Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates

[StingrayOZ]

That’s a pretty bold statement. Who when and where?

I am genuinely concerned regarding West Papua.

Refugees are now moving into PNG
West Papuan refugees welcome in PNG - PM
More recently more bodies are being found, reports are things are not good over there. Things are bad, worse than they have been for a long time
Questions raised over bodies found in West Papua

PNG has their own problems currently with the recent arrests of senior politicians. And previous violence and shootings regarding the demonstrations regarding this internal issues.
Arrest warrant issued for former PNG PM Peter O'Neill

It doesn't have to be an all in commitment, but I would expect that Australia will be asked to help out PNG's significant issues along its border, including aid and humanitarian. But in the background we are watching East Timor 99 basically unfold again. West P has been on the ADF radar for 50 years+. We know that these issues are also hard for the US to back us up on. We know we have to do the heavy lifting and Australia will be the one calling timeout.

• West Papua exploding
• Solomon islands is basically lulling before the next storm.
• 2019 Bougainvillean independence referendum is on Saturday the 23rd of November.
• There are some internal issues in Indonesia which are of concern in the medium term.

So you know. The regular stuff.

So in the background we have Turkey threatening mass exodus into the EU and just the threat of that is enough to get far right nationalist governments elected. Turkey breaking away from NATO. The collapse of NATO nuclear sharing and possibly the whole nuclear umbrella. Trump running for a second term, China / Japan / Korea relationship souring in 3 different ways.

Yeh, I think Australia needs a new whitepaper to address the significantly deteriorating situation locally and globally.

 

[Raven22]

So.... situation normal?

I think there’s a big difference between that and ‘almost a certainty that we will be doing something big ...shortly’.

You could take a slice at any point over the last 20 years and probably find as many issues in the region, if not more. I remember sitting on my pack ten years ago ready to go into the Solomons with 3 RAR on the next Herc flight. That’s when we still had a thousand or so personnel deployed in the region on active operations. I don’t think the region has any more problems now than it did then. The great power competition is new, but if anything that has a stabilising effect on the region.

 

[Stampede]

So.... situation normal?

I think there’s a big difference between that and ‘almost a certainty that we will be doing something big ...shortly’.

You could take a slice at any point over the last 20 years and probably find as many issues in the region, if not more. I remember sitting on my pack ten years ago ready to go into the Solomons with 3 RAR on the next Herc flight. That’s when we still had a thousand or so personnel deployed in the region on active operations. I don’t think the region has any more problems now than it did then. The great power competition is new, but if anything that has a stabilising effect on the region.

Today's article in the Strategist touches on the need for a "Strategic review"
Pertinent,are the words of our current Defence Minister only last week in the link within the article titled - Linda Reynolds stated.

I'll paste a relevant paragraph

"While the White Paper’s analysis of these drivers still holds, it underestimated the speed of that change. Indeed, the world itself has changed more quickly than we assessed in 2016 and so too are the consequential challenges. These challenges operate simultaneously in a dynamic, and quite unpredictable mix. At any point they can compound and cascade, creating challenges of much greater strategic significance than any single one challenge or problem on its own. The challenges are multifaceted, they are multidimensional and they require a whole-of-nation response. There is simply no point wishing that these changes are not happening. They are – the world is rapidly changing."

The above maybe in defence speck, and I'd like not to go done the path of predicting doom and despair, but if the conversation of "concern" is happening at the national defence level and is acknowledged publicly; then it regretfully mirrors the concerns of many like myself who are interested in this space.

Much of the review implies an emphasis on the maritime domain, which is relevant to this thread; but in the broad context of looking at the crystal ball of uncertainty, I would much prefer the uncertain outlook from back in 1999, than speculating about the worlds current geopolitical future in 2019.

Regards S

 

[Raven22]

I don’t disagree the world is a more uncertain place than it was a few years ago, and that a review of national strategy is required. I do disagree that the South West Pacific is somehow about to fall apart and need a large intervention, which is the statement to which I was objecting.

