NZDF General discussion thread

[chis73]

Just to add on to what has been said above:

Other problems with the NH-90s are that they are not fully marinized (and therefore aren't very suitable for operation from ships) nor easily deployable overseas. They are physically too large to be carried easily by the RNZAF's current airlifters (and their forthcoming replacements), so they have to travel slowly (days rather than hours) onboard HMNZS Canterbury (up to 3 I think) or 1 on HMNZS Aotearoa, unless the RAAF/USAF turn up and give them a lift. They can't be operated while at sea (only when in a sheltered harbour or tied up to the wharf). On top of all that, they have been fantastically expensive to run/maintain (so much so the Royal Australian Navy currently wants to ditch theirs)

This kind of problem is typical within the modern NZDF. They have too little equipment, and what little they have doesn't work coherently together. Some other examples:
a. The Army bought 105 LAV3 armoured personnel carriers, all of one variant (the troop carrier). Sensibly, they should have procured several variants (mortar carrier, command vehicle, the self-propelled artillery as Ngati mentions). The Govt has been trying to sell the excess vehicles for several years, unsurprisingly without success.
b. Some of the new MAN trucks are too heavy when loaded to use the ramp on the landing craft carried on HMNZS Canterbury.
c. As noted above, the NZDF has never ordered a serious long-range anti-ship missile to replace the Skyhawk fighter in the maritime strike role (in either an air-launched version for the P-8A, or a ship-launched version for the ANZAC frigates)
d. Many of the RNZAF's aircraft lack self-protection suites (ie. chaff & flares) - for example the Boeing 757 & the P-3 Orions. As such, they can't go into areas where an air threat exists.
e. Similarly many RNZN ships lack basic defensive measures (eg. the CIWS for the new HMNZS Aotearoa, which has just provocatively sailed through the South China Sea with a US/UK taskforce). It would not surprise me if the HMNZS Te Kaha's new missile system hadn't even been test fired before the same mission, or if we even have the missiles fitted yet). Ditto the Penguin missiles carried by the Seasprite (supposed to have been test-fired in 2016, never have been to my knowledge).
f. The Seasprite lacks a dipping sonar for anti-submarine work, and the ANZAC frigates lack a towed-array sonar.
g. Naval mine-clearance vessels are absent (considering we were attacked by mines in NZ waters in both world wars). The HMNZS Manawanui is best described as a Salvage/Dive Support/Hydrographic vessel (and it finally replaces a vessel removed without replacement in 2012).

There are just so many glaring omissions regarding basic NZDF logistics. Many of the 'unsexy but important' elements are missing.
a. All Forces are too small to sustain operations (Army should be at least 3 battalions of infantry, Navy has 2 instead of a sensible minimum of 3 frigates). Resilience is a major problem (for example fuel stocks). There are still serious personnel/skills problems (however these are common to most Western defence forces)
b. As an example, we lack a repair/maintenance facility for our largest ships (we urgently need a new dry dock [the current one was opened in 1888] and perhaps a large tug to go with it). The dock is also needed to service the Cook Strait Ferries as well. HMNZS Canterbury has sailed to Singapore (>8000km as the crow flies) for an overhaul with a skeleton crew.
c. We produce very little (if not none) of our own defence equipment (even the NZDF uniforms are manufactured now by an Australian firm).
d. We are at the end of a very long supply line (basically, if it ain't here now, there is no chance of getting it here and in service before we need it).


Things did look like they were improving under Ron Mark in the previous parliamentary term (two 20-year overdue projects, the C-130s & P-8A got approved, plus the frigate upgrade started [5 years late] and the Bushmasters ordered to replace the dangerously inadequate Pinzgauer). The new minister (Peeni Henare) has been a huge disappointment (it seems we are back to the normal policy of ignoring Defence again - to save money, of course!). On top of that the NZDF is currently being abused to run the MIQ facilities (after 18 months, they shouldn't still be doing this).

Pity that the strategic situation has gotten a lot worse. That, however, seems to be of no concern to the Minister.

 

[Nighthawk.NZ]

Okay this is I'm sure a dumb question.

No such thing when learning...

But any chance you could tell me what sort of "heavier weapons" we need and what we need for a modern battlefield?

