Gents, I understand your frustrations, but patience please as when it is released it will be vastly different from those of the last three Govt terms in power (1999-2008, 2008-2017, 2017-2023). The last "decent" review, from a balanced force perspective, was in 1997 (and disregarded when the Govt changed two years later). All those that followed 1997 had a narrower "unbalanced" foundation (which did ease slightly over time but the main foundation was largely the same). However it is clear in both analyst and Govt commentary in recent times that the focus will change to realistically reflect the world we now live in (which will only become "worse"), that expenditure will grow and that interoperability with Australia needs to be better (and from that one can assume wider ABCANZ interoperability using Army terminology). And if the NZ Govt is now talking about increasing lethality, then presumably the best way to achieve this is with balanced capabilities.
Gibbo makes a valid point that these reviews are never on time ... so following on this review can the Govt simply have regular (annual or biennial) updates? Eg in order to incrementally makes changes to add new capabilities as the strategic situation warrants this? Surely that could be a logical solution to these (supposed) five year plans, which effectively halts Defence planning and acquisition for a couple of years as each time there is a change of Govt they review the landscape (and even when Govt's are continuous for 2-3 terms Defence planning seems to halt for a year whilst the review is conducted). This is no longer good enough in these times. Yes, it means setting up a continuous review team in the MoD but it means they are already there to provide bipartisan advice to each flavor of Govt when there is a change. "We" no longer have the luxury not to do something like this in these now uncertain and changing times (or no doubt something else that other commentators here could better articulate).
So whilst nothing official has been articulated that makes any real sense of what the reasons for DCP release hold up is, if one reads between the lines the answers are in plain sight. Curiously our professional defence and security analysts haven't provided the answers but someone who I believe has is Thomas Manch. Forget Newsroom and Radio NZ (in particular, who seem obsessed at picking holes in defence/Govt efforts and presenting some really misleading conclusions - more about this later), go read his articles at The Post on foreign affairs and defence. They are balanced and informative.
From his article "Washington wants defence "burden sharing" from New Zealand" on 20 March. Some snippets:
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio discussed defence “burden sharing” with Foreign Minister Winston Peters, according to the US State Department.
Rubio, who is US President Donald Trump’s top diplomat, and Peters met in Washington DC on Wednesday morning. Peters afterwards said he was “very pleased” with the discussion, which covered both security and trade matters.
A brief statement published on Thursday by the State Department, which Rubio heads, said the pair discussed “avenues for strengthening defence cooperation through burden sharing, allowing our militaries to work more closely together, and ensuring security and economic strength in the Pacific region”.
****
“We came to the United States to ask the new Administration what it wants from New Zealand, and we conveyed what we would like from them,” he said in a statement issued on Thursday morning.
“This visit has provided the starting point for considering what constructive cooperation between New Zealand and the United States might look like in the months and years ahead. It is just the first step. We will now go back to New Zealand to discuss with Cabinet colleagues what we have learned here in Washington.”
So in other words, with the change of Govt in the USA and with the new Trump Administration's expectations, the NZ Govt sought to clarify defence (and trade) and this will now inform the DCP. Now of course, the NZ Govt isn't going to trot this out and hence why we have the wishy-washy generalisations for answers coming from them.
www.thepost.co.nz
Next, Mr Manch better outlines the current situation. Snippets from a follow up article on 22 March:
We have learnt little from Peters’ week in Washington, really, other than that he has heard the Trump administration’s “expectations” of New Zealand.
These expectations have conformed with Peters’ own expectations.
But the New Zealand public can’t expect a briefing on these expectations from its foreign minister – that is first for a Cabinet discussion.
At this moment, it might serve New Zealand to listen rather than speak, as Peters has effectively done.
*****
Prime Minister Christopher Luxon has already said the Government will lay out a path to 2% of GDP in the coming defence capability plan, which was to be made public in the coming week. Now Luxon is saying “weeks”.
Cabinet has yet to settle on this plan as the fiscally-tight 2025 Budget nears, and it appears the latest delay is due in part to wanting to first hear Washington’s “expectations” directly.
Washington’s view also complicates the domestic conversation. If New Zealand hits that 2% GDP target, have we ceded to Washington’s bullying demands?
The stronger argument is possibly that, with such uncertain US policy and deteriorating regional security, it’s first and foremost in New Zealand’s interest to spend more on defence – that it pleases Washington should be a second-order concern.
*****
The rest of the article talks about the linkages with tariffs and trade, and the Pacific.
If anyone has trouble accessing the article try clearing your cookies or get in touch via the messaging.
www.thepost.co.nz
So piecing things together, the reality is as NZ is not a wealthy nation (in comparison) and has to make careful decisions on defence investment and its relations with primarily Australia and the USA. Clearly there will be an expectation from Australia and the US to better support allied efforts to stabalise the Indo-Pacific (alongside the likes of Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and further west, India).
Does this mean that if a DCP was released on time in 2024 that it may have looked different to one about to be released in 2025? I can only guess yes it would. But would it now be "better"? Probably, on the assumption that there will definitely be a higher spending pathway ahead (than what may have been envisaged last year) and that relationships with the US and SE Asia are being strengthened since our change of Govt 2023 i.e. since 2024 and into 2025. So now with the expectation to plan for and provide capabilities "concurrently" i.e. provide a reasonable and timely presence when required to support Australian and US efforts in the wider region to assist the likes of Japan, SK, the Philippines and of course our South Pacific neighbours.
I also wonder if the NZG is waiting on the US Administration's 2 April tariff announcement (probably later tonight our time), as that will affect our trade and income to fund a wide range of NZG initiatives, but I'm unclear on what the implications would be for defence directly (apart for being another reason to hold off making a DCP announcement, eg perhaps as they re-asses Budget forward estimates etc)? If so let's hope the DCP isn't further caught up in the latest foreign affairs "turmoil"!
