Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0

[Morgo]

Your right, attacking mainland China with Tomahawks isn't going to be a thing. You will never do enough damage, and the Chinese have enough layered systems to defend from that and make instant responses to anything that fired them.

I’m not sure I agree with this.

https://encrypted-tbn0.gstatic.com/...MJuzXwIX8HWfwJtJLYEwrbjM_895dgF758Ot0ZJg&s=10

Take a look at this map. It shows China’s main oil and gas pipelines.

I agree that any significant military bases, ports, urban areas, industrial and logistics hubs are likely to be well defended. But covering the full length of this network? That’s not possible. Hitting one of these pipelines in multiple places with a 1000lb warhead every couple of weeks is likely to put a very significant dent in China’s energy supplies, especially when combined with a blockade of China bound tankers through the Malacca and Sunda straits (assuming we can do this with SSKs / SSNs or other assets). This would cause the Chinese very big headaches indeed.

I fully agree that a Tomahawk strike on Hainan Island or similar in sufficient mass to make a noticeable impact doesn’t sound like a good use of limited resources to me.

 

[downunderblue]

Reading all the above, I'm starting to gloss over the projected impact of any sea based land attack on China. If we end up there then I'd suggest we'll all be on the losing side.

I do care to scare the bejesus out of their political leadership so they won't propergate any thought out future conflict out of fear they will lose everything. They need know we won't back down.

There was something quite rational about mutually assured destruction. It kept us all alive.

 

[swerve]

Australia's tomahawk capability isn't massive on its own, particularly to China. Like a panda and flies. But it would mean it would be Australia, UK and the US (the three tomahawk operators) in the loop around making decisions around first strike and battleplans. That is huge. 8 or 9 SSN alone isn't going to completely disable China. But the level of integration with US leadership is huge.

Japan is buying 400 Tomahawk. It's also developing its own cruise missiles, aiming for 1500km.

 

[SammyC]

I’m not sure I agree with this.

https://encrypted-tbn0.gstatic.com/...MJuzXwIX8HWfwJtJLYEwrbjM_895dgF758Ot0ZJg&s=10

Take a look at this map. It shows China’s main oil and gas pipelines.

I agree that any significant military bases, ports, urban areas, industrial and logistics hubs are likely to be well defended. But covering the full length of this network? That’s not possible. Hitting one of these pipelines in multiple places with a 1000lb warhead every couple of weeks is likely to put a very significant dent in China’s energy supplies, especially when combined with a blockade of China bound tankers through the Malacca and Sunda straits (assuming we can do this with SSKs / SSNs or other assets). This would cause the Chinese very big headaches indeed.

I fully agree that a Tomahawk strike on Hainan Island or similar in sufficient mass to make a noticeable impact doesn’t sound like a good use of limited resources to me.

One of the things to note about that pipeline map for China, is that it runs predominantly from the coast to the inland. China obtains the bulk of its LNG and oil by sea (with Australia being a not insignificant provider).

While one means of causing damage to this infrastructure is to destroy the pipeline, the other is to stop the ships. Hence the interest in controlling strategic straits throughout SE Asia.

China is investing in pipelines from Russia, but they will be small in comparison the the demand, and given the European experience, they don't want to become excessively reliant on Russia either.

The Houthis have clearly demostrated that for fifty bucks and a home made sugar missile you can shut down a major shipping route, and there is very little that the biggest powers in the world can do about it. To this day, most ships now go around Africa rather than through the Suez Canal.

China would struggle to escort all its essential supply ships, and act as an agressor at the same time.

 

[Armchair]

China is a (nuclear) superpower. If Australia were to develop a credible sovereign first strike capability (by basing armed transport aircraft in strike range of mainland China or acquiring B-21 or superdrones or whatever) that could deliver a serious threat to China then China would be developing the capacity to neutralise that threat (e.g., through intensified efforts to acquire bases near Australia).

In the actual world, and relevant to this thread, Australia (and Japan) are developing a long range sea based strike capability. There isn’t (to my knowledge) any public guidance as to how that capability would be used by the RAN and for geo and domestic political reasons there won’t be, but the possibility exists that it would be used to help deter an invasion of Taiwan.

