Royal Australian Air Force [RAAF] News, Discussions and Updates

[downunderblue]

I have to say I disagree with the above, not to say there aren’t challenges posed in some of the comments (which I would argue could be overcome), but I would reiterate the main objective of any armed force is to actually deter future conflict.

We are in an age of great power competition where our interests are closely aligned in maintaining the status quo (rules based order) in NE/SE Asia and the Western Pacific. China however is seeking to change the regional balance leading us and several other neighbouring nations to fear future PRC coercion and the erosion of their sovereignty. Efforts to historically economically and politically coerce us have been unsuccessful because we stood strong. China had more to lose in a trade war with us so eventually they put away their 15 claims and gave up returning to the rules based status quo.

Militarily you have to ask what we possess of real strength to deter any military conflict. Our real asset is our geography- a third island chain fixed aircraft carrier and forward staging base to allow our main ally to do the real heavy lifting. I've always been very supportive of the SSN's because they put sufficient doubt in a opposition decision maker mind when determining whether they can win a future conflict. Their benefit is of significant tactical and operational value but I would argue their real benefit is strategically how they deter conflict.

There is significant program risk though with AUKUS and no plan B. I would argue in the same vein that the real value of a B-21 acquisition is similar in their projected deterrence value. An SSN can be anywhere ready to hit you, as does a B-21, and whilst in reality we could be talking about 2 fwd deployed subs here and a squadron there, they do add up in addition to a powerful reiteration to our most important ally that we are more than just a fwd staging base.

Now not all defense aquisitions are of deterrent value. It would be pointless to have SSN's or a B-21 squadron if you dont have the ability to defend them. However every acquisition needs to be measured on how it improves our long term security and a main way to do that is to deter conflict in the first place.

Now I could go on but I don’t have the time as of now. I'm not saying there aren’t obstacles, but in terms of deterrent value I would conclude that a handful of 1500km Tomahawks fired off a destroyer won’t cut it. Ask yourself what will and what would give you pause as an operational commander of an opposing force. The SSN's will be awesome, but what else do we have on top of how do we mitigate their loss if we fail to obtain the first three boats on time.

 

[aviation_enthus]

I have to say I disagree with the above, not to say there aren’t challenges posed in some of the comments (which I would argue could be overcome), but I would reiterate the main objective of any armed force is to actually deter future conflict.

We are in an age of great power competition where our interests are closely aligned in maintaining the status quo (rules based order) in NE/SE Asia and the Western Pacific. China however is seeking to change the regional balance leading us and several other neighbouring nations to fear future PRC coercion and the erosion of their sovereignty. Efforts to historically economically and politically coerce us have been unsuccessful because we stood strong. China had more to lose in a trade war with us so eventually they put away their 15 claims and gave up returning to the rules based status quo.

Militarily you have to ask what we possess of real strength to deter any military conflict. Our real asset is our geography- a third island chain fixed aircraft carrier and forward staging base to allow our main ally to do the real heavy lifting. I've always been very supportive of the SSN's because they put sufficient doubt in a opposition decision maker mind when determining whether they can win a future conflict. Their benefit is of significant tactical and operational value but I would argue their real benefit is strategically how they deter conflict.

There is significant program risk though with AUKUS and no plan B. I would argue in the same vein that the real value of a B-21 acquisition is similar in their projected deterrence value. An SSN can be anywhere ready to hit you, as does a B-21, and whilst in reality we could be talking about 2 fwd deployed subs here and a squadron there, they do add up in addition to a powerful reiteration to our most important ally that we are more than just a fwd staging base.

Now not all defense aquisitions are of deterrent value. It would be pointless to have SSN's or a B-21 squadron if you dont have the ability to defend them. However every acquisition needs to be measured on how it improves our long term security and a main way to do that is to deter conflict in the first place.

Now I could go on but I don’t have the time as of now. I'm not saying there aren’t obstacles, but in terms of deterrent value I would conclude that a handful of 1500km Tomahawks fired off a destroyer won’t cut it. Ask yourself what will and what would give you pause as an operational commander of an opposing force. The SSN's will be awesome, but what else do we have on top of how do we mitigate their loss if we fail to obtain the first three boats on time.

Army Reserve units with HIMARS or similar indigenous designed truck launchers could add to the “mere handful” launched by destroyers.
Would also be significantly cheaper to maintain in peacetime, missiles could be built in an Australian based factory at low rate production (with capacity to 3-4x production in war).

Long range drones (like existing capability- Triton) could be acquired for targeting. SSN’s could be used for maritime areas. Future drone submarines etc can also be developed in Australia to assist.

This plays on our advantage in geography, large land mass to launch from (look out how hard it is for USA to stop launches from Iran). PLUS these weapons could be forward deployed to defend Indonesia if required, our biggest threat is loosing the natural barrier to our north.

As others have stated, B-21’s are an expensive item that don’t meet the needs of our country. Many other options that are more flexible, sustainable or affordable.

