NZDF - Now and the Future.

[Markus40]

In my book i dont think you can call bloodless coups by the military to be professional by any standard. The Army is supposed uphold the government and its peoples and protect them. But what we have seen is corruption among the Military brass and as a result destabalizing the region.

I think its actually been to pure good luck that due to problems with the indigenous Fijians and Indians there hasnt been a civil war. With the Army in the middle of it, i cant see a good result coming out of it, considering their reputation of coups. Not a good look.

Actually according to many professional sources the Fijian military are considered very professional and disciplined, hence the coups have actually been bloodless and the nation has not fractured. I think Aussie Digger alluded to this in a previous post.

As for staging an invasion/lodgement. I think it can be done in the way you describe, but at considerable risk and not as fast as you allude to. One thing tho. I do not believe that the NZDF has the logistics and stores it requires to carry out this operation at the present time.

To get back to my overriding point, the NZDF needs to be structured, equipped and supplied to carry out a worst case scenario operation in NZ’s area of operations. I believe the army is mostly there (and has a plan to get it even further in the right direction), all that is required is the lift, logistics infrastructure, and supplies to get it from A to B.

 

[Whiskyjack]

In my book i dont think you can call bloodless coups by the military to be professional by any standard. The Army is supposed uphold the government and its peoples and protect them. But what we have seen is corruption among the Military brass and as a result destabalizing the region.

I think its actually been to pure good luck that due to problems with the indigenous Fijians and Indians there hasnt been a civil war. With the Army in the middle of it, i cant see a good result coming out of it, considering their reputation of coups. Not a good look.

I think we are going a little off topic, and I hear what you are saying, and I do agree. What i mean is that is does require disipline and an ability to plan. I am not suggesting that coups are a sign of a proffesional army .

 

[KH-12]

Will we ever be in a position where our forces are to go up against a professional military force (eg Fiji) rather than something like an insurgency of militants in the context of the South Pacific region, it is a step further down the track from "peacekeeping", maybe as part of a multinational effort but not on our own.

 

[Sea Toby]

Why does every military operation discussion involving New Zealand's defence forces always evolve into a worst case scenario? I mentioned anarchy, a situation not necessarily a full blown invasion, especially if Australian forces are too committed elsewhere. New Zealand defence forces should be able to insert forces, inlcuding light fighters, into Fiji for scenarios of less than a full blown invasion. There could be many scenarios where the airport and/or port won't have to be taken by force.

I don't think any New Zealand government would invade Fiji without the support of the government of Fiji, and without the support of the other Pacific Island states. Light fighters provide QUICK ground fire support. Light fighters have the ferry range to reach Fiji or other neighboring island states.

New Zealand's artillery could be on one island, and the trouble spot could be on another. Frigates take time to move arbout at 28 knots, light fighters moved forward can hit targets throughout Fiji quickly.

New Zealand moved forward short range fighters during World War II into the Solomon Islands. Why do some not see doing it again in the future? I cannot see New Zealand not becoming involved in the island states north of it when the involvement is requested.

 

[KH-12]

Would it not be possible to make the Orions JDAM compatible then they could provide a reasonable level of air support in a low risk air environment, they certainly have the range if based in the region, and could carry a reasonable load of GBU-29's, could stay on station for a couple of hours.

 

[Markus40]

I see also that the Fijian Military are going to cut their army size to around half the number they have at present as well as cut their Navy patrol size.

I really dont think we are going off topic, because the overall desision making that relates to causing coups and destabalising government and resources is a serious breach, to any so called professional army. It has a serious effect to morale, and anything can happen when morale and dicipline falls down.

I think personally the fijian army are good soldiers when fighting in coalition with other forces, but i am unconvinced about their strength and posture in being able to co ordinate efficient operations like fighting against a "fictious Army" like NZ by themselves.

I think we are going a little off topic, and I hear what you are saying, and I do agree. What i mean is that is does require disipline and an ability to plan. I am not suggesting that coups are a sign of a proffesional army .

 

[Whiskyjack]

Why does every military operation discussion involving New Zealand's defence forces always evolve into a worst case scenario? I mentioned anarchy, a situation not necessarily a full blown invasion, especially if Australian forces are too committed elsewhere. New Zealand defence forces should be able to insert forces, inlcuding light fighters, into Fiji for scenarios of less than a full blown invasion. There could be many scenarios where the airport and/or port won't have to be taken by force.