I think, however, it is safe to assume any RAN (and JMSDF) long-based strike capability against mainland China is ONLY relevant in the context of US-led coalition operations (and the Australian contribution would be a very small part of that effort). While the USN and JMSDF continue to base that long range strike capability around Tomahawk I don’t think it is reasonable to argue that Australia should instead be delivering it through another system (and if it is reasonable the same argument could be made in the USN and JMSDF threads here).

 

[SammyC]

I can't see Australia establishing strike capability with the intention of targeting mainland China at all. Even with America and Japan. They would struggle.

To your point Armchair, the Government has deliberately been silent on how a capability like this might be used. Ambiguity is useful to avoid unnecessary escallation. And to keep adversaries guessing.

I do however think this capability can be used in our own area of influence much more effectively.

Lets say China wants to push its influence through the Pacific Islands and start establishing military bases throughout the region. Just as it did within the S China Sea. It has the intent to fortify the second island chain in its long term objective, so it absolutely wants to do this. We are already seeing early signs with the Solomons and PNG.

If Australia has a means (Tomahawk, JASSM, submarines) to subject a remote base to threat on a Pacific Island, particularly from a distance, then China (or the relevant island government) may think twice before establishing it, or if they still pushed on, we have a means to contain it if need be. Converse to the Chinese mainland, China would have a hard time supporting and defending a base in this region if under duress elsewhere. We would have much more home ground advantage with the assets we are procuring. Smaller numbers of missiles would be more capable in this context.

Australia increasing its strike, littoral and maritime capability sends a message to these islands that we are able to defend them from China, or threaten them if they switch allegiance to China. Which ever happens first.

One thing to learn from the missile age, is that moving targets (i.e ships) are becomming more and more at risk, however isolated and stranded fixed targets (i.e remote land bases) are even more exposed. So the only thing more vulnerable than a ship is a stationary base on an island in the middle of nowhere.

I would view that our benefit to an American and Japanese aliance is a lot more in defending the region (second islands) rather than muscling up into the S China Sea or around Tiawan. This very much protects the flanks of other forces doing the latter. In peace time or war time.

 

[Todjaeger]

China is a (nuclear) superpower. If Australia were to develop a credible sovereign first strike capability (by basing armed transport aircraft in strike range of mainland China or acquiring B-21 or superdrones or whatever) that could deliver a serious threat to China then China would be developing the capacity to neutralise that threat (e.g., through intensified efforts to acquire bases near Australia).

In the actual world, and relevant to this thread, Australia (and Japan) are developing a long range sea based strike capability. There isn’t (to my knowledge) any public guidance as to how that capability would be used by the RAN and for geo and domestic political reasons there won’t be, but the possibility exists that it would be used to help deter an invasion of Taiwan.

I think, however, it is safe to assume any RAN (and JMSDF) long-based strike capability against mainland China is ONLY relevant in the context of US-led coalition operations (and the Australian contribution would be a very small part of that effort). While the USN and JMSDF continue to base that long range strike capability around Tomahawk I don’t think it is reasonable to argue that Australia should instead be delivering it through another system (and if it is reasonable the same argument could be made in the USN and JMSDF threads here).

I have two fundamental issues with the RAN adopting RGM-109E Tomahawks for long-ranged strike, issues which are not applicable to the USN, and much less applicable to the JMSDF, and for the RAN at least, the issues could potentially trigger tandem problems.

The first is the age of the basic Tomahawk design. I have mentioned this previously, but the basic design originates from the 1970's and a time when sensor systems were much less capable and data linked, networked warfare was not really a thing, never mind as prevalent as it has become. Tomahawks were themselves designed to be able to penetrate hostile/contested airspace by flying at low altitudes of 30 m - 50 m and following terrain. However, it has been over 40 years since the design first entered service and now potential hostiles are aware of the threat they have presented and defensive tactics and systems have been developed and successfully deployed to at least mitigate the threat and damage in circumstances, if not able to eliminate it altogether. At this point, I suspect surface-launched Tomahawk missiles are going to be significantly less effective vs. advanced hostiles unless/until their capabilities have been degraded. One result of degraded effectiveness vs. hostiles is the likelihood of future strikes needing to be conducted by volumes of missiles in an attempt to overwhelm or saturate potential defenders.