 

[Volkodav]

Something I read a few weeks back on the current head of the USMCs view on large amphibs, i.e. he sees them as attractive targets that if lost would take out a big chunk of any expeditionary force and is pushing for larger numbers of smaller ships moving smaller packets of his people. I wonder if this view will gain traction, and if so what its impact will be on the ADFs thinking, i.e. would a class of LCH replacements be a better investment than a third big amphib / Choules replacement? Would moving to multi role support ships filling the AOR and sea lift role be the way to go?

Navy, Marines Rethinking How to Build Future Fleet with Unmanned, Expeditionary Ships - USNI News

Maybe a way forward would be a new generation APD (High Speed Transport) obsolescent destroyers and new build Destroyer Escorts fitted as fast troop transport in WWII. I suppose the Danish Absalon class probably fit the bill, frigate sized, armed and capable of defending themselves and a useful capacity for personnel and equipment, up to and including MBTs, an interesting solution considering the RNs Type 31 is to be based on the Iver Huitfeldt class FFG which was evolved from the Absalons. Give Austal a bone and do an APD version of the Independence class, or perhaps a version of the Arafura class OPV set up to lift an infantry company and the stern boat ramp modified for a LCM or perhaps CB90 type combat boat.

With the LHDs still being very new this sort of decision is a long way of for Australia but I thought it might be worth discussing. Thoughts?

 

[Redlands18]

Something I read a few weeks back on the current head of the USMCs view on large amphibs, i.e. he sees them as attractive targets that if lost would take out a big chunk of any expeditionary force and is pushing for larger numbers of smaller ships moving smaller packets of his people. I wonder if this view will gain traction, and if so what its impact will be on the ADFs thinking, i.e. would a class of LCH replacements be a better investment than a third big amphib / Choules replacement? Would moving to multi role support ships filling the AOR and sea lift role be the way to go?

Navy, Marines Rethinking How to Build Future Fleet with Unmanned, Expeditionary Ships - USNI News

Maybe a way forward would be a new generation APD (High Speed Transport) obsolescent destroyers and new build Destroyer Escorts fitted as fast troop transport in WWII. I suppose the Danish Absalon class probably fit the bill, frigate sized, armed and capable of defending themselves and a useful capacity for personnel and equipment, up to and including MBTs, an interesting solution considering the RNs Type 31 is to be based on the Iver Huitfeldt class FFG which was evolved from the Absalons. Give Austal a bone and do an APD version of the Independence class, or perhaps a version of the Arafura class OPV set up to lift an infantry company and the stern boat ramp modified for a LCM or perhaps CB90 type combat boat.

With the LHDs still being very new this sort of decision is a long way of for Australia but I thought it might be worth discussing. Thoughts?

Crossover is autonomous, agile, robust and powerful
Maybe the Damen Crossover series would fit the Bill. More along the lines of a fast well armed Amphib but they can carry up to 128 troops can carry Landing Craft, has Aviation facities.

 

[ASSAIL]

Maybe Singapore’s Endurance class provides us with an example of an extremely useful and versatile platform.
They would fill the void as discussed, above, we could learn from the SAF experience and CONOPS and we’ve had many opportunities to observe their utility.
I’m not suggesting a copy, simply a blueprint for size and capability.

Endurance-class Landing Ships Tank | Republic of Singapore Navy

 

[StingrayOZ]

Key things I like about the endurance (or something like it)
- Its of a size that can be built locally (<156m long <32 m wide)
- It has fairly low crewing (~60, but could be less with more modern automation).
- In service with Thailand and Singapore with obvious synergy and training etc benefits

Something like a modern endurance, some 10 m longer, more automation/reduced crewing to get to OPV levels would be quite attractive. You could build and operate two for the price of one slightly larger ship. This would seem to be ideal. They could be fitted with ex-FFG 76mm gun, space for CIWS, would make ideal anti-piracy, gulf/SEA patroling, HDAR, amphibious support. They could be civilian crewed (if un gunned), crewed by coast guard, or Navy. One could act as a Pacific ship.