I don't think any New Zealand government would invade Fiji without the support of the government of Fiji, and without the support of the other Pacific Island states. Light fighters provide QUICK ground fire support. Light fighters have the ferry range to reach Fiji or other neighboring island states.

New Zealand's artillery could be on one island, and the trouble spot could be on another. Frigates take time to move arbout at 28 knots, light fighters moved forward can hit targets throughout Fiji quickly.

New Zealand moved forward short range fighters during World War II into the Solomon Islands. Why do some not see doing it again in the future? I cannot see New Zealand not becoming involved in the island states north of it when the involvement is requested.

So what happens if the legitimate Fijian Govt is overthrown by its army and asks for aid?

Sure the Aussies will be there, that doesn't mean that NZDF may have an area of ops assigned to it, it certainly does not mean that the NZDF should not be trained and equiped for medium level amphibious ops in conjunction with Australian forces.

As I have stated above light fighters just don't cut it in the environment. Where are they moving forward to and how are they supported logisticly?

You have to be careful you are not inventing a force structure on what you think will fit the situation, you tailor your force for what you know is the worst case scenario.

In the Pacific IMHO that is a forced entry into a state where the ports and airports are not open to your forces.

At the end of the day you prepare for the worst and hope for the best, that is the Govts job in all areas, not just defence.

 

[Whiskyjack]

I see also that the Fijian Military are going to cut their army size to around half the number they have at present as well as cut their Navy patrol size.

I really dont think we are going off topic, because the overall desision making that relates to causing coups and destabalising government and resources is a serious breach, to any so called professional army. It has a serious effect to morale, and anything can happen when morale and dicipline falls down.

I think personally the fijian army are good soldiers when fighting in coalition with other forces, but i am unconvinced about their strength and posture in being able to co ordinate efficient operations like fighting against a "fictious Army" like NZ by themselves.

Yet NZ has an army, navy and air force that is thousands of kms from potential areas of operations.

Where is the amphibious training, and I am not talking opposed landings here, but over a beach. Where are the ships that will get the army from a to b, place them over the beach and support them logisticly? Air lift? etc...

Is the MRV the ship for the job?

We are not currently able to conduct operations we are talking about. Are we capable? Yes we are.

 

[Markus40]

I dont like to keep repeating myself, but the NZDF can, if operating fast aircraft use an forward operating base IE Niue to set up MASH style operations and move equipment, IE Ro/Ro vessels with sustained supplies and have them flown into Suva once the MRV has secured the Airport and Port facilities. Its totally possible. Even if we just used our Helos on our ships, it is.

The force structure is already in place to carry out this type of operation less a fast attack craft.

So what happens if the legitimate Fijian Govt is overthrown by its army and asks for aid?

Sure the Aussies will be there, that doesn't mean that NZDF may have an area of ops assigned to it, it certainly does not mean that the NZDF should not be trained and equiped for medium level amphibious ops in conjunction with Australian forces.

As I have stated above light fighters just don't cut it in the environment. Where are they moving forward to and how are they supported logisticly?

You have to be careful you are not inventing a force structure on what you think will fit the situation, you tailor your force for what you know is the worst case scenario.

In the Pacific IMHO that is a forced entry into a state where the ports and airports are not open to your forces.

At the end of the day you prepare for the worst and hope for the best, that is the Govts job in all areas, not just defence.

 

[Sea Toby]

I rather use a more effective and cheaper P-51 Mustang than use a P-3 Orion, after dropping a few bombs the Mustang could straff the area. Why risk a NZ$ 300 million aircraft when a modern NZ$30 million light fighter can do the job better?

If and when New Zealand has to plan for the worst case scenario, I'm sure there would be no rush to invade Fiji? New Zealand will have the time, to enlist allies, much less acquire more equipment and draft troops, to invade....

 

[Stuart Mackey]

RIGHT!! Check your facts sir.The MRV can carry extra supplies and stores along with up to 20 LAVS if needed with 4 Helos.

CANTERBURY, has a vehicle capacity for up to 40 NZLAVs (the Army’s new armoured fighting vehicle) along with an embarked force of up to 250 personnel.