That my friend is a loaded question as there are a variety of different frames of thought... some wanting heavy armor (Tanks), others want self propelled guns, (which look like tanks... but they are not) some want the 155 Howitzers to off set the 105's, others would like to see more on the Amphibious armour like the AAV's, (and considering the new enhanced sealift vessels... sort of makes sense). Some people want to see other technologies... including attack helo's to give some air cover for our troops, Armed Drones to our ACF strike wing... And others want all the above I will say not are all on this site... as I visit many others sites...

I am not going to give my school of thought here for a variety of reasons... but NZ doesn't really have a National strategic and security plan or mandate and what little idea of planned mandate we do have changes with each government... Because of this what we buy to meet the needs of the NZDF, is not cohesive andie; the NH-90 was known it was going to go on HMNZS Canterbury and be used in the area but they are not marinized. We can not carry them by the C-130's Same with NZLAV can't really take them anywhere in the Herc's

However, keeping those shipping lands and lines of Communication open, the Frigates need to be able to meet a variety of threats, from lightly armed pirates, to fully armed conflict able to cover anti submarine, anti air, anti-ship... to fishery patrols, and general duties, including SAR, HADR

We lack the anti-ship capability both Naval and Air Force and need an anti-ship missile like the "Naval Strike Missile" and while I will question CAMM vs ESSM, and the various other upgrades compared to the Aussie ANZAC's... CAMM (Sea Septor) is arguably better than what we had with the aging Sea Sparrow and going from 8 missiles to 20 with CAMM. Now CAMM and ESSM do have what is call surface mode, however the war head in CAMM is so small it would be hard to tell what size vessel it would used against...

And what sort of assets do the navy need to keep comms open? Do you mean in terms of making sure the Southern Cross cable isn't cut and satellites wiped out or so that our navy can continue to operate with ally ships? THANKS

Todjaeger answers this quite well.

These real world examples are excellent! Also I'm very issued in the problems caused when NZ tries to respond to two things at the same time.

Let alone two scenario's we could hardly do one decent response... with the evacuation of Afghanistan. (this comes back to not having enough air frames etc)

When the MoD make a decision of what to buy the NZG always buy too few of them...

 

[MrConservative]

We don't have enough helo air frames, we barely have enough C-130 air frames and can't air transport the NZLAV, or the NH-90 and a few other items.

The T-6 may be able to light CAS duties, limited recon... but they are not trained in any of this, and don't have the systems and or armament or equipment to do so.

Don't get me started on not having a strike wing... leaving no air cover for our troops and or naval assets... don't get me started I may go on a real tangent rant... :-/ lol

Nighthawk is right about this.

Defence when it workshopped through the C-130J-30 (Future Air Mobility Capability Project) they looked at a capability mix of 4, 5, 6 and 7 airframes.

However for COST reasons as opposed to having the optimal CAPABILITY levels they went with just five plus the simulator. Pretty much the status quo based on past requirements over the last 30 years.

Which again reflects the recklessness (ignorance - wishful thinking) of assuming that the past performance of the Indo-Pacific arena is going to perform the same over the next 30 years. That the baseline requirements for 2025-2060 are going to be the same as 1990-2020.

The reason, fiscal numbers, and advice for not getting what would likely again be the optimal number of C-130J-30 aircraft (which seemingly would be Seven (7) airframes plus a simulator), is hidden under the usual OIA s6(a), s9(2)(g)(i) and s9(2)(b)(ii) smokescreen.

To reality check those numbers former CDF Air Marshal Carey Adamson was quoted in the NZ Herald around the time of INTERFET (1999-2002) that the RNZAF has five C-130's but taskings for eight (8).

Basically this means that the NZDF for it to concurrently achieve its basic almost civilian support operations per training, HADR, Antarctic resupply, a small scale UN Chp VI SASO type event and the usual MAOT support to the government, plus go off and do an actual UNSC Chp VII Peace Enforcement mission would need at least 7 C-130J-30 aircraft.

So the whole process seems to be with NZDF acquisitions - a study is taken - capability requirements are formulated - overseas defence forces are consulted - a report is made by NZDF experts - options are laid out along with costings - and then Cabinet with the Treasury bean counters always go for the absolute bottom basement option. That is why we end up with 5 C-130J-30's and not the seven airframes we actual need.

