Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0

Bob53

Well-Known Member
Not really. A patrol vessel is defined by role, not by size. The RoDN's Thetis-class patrol vessels are the size of frigates and sometimes referred to as patrol frigates, with a displacement of ~3,500 tons, a length of 112 m and a beam of 14 m. The armament however whilst possibly heavy for a patrol vessel considering they have a 76 mm/62 cal. gun, is well under what most frigates would be fitted out with.

Size is potentially a useful measure to distinguish between a frigate and a corvette, but that does not really carry over into vessels intended primarily for patrolling roles. An OPV and a corvette could very well be of approximately the same size, but would intended for very different roles with a correspondingly different fitout, as the role demands different capabilities.

Once a vessel starts to get below a certain size and displacement, then they become much less suitable for transiting long distances and/or crossing blue water/open ocean. The low end of OPV sizes (~80 m long, ~1,500 tons +/-) is right around the minimum for some of these requirements. If a vessel were to try and operate whilst being even smaller or lower displacement, then the vessel and crew could run into serious difficulties and risk, particularly if they had to weather a storm at sea and no port or harbour within a safe distance. What an OPV will usually do with the available space and displacement (beyond the DWT of a vessel) is to have victuals and bunkerage enabling long distance ops of corresponding duration.

A corvette OTOH would typically have much of the space and displacement used to fit weapons, combat systems, sensors and gen sets. As a result, both the transit distances as well as vessel endurance is typically lower for a corvette of a given size when compared with an OPV of similar size and displacement.

What this in turn means, is that if a number of the planned Arafura-class OPV's are cancelled in favour of some hypothetical corvette of a similar size and displacement, to also primarily operate in a patrol/constab role, then these hypothetical corvettes would be limited to much shorter endurance missions, and would also need to stick much closer to port. In that essence, they (the corvettes) might find themselves only able to operate in areas where the Attack-class or Fremantle-class patrol boats operated because they just could not have sufficient food or fuel loaded.

One of the other things is that typically an OPV, being built for a patrolling rather than a combat role, will usually be significantly less expensive to have built than a warship like a corvette or frigate of comparable size would be. Part of this is due to a much simpler weapons fitout, but also due to a less comprehensive sensor and CMS fitout. As an aside, I seem to recall that the electronics fiout to a modern warship is typically a significant portion of the initial acquisition costs, to the tune of a third to half the initial cost. Now IIRC the CMS and combat data systems fitted to the Arafura-class OPV, the SaabTech 9LV, are more than is normally fitted to an OPV, and likely put the cost of the RAN OPV's higher (I seem to recall a figure of AUD$300 mil. per vessel in 2018 dollars). This is a bit more than the ~NZD$110 mil. per vessel in 2010 dollars for the RNZN's OPVs. However, this figure is still well below the FY2017 cost of €400 mil. for the Braunschweig-class corvettes, which would otherwise have cost something like AUD$660 mil.

IMO it would be much better for Australia to keep with the Arafura-class OPV to meet patrolling needs, and get a proper class of frigates or destroyers to meet the need for potential combatants. To try and have a small vessel that can do both would IMO be a decision to spend too much money (and time, a key factor as well) to get another call of vessel that can do either patrolling or combat, but would perform those roles poorly.
I agree whatever the outcome…the decision should be do not stop doing anything you are doing now while we plan the next capability . Complete Arafura and Hunter and work on rapidly inserting or finding capability for additional designs but do no stop…if we cut the programs in 2/3 or half the cost per unit will be astronomical and there is zero confidence anything that comes along later will end up any cheaper or mor capable. My gut feeling is that it is all about cost …. and capabilities will take a back seat.
 
Last edited:

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Spending $60 billion to build a semiconductor plant to produce the ~200 microchips needed for missiles is a complete waste.
There is strategic logic in Australia building a sovereign semiconductor plant, because if the PRC does successfully blockade / conquer Taiwan, that is a very significant amount of semiconductor manufacturing capability removed from the market. The costs $60 billion you cite is I think somewhat extravagant. Maybe $6 billion would be much closer to the cost.
The Australian submariner pay will be a very attractive carrot to attract US & UK lateral transfers. We just can't actively recruit their submariners.
It's only illegal if you get caught.