From the navies site

As I said, 250 troops. Yes it can lift 40 LAV's, half of which can be crewed properly from the embarked troops, and that does not take into account logistics equipment requirements ashore. I quoted a former NZ army officer above who was of the opinion that armed intervention by us in Fiji was practically an impossibility if we were opposed. Our lift capacity is not that great now for an opposed intervention, and at the risk of an appeal to authority, why should I accept your opinion over his?.

The Fijian Army has shown that it HASNT in the past been able to take control properly over coups and NZ along with Australia have expressed deep concern over the role of the Army in times past. Any military commander who is weilding control over a coup and manipulating the armies control like it has in Fiji, and asks for outside help is in cookkoo land.

You ever hear that the deposed governemnt in 1987 asked for help? well it did, I hear they used a telephone. And as for our concerns over the Fiji army..so what? if that army opposes us intervening, we wont be going, because we cannot put ashore the force nessary to do anything about it.

 

[Stuart Mackey]

Mr Stuart Mackey-I thought you might like a history lesson to broaden your understanding over the fijian military/political scope. Im sure you will find the information helpful and understand why the NZ government might be concerned over the way the Fijian military acts.

snip

Nice attempt at a strawman, shame I can see through it. The history of Fiji since 1987 has absolutly no bearing on the fact that NZ cannot move a a battalion group {the minimum force that can sustain itself in the feild and do a job, according to the army] anywhere out side of New Zealand.

 

[gf0012-aust]

There are some really non trivial issues that have to be addressed:

• amphibious and airborne insertions do require 5:1 ratios to the advantage of the assaulting force
• an entrenched enemy
• a disciplined force that has historically demonstrated good and persistent deliverance of their craft
• minimal entry points - all made easier to defend by their location
• local knowledge for the entrenched forces to maximise mobility
• projection of disparate capability - not only at the transport to theatre level, but within the battlespace
• persistence - a severe logistics issue - and its logistics which often dictate outcomes
• political will and intent on the part of the Govt for the assaulting force to wear casualties against committed defenders
• time and timing of force overlap
• objective issues

I struggle to see how NZ is going to deliver on various but necessary elements of the above when the existing and near future force capability is less than what Australia was ready to consider deploying in 1987.

We did not have the ability to lay sufficient forces into the theatre within what was defined as a preferred time frame - and that was with a regiment of soldiers, landing vessels, good ISR in place and 3 major surface combatants for shore bombardment and "presence". The preference was for a battalion strength insertion - and there was no way that we could get the right numbers ashore even with combined aerial and amphib events under way. The time frame for SASR to hold the air and shipping ports until heavier support was inserted was regarded as unfavourably risky. This was with SASR being inserted by Oberons and not regarded as part of the "force de main"

250 troops going against an existing land force of between 3000-3500 people at any given time - and being able to sustain that persistence and presence is not a lightweight event by any means.

No ones doubting the capability of Kiwi troops to do the job - but to argue that you can provide sufficient mass using light troops as an interim hold against 3000+ regulars of highly regarded calibre is pretty optimistic.



As I said before - I think the only way to do this is to seize and hold an outlying island and use it as a logistics hub and a sally point. Its the only way to build up sufficient mass before you can launch an attack. Your naval vessels can then blockade major shipping events in the interim.

Logistics logistics logistics.

 

[Markus40]

Actually the Fijian Military is about to take a reduction in military army numbers to about half of the 3500 regulars. As well as cutting back on their Navy personel. So the ratio will be well down on this estimate.

No one to this point has convinced me that NZ cant perform this operation by itself. As trivial as it is, it does raise interesting questions about our own ability to deploy such elements within our armed forces, and as far as i am concerned the operation can be carried out with persistance and precise planning.

Its highly unlikely that the Fijian army will put all its 3500 regulars against the incoming assault party at one time, and they will never be able to pitch that number on a surprise landing at night, if the NZ Army planning consisted on landing anywhere on the Island of Fiji. The Fijian army of 3500 men will not be able to extend its forces so thinly across the Island, as this will jeopodise their own defenses. This will be an advantage to a surprise landing. With equipment and man power along with fire support from the Frigates and Helos.