Then the reports that they publicly release go - "haven't we done well the new 5 Herc's being more reliable than the 5 old Herc's and will achieve more - all great". No - it is just BS.

 

[ngatimozart]

To add to the comments above. In Defence circles there is a rule of threes that covers everything from platforms to personnel, especially combat personnel such as infantry. It is something that has evolved over time from experience in wars such as WW1 and WW2. It works like this, and I will use our two Anzac frigates as an example. Three platforms, A, B, & C. A is fully serviceable and capable for immediate use, so regardless of what it is, ship, aircraft, helicopter, frigate, soldier, sailor, or aviator, it is immediately available for any mission, requirement etc. B is either doing some training and / or having some minor maintenance done. However they can be made operational and surged quickly. C is in deep maintenance or if personnel on long courses, in hospital reasonably crook, recovering from illness or injury, or on leave. If platforms deep maintenance then platforms are in bits and pieces across workshop and hangar floors for reasonably long periods of time.

With our Anzac frigate FSU project, because of political back sliding in NZ and issues with contractors and the COVID-19 pandemic in Canada, the project was, as the Americans are fond of saying, continually sliding to the right because of the delays. Having only two frigates means that we have gone approximately three years without a fully serviceable frigate in NZ waters. Our complete Naval Combat Force was in British Colombia, Canada, with Te Kaha only returning last December.

We have a similar problem with our Strategic Airlift capability, the Boeing 757-200 Combi. Only two were acquired and the government was to stingy to outfit them with the appropriate self defence capabilities, the cost of which wouldn't have been overly expensive. As a result the aircraft were not able to operate in and out of Afghanistan. Also at the time the Boeing 767 would have been the better acquisition because it has the range that would've enabled the RNZAF to operate to McMurdo, Antarctica without the requirement for a (PSR) Point of Safe Return. A PSR is used by aircraft that don't have the range to reach their destination, orbit for 45 minutes and return to their point of departure with sufficient minimum safe fuel reserves, where there isn’t a safe alternative airfield available. The B757-200 Combi doesn't have the required range. Air NZ were operating B767 aircraft at the time, and there would have been synergies with them until they retired their B767 fleet.

Another wasted option was the failed Boeing C-17A acquisition in 2014 - 15. The C-17A would have solved NZ's strategic airlift capability problems and at the time Boeing had 10 white tails for sail that they had built on spec. Gerry Brownlie who was Minister of Defence at the time, had taken a proposal to Cabinet for the acquisition of 2 - 3 of these white tails but the then PM, John Key, wasn't willing to spend the political capital or the money on them. Probably fearing electoral blowback, but I don't think that there would have been much because the public would have understood the reasoning. The thing is that every air force that acquired the C-17A found uses for them that they didn't realise they would have. Now it's to late because production stopped in 2014.

The current plan is to replace the B757-200 Combi strategic airlifter with another converted airliner, but that's a cheap way and doesn't solve the problem of moving out sized loads or heavy loads to big for the Hercules. The Ministry of Defence Capability Branch and NZDF develop business cases and forward them to the Defence Minister and through the Minister to Cabinet. It's when the politicians become involved that everything turns to rubbish. As MrConservative has shown they cut back to the bone always citing cost. However that argument is a lie because the country can afford to spend a minimum of 2% GDP on defence per annum and that excludes the capital charge. AFAIK NZ is the only country that imposes such a charge on its defence force and IIRC last years capital charge could have paid for 85% of another Aotearoa.

 

[MrConservative]

NG. Not quite accurate about the C-17 decision and John Keys role in it. The reality was the C-17 decision was on, and Key with English who had equally as much clout on the numbers side of that government where supportive of it - but because they had a well publicised political target to achieve a 2016 Fiscal Year Surplus, they wanted to delay getting two C-17's from the last remaining 5 whitetails by another 12 - 18 months. If Qatar had not swallowed up four of the five suddenly in June 2015 and a couple were still floating around for sale later in that year once that political and fiscal milestone had been meet we would have likely ended up with them.