"The UK Ministry of Defence (MOD) has awarded £3.95 billion (A$7.5 billion) to BAE Systems for the next phase of the UK and Australia's next-generation nuclear-powered attack submarine program."
BAE Systems wins AUKUS submarine contract - Australian Defence Magazine

So it appears that the first major AUKUS sub contract has been let.
 

koxinga

Well-Known Member
There is strategic logic in Australia building a sovereign semiconductor plant, because if the PRC does successfully blockade / conquer Taiwan, that is a very significant amount of semiconductor manufacturing capability removed from the market. The costs $60 billion you cite is I think somewhat extravagant. Maybe $6 billion would be much closer to the cost.
It is not about building "a plant". It is the supporting capabilities, sub-contractors, testing facilities and the eco-system that goes into building the "chip" and also, the specialised knowlege and manpower, which is something Australia lacks.



If the Taiwan Straits situation does affect chip supply, everyone is affected, not just Australia. It clearly does not make sense that the response is every country invest in their own plants or supply chain.

The logical response is to build an independent supply chain outside of China, that is shared by multiple likeminded countries. This lowers the overall cost and at the same time, prevent a single point of failure.
 
Last edited:

Alberto32

Member
It is not about building "a plant". It is the supporting capabilities, sub-contractors, testing facilities and the eco-system that goes into building the "chip" and also, the specialised knowlege and manpower, which is something Australia lacks.



If the Taiwan Straits situation does affect chip supply, everyone is affected, not just Australia. It clearly does not make sense that the response is every country invest in their own plants or supply chain.

The logical response is to build an independent supply chain outside of China, that is shared by multiple likeminded countries. This lowers the overall cost and at the same time, prevent a single point of failure.
I do believe that NZ should get involved with Australia on this, and contribute to the cost's. Thus preserving chip security on both sides of the Tasman. I can't believe that we're not seeing any of this from our politicians in the upcoming election in NZ.
 

CJR

Active Member
There is strategic logic in Australia building a sovereign semiconductor plant, because if the PRC does successfully blockade / conquer Taiwan, that is a very significant amount of semiconductor manufacturing capability removed from the market. The costs $60 billion you cite is I think somewhat extravagant. Maybe $6 billion would be much closer to the cost.
A cutting edge tech (sub-10nm processes) consumer electronics production scale fab is of the order of US$15-20B, older generation but still useful tech (sub-40nm processes) is about US$3-6B, that's on the basis of a dozen or two dozen lithography machines per plant (40,000ish wafers per month production scales). Small scale production? lithography tools for a 55nm process run at about US$40M, and those for 30-16nm processes run at about US$100M... So, the infrastructure for emergency production could probably be had for under US500M but the tech-transfer and licensiing costs would be at least comparable to the capital costs...
 

Bluey 006

Active Member
IMO it would be much better for Australia to keep with the Arafura-class OPV to meet patrolling needs, and get a proper class of frigates or destroyers to meet the need for potential combatants. To try and have a small vessel that can do both would IMO be a decision to spend too much money (and time, a key factor as well) to get another call of vessel that can do either patrolling or combat, but would perform those roles poorly.
I tend to agree that for patrol work sticking with the Arafura class makes the most sense, they have been specifically designed for offshore patrol. However, in the current threat environment, it probably could do with up-gunning.

This brings into question what has gone wrong with the long-term threat assessments when the decision was made (2017) , the writing was on the wall long before then that our region would face a far more challenging geopolitical situation in the years ahead.

Should we have gone for one of the other OPV options (say the Fassmer option), or a more heavily armed alternative to fulfil this mission at that time? (Like a Corvette or Light Frigate)


Back to hauritz point though what does RAN want these suggested "tier 2" combatants or corvettes to do? Or are they just a way to reduce the Hunter class buy? Sadly, it feels like the latter.

Language in DSR would suggest they want more missile platforms. Are smaller vessels really the best choice for that?