The second problem the RAN faces is the number of platforms which can actually carry out a Tomahawk strike. As of right now, and likely until at least 2034 if not later, the ADF only has three individual platforms which could participate and the number of VLS cells which could be so loaded are quite limited. This VLS cell limitation is further compounded by the reality that there would be competing service or role demands for the Hobart-class DDG's. The USN does not suffer this same VLS count limitation because they have many more vessels with the appropriate VLS cells, and the individual ship VLS cell count is likewise greater than the RAN. To provide some context, a USN Flight IIA Arleigh Burke-class DDG has a common missile loadout with half of the 96 VLS cells loaded with RGM-109 Tomahawks (48 Tomahawk) whilst the other 48 VLS cells are loaded with air defence missiles like ESSM, SM-2/3/6, or VL-ASROC. Now, whilst the JMSDF has significantly fewer ships which can fit strike-length VLS cells than the USN, it does have more than Australia does, and those vessels are like the USN in having significant numbers of VLS cells individually.

Basically Australia is spending (or perhaps already has spent) up to USD$900 mil. to adopt and field a strike capability that it might not be able to field in sufficient quantities to be effective for another decade. Further, in a decades time the effectiveness of the specific munition could very well be even less than now, as well as existing at a time when newer ordnance would likely be supplanting ship-launched Tomahawk for strike roles.

 

[ADMk2]

I could be mistaken, but I was under the impression that once a Tomahawk was launched at a designated target, the onboard guidance system would be responsible for getting the missile to target and not any control system from a launching platform. IIRC there can be some potential for midcourse correction and/or updates via data links, but those are launch platform agnostic.

As a matter of practicality, a ship launching Tomahawk cruise missiles would only really be able to track and directly communicate with them if they were in the 'local vicinity' of the launching vessel. One needs to remember that the flight profile of a Tomahawk missile has it flying at low altitude, some 30 m - 50 m above ground level, which means the missile would be below the radar horizon of most launching ships after ~30 km. Given that the range of Block V Tomahawks are believed to be in excess of 1,600 km there really is no way for a ship to directly communicate with missiles at such extreme ranges.

From my POV, if Australia was really serious about having the ability to launch sudden 'surprise' strikes at the fixed infrastructure of hostile powers there are potentially much better options than ship-launched RGM-109E Tomahawks. As it stands now, the Hobart-class DDG's can carry and launch them, at the expense of VLS cells which otherwise could be loaded with ESSM or members of the Standard Missile family to provide air defence. Further, this does not appear likely to change prior to ~2034, which would put the Tomahawk design even older/longer in service at that point. The potential battlespace of the mid-2030's might very well be one where long-range Tomahawk LACM strikes targeting a peer (or possibly beyond peer) level power are no longer realistically viable/effective.

A concern of mine is that Australia (and elements of the US and UK for that matter) are working to build a combat capability in the mid-2030's that is appropriate for conditions now. If one considers the likelihood of a hostile nation adopting and implementing systems comparable to those which NATO and major allies have used for decades, specifically integrating broad area surveillance systems like AEW platforms and effective datalink systems and networks, then the relevance of something like Tomahawk might not be all that much by the time the Hunter-class frigates enter service.

Both the launching ship and the weapon inflight have satellite communications links, that enable re-targetting to on of up to 15 pre-programmed targets at extended (BLOS) ranges as well as the weapon sending missile status, flight data and imaging data up until the point of impact back to it's launching command centre. This is what Tactical Tomahawk Weapon Control System actually does. The inflight comms links also allow for "loiter" mode for the weapon, in case of targets of opportunity arising with updated targetting co-ordinates then provided to the weapon.

This capability has been present in Tomahawk since 2004 when Block IV was introduced to service.

