For me, tier 1 says survivable and still in the fight after multiple hits this means size and redundancy, tier 2 ships, one hit and your out. I’m not against the inclusion of FF’s or FFL’s but they shouldn’t be taking the fight to the enemy. They should be escorting and patrolling. DDG’s & FFG’s will be needed in quantities to slug it out with peer enemies and must be able to inflict and take damage longer than the enemy. On the DSR as whole If the unclassified version says anything it says they think we’re stupid or in fact they are. It was a 120 odd pages of fluff disguising defence cuts that are being spread through two reviews, not one new capability, re-rolling the army to a insurgent force with a negligible close combat capability and a status quo for the Air Force.
Reality check.
If the primary threat is missile and air strikes from forward island bases and naval strike groups, supported by infiltrating special forces and saboteurs, then you need the capability to respond to and defend against those threats.
I like tanks, I love heavy armour, when I was young and stupid I honestly thought the Army should be remodelled with each of the three brigades converted to US style, tank heavy Armoured Cavalry Regiments. The remaining infantry would be concentrated into a single three battalion light, airmobile brigades plus supporting elements. Like I said, I was young and stupid.
When you tailor your defence forces to what you think is sexy, or even what someone else used to smash their enemy somewhere else, you are not necessarily getting the capability you need where you are.
Same applies to a force structure designed for a specific threat at a specific time. In 1942 the Australian army divisions pivoted from becoming a combined arms force to what was called "jungle infantry". This entered the national psyche for decades afterwards, elite, light infantry fighting in jungles against Japanese, then various Communist threats, not a tank in sight.
This was totally wrong. The "jungle infantry" were actually more accurately quickly reroled conventional infantry, stripped of much if their support equipment to fight in mountains. Eventually they received the "mountanised" support equipment they needed, while much of the force reverted to convention infantry, supported by similar, or greater scales of armour, artillery and engineers as earlier in the war, to fight the Japanese other than in the mountains. Much of this conventional capability being deployed amphibiously.
Somewhere along the line, armour, artillery, close air support, naval gunfire support, resupply from air and sea, were forgotten and it became the legend of "jungle" light infantry defeating the Japanese threat.
Korea, we needed tanks, didn't have them, Vietnam we had and used armour to great effect.
Every single conflict the RAN and RAAF have been there doing their jobs with what they have. Sometimes it's been the right gear, sometimes it been the ideal gear, sometimes they have had to make do, but they have always been there.
Against major powers there is no getting past the fact that air and sea power is the decider in our region. These days army can contribute to both, and due to the DSR and previous initiative by previous governments, they will.