"Enhancing Navy’s capability in long-range strike (maritime and land), air defence and anti-submarine warfare requires the acquisition of a contemporary optimal mix of Tier 1 and Tier 2 surface combatants, consistent with a strategy of a larger number of smaller surface vessels " - DSR 2023

“Such a fleet should consist of Tier 1 and Tier 2 surface combatants in order to provide for increased strike, air defence, presence operations and anti-submarine warfare”. – DSR 2023
 
Last edited:

Scott Elaurant

Well-Known Member
I think it was August 2022 that government announced the DSR would be conducted.
The reviews public findings came out April 2023 , which for Navy meant no detailed updates other than another review of 6 months.
The findings were handed to government recently for them to ponder for another half year to make a call as to the structure of our future fleet.
Now the rhetoric in the DSR was all about a deteriating situation and getting capability quickly.
I can see some of that with the other two services , but really it's on a budget and smacks more of 1929 not 1939.

It the true situation is dire, a round table chat with government and uniforms with a coffee and biscuit could wrap up what's needed in a good afternoon tea.
Just make a decision.

I don't know the outcome of the review but I'm confident much will stay the same.
LHDs, Supply Class, Hobart's, Cape's,Collins will soldier on.
The variables
Arafura Class and their varied mission roles and the Hunter Class.
Do we need two years to sort that out.

I find it very difficult to believe they did not know in Aug 2022 what they wanted Navy to look like going forward.


A tier two something and fleet numbers will be interesting.

Cheers S
When governments change and cash is tight, which was certainly the case after the 2022 federal election, sometimes stalling or delaying expenditure can be an objective in itself, to get the current financial year back into the black. The DSR combined with extra time to “consider its findings” is a convenient way of slowing down spending. So it may not be cuts, just stalling.

I say this because in my own field (civil infrastructure) a lot of Federally funded projects were halted in 2022/23 pending review over the past year. This did not cause much pain in my industry because there is a shortage of construction workers and pressure to divert more resources into housing projects. But it undoubtedly saved the Federal government a few billion and helped get the budget back into surplus. There has been a noticeable uptick since July with money flowing again.

This is only speculation on my part as to motive, but the point is this government has reviewed a lot of expenditure since it took office. Defence is not alone here.
 

Stampede

Well-Known Member
When governments change and cash is tight, which was certainly the case after the 2022 federal election, sometimes stalling or delaying expenditure can be an objective in itself, to get the current financial year back into the black. The DSR combined with extra time to “consider its findings” is a convenient way of slowing down spending. So it may not be cuts, just stalling.

I say this because in my own field (civil infrastructure) a lot of Federally funded projects were halted in 2022/23 pending review over the past year. This did not cause much pain in my industry because there is a shortage of construction workers and pressure to divert more resources into housing projects. But it undoubtedly saved the Federal government a few billion and helped get the budget back into surplus. There has been a noticeable uptick since July with money flowing again.

This is only speculation on my part as to motive, but the point is this government has reviewed a lot of expenditure since it took office. Defence is not alone here.
A good point and observation.
Good governance across the departments is important to guide the ship of state.
Defence can at times be unique depending on the world environment.
Again the rhetoric of the DSR seems at odds with the perceived real short term defence build up on capability.

Thanks S
 

Aardvark144

Active Member
When governments change and cash is tight, which was certainly the case after the 2022 federal election, sometimes stalling or delaying expenditure can be an objective in itself, to get the current financial year back into the black. The DSR combined with extra time to “consider its findings” is a convenient way of slowing down spending. So it may not be cuts, just stalling.

I say this because in my own field (civil infrastructure) a lot of Federally funded projects were halted in 2022/23 pending review over the past year. This did not cause much pain in my industry because there is a shortage of construction workers and pressure to divert more resources into housing projects. But it undoubtedly saved the Federal government a few billion and helped get the budget back into surplus. There has been a noticeable uptick since July with money flowing again.