There are some really non trivial issues that have to be addressed:

• amphibious and airborne insertions do require 5:1 ratios to the advantage of the assaulting force
• an entrenched enemy
• a disciplined force that has historically demonstrated good and persistent deliverance of their craft
• minimal entry points - all made easier to defend by their location
• local knowledge for the entrenched forces to maximise mobility
• projection of disparate capability - not only at the transport to theatre level, but within the battlespace
• persistence - a severe logistics issue - and its logistics which often dictate outcomes
• political will and intent on the part of the Govt for the assaulting force to wear casualties against committed defenders
• time and timing of force overlap
• objective issues

I struggle to see how NZ is going to deliver on various but necessary elements of the above when the existing and near future force capability is less than what Australia was ready to consider deploying in 1987.

We did not have the ability to lay sufficient forces into the theatre within what was defined as a preferred time frame - and that was with a regiment of soldiers, landing vessels, good ISR in place and 3 major surface combatants for shore bombardment and "presence". The preference was for a battalion strength insertion - and there was no way that we could get the right numbers ashore even with combined aerial and amphib events under way. The time frame for SASR to hold the air and shipping ports until heavier support was inserted was regarded as unfavourably risky. This was with SASR being inserted by Oberons and not regarded as part of the "force de main"

250 troops going against an existing land force of between 3000-3500 people at any given time - and being able to sustain that persistence and presence is not a lightweight event by any means.

No ones doubting the capability of Kiwi troops to do the job - but to argue that you can provide sufficient mass using light troops as an interim hold against 3000+ regulars of highly regarded calibre is pretty optimistic.



As I said before - I think the only way to do this is to seize and hold an outlying island and use it as a logistics hub and a sally point. Its the only way to build up sufficient mass before you can launch an attack. Your naval vessels can then blockade major shipping events in the interim.

Logistics logistics logistics.

 

[Markus40]

I actually dont want your opinion over this. Im quite well informed over the political and military structure of the NZ and Fijian armed forces. Im just trying to educate you. Obviously you are a little unititiated as i previously mentioned.

The 87 coup for your information came very close to NZ becoming involved. I would suggest the reason we didnt was because we didnt have the capability like we do now.

From the navies site

As I said, 250 troops. Yes it can lift 40 LAV's, half of which can be crewed properly from the embarked troops, and that does not take into account logistics equipment requirements ashore. I quoted a former NZ army officer above who was of the opinion that armed intervention by us in Fiji was practically an impossibility if we were opposed. Our lift capacity is not that great now for an opposed intervention, and at the risk of an appeal to authority, why should I accept your opinion over his?.





You ever hear that the deposed governemnt in 1987 asked for help? well it did, I hear they used a telephone. And as for our concerns over the Fiji army..so what? if that army opposes us intervening, we wont be going, because we cannot put ashore the force nessary to do anything about it.

 

[gf0012-aust]

The 87 coup for your information came very close to NZ becoming involved. I would suggest the reason we didnt was because we didnt have the capability like we do now.

Maybe we just have to agree to disagree

I was attached to International Division at the time of the coup - so I distinctly remember the internal kerfuffle we had re how we were going to be able to intervene.

We not only had to deal with the coup, but also had to liaise with the Indian Military as they were keen to go in and rescue ex-pat Indians. Needless to say that would have seen the manure hit the mistral in a large way and it would have provided the catalyst for a civil war. Anti-Indian sentiment is still very palpable - and we thought that it was going to brew up again earlier this year. In fact, I'd suggest that the troops that deployed for East Timor recently were in real terms marked up for Fiji when we getting some pretty ugly traffic about local racial dissent again. Fiji is still on our radar screen as far as that goes as we do expect it to get messy as the elections draw near (even though we hope it will stay civilised etc...)

So, I'm struggling to see why you think NZ could pull it off now when in absolute terms you have less maritime transport options and boots on ground capability than what we were ready to deploy in 87. We had far 4 times the (immed) available troops, substantially more available armour and certainly had the capability to get air/battlespace intimidation. We knew that the locals were very very anti-indian and they were in the process of shifting heavy trucks and equipment onto the runways to stop transports and int'l passenger jets landing (with or without plain clothes soldiers on board)

With 250 troops you already have diluted forces - and you have to be able to insert and hold until heavier forces are landed. Every major amphib/insertion event that failed in the last 70 years was due to an inability of the light forces to hold out long enough for heavier support elements to arrive - and that gets back to force ratios in limited time frames.