 

[Gibbo]

Okay this is I'm sure a dumb question. But any chance you could tell me what sort of "heavier weapons" we need and what we need for a modern battlefield? And what sort of assets do the navy need to keep comms open? Do you mean in terms of making sure the Southern Cross cable isn't cut and satellites wiped out or so that our navy can continue to operate with ally ships? THANKS

Yes definitely not a dumb question...however if there's one piece of advice I can offer for your eventual expose.... be very, very wary of publishing 'shopping lists' in your eventual publication. They are very relevant, but only when coherently presented in concert with a clear strategic role. We see these 'lists' fairy regularly on this & like-minded forums and it does the collective heads of some of us in... some are pet projects at best! You can tell the real Defence Professionals on here... they don't get into these random lists but will give you a logical & balanced opinion & what is likely to achieve it. Mind you I'm not saying this forum isn't the place for such discussion...it's an open forum & is the better for it!


The question of what sort of weapons NZ needs is secondary... the primary question to answer is what should the Govt mandate the NZDF to do.... given the increasing security concerns in this region the current mandate seems to rapidly becoming ignorant, irrelevant, un-ambitious (is that even a word?) & in many ways ambiguous (certainly the latter for our allies I'm sure!). Only once strategic roles are defined can you start considering what equipment (not just weapons) that might be needed.

With regard to equipment rather than just weapons, in today's military forces technology has become an incredible enabler... but on the flip-side of course so it has for the likes of ISIS & other 'non-state' actors that present a very real risk with often low-risk, high-tech weapons with huge hitting power (cell phone controlled bombs on aircraft, IED roadside bombs...the list goes on).

However that Tech also offers NZ great opportunities to counter these threats...especially in the ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) 'domain'... the bit where we are able to detect, identify & track risks. This is an area that NZ has been noticeably slow, IMHO, in the uptake of technology although there are plans for the upcoming (delayed?) DCP (Defence Capability Plan).... https://www.defence.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/03acb8c6aa/Defence-Capability-Plan-2019.pdf …they are still some way off whilst most developed nations are currently replacing earlier generation tech platforms which the NZD seemed to completely miss out on... just IMHO tho!


So if you want to paint a picture of how under-funding of the NZDF affects NZer’s, here’s my 2 biggest bug-bears! Neither require weapons per se, and one may be partially resolved in the planned DCP…if the Govt doesn’t pull funding!

The first is the ‘Enhanced Maritime Capability’ known as the ‘EMAC project… refer page 14 of the DCP (link above)… the upshot is an acknowledgement that 4 P8A aircraft cannot do the job of 6 Orions... which themselves realistically couldn’t do everything we needed them to do given our massive, by international standards, EEZ & SAR areas…along with trying to help out small South Pacific Island nations do the same!

The EMAC project offers the possibility of mixed platforms but I expect Govt will slash that… but if we were to tie in satellites with fixed wing manned or unmanned aircraft and Naval Patrol vessels as suggested, we’d finally have for the 1st time in many decades, a capability that can actually properly patrol & provide oversight for our area of responsibility and we’d actually be able to start to actually start to effectively keep an eye on vessels going after our fish stocks & smuggling (eg: dropping drug shipments offshore…remember the big bust up Northland way made due to the diligence of locals, not by any security systems).

Such an integrated system would actually be welcomed by the Aussies as it can scale up from coastal waters with smaller aircraft & inshore patrol craft to further afield with P8A & offshore patrol vessels…and importantly the P8A freed for actual military taskings when & where required. The Aussies run an very effective similar ‘layered’ maritime awareness system… the Australian Border Force…check it out.

The point being, at the moment Govt agencies (Defence, Customs, Immigration, Fisheries etc) have severely limited resources and we do relatively little to actually ‘police’ any of it, although they have exceptional teams doing what they can with what they do have… that ‘costs’ NZ.

The other bugbear I have doesn’t even rate a mention in the DCP… our lack of an effective deployable (naval) mine counter-measures (MCM) systems. Crikey our Navy’s mine disposal system still revolves around divers swimming up near mines to lay charges…. most other Navies have realised the folly of putting highly trained personnel near explosives and deploy remotely controlled disposable devices to destroy the mines remotely at a safe distance from blast. Divers still have a significant part to play and won’t be made ‘redundant’ by such technology as I once heard be told!

The thing is we are a sea-trading nation and our harbours were ‘visited’ and in some cases mined during both world wars. Underwater mines like other technology are now super cheap, small & easily deployable and if deployed at our ports would close 95% our international trade completely overnight!