This is only speculation on my part as to motive, but the point is this government has reviewed a lot of expenditure since it took office. Defence is not alone here.
Be that as it may. Government rhetoric is not being matched by actions. They rode in on the 'we need action now not later', 'total inaction from the previous Government over the last decade ' etc, etc. Every time MINDEF fields a comment about Defence funding he inevitably trots out AUKUS. There has been nothing of any consequence since the last election to match the bravado. Not picking a fight here; however, how many of your civil projects were pivotal for the Defence of Australia? There seems to be a vanity project in the Government to show a surplus (look at us! look at us!). Once again if a Government is serious on Defence money is there, why stall expenditure! again rhetoric not matching reality. Not saying projects do not need reviewing; however, we continually go through this scenario every time we change Government needlessly delaying projects not only creating uncertainty in Defence but also Defence industry.
 

Bob53

Well-Known Member
Be that as it may. Government rhetoric is not being matched by actions. They rode in on the 'we need action now not later', 'total inaction from the previous Government over the last decade ' etc, etc. Every time MINDEF fields a comment about Defence funding he inevitably trots out AUKUS. There has been nothing of any consequence since the last election to match the bravado. Not picking a fight here; however, how many of your civil projects were pivotal for the Defence of Australia? There seems to be a vanity project in the Government to show a surplus (look at us! look at us!). Once again if a Government is serious on Defence money is there, why stall expenditure! again rhetoric not matching reality. Not saying projects do not need reviewing; however, we continually go through this scenario every time we change Government needlessly delaying projects not only creating uncertainty in Defence but also Defence industry.
The 22/23 current federal surplus hit our windscreen. It’s was 1000% related to mining commodity prices, that were treasury forecasted to drop over the past 12 months on forward estimates, but actually increased. Yes it’s being used for political purposes ( as anyone would) but was initially forecast to be a deficit and turned around by no one in Canberra. Federal deficits are expected this year and for the next 10 years. State deficits are also increasing significantly. Victoria is expected to have $270 Billion debt by 2026 which is more than the entire federal debt pre covid. The point here is that despite a get out of jail this year… finances are not good.
 

Scott Elaurant

Well-Known Member
Cash was so tight that 22/23 showed a $22 billion surplus…….

Politics, not dollars.
That surplus was only after a lot of cuts. Labor killed off over $10 billion in Morrison grant programs and delayed billions in other projects, including but not limited to defence. Then there were all the other project delays I explained above. For example, delaying sub building alone effectively saved $2 billion per annum in spending, relative to projected spending on the Attack Class. Plus as Bob explained there was an unpredicted windfall increase in mining revenue.

The problem was debt repayment. Federal debt has tripled in the past decade as a % of GDP. It increased by 1/3 during covid alone. That had to stop. It didn’t matter so much prior to the war in Ukraine because interest rates were very low. But once interest rates returned to historic norms in 2022, Federal debt repayments went shooting up, and they had to start cutting and paying off the debt.

I am explaining, not defending this, although it was unavoidable IMO. I agree that defence spending is more critical now, which is unfortunate timing. Unless interest rates come down I expect there will be a lot of pressure to manage spending more tightly this decade.

The above article contains a political view on the debt, however the problem is real, as this article below explains.
 
Last edited:

Massive

Well-Known Member
IMO it would be much better for Australia to keep with the Arafura-class OPV to meet patrolling needs, and get a proper class of frigates or destroyers to meet the need for potential combatants. To try and have a small vessel that can do both would IMO be a decision to spend too much money (and time, a key factor as well) to get another call of vessel that can do either patrolling or combat, but would perform those roles poorly.
This is what I would expect the outcome to be, with as many as 12 being commissioned.

Regards,

Massive
 

MickB

Well-Known Member
[QUOTE="

Once a vessel starts to get below a certain size and displacement, then they become much less suitable for transiting long distances and/or crossing blue water/open ocean. The low end of OPV sizes (~80 m long, ~1,500 tons +/-) is right around the minimum for some of these requirements. If a vessel were to try and operate whilst being even smaller or lower displacement, then the vessel and crew could run into serious difficulties and risk, particularly if they had to weather a storm at sea and no port or harbour within a safe distance. What an OPV will usually do with the available space and displacement (beyond the DWT of a vessel) is to have victuals and bunkerage enabling long distance ops of corresponding duration.