 

[downunderblue]

The ability to put 4x 2000 lb bombs in a house 1500 km away? Let me introduce you to Tomahawk. Carry an anti-shipping strike? Nope. What else could an F-111 do? And if there are comments about deterrence or scaring Jakarta, I'm going to need tangible evidence. I've never found a single piece of evidence that the F-111 impacted any neighbour's political thinking - I've been looking and asking for a decade now

I don't have time to counter each of the above statements but this one got my attn.

I've tried to quickly reference it but cant, but from recall I believe I watched a doco or similar with a comment quoted from B.J. Habibie around the time of East Timor when talking to one of his minitsters or advisors etc of the ability/threat of a RAAF F-111 to successfully target the Presidential palace with little to no warning. I've tried to find it but cant but the memory of that comment stayed with me. I will try to look for the direct ref when I get some time.

Btw, the distance between Darwin and Yulin Naval Base is about 4200km. To get your Hobart class destroyer within 1500km of Yulin would need you to move closer to the first island chain, say maybe near Palawan. Yes that's ok if you have an SSN anytime soon but aHobart will be lucky to get that close in a shooting war. 30 mins later your big stick needs reloading and that doesnt happen anytime soon if ever. A B-21 with 8 JDAM's can get close without notice and keep coming back.

 

[Todjaeger]

I don't have time to counter each of the above statements but this one got my attn.

I've tried to quickly reference it but cant, but from recall I believe I watched a doco or similar with a comment quoted from B.J. Habibie around the time of East Timor when talking to one of his minitsters or advisors etc of the ability/threat of a RAAF F-111 to successfully target the Presidential palace with little to no warning. I've tried to find it but cant but the memory of that comment stayed with me. I will try to look for the direct ref when I get some time.

Btw, the distance between Darwin and Yulin Naval Base is about 4200km. To get your Hobart class destroyer within 1500km of Yulin would need you to move closer to the first island chain, say maybe near Palawan. Yes that's ok if you have an SSN anytime soon but aHobart will be lucky to get that close in a shooting war. 30 mins later your big stick needs reloading and that doesnt happen anytime soon if ever. A B-21 with 8 JDAM's can get close without notice and keep coming back.

I too recall hearing stories about Indonesian thoughts about the F-111, but I do not recall whether the stories were actually confirmed officially as accurate.

Me being me, I would much rather a Hobart-class DDG get primarily tasked with providing area air defence, either for a TF or for important coastal areas of Australia, like a port or naval base.

A LO strategic bomber is really a very niche (and expensive) capability. If one is really going to contemplate Australia using them to launch strikes, esp non-standoff range strikes against Hainan Island or elsewhere in the PRC, the one really needs to also consider the full scale scenario. If things have degraded to the point where Australia is launching LO strikes against the PRC, it is distinctly possible that the PRC would be looking at launching either strikes or counterstrikes at Australia. Given that air-launched LACM or ballistic missiles from PLAAF H-6's could likely reach a significant portion of Australia including where the RAAF might base hypothetical B-21 Raiders, spending billions to establish a niche capability to drop guided bombs on a nation which could likely respond with an overwhelming amount of conventional ordnance does not seem like a wise use of scarce resources. Esp considering that there are other long-range strike options available.

TBH, for people to keep going back to Australia establishing or restoring bombers/strike aircraft as a form of strategic deterrence does rather make me think of the saying, "if all you have is a hammer..."

 

[Takao]

*long list of unclassified details that were considered professionally*

I don't agree.

Cool. And I ack you don't have time; but they are very serious reasons that cannot be countered by "my feels disagree".

When it comes to deterrence, you need to be quite specific. Deterrence theory is very poorly understood in Australian professional circles; and even more so in public. I firmly believe that there are only two ways of providing military deterrence - mass or nukes - neither of which applies to us (except against NZ / Tonga / Fiji / etc). So if we double our deterrence capability - we are doubling nothing. Furthermore, air power as a deterrence has long been questionable (the very tenent's of airpower argue against it). What is particularly interesting - and very unpopular against a significant part of the ACT's population - is that heavy land power deployed forward is actually a greater deterrence. It demonstrates national will and a willingness to fight significantly more than any light or easily deployable force.

So from that, quite frankly, a Sqn of B-21 offers no deterrence value unless they are nuclear armed. Ours won't be. A Sqn equates to no more than four ready to go - against a IAMD system designed to counter waves of USAF B-2 and B-21. Just what do you those 4 aircraft will do. Airpower is great tactically; but strategically poor. And when dismissing those handful of Tomahawks (and ignoring land based launchers, notably PrSM), note that you have only 4 whole B-21s

And those 4 online aircraft are going to cost $80 b at minimum. You cut Mogami, all Land vehicle programs landing craft and a bunch of ancillary projects - and you don't get $80 b. So you have today's ADF with no FFG, maybe 2 Hunter and a light infantry Army. But a Sqn of B-21. That isn't deterring anything. But, and I'm not seriously arguing this, $80 b of heavy Land Power and the ability to put it where we want....that starts offering deterrence.

I don't have time to counter each of the above statements but this one got my attn.

I've tried to quickly reference it but cant, but from recall I believe I watched a doco or similar with a comment quoted from B.J. Habibie around the time of East Timor when talking to one of his minitsters or advisors etc of the ability/threat of a RAAF F-111 to successfully target the Presidential palace with little to no warning. I've tried to find it but cant but the memory of that comment stayed with me. I will try to look for the direct ref when I get some time.