Also the Navantia Support ship looking at its specs and the Galicia class its based off, seems odd. They made it longer by approximately 10m. It appears both too long for local build and too long for Malaysia's requirement. I'm not sure they were targeting either of those. Crewing is ~160.
If the Galicia was ~3m (157m) shorter it could probably be squeezed onto the existing shiplift at osborne.
At 176m its as long as Choules/bay class.

At that point making a bigger, more expensive, slightly more risk, less lift capable choules/Galicia doesn't seem to be a great fit IMO. Why not push the light AOR role to a bigger platform, like the LHD, which the Spanish fit with FAS provider capability, and build a bigger one of those. Extend the length from 230 to ~250m. Expand the lift to be able to reach the heavy vehicle deck so you basically double your hanger space. Have a 40,000t+ LHD with the same man power and basic configuration as our existing LHD fleet.

The LHD itself has a non trivial 2100t DFM, 800t jp5 and 500t of water capability in standard configuration, so a larger configuration could easily surpass that of the new JSS design (3600 tons marine diesel capacity, 600 tons of aviation fuel and 400 tons of fresh water which is WAY less than a Cantaberia/Supply class.). I don't really see the point in building supply ships/AOR which less capacity than the ships they are designed to resupply. The days of lone frigate patrols are over.

While we are a blue water force, we tend to make a lot of visits in the region and have plenty of friends. It may be worth aiming for larger storage than a compromised AOR/amphib. By definition Amphibs tend to operate in regions rather than out in the middle of the pacific ocean.

I would couple this new ship around with the new SSC and have a greater aviation focus (drones, MV-22, F-35, attack helicopters, Chinooks). The dock wouldn't have to be flooded with less disruption of air ops, high speed insertion at greater distances could be specifically done from this platform. You get better and greater amphibious capability than a LHD, greater aviation capability than a LHD, greater AOR capability than a JSS. In combination with the LHD's and the amphibs (ie the Endurance type ships) you can easily insert a fully kitted packed out ARG and provide additional air support and growth margin for the Army. Operation cost is reduced as leverages off existing LHD supply chain, training and consumables. No modification of existing LHD's assets would be needed in the short/medium term. Risk is low as its a lengthening of an existing in service design with the RAN. FOC would be fairly quick given the existing two LHD's in operation.

I would personally prefer an assessment of feasibility of that type of project.

 

[ngatimozart]

If you were to use the RDN Absalon design, as a template, you'd have to modify the design to include a welldock, because it only has a ramp. However, as a concept, yes it could be well worth studying. Possibly something with a welldock, no larger than Canterbury's size (~9,000 tonne displacement full load), with 200 troops, say six MBT max, and similar armament, sensors, etc., to the Absalon and the speed range of a FFG.

Probably be expensive to such a capability into the fleet when it might be cheaper to fit out the current LHDs and LSD with an AWD fitout. How many ships would you be looking for the equivalent amphib capability Vs 3 AWD fitouts?

 

[Raven22]

You want to fit out the LHDs and Choules to be an AWD? Why?

 

[ngatimozart]

You want to fit out the LHDs and Choules to be an AWD? Why?

Defence against anti ship missiles if needs be. I know that current doctrine calls for the AWDs and FFGs to defend them, but I believe that current PLAN doctrine is to take out the escorts and then go after the phat ships. If the proposal is to move away from large amphibs to smaller amphibs built around the WW2 DE fast transport concept, then my question was what would be cheaper a fleet of those or refitting the 2 LHDs and the LSD with AWD capabilities? If they had such then they have greater probabilities of surviving enemy missile strikes. I have been of the opinion for the last few years that RAN & RNZN phat ships are woefully under armed for defence, especially against modern AShM threats. Phalanx and SeaRAM just don't cut it any more.

 

[BPFP]

Agree with this. The impact on national will to fight if any of these amphib assets went down with personnel woudl be incalculable. We have so few escorts in any case.

A reasonable ESSM loadout with CEAFAR (similar ot the initial ANZAC fitout) seems a minimum investment to protect these assets.

 

[Raven22]

I’d suggest there is a fair difference between enhancing the self protection suite of the LHD and giving it capabilities similar to the AWDs.