[/QUOTE]

Sounds like a description of the ACPBs to me.

As for these never ending reveiws.
They have the position of shadow defence miister, do they exist only to put shit on the government in power and use the title as some sort of proof of expertise.
Or do they at any time realy look at the portfolio they are given. (note I do not say earn)
Do they not have a plan going forward.
Have they no policies at all before being elected, thus the need for all these reviews and if this is the case why have shadow ministers at all.
If they have polices and plans in place why doe's it take two years plus to do a reveiw after each election.
 

devo99

Well-Known Member
Looking into the past momentarily.
On this day 110 years ago.
RAN Fleet Entry 1913.jpg

@devo99 Source for image required. You have been on here long enough to know the rules.

Ngatimozart.
Source:
The battlecruiser and flagship of the Australian Fleet Unit, HMAS Australia (I) leads the line of HMA Ships Sydney, Melbourne, Encounter, Parramatta, Warregoand Yarra in to Sydney Harbour at 10.30 on the morning of 4 October 1913.

Maker: Exchange studios

AWM A04073
 
Last edited:

Redlands18

Well-Known Member
Satirical question, but could this fleet pose a real threat to the current RNZN? Would they be able to stop it?
Very interesting question, the vastly superior accuracy and rate of fire of the Mk 45 127mm would take out the Cruisers unless they scored an early hit and Penguin ASMs launched from the Sea Sprites would at least mission kill the Battlecruiser and overwatch provided by the P-8s would be a massive factor. Also against ships with zero real defence against missiles, the CAMM missiles could be used in the SSM role.
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
Very interesting question, the vastly superior accuracy and rate of fire of the Mk 45 127mm would take out the Cruisers unless they scored an early hit and Penguin ASMs launched from the Sea Sprites would at least mission kill the Battlecruiser and overwatch provided by the P-8s would be a massive factor. Also against ships with zero real defence against missiles, the CAMM missiles could be used in the SSM role.
Agree that the question is interesting, but I am not so certain about the conclusions.

I agree that the Mk 45 is likely more accurate and has a higher ROF, but I am skeptical about how effective the 5"/127mm shells would be vs. the armour aboard the cruisers or the battlecruiser. One has to remember that warships designed and built in that era were expected to engage in gun duels. The Mk 45 would have out-ranged the guns fitted aboard the cruisers with a max effective range of ~24 km vs. ~13 km for the 6"/50 cal. Mk XI guns which IMO is one of the two factors which would have mattered. The other being how effective the 5"/127 mm shells would have been against the various thicknesses of armour. If the RNZN frigates could maintain a distance from the cruisers, then they would likely overcome the cruisers in time. The ROF difference I believe would work to to being negligible in the end, whilst the Mk 45's have a higher ROF (at least when using ready rounds, which could get exhausted after a few minutes) of up to 20 rounds/min, the cruisers themselves have more guns each with a ROF of 5-7 rounds/min. If a cruiser could manage to get three of their 6" guns to bear, that would be a ROF of 15-21 rounds/min and with three cruisers vs. two frigates... it easily be that the cruisers could manage a greater volume of fire, assuming they could get within range.

Similarly, I am not so certain that a Penguin AShM could manage to achieve a mission kill vs the battlecruiser, since the design again was from an era where naval gun battles were expected as well as there being significantly less of the modern sensors and electronics. No question that the 120 kg warhead would do damage, but I am much less certain that it could inflict enough damage, in critical areas of a warship from that era, that would effectively neutralize it. If the NZDF actually has any Penguin AShM that could be fired (there is some question of what the inventory is, what condition it is in, and whether or not NZ has ever actually test-fired it) then a max of two could be fitted at once. In order to effectively disable the main guns of the battlecruiser both normal and backup fire control positions would need to be disabled, and there would still be 16 4" guns fitted to the superstructure which could be used as well.