Did you see my comment about tangible evidence? I have hundreds of anecdotes about what people said or thought - I am yet to see any evidence of said discussions. Perhaps 2029 will unveil some INTERFET cabinet papers, but I have access to a variety of databases and nothing shows anything tangible about F-111s deterring. Even then, it honestly appears to stem from Air Power Australia in the mid-2000s in an attempt to keep the F-111 flying.

Btw, the distance between Darwin and Yulin Naval Base is about 4200km. To get your Hobart class destroyer within 1500km of Yulin would need you to move closer to the first island chain, say maybe near Palawan. Yes that's ok if you have an SSN anytime soon but aHobart will be lucky to get that close in a shooting war. 30 mins later your big stick needs reloading and that doesnt happen anytime soon if ever. A B-21 with 8 JDAM's can get close without notice and keep coming back.

It's very bold to think that we will penetrate an IAMD bubble that is designed around stopping the US Air Force with the same platform that the US Air Force operates. Certainly not asymmetric. And 8 JDAMs will do squat. And yes, similar arguments apply against a DDG. These bases are hardened, big and have redundancies. But that's before we get into why would we strike Yulin Naval Base? It shows a very superficial level of strategic analysis about what our likely tasks are going to be in a PRC-US war over Taiwan. The idea that we will have crewed platforms anywhere near the SCS is bordering on farcical.

 

[StevoJH]

@downunderblue

To follow up on the posts by @Takao and @Todjaeger

Ignoring the fact that even if you could put a squadron of 20 B21's on target simultaneously (which you can't), a single strike is unlikely to inflict catastrophic damage, consider the supporting capabilities required to put those bombs or missiles on target.

If you are planning on penetrating Chinese airspace you are going to need Fighter and Jammer support. So that means F-35A and EA-18G also involved in the strike package, are you forward basing them or are you launching from Darwin or Tindal with Tanker support?

If you are forward basing them, then you don't need B-21 since you can just use a strike package of F-35A's, supported by EA-18G.

If you are launching from the Australian continent, are you flying over Indonesia (and either Malaysia or Philippines) with their permission? In which case the Chinese are likely to know the strike is inbound if they haven't noticed the concentration of assets at Northern Australian bases already. Or are you flying all the way out over the pacific through international airspace?

How many additional A330-MRTT do you plan to acquire to support this?

In addition, due to attrition and shear amount of resources required for such a strike, it would be very hard to repeat a second time.

How is this being paid for? What is it at the expense of?

If this is *new* money, you can buy an awful lot of F-35A, Frigates, AFV's or even additional SSN's for the money that would be required to introduce a very limited Heavy Bomber capability.

If the capability for a single one off strike is required, maybe something like Rapid Dragon would be a better solution. Sadly purchasing additional C-17's is no longer an option.

 

[ADMk2]

@downunderblue

To follow up on the posts by @Takao and @Todjaeger

Ignoring the fact that even if you could put a squadron of 20 B21's on target simultaneously (which you can't), a single strike is unlikely to inflict catastrophic damage, consider the supporting capabilities required to put those bombs or missiles on target.

If you are planning on penetrating Chinese airspace you are going to need Fighter and Jammer support. So that means F-35A and EA-18G also involved in the strike package, are you forward basing them or are you launching from Darwin or Tindal with Tanker support?

If you are forward basing them, then you don't need B-21 since you can just use a strike package of F-35A's, supported by EA-18G.

If you are launching from the Australian continent, are you flying over Indonesia (and either Malaysia or Philippines) with their permission? In which case the Chinese are likely to know the strike is inbound if they haven't noticed the concentration of assets at Northern Australian bases already. Or are you flying all the way out over the pacific through international airspace?

How many additional A330-MRTT do you plan to acquire to support this?

In addition, due to attrition and shear amount of resources required for such a strike, it would be very hard to repeat a second time.

How is this being paid for? What is it at the expense of?

If this is *new* money, you can buy an awful lot of F-35A, Frigates, AFV's or even additional SSN's for the money that would be required to introduce a very limited Heavy Bomber capability.

If the capability for a single one off strike is required, maybe something like Rapid Dragon would be a better solution. Sadly purchasing additional C-17's is no longer an option.

Seeing as though we apparently have an imaginary $80b and the human resources to support this, I’ll argue a better strategic deterrent would be a pair of Queen Elizabeth Class carriers, sufficient fixed wing fighters to equip them and an extra couple of escorts to protect them.

Then we have all the long range strike we could ever use. We have genuine sea power to go with it, genuine fleet level ASW which the B-21‘s can never provide, a capability that can sit off a coast during a time of crisis and provide some actual deterrence, whereas the B-21A’s by nature can’t be “visible” in the way a carrier could. $20b for the carriers, $10b for the escorts and $20b for the fighters and extra ASW helos / UAS.

The remaining $30b goes on SM-3 for RAN and THAAD for RAAF to give us a genuine BMD capability.

Seeing as though we are now doing imaginary money and imaginary resources and all…