Those ports would have to wait until a Navy team could arrive & get stuck into detecting mines the clearing them… days worth of effort that could be undone as quick as it is done. Nor is MCM generally a capability that countries would often deploy to other nations in a crisis as they’d likely be busy dealing with the same threat to their own ports.

We do have a Naval Volunteer Reserve (RNZNVR) unit in most major NZ port cities who until a decade or so ago had their own small patrol vessels. They seem such an undervalued & under-used resource that could likely do so much more if equipped with a couple of mid-size inflatable boats at each port and while MCM may be a big ask for them, MCM equipment these days is very modular & does not required dedicated ships. The Navy I’m sure would do more with them if they weren’t so cash-strapped! Yes that admittedly is a ‘pet’ project… but our almost complete inability to clear our harbours & re-open ports in a crisis is a friggin major failure in my book!

So neither of my bug-bears actually requires weapons… they require funding for technology that would deliver such huge gains to NZ maritime security!

 

[Nighthawk.NZ]

'US and UK must stop': Chinese diplomat warns New Zealand audience of Australia's nuclear ambitions

So it begins...

Typical China/CCP lies and scare mongering. Nuclear power vessels is totally different to nuclear weapons, and Australia are not after nuclear weapons. Will they in the future??? I very much doubt it... CCP are trying put a wedge between Australia and New Zealand relations using our Anti Nuclear stance as a starting point.

 

[MrConservative]

'US and UK must stop': Chinese diplomat warns New Zealand audience of Australia's nuclear ambitions

So it begins...

Typical China/CCP lies and scare mongering. Nuclear power vessels is totally different to nuclear weapons, and Australia are not after nuclear weapons. Will they in the future??? I very much doubt it... CCP are trying put a wedge between Australia and New Zealand relations using our Anti Nuclear stance as a starting point.

It came from the event, AUKUS: What's All the Fuss About? where the keynotes were 1. Wang Genhua, Deputy Chief of Mission, of the Chinese Embassy and 2) Michael Powles, former NZ Ambassador to China and along with Allan Gyngell who is at least an Aussie.

So we have an event to discuss AUKUS but don't have much in the way of a United States and United Kingdom voice let alone voices from NZ that don't sing from the same China is simply misunderstood song sheet or if we say we "have an independent foreign policy" enough times we will keep on believing it?

 

[Gibbo]

On a different matter any of us getting into this & providing feedback?: The Latest | Ministry of Defence Website

 

[Nighthawk.NZ]

It came from the event, AUKUS: What's All the Fuss About? where the keynotes were 1. Wang Genhua, Deputy Chief of Mission, of the Chinese Embassy and 2) Michael Powles, former NZ Ambassador to China and along with Allan Gyngell who is at least an Aussie.

So we have an event to discuss AUKUS but don't have much in the way of a United States and United Kingdom voice let alone voices from NZ that don't sing from the same China is simply misunderstood song sheet or if we say we "have an independent foreign policy" enough times we will keep on believing it?

Exactly... not forgetting media blowing stuff out of proportion...

 

[Gibbo]

Okay this is I'm sure a dumb question. But any chance you could tell me what sort of "heavier weapons" we need and what we need for a modern battlefield? And what sort of assets do the navy need to keep comms open? Do you mean in terms of making sure the Southern Cross cable isn't cut and satellites wiped out or so that our navy can continue to operate with ally ships? THANKS

@LucyCraymer,... I meant to add this link https://www.transport.govt.nz//assets/Uploads/Report/MaritimeSecurityStrategy.pdf to my earlier post about a wider discussion about equipment versus just weapons (combined I guess you'd call these the 'tools' the NZDF needs). Referring back to my first bugbear about the NZ's inability to effectively police our maritime area, this project offers a massive opportunity to largely, if not completely, plug the gap in this space. My concern is it will get put back or scaled down as is the accepted norm it seems in NZ Defence led projects.

I'd like to draw your attention specifically to page 6. There's a graphic showing the area that NZ has international obligations over... either for search & rescue or in purely EEZ terms, including some Sth Pac nations. It's absolutely huge and somewhere I've seen a graphic of that same area transposed across a map of Europe to put that area in perspective. It is an area that covers something like Norway to North Africa, and the UK to Russia...or something like it... if anyone here can help find that please post.

