we don’t know. I would hazard a guess that if it was a tail rotor failure the crew would have suffered severe injuries.

 

[Stampede]

Hopefully not a silly question.

Would the recent MH-60R Seahawk helicopter ditching in the Philippine Sea have sunk like a lead sinker or do the helicopters now have some emergency flotation gear for such a contingency.
I think this was talked about when a Blackhawk crash landed on the flight deck of a frigate and went over board.

Regards S

 

[ASSAIL]

Hopefully not a silly question.

Would the recent MH-60R Seahawk helicopter ditching in the Philippine Sea have sunk like a lead sinker or do the helicopters now have some emergency flotation gear for such a contingency.
I think this was talked about when a Blackhawk crash landed on the flight deck of a frigate and went over board.

Regards S

Even the old Wessex 31Bs had flotation bags in their wheel hubs.
Mind you it had a propensity to turn the aircraft turtle if operated.

 

[John Newman]

Hopefully not a silly question.

Would the recent MH-60R Seahawk helicopter ditching in the Philippine Sea have sunk like a lead sinker or do the helicopters now have some emergency flotation gear for such a contingency.
I think this was talked about when a Blackhawk crash landed on the flight deck of a frigate and went over board.

Regards S

Here’s some examples of maritime helicopter flotation devices:

RAN Sea King:

Welcome to ADF Serials

From ADF-Serials - this particular Sea King was reported to have stayed afloat for six hours before eventually sinking.

(Unfortunately the ADF Serials link doesn’t stay on the appropriate page, go to the RAN page, select Sea King, scroll down to 904 and click on the photo).

MRH-90:

mrh90 flotation device - Google Search

The RAN fleet of MRH-90 has four flotation devices, if you look at photos there are two each side, appear not to be painted, a beige/tan colour panel covering them.

To date I have never seen any reports that the MH-60R fleet has flotation devices fitted.


I don’t think flotation devices should be seen as a method of keeping the helicopter afloat indefinitely, but rather as a device to keep it afloat long enough for the crew to escape in a reasonable time frame.

Cheers,

 

[alexsa]

Here’s some examples of maritime helicopter flotation devices:

RAN Sea King:

Welcome to ADF Serials

From ADF-Serials - this particular Sea King was reported to have stayed afloat for six hours before eventually sinking.


MRH-90:

mrh90 flotation device - Google Search

The RAN fleet of MRH-90 has four flotation devices, if you look at photos there are two each side, appear not to be painted, a beige/tan colour panel covering them.

To date I have never seen any reports that the MH-60R fleet has flotation devices fitted.


I don’t think flotation devices should be seen as a method of keeping the helicopter afloat indefinitely, but rather as a device to keep it afloat long enough for the crew to escape in a reasonable time frame.

Cheers,

They do actually attempt, on occasion to land a Sea King on water under power. Millpond conditions vital. As an example

Prince William lands helicopter on water during Canadian visit - BBC News

 

[Redlands18]

Hopefully not a silly question.

Would the recent MH-60R Seahawk helicopter ditching in the Philippine Sea have sunk like a lead sinker or do the helicopters now have some emergency flotation gear for such a contingency.
I think this was talked about when a Blackhawk crash landed on the flight deck of a frigate and went over board.

Regards S

It was actually the Manoora,

 

[aussienscale]

Hopefully not a silly question.

Would the recent MH-60R Seahawk helicopter ditching in the Philippine Sea have sunk like a lead sinker or do the helicopters now have some emergency flotation gear for such a contingency.
I think this was talked about when a Blackhawk crash landed on the flight deck of a frigate and went over board.

Regards S

The Romeo's actually had the emergency flotation device removed that was in previous models, so would have sunk pretty quickly.

Brief introduction of helicopter surface emergency landing floating system

www.nasc.gov.tw

Cheers

 

[Stampede]

The Romeo's actually had the emergency flotation device removed that was in previous models, so would have sunk pretty quickly.

Brief introduction of helicopter surface emergency landing floating system

www.nasc.gov.tw

Cheers

Thanks all for the feedback

Regards S

 

[Aussie Coms]

ASW is a combined operation and the days of a single ship searching for submarines is gone.
Within the TF there will be a number of options, plenty of helos and a sprinkling of ASROC if the USN is involved.
If we are being hunted by submarines we are involved in a hot war (see RAN CONOPS) and we are part of a multi National TF So the scenario is not “a single point of failure” and even if we were engaged in an national ARG there will be back up.
In any case, the Hobarts will be involved as the primary AAW asset and as such they will be much closer to the HVU, other escorts including the Hunters will be further away in the ASW screen

Can’t you just dial up a P8, or a loyal wingman or 2, with a few Mk46 ?
And , in the future, won’t we have UAV‘s on most, if not all ships, including Arafura OPV, which could drop a few sonobuoys
So, network effects, loss of one asset doesn’t denigrate the network

 

[hauritz]

The reason the Hunters will be so important will be the level of redundancy and the range of options it will offer. It will come with a mission bay packed with UAV, USV and UUVs. ASW helos are a vital asset right now but circa 2030 it will just be one of many options that will be available to the fleet.