Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0

[ADMk2]

From my POV given the current composition of the RAN fleet, even with the introduction of RGM-109E the RAN still lacks an effective long-range strike capability, which is why I have issues. One also needs to keep in mind what else could have been done with that nearly USD$900 mil.

If Tomahawk, or some other VL LACM were getting added into service circa ~2032 just ahead of when the RAN fleet should be expanding along with the per vessel VLS count, the situation would be a bit different. However, as selected the Hobart-class DDG's were kitted out with 48 VLS cells, which is the same number of VLS cells that the RN and typically the USN load for air defence aboard their respective destroyers. Yes, I am aware that the RN's Daring-class DDG's are getting modified to include 24 Sea Ceptor cells, enabling the 48 A50 VLS cells to be used for Aster 30 missiles providing more missiles for both long-ranged and short-range/point defence engagement. However that is sort of making a different point IMO, in that air defence capabilities need to be expanded. With Australia currently only having three air defence destroyers in service (and therefore likely only one or two available for or on deployment at any given time) that means the potential size of a strike package is limited and would come at the expense of the RAN's area air defence capabilities. I would suggest looking possible missile loadout combinations might be, whilst asking the question, "do I want a strike missile, or air defence?"

See my previous answer. An effective strike capability might be one missile, impacting on one target. Depending entirely on the circumstances of the strike, whereas the capability to launch 57x cruise missiles against one airbase (which is realistically larger than the whole RAN will be capable of employing) was not a demonstrably effective strike capability.

The nuance and context is important here. The effectiveness starts before we even consider which launch point can hit which target and that is the addition of threats which any potential enemy has to consider and has to cater for.

Yes we have 3. Which is 3 more than we had last year and that capability will expand over time.

What else could that $900m have bought? Well an extra Regiment of SP guns or 4-5 JSF’s or Super Hornets with all their capability enablers included, thereabouts. Do any of those options have the strategic effect that parking a destroyer full of Tomahawk land attack cruise missiles off the coast of some country we are having “issues” with does? I would think not… Forget the missile and the perception of it’s relative capability for a moment and consider what it’s intent is meant to achieve. Just like the F-111 was in it’s day, the capability is designed to allow near impunity at striking targets we have chosen. Whether they actually can or not in reality (NVA forces proved able to shoot down F-111’s in real combat after all) isn’t the point of acquiring them. The perception of that capability is, just as it is with nuclear submarines. How much rumbling did we hear when we announced nothing more than an intention to acquire them? I feel pretty confident in suggesting that that similar rumbling has occurred against the only user of the most famous cruise missile in the world, based in the southern hemisphere…

The idea that because it’s limited it’s therefore not effective can be broadened to encompass the entire ADF if you really want to. What’s the point of an airforce with 4 operational fighter squadrons, that has to try and defend a whole continent?

What’s the point of having a single armoured combat team? You could make that argument til the cows come home, but that still isn’t a reason not to generate such capability.

We could always spend less on the gold-plated high end stuff we buy. We didn’t “need“ Wedgetails. Most airforces in the world don’t have them and ground controlled intercept and radar surveillance works well enough for most forces.

We could have bought plenty more fighters for the cost of the Wedgetails, or more maritime patrol, possibly more relevant given our geography...

But they substantially elevate the overall capability of our force packages. So does the presence of Tomahawk in our naval taskforces, which without them have only limited capability to do anything at all, beyond self-defence and everyone knows this. Now they know what they knew previously of the capability of our naval taskforces, but they also now know we can reach out and touch, what they likely don’t want touched. Not hugely, not overall war changing in most circumstances, but not nothing either.

 

[Stampede]

I agree with @Todjaegerwith respect to the limited nature of the capability, but I differ on the perspective of the relevance of the capability we do have.

The example of this, is the demonstrated reality that small number of missiles can often have a strategic effect, while occasionally large numbers of missiles have almost no tactical relevance whatsoever.