The thing is when it comes to providing oversight to this area 24x7x365 the Govt expects us to believe we do that effectively with (soon) 4 x P8 aircraft and 4 Naval patrol vessels, only 2 of which are 'offshore' patrol vessels. The other AirForce & Navy fleets are also very small in size & critically have other primary tasks to perform... in most cases those fleets are also too small to meet what is asked of them. As an example the new 'J' model Hercules on order will be equipped with electro-optical / infra-red camera tech which will provide much better SAR assistance than the current 'H' models, but 5 Hercules of any model is simply not enough to carry the weight of NZDF's tactical air transport task, remembering the Boeing 757 partially (due again to fleet size) fulfils the strategic transport role. So what I'm saying is these other fleets can't provide effective backup to the primary fleets tasked with these roles.

We keep running off to bludge assistance from the allies or simply doing a lot less in the region than we used to 30 years + ago... therein lies the 'cost' to NZ... reputational damage at a very minimum.

 

[Todjaeger]

@LucyCraymer,... I meant to add this link https://www.transport.govt.nz//assets/Uploads/Report/MaritimeSecurityStrategy.pdf to my earlier post about a wider discussion about equipment versus just weapons (combined I guess you'd call these the 'tools' the NZDF needs). Referring back to my first bugbear about the NZ's inability to effectively police our maritime area, this project offers a massive opportunity to largely, if not completely, plug the gap in this space. My concern is it will get put back or scaled down as is the accepted norm it seems in NZ Defence led projects.

I'd like to draw your attention specifically to page 6. There's a graphic showing the area that NZ has international obligations over... either for search & rescue or in purely EEZ terms, including some Sth Pac nations. It's absolutely huge and somewhere I've seen a graphic of that same area transposed across a map of Europe to put that area in perspective. It is an area that covers something like Norway to North Africa, and the UK to Russia...or something like it... if anyone here can help find that please post.

The thing is when it comes to providing oversight to this area 24x7x365 the Govt expects us to believe we do that effectively with (soon) 4 x P8 aircraft and 4 Naval patrol vessels, only 2 of which are 'offshore' patrol vessels. The other AirForce & Navy fleets are also very small in size & critically have other primary tasks to perform... in most cases those fleets are also too small to meet what is asked of them. As an example the new 'J' model Hercules on order will be equipped with electro-optical / infra-red camera tech which will provide much better SAR assistance than the current 'H' models, but 5 Hercules of any model is simply not enough to carry the weight of NZDF's tactical air transport task, remembering the Boeing 757 partially (due again to fleet size) fulfils the strategic transport role. So what I'm saying is these other fleets can't provide effective backup to the primary fleets tasked with these roles.

We keep running off to bludge assistance from the allies or simply doing a lot less in the region than we used to 30 years + ago... therein lies the 'cost' to NZ... reputational damage at a very minimum.

I believe the image you are looking for is this one, posted by @Nighthawk.NZ back in January of this year in this post. I would suggest that Nighthawk.NZ upload a copy of that image, as well as any other overlay images of NZ areas of responsibility into one of the appropriate NZ galleries, which could then make it easier to refer back to these images when desired. Just a thought.

 

[Gibbo]

I believe the image you are looking for is this one, posted by @Nighthawk.NZ back in January of this year in this post. I would suggest that Nighthawk.NZ upload a copy of that image, as well as any other overlay images of NZ areas of responsibility into one of the appropriate NZ galleries, which could then make it easier to refer back to these images when desired. Just a thought.

Perfect, yes thanks @Todjaeger

 

[Gracie1234]

On a different matter any of us getting into this & providing feedback?: The Latest | Ministry of Defence Website

Feedback has been provided. Thank you for sharing i was not aware of this.

 

[ngatimozart]

@Gibbo points to a critical problem of there being a lack of an overall strategy. There is also a lack of bipartisan agreement on defence which means that everytime there is a change of government there a both defence and foreign policy swings that our sole ally and friends have difficulty dealing with. During the Helen Clark government's first term, and part way through its second term, it ran an overtly anti-Australian foreign policy alongside her anti-American foreign policy for the same period of time. No wonder the Aussies spat the dummy back then.