I also think you are missing the point of the smaller amphibs, as described by the Commandant of the USMC. Those vessels are to work in tandem with large amphibs to allow greater agility, lower signature and support distributed operations. They are not simply smaller amphibs expected to replace the large ships and fight their way through to the objective alone. Indeed, such a concept would be the worst of all possible words - not small enough in signature to be agile and survivable, but not large enough to actually be good amphibs or have the combat systems to defend themselves from a proper threat.

For the RAN, smaller amphibious vessels able to support the larger ships and conduct semi independent operations would be great, but a 9000 tonne frigate with a well deck is not that.

 

[StingrayOZ]

I think we are still committed to the ARG concept, go big on amphibious operation. We are still planning more around an amphibious landing than an amphibious assault. Even within that concept, you would expect multiple surface combatants (48VLSm 5"+), ship based fire platforms (Tiger/MH60Rs etc), air superiority from land based projection (P8, Wedgetails, perhaps F-18's), superior situational awareness, subs and sub surface assets. As in Timor, these are more about deterrence, support and cover, than sinking opposing surface combatants and fighting your way to the beach. We won't be solo amphibiously invading mainland China on our own.

Say in West Papua (or PNG), we could be facing a fractured or possible rouge TNI forces or Milita, or aggressive shows of force, while trying to operate and land a force. Jakarta could have is own leadership coupe at the same time or facing its own threats elsewhere. Or in the wider Pacific, a Chinese or Russian (or other) presence might appear, we would want to be able to show greater capability than say just one or two ships looking for opportunities, which is typically what is happening. We aren't watching large set piece moves.

Given the current state of the world, I doubt we could rely on the US or UK or anyone else to lead such a mission. These are the same fears Korea or Japan have. Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, Pakistan are effectively in various failed state conditions, it wouldn't take much where we might be asked to contribute or lead something there.

I think of an Australian lead task group or Expeditionary group made up of
1 AWD SM2 and SM6
2 Upgraded Anzacs ESSM or a Hunter (SM2/SM6) or two
2 LHD's
1 LPD's
1 OPV
1 in theater sub

Is pretty capable and would deter anything other than a large task force from a major power made up of their best kit and the would have to have some serious skin in the game to run with that. Ideally we won't be alone, so throw in one or two US destroyers, a UK type 45, a Japanese destroyer and frigate, another big European (Spain/France/Germany/Italy) Frigate, a SSN, maybe a NZ frigate all under a AUS command. If we had a larger LHD, and embarked fighters, you would easily have local dominance. Ideally we would have 2,500 US marines from Darwin, and a complete US ESG to come along as well (but hard to say in this political environment), with our combined amphib force sitting in the middle of a combined bubble of protection.

Where we are out gunned IMO is surface action groupings, where say two or three RAN ships meet up with 2 or 3 peer level opposing force. Where one large destroyer has more VLS than our task force, and is faster, longer ranged, can call on carrier power or remote bases with long range (and unescorted) bombers on station, has greater sub surface support etc.

I don't see how Absalon really fits into the ADF. It has no proper dock and very limited in our region and for the ADF. Not sure if arming the amphibs with missiles really fits in either given they would be at the centre of a multi layer, multi ship protected at the outmost levels by longer range air launched missiles, then ship launched missiles, then SM6, then SM2 then ESSM then gun based stuff to clean up. With really the RAAF and the subs most likely to plink anything offensive.

If we are to fail it more likely we will fail to land enough of our equipment, fast enough, nimble enough, forced to pack light, unable to support additional embarked forces from our close allies, logistically fail to support that deployment.

 

[ngatimozart]

I’d suggest there is a fair difference between enhancing the self protection suite of the LHD and giving it capabilities similar to the AWDs

Is there really? A LHD is a high value target, especially if it is fully laden. How much risk are you will to place on a fully laden LHD going to Davy Jones locker with all on board? I think that we forget the lessons of history and the lessons from naval operations in the Pacific during WW2 are still as applicable today as they were then. It's just the technology that's changed, but each ship still had its AAA defences and lots of them, with more being added as the war progressed. Today the enemy can launch from far greater distances, and we can detect and shoot down at far greater distances. However, unlike WW2 we cannot reload our main AA weapons at sea. I am also a supporter of the distributed lethality concept and again having offensive weapons spread right across the fleet makes it harder for an enemy to reduce the offensive capabilities of a fleet / task force.