At least seize and hold of a nearby island enables force massing and logistics to be secured. It means that troops are less fatigued and can be short rested if need be. It also means that aircraft can be localised, fuel bladders laid out, runways built, sensor systems established to watch likely approaches. Going in cold when you don't have the numbers removes a lot of the opportunity to succeed in a meaningful fashion. and usually that means that the defenders are left in no doubt that they are foolhardy if they want to make it a protracted event. battlespace dominance does not only have to be inferred and implied - but self evident so as to remove any doubt on the defenders part that you will apply overwhelming mass and capability into the area. Thats really getting into ARG territory.

 

[Markus40]

Yes, we had our Air combat element in place then, and probably did have more foot soldiers as well, but i dont agree on less maritime options with our MRV coming in late 06. We didnt have this in 87. Yes, we had the scorpions as armour, but to be honest the LAV can do a better job because it can transport troops over a wider area. A scorpion cant. Besides it does have a 25mm gun as fire suppression.

I do believe the option of having an Island to start deploying resources and equipment is the way to go, and to jump from this starting point to the target area. With deploying with the element of surprise and location, i still believe that this type of operation could be carried out. Its a pity we lost our air strike element isnt it?

Maybe we just have to agree to disagree

I was attached to International Division at the time of the coup - so I distinctly remember the internal kerfuffle we had re how we were going to be able to intervene.

We not only had to deal with the coup, but also had to liaise with the Indian Military as they were keen to go in and rescue ex-pat Indians. Needless to say that would have seen the manure hit the mistral in a large way and it would have provided the catalyst for a civil war. Anti-Indian sentiment is still very palpable - and we thought that it was going to brew up again earlier this year. In fact, I'd suggest that the troops that deployed for East Timor recently were in real terms marked up for Fiji when we getting some pretty ugly traffic about local racial dissent again. Fiji is still on our radar screen as far as that goes as we do expect it to get messy as the elections draw near (even though we hope it will stay civilised etc...)

So, I'm struggling to see why you think NZ could pull it off now when in absolute terms you have less maritime transport options and boots on ground capability than what we were ready to deploy in 87. We had far 4 times the (immed) available troops, substantially more available armour and certainly had the capability to get air/battlespace intimidation. We knew that the locals were very very anti-indian and they were in the process of shifting heavy trucks and equipment onto the runways to stop transports and int'l passenger jets landing (with or without plain clothes soldiers on board)

With 250 troops you already have diluted forces - and you have to be able to insert and hold until heavier forces are landed. Every major amphib/insertion event that failed in the last 70 years was due to an inability of the light forces to hold out long enough for heavier support elements to arrive - and that gets back to force ratios in limited time frames.

At least seize and hold of a nearby island enables force massing and logistics to be secured. It means that troops are less fatigued and can be short rested if need be. It also means that aircraft can be localised, fuel bladders laid out, runways built, sensor systems established to watch likely approaches. Going in cold when you don't have the numbers removes a lot of the opportunity to succeed in a meaningful fashion. and usually that means that the defenders are left in no doubt that they are foolhardy if they want to make it a protracted event. battlespace dominance does not only have to be inferred and implied - but self evident so as to remove any doubt on the defenders part that you will apply overwhelming mass and capability into the area. Thats really getting into ARG territory.

 

[KH-12]

Yes, we had our Air combat element in place then, and probably did have more foot soldiers as well, but i dont agree on less maritime options with our MRV coming in late 06. We didnt have this in 87. Yes, we had the scorpions as armour, but to be honest the LAV can do a better job because it can transport troops over a wider area. A scorpion cant. Besides it does have a 25mm gun as fire suppression.

I do believe the option of having an Island to start deploying resources and equipment is the way to go, and to jump from this starting point to the target area. With deploying with the element of surprise and location, i still believe that this type of operation could be carried out. Its a pity we lost our air strike element isnt it?

I still believe a JDAM equiped Orion could provide useful air support, as long as you have the troops on the deck to mark the targets accurately and data-uplink ability, it could loiter on station for a reasonable period of time and sit at 20,000ft well out of harms way (small arms fire) , in the recent Gulf actions apart from the A-10's most of the ordinance was dropped from medium level anyway.

 

[KH-12]

Looks like it is definately a maximum of 8 NH90.

http://www.beehive.govt.nz/ViewDocument.aspx?DocumentID=26412

 

[The Merovingian]

Last I heard, our military strategists at the beehive were recommending throwing grenades out the rear loading ramp of our hercs for a cheap air-to-surface capability.