Since the 1998 election defence has been politicised by the two major parties, but they will not campaign on it during elections. They have also reduced NZDF's independence from political interference which used to be a check against unlawful use of the military against the people. Clark especially was not happy that military personnel held their oath to the Queen to be more important than any allegiance to the NZ government. The oath is designed that way so that the guns do not end up being controlled by a political party. It's a constitutional protection.

The main political parties need to sort out their differences and formalise a joint understanding on defence in order for a long term National Security Strategy to be formulated. That way everyone knows the gameplan and can plan ahead with a degree of certainty without these large lurches each time there is a change in ownership of the Treasury Benches.

At the moment most of the political parties have stuck their heads in the sand and are trying hard to ignore the deteriorating geopolitical and the situation in the Indo-Pacific. They are fixated on trade and the treasure, but are not willing to provide for the protection of the trade and treasure. In time immemorial rulers realised that to increase their treasury they had to trade, which they did. However they soon realised that their trade goods were being plundered by bandits and robbers on the way to the foreign markets and / or the coin, gold, silver, and goods traded in exchange were robbed and plundered on the return journey. So they raised forces to guard the traders and the trade routes. That is the symbiotic relationship between treasure, trade and defence, however the political elite, Treasury, and the government bureaucracy have forgotten that.

 

[Simon Ewing Jarvie]

@Gibbo points to a critical problem of there being a lack of an overall strategy. There is also a lack of bipartisan agreement on defence which means that everytime there is a change of government there a both defence and foreign policy swings that our sole ally and friends have difficulty dealing with. During the Helen Clark government's first term, and part way through its second term, it ran an overtly anti-Australian foreign policy alongside her anti-American foreign policy for the same period of time. No wonder the Aussies spat the dummy back then.

Since the 1998 election defence has been politicised by the two major parties, but they will not campaign on it during elections. They have also reduced NZDF's independence from political interference which used to be a check against unlawful use of the military against the people. Clark especially was not happy that military personnel held their oath to the Queen to be more important than any allegiance to the NZ government. The oath is designed that way so that the guns do not end up being controlled by a political party. It's a constitutional protection.

The main political parties need to sort out their differences and formalise a joint understanding on defence in order for a long term National Security Strategy to be formulated. That way everyone knows the gameplan and can plan ahead with a degree of certainty without these large lurches each time there is a change in ownership of the Treasury Benches.

At the moment most of the political parties have stuck their heads in the sand and are trying hard to ignore the deteriorating geopolitical and the situation in the Indo-Pacific. They are fixated on trade and the treasure, but are not willing to provide for the protection of the trade and treasure. In time immemorial rulers realised that to increase their treasury they had to trade, which they did. However they soon realised that their trade goods were being plundered by bandits and robbers on the way to the foreign markets and / or the coin, gold, silver, and goods traded in exchange were robbed and plundered on the return journey. So they raised forces to guard the traders and the trade routes. That is the symbiotic relationship between treasure, trade and defence, however the political elite, Treasury, and the government bureaucracy have forgotten that.

Absolutely agree on the need for a national security strategy. But we need to go beyond that in terms of de-politicisation and move the oversight function out of DPMC where invisible party forces like Chiefs of Staff hold sway. In my opinion, a national security agency as a statutorily independent crown agency headed by a National Security Advisor who is an Officer of Parliament is the right model.

 

[Rob c]

I am of the opinion that first and foremost me must have sufficient forces to provide a significant deterrent to any aggression against us and have the ability to defend ourselves for a limited period of time. Not to have this ability and expect other nations to sacrifice their young men and women to defend us is in my opinion a form of moral corruption by our Government and having our own young men and women sacrificed due to a lack of resources to defend us is also morally wrong.

 

[ngatimozart]

Absolutely agree on the need for a national security strategy. But we need to go beyond that in terms of de-politicisation and move the oversight function out of DPMC where invisible party forces like Chiefs of Staff hold sway. In my opinion, a national security agency as a statutorily independent crown agency headed by a National Security Advisor who is an Officer of Parliament is the right model.

Definitely Simon and it should report to the full Parliament, not to the DPM&C or the Cabinet itself.