Navy Posts Successful Test of Raytheon's Block IV Tomahawk Cruise Missile

TUCSON, Ariz., Dec. 14, 2006 /PRNewswire/ -- A U.S. Navy Tomahawk Block<br /> IV cruise missile built by Raytheon Company...

web.archive.org

 

[Armchair]

I can't see Australia establishing strike capability with the intention of targeting mainland China at all. Even with America and Japan. They would struggle.

well the chief ambiguity is in relation to a coalition intervention against an invasion of Taiwan. In the unlikely event of such an invasion a coalition intervention would involve missiles targeting staging areas, command centres and the like in mainland China (I don’t think destroying pipelines and civilian infrastructure are things Australia would put its hand up for).

 

[StingrayOZ]

Japan is buying 400 Tomahawk. It's also developing its own cruise missiles, aiming for 1500km.

Japan is within counter range. So things are bit different for them. I wouldn't always expect Japan to join in Tomahawk strikes.

But they are going to be an operator, and have a significant number. But still. Its China.. 400 Tomahawks would be a significant strike against a middle power nation, but China is huge and capable, they will see it coming, they can absorb that kind of damage. You aren't going to disable China will 400 or even a 1000 Tomahawks even if everyone hits a high value target. You are going to piss them off. But it would perhaps be very disruptive in executing an amphibious invasion of Taiwan.

Tomahawk has pretty huge value when it comes to a limited response. Someone crosses a red line. You can hit them with a clearly conventional strike and take something away from them, send a message. With almost no risk to yourself.

So things like the Chinese artificial islands, which are military targets, stationary, legally and politically ambiguous. Strikes on Chinese oversea bases perhaps. Annoying China, but not hitting the home land and people dying in the streets.

The second problem the RAN faces is the number of platforms which can actually carry out a Tomahawk strike. As of right now, and likely until at least 2034 if not later, the ADF only has three individual platforms which could participate and the number of VLS cells which could be so loaded are quite limited.

Hobarts won't be loading up on Tomahawk and sailing off into the South China sea, launching a dozen missiles at mainland China, and then sailing back to reload.
Our Tomhawk missile capability is basically just for our region. Take out any value assets/bases that appear. So being able to fire a dozen is probably, okay. For now. To deter that from happening. From China just walking up and taking Fiji or Samoa and turning it into an airbase. Maybe somewhere in SEA the Americans aren't in position to do easily.

While we have a limitation of launch platforms, the UK has even more limitations. They can only launch from Subs, and they only have 6 tubes and limited reloads. Giving up their location is also a huge issue particularly against a peer adversary.. Also all that really neat stuff the Tomahawk blk 4 and newer can do needs coms.. Which on a sub is always another interesting problem. Particularly when people come looking for you.

The US has 4 SSGN and each can launch 150+ Tomahawks. They can also have other assets to guide and control stuff. So anything AU/UK/JP does is going to be small fries stuff compared to the US. Literally one single US launch platform can probably launch a strike as big as JP/AU/UK combined.

But we are in different spaces geographically, it provides political support, we are in the fight tangibly. But the US is always doing the heavy lifting.

Australia isn't the main game for China. Its barely on the radar. We are very far away. Our most powerful moves are in fact cutting our trade. But we also make it hard for them to free operate in our region. That is a huge advantage for the USA. We can support them say operating 24 B-52 just trucking ordinance 24/7/365 dropping 2000Lb every 90 seconds constantly for 5 years.

 

[Armchair]

I would view that our benefit to an American and Japanese aliance is a lot more in defending the region (second islands) rather than muscling up into the S China Sea or around Tiawan. This very much protects the flanks of other forces doing the latter. In peace time or war time.

I agree with this but I suspect the geopolitics means Australia has put its hand up for another behind the scenes commitment (akin to SSGs in South China Sea). I agree with Todjaeger’s argument that Australia does not have have enough platforms to reliably deliver on such a commitment (but that seems to be true for many things across the ADF) but there is no way to change that this decade.

Note. something went awry with quotes in previous post