The perfect example of this is the Russian use of Oreshnik missiles, of which it has fired about 5, last I checked. A similar example are Kalibr missiles of which Russia has fired dozens at most. They demonstrate the capability to hit the targets (more or less..) that they want to at extended range. This “strategic shock” isn’t even intended for Ukraine, but rather Western audiences.

Another strategic use of a small number of missiles was the famous Apache strike using Hellfires against an Iraqi air defence post that was aimed at large scale air defence missions and not at all configured to defend against a small, limited, low level attack. Yet these handful of Hellfire missiles opened up a critical ingress into Iraqi defences that allowed the Coalition to dominate them, with astonishingly little opposition.

On the flipside is the large use of Tomahawk missiles in futile strike missions in Afghanistan and Syria. 57 missiles fired to cause some little damage to an airfield that was repaired within hours or hitting caves that may or may not have anyone in them. In reality these strikes didn’t send the strategic message that was intended, because what it actually demonstrated was just how unwilling the US was to get in and seriously fight. They’ll do a bit of threatening, fire a handful of missiles maybe and thump their chest, but what they won’t do is hook in and seriously combat their enemy.

The point is obvious, savvy employment of capability, beats chest-thumping useless gestures every day of the week and capability, though small in comparison to other capability most definitely CAN have serious outcomes, when employed judiciously…

I’d like to think such will be the hallmark of any RAN operational use of their capability, should that unfortunately reality hit...

I think it was in 1998 that Tomahawks were used in Afghanistan.
If I recall a comment regarding its use.
“All we did was blow up a tent!”

A sceptical response for sure , but it does highlight somewhat the effect you want to achieve , be that military or political.

No doubt the ADF sees enough merit in the Tomahawks capability to justify its purchase and potential as a government response to a given situation

Cheers S

 

[ADMk2]

Following on from the earlier discussion about the load-out of AWD’s and all the things we might want to fire from them, I am wondering if RAN thinking on that matter might be starting to change on that as well? I have certainly been thinking about it for a while, and clearly RAN has been, introducing 3 new missile types in 2024 alone.

We have for a long time been all in on ESSM. It made sense. 75% of our surface fleet could only really operate one air defence missile without unacceptable compromise in other areas (such as perhaps the loss of the 127mm gun).

The main air launched threat was also cruise missile attacks and unarguably they remain one of the main threats today. ESSM has long demonstrated it’s excellent performance against such threats. Block II not being entirely tied to ship-borne radar makes it no doubt even better against such threats. However it isn’t the only missile RAN uses which can defend against them, SM-2 is also excellent in that role.

But cruise missile attacks are only one threat modern forces including navies are facing. As we see in Ukraine (and in return in Russia) and in the Red Sea, ballistic missile attacks and drone attacks are making up at least as much of the threat, if not more. Further to this ”drone” attacks are not restricted to air-launched drones, but USV drone attacks are occurring more frequently and with increasing levels of capability as well.

One of the issues we have seen, is that big, powerful radar systems designed for extended range air defence against fast moving air and missile threats, have not fared well against low, slow drone attacks. In many cases they have been an absolute liability. Such is exactly the type of capability you need to employ ESSM and is certainly what we employ with CEA radars or SPY-1D radars used to employ ESSM (and yes, other weapons).

Add to which ESSM is a very solid mid-range missile, but it has problems against high-end ballistic missile threats as well as being far too much missile for most drone threats. It also (crucially) requires VLS launch cells…

RAN has a similar albeit lesser problem with Phalanx. They have been all in on Phalanx since the 80’s and whilst it has been enhanced with a FLIR sensor and other upgrades, it has the same problem of being “too much” for drones (though it can certainly defeat them) and not being enough for any ballistic threat and arguably not enough for modern cruise missiles either. Plus it is facing increased competition from medium calibre gun systems typically carried on-board modern ships, which out-range it and have useful anti-drone and anti-surface effects as well.