The other point that I note, is that the defence consultation is being run out of the DPM&C not by the Ministry of Defence, so it's going to be strictly political and one could argue have a predetermined outcome regardless of what the consultation says.

I am of the opinion that first and foremost me must have sufficient forces to provide a significant deterrent to any aggression against us and have the ability to defend ourselves for a limited period of time. Not to have this ability and expect other nations to sacrifice their young men and women to defend us is in my opinion a form of moral corruption by our Government and having our own young men and women sacrificed due to a lack of resources to defend us is also morally wrong.

I agree Rob, but we have to have a strategy before we can start looking at force structures and TO&E. We also have to look to the future as well with future proofing in mind, something that will be a new experience for NZ governments. Up until now there has been no real coherent national strategy and that needs to change.

 

[Lucasnz]

@LucyCraymer I would support what Todjaeger has written about the issues around rotary lift. As noted in my comments my observations indicate that overseas countries provided around 33% of the Kaikoura earthquake military rotary lift, plus civilian helicopters. An OIA to the NZDF would I think provide a more accurate insight.

I would comment on three more areas:

1. The first is the RNZNVR. Prior to the lost of IPC, HMNZS Kiwi and Moa were often the sole naval presence in the South Island. Moa responded to both the Aramoana by acting as guard ship and keeping recreational fishers out of harms way and provided the survey capability using the MCM equipment fitted for the Foveaux straight aircraft crash; crewed by part time sailors. I know Kiwi intercepted one Foreign Fishing Vessel in NZ waters. The loss of these vessels means that there are no naval vessels permanently based in the South Island to support wider government operations. To give further context the police make trips out of Wellington to Marlborough Sounds and MAF have some RHIB's they can use, but nothing significant to support wider government requirements.
   
   That said trials of the RNZNVR on the IPV found that while the seaman branch were able to operate the vessels the engineering branch needed further training (which was one of the reasons that the IPC had a engineer assigned permanently to them to ensure maintenance and training was up to date). Since the loss of two of the 4 IPV the only naval presence that appears in the South Island seems to be for transit to the Southern Ocean and the odd training trip. Even one vessel located in the South Island permanently would provide a significant uplift in capability, especially if it was able to multi-task between mine countermeasures, EEZ patrol etc. Internationally the general trend is away from divisional / port specific assigned vessels (as they do cost money, and a ship in port isn't earning its way - to use a merchant navy maxim) to having the volunteer reserves support wider maritime operation. Again an OIA would be of benefit to see days at sea and what percentage was in the South Island.
   
   
2. Maritime Mine Countermeasures technology is at a point where unmanned vessels with remote teams are now able to go into the danger zone etc. Deployable teams are a viable option to a point. But if the core data for shipping lanes is not up to date and maintained, the deployment becomes more problematic. That was one of the advantages of the IPV. Consequently from the perspective of keeping the ports open in New Zealand to ensure we continue to trade, having all our MCM assets located in Auckland seems just a little odd, especially given our historical vulnerability to mines and the fact that the South Island have some ports that need to remain open at all times in order to receive fuel etc. Fuel is one of New Zealand's strategic vulnerabilities, given no significant reserves are held in New Zealand.
   
   
3. It is easy to think about keeping our sea lanes open from a New Zealand Coastal / Tasman sea perspective. However most of our trade routes though South East Asia. Were a conflict to break out in South East Asia: New Zealand - even it remained neutral - would need to contribute some form of naval vessel to escort neutral ships to assist in keeping our trade moving. New Zealand is completely dependent on overseas shipping companies to move our produce. Typically the ship of choice for escort duty is a frigate, though the lines between a frigate and destroyer are getting a little blurry these days, depending on country of manufacturer, but the Type 31 is probably closer to the original concept. The Iran - Iraq war showed how vulnerable neutral shipping is to random attack in a wider conflict.

 

[MrConservative]

Absolutely agree on the need for a national security strategy. But we need to go beyond that in terms of de-politicisation and move the oversight function out of DPMC where invisible party forces like Chiefs of Staff hold sway. In my opinion, a national security agency as a statutorily independent crown agency headed by a National Security Advisor who is an Officer of Parliament is the right model.

And the appointment done through a robust process through the SSC so that the DPMC has less chance to hijack the process.