I also think you are missing the point of the smaller amphibs, as described by the Commandant of the USMC. Those vessels are to work in tandem with large amphibs to allow greater agility, lower signature and support distributed operations. They are not simply smaller amphibs expected to replace the large ships and fight their way through to the objective alone. Indeed, such a concept would be the worst of all possible words - not small enough in signature to be agile and survivable, but not large enough to actually be good amphibs or have the combat systems to defend themselves from a proper threat.

For the RAN, smaller amphibious vessels able to support the larger ships and conduct semi independent operations would be great, but a 9000 tonne frigate with a well deck is not that.

I read Gen Berger's original guidance, earlier in the year, after his appointment as Commandant USMC, and I took from that he was look at a distributed force away from big "phat" ships with considerable forces in them.

I am not necessarily advocating such measures as 9,000 tonne destroyers with welldocks or LHDs with the capabilities of AWDs, however such should not be discounted just because they are not part of or don't fit the present CONOPS. Remember submarines once didn't and were seen by the establishment as unsporting, very ungentlemanly, and downright dastardly - not cricket at all. CVs were not going to be of any real use as an offensive weapon and would get in the way of the battleship. On 3/9/1939 when war was declared, the battleship was the premier naval weapon of the worlds fleet. 6 years later on 3/9/1945 when the surrender document was signed in Tokyo Bay, the CV was the premier naval weapon.

MODERATORS NOTE: Before people start reeling off into fantasy fleets and platforms for the RAN, DON'T. This is purely hypothetical discussing concepts and the Moderators will be rather intolerant of people who stray from the line.

 

[aussienscale]

Naval operations in the Pacific during WW2 are still as applicable today as they were then. It's just the technology that's changed, but each ship still had its AAA defences and lots of them, with more being added as the war progressed.

I would probably add to that the more relevant lessons learnt, especially in Task Group defence, and in a bit more of a modern context is what happened during the Falklands War.

Bluff Cove is a good example, direct changes in UK doctrine and conops made as a result are still in play today

Cheers

 

[Raven22]

Is there really?

I may be taking you too literally, but adding an ‘AWD capability’ to the LHDs would imply an area air defence capability. That would mean SPY1/6 or similar radar and large numbers of tactical length Mk41s. Besides the very obvious cost and engineering problems, I think you would find combining the capabilities of area air defence ship and amphibious ship quite difficult. That is all very different to enhancing the self defence capability by adding some CIWS or Sea-Ram, or even some Mk29 with ESSM, like US amphibs and carriers, which does makes sense and is achievable.

You speak of learning from history - it’s worth noting that the RN removed the Sea Dart launcher from the Invincible class because it compromised flight operations too much. They ended their careers with an armament of three CIWS - the same armament the LHDs will soon have.

I am not necessarily advocating such measures as 9,000 tonne destroyers with welldocks or LHDs with the capabilities of AWDs, however such should not be discounted just because they are not part of or don't fit the present CONOPS. Remember submarines once didn't and were seen by the establishment as unsporting, very ungentlemanly, and downright dastardly - not cricket at all.

Submarines are a good comparison. Submarines became a thing because second tier navies were trying to find away to functionally dislocate the Royal Navy’s supremacy in battleships. The small amphibious ship concept is similar - it is a way to dislocate the A2AD capabilities of China (and others). The logic is that future A2ADs capabilities will be so lethal that large groups of amphibs, no matter how they’re escorted or armed, aren’t survivable. The small amphibs are designed to dislocate this threat by being lower signature, more dispersed, more numerous and more agile. They will allow the large amphibs to stay further away from threats, with the smaller amphibs being able to be risked closer to the objective. There is logic to that theory.