Recently we have seen RAN request information on 127mm counter-drone ammunition, indicating they are well aware of that threat. I have little doubt we will see additional kinetic and non-kinetic responses to drone threats from RAN. We have also seen RAN respond to ballistic threats with the acquisition of SM-2 Block IIIC and SM-6, as well as (if you choose to believe Mr Conroy’s one time words) SM-3.

In actual recent combat we have seen the USN overwhelmingly employ SM-2 (and SM-3) to address both ballistic threats and cruise missile threats fired by Houthi and Iranian forces, despite many of those threats being well within the ‘wheelhouse’ of ESSM and despite the increased cost and more limited magazine depth that SM-2 imposes compared to ESSM. On the other hand we also haven’t seen any substantial ESSM use on drone threats they have similarly had to counter, preferring non-kinetic means, guns and lighter missiles such as RIM-116 RAM Blk 2. The Germans I believe have also employed RIM-116 RAM operationally in the Red Sea against drones (but happy to be corrected on that point).

So musing on these issues and coming back to the AWD load-out situation, makes me wonder if we might not see RAN carry fewer ESSM missiles in it’s precious few VLS cells moving forward and perhaps look to other missile solutions for lower end drone and “leaker” self-defence roles and more SM-2 / SM-6 for the higher threats, as well as the threats that once ESSM was intended for, just as the USN is doing?

In addition to which, we have our Canberra Class LHD’s which are still listed as intended to carry Phalanx (per below link) yet the RAN clearly having no intention whatsoever of increasing it’s absolutely glacial pace in integrating these aboard the ships, having had them commissioned for some 10 years now and still no sign of Phalanx…

Given the current operational imperative to counter drones and ballistic threats (and in the near future hypersonic ones) as well as other defensive systems such as directed energy systems becoming more prominent, I am wondering whether we will start to see the decline of RAN interest in ESSM and Phalanx and a move towards more contemporary defence systems?

I have no opinion either way, but it seems to me a combination of RAM Block II (or similar) and more SM-2 / SM-6 would offer numerous advantages over the more ESSM and less SM-2 based load-outs we currently employ, especially as we move forward into an era where our vessels are no longer restricted to one principle air self-defence weapon type? Additionally if a case existed for employing RIM-116 RAM Blk2 within RAN surface’s combatants, might not the case be a similar situation for the LHD’s and perhaps RAN’s other major surface craft?

I am wondering accordingly if the RAM Blk 2 fired from the Mk.49 GMLS in 21 round launch configuration or in SeaRAM 11x round configuration, might not become the modern “CIWS” for RAN? This system fits wherever Phalanx fits and offers more engagements per loadout than Phalanx does whilst also operating over a greater engagement envelope. The weapon also has multiple guidance modes including active radar and infra-red homing meaning it is likely much better at engaging small drone targets than a radar-guided only ESSM and each RIM-116 is less than half the cost of an ESSM equivalent. Additionally with a 21 round launcher it offers self-defence firepower (equivalent to 5x VLS cells fitted with ESSM) and can be reloaded between engagements, unlike ESSM. The intent with RIM-116 is that it would be for leaker and drone threats, while freeing up cells for SM-2 / SM-6 which will be the primary defensive missiles anyway, if we follow the USN pattern. The LHD’s would be better protected with RAM Blk 2 than they are today and better protected than they would even if they were fitted with Phalanx. SeaRAM would of course leverage our existing investment in Phalanx and require little to no integration on the ships, it was being placed upon.

Finally the 2024 IIP document stated that specified RAN vessels would receive ‘upgraded phalanx self defence system to improve anti-ship missile defence capabilities and provide the ability to engage targets including slow flying aircraft, uncrewed aerial vehicles and surface vessels’.

Now this could mean the Phalanx Block I B2 upgrade that has been in existence for years already (and should be already finished according to the project timeline below) or it could refer to some upgrade beyond Block I B2, of which SeaRAM is the only publicly acknowledged one I can find, at present...

https://www.defence.gov.au/defence-activities/projects/phalanx-close-weapons-system-block-upgrade