Such an engagement would come down to whether or not the RNZN could maintain the distance from the cruisers and battlecruiser, and would the stocks of ordnance be sufficient to hold out whilst damage was being inflicted. If the battlecruiser was able to close range with the RNZN frigates, then the contest would essentially be decided. The speed of the battlecruiser was quite close to that of the frigates, and the 12"/50 cal. Mk X guns had a range of ~18.5 km, so things would get quite dicey for the frigates. They would have little opportunity to fire the Mk 45's since they would need to be on a heading away from the battlecruiser in order to maintain the distance, which would put the Mk 45's out of a useful firing arc whilst there would be multiple potential firing arcs from the battlecruiser and cruisers.
 

Rob c

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
The speed of the battlecruiser was quite close to that of the frigates, and the 12"/50 cal. Mk X guns had a range of ~18.5 km, so things would get quite dicey for the frigates. They would have little opportunity to fire the Mk 45's since they would need to be on a heading away from the battlecruiser in order to maintain the distance, which would put the Mk 45's out of a useful firing arc whilst there would be multiple potential firing arcs from the battlecruiser and cruisers.
yes the stated speeds are quite close with only a 2knot difference, However a lot would depend on how long the Battle cruiser had been out of refit as steam plants of that era tended to not produce full power as they aged and even when new, they could not make full speed for a long period. I remember reading about 2 RN similar Battle Cruisers with had a 25 knot published speed, but they could only reach 22knots when chasing a German B.C. in the Mediterranean sea in WW1. they were a year past their last refit.
 

CJR

Active Member
Satirical question, but could this fleet pose a real threat to the current RNZN? Would they be able to stop it?
Cruisers vs Frigates? Ignoring choppers and air support for now...

5in 54 has a maximum range of 23km but "effective" range is quoted at about 15km (per navweapons)
Taking the British 6in/50 Mark XI (assuming those are Town class CLs), range on standard naval mounts tops out at about 13km (at 15deg elevation), in later modified naval mounts (elevation of 20-22deg) maybe 16km.

ANZAC class have a nominal top speed of 27 knots vs the Town class topping out at a nominal 25 knots. Of cause, plus/minus the whole time out of dry dock; state of engines; definitions of speed (trials vs operational; on initial entry to service vs after refits; etc.); how hard the crew are willing to press their machinery... Close enough that given the vagaries I'd call it a dead heat.

So, the ANZACs can happily plink away from outside Town-class range but needs to close to about the up to about the limits of the Town-classes maximum range for a reasonable prospect of rapidly knocking 'em out. At that point modern fire control still has an advantage but it's somewhat offset by the number of gun tubes on each side (2 vs 12-16ish).

Battle Cruiser vs Frigates? Again ignoring choppers and air support for now...
12in/45 can reach out to 15-17km in a standard naval mounting (13.5deg elevation) depending on the type of ammo (2crh vs 4crh AP shell).

Top speed of 26 knots (assuming Indefatigable class).

Pretty much the same as for the Cruisers, but with the note that any 12in hits will sting an awful lot more...

So, in a head on action good prospect of a RNZN tactical victory/strategic draw with the downtime vessels escaping afloat but with badly smashed up upperworks. But, of cause, the larger number of downtime ships means the downtime fleet would have a reasonable prospect of pinning the RNZN in place while being able to spare a Cruiser and a few TBs to cause havoc elsewhere. Or split the RNZN and overwhelm each Frigate separately.

With helicopters? I'm dubious a Penguin can get through an I class's belt (4-6in) or deck (1.5-2in... more doable if the missile is diving at a steep angle) but it'd sure make a mess topside. Better prospect it'd get through the belt on the light cruisers (1.5-3in) which opens up the serious possibility of a fireworks display... But barring a magazine hit then we're probably talking 1-2 hits for a mission kill and 2-4 hits for an actual sinking.

Torpedo Boats I'd certainly say one Penguin is a mission kill with a good prospect of a sinking.

So, with SH-2s there's a good prospect of clear RNZN strategic victory with the BC getting away smashed up but afloat but most of the CLs and TBs sunk.
 
Last edited:
Top