A 9000 tonne amphibs with a frigate’s combat system shares no such logic. It is still a large, high signature vessel that has all the disadvantages of the traditional amphibs and escorts, but has very few of the advantages of the true smaller amphibs. Arming the LHDs with any weapon you care to name has the same problem. Clearly, it is not a concept that will dislocate a A2AD system. Seemingly it’s major advantage is that less soldiers and sailors will die if they are sunk. It might make sense in a global gunboat sort of role for operations that don’t involve a major threat, but that is very different to the problem the small amphib concept is designed to solve.

I agree that we shouldn’t discount options that aren’t part of current business as usual, but there has to be some coherence to the logic behind what you propose.

 

[Stampede]

Is there really? A LHD is a high value target, especially if it is fully laden. How much risk are you will to place on a fully laden LHD going to Davy Jones locker with all on board? I think that we forget the lessons of history and the lessons from naval operations in the Pacific during WW2 are still as applicable today as they were then. It's just the technology that's changed, but each ship still had its AAA defences and lots of them, with more being added as the war progressed. Today the enemy can launch from far greater distances, and we can detect and shoot down at far greater distances. However, unlike WW2 we cannot reload our main AA weapons at sea. I am also a supporter of the distributed lethality concept and again having offensive weapons spread right across the fleet makes it harder for an enemy to reduce the offensive capabilities of a fleet / task force.

I read Gen Berger's original guidance, earlier in the year, after his appointment as Commandant USMC, and I took from that he was look at a distributed force away from big "phat" ships with considerable forces in them.

I am not necessarily advocating such measures as 9,000 tonne destroyers with welldocks or LHDs with the capabilities of AWDs, however such should not be discounted just because they are not part of or don't fit the present CONOPS. Remember submarines once didn't and were seen by the establishment as unsporting, very ungentlemanly, and downright dastardly - not cricket at all. CVs were not going to be of any real use as an offensive weapon and would get in the way of the battleship. On 3/9/1939 when war was declared, the battleship was the premier naval weapon of the worlds fleet. 6 years later on 3/9/1945 when the surrender document was signed in Tokyo Bay, the CV was the premier naval weapon.

MODERATORS NOTE: Before people start reeling off into fantasy fleets and platforms for the RAN, DON'T. This is purely hypothetical discussing concepts and the Moderators will be rather intolerant of people who stray from the line.

I remember reading an article regarding the Falklands conflict and a rather comical situation for a royal marine taking up defence against the invading Argentine forces when they first arrived in Port Stanley.
He radioed for clarity as to what would be the best target. Is it the Aircraft Carrier or the LHD. Not sure of the answer, but the marine was armed with a Carl Gustaf 84mm.
As you appreciate probably not a situation you train for!
The up shot is, if the ship is painted naval grey,if its in range, and its the enemy, its a target!!
If a ship is big enough in size and weight, then regardless of it's principle mission,if it must be sent into harms way, then it must have some degree of defence, both passive and kinetic.
In relation to our supply / Amphibious ships they can certainly do with much more clout than what they have at the moment.
A single 8 cell Mk 41 on each would not go astray.
While certainly unusual for many navy's, the RAN needs to maximise its limited assets to great effect.
The AWD can engage an adversary using anyone of the Mk 41 cells in the accompanying fleet.The weapons in effect become a shared resource.
We need to be open as to how we go about doing business in the future. Technology is our friend to be used to it's fullest.
Again the question of cost will need to be answered, but at least lets ask the question.
Should these ships have more integral defence than they have at the moment?

Regards S

 

[Pusser01]

Just read an article in Jane's that would indicate the transfer for the Melbourne & Newcastle to Chile is likely to be agreed to by year's end. I wonder if they'll try to increase the hanger to enable it to house their Super Puma's like they did with their previous purchases.
Cheers

Chile's frigate modernisation plans make progress | Jane's 360

 

[Flexson]

Weapons fit for the Supply Class AOR's is looking pretty good, certainly an improvement over Success in her later years.

2x Phalanx CIWS. 2x 25mm Typhoon. Chaff Launchers. Towed Torpedo Decoy. Missile and Torpedo Magazine off the Hangar to allow embarkation of armed MH-60R Seahawk Romeo's. Not saying that will happen often but it